ORDER Hari Swarup, J. - Ganesh Prasad has filed this revision against the order dated 17th July, 1971, passed by the IInd Additional District Judge, Varanasi, dismissing his application u/s 28 of the Specific Relief Act. 2. A suit wan filed for specific performance of a contract to recover the property. The suit was ultimately allowed in appeal. The appellate judgment dated 6th January, 1971 states: The Plaintiff-Appellants shall deposit the entire amount of Rs. 4,830/- in court within a week of this date...in case, the Plaintiff-Appellants fait to deposit the entire amount mentioned above within the prescribed time, the Plaintiffs' appeal shall stand dismissed with costs throughout. The money was, thus, to be deposited by 31st (? 13th) January, 1971. On 13th and 14th January, 1971, the courts were closed, because of curfew. On 15th January, 1971, the court opened for some time, but closed again due to curfew in the second half of the day. 16th January was Saturday and 17th January was again a closed day being Sunday. The decree-holders presented the tender for payment of the money on January 15, 1971 and the money was Ultimately deposited on 18th January, 1971. According to judgment-debtor, the tender was made riot on the 15th but on the 16th January, 1971. Ob a consideration of the evidence led by; the parties, however, the court below has recorded a finding that the tender was made on the 15th January, 1971. The court below has disbelieved the evidence of the judgment-debtor on this point and has accepted the version of the decree-holders. Its finding does not suffer from any error of law or jurisdiction and has to be accepted. 3. The court below held that the deposit in the circumstances mentioned above was a deposit in compliance with the appellate decree dated 6th January, 1971. It further held that the lender was made at the first available opportunity and as oh Saturday the banks were closed at 12 noon, the deposit of cash was also made at the first available opportunity. On these findings, it held that the case was covered by Section 4 of the Limitation Act and hence dismissed the application u/s 28 of the Specified Relief Act. 4. On these findings, it held that the case was covered by Section 4 of the Limitation Act and hence dismissed the application u/s 28 of the Specified Relief Act. 4. Learned Counsel for the Applicant contended that as Section 4 of the Limitation Act applied only to the cases off suits, appeals and applications and the period prescribed therein referred to the period prescribed by law and not fixed by a decree, the court below was in error in taking resort to Section 4 of the Limitation Act. I need not, however, go into the question of the applicability of Section 4 of the Act in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C.F. Angadi Vs. Y.S. Hirannayya, AIR 1972 SC 239 . In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that in a decree, similar to the decree before us, deposit made on the next practicable day was sufficient compliance of the decree. The words of the Supreme Court are: In such cases the act may, when the last day limited for the performance of it appears to be a day when the Court or its office is closed, be done on the next practicable day. The Supreme Court further held that when the court allowed the deposit to be made after the time limited by the decree had expired in the circumstances aforesaid, the court's action would not amount to any variance of the terms of the decree and the amount so paid would be a deposit of money made in compliance to and in accordance with the decree itself. The deposit in the present case, therefore, must be held to have been made in accordance with the decree and as such-the Plaintiffs would be entitled to execute the decree. 5. Learned Counsel for the Applicant, however, tried to distinguish the case of C.F. Angadi v. Y.S. Hirannayya (supra) on the ground that in that case the tender had been made within time and only cash deposit was made later on. According to him, it is the cash payment that is relevant and not the mere filing of the tender on the first practicable day and in support of his contention learned Counsel has urged that if this were not so, the Supreme Court would not have considered the question of deposit itself. According to him, it is the cash payment that is relevant and not the mere filing of the tender on the first practicable day and in support of his contention learned Counsel has urged that if this were not so, the Supreme Court would not have considered the question of deposit itself. The distinction sought to be drawn is, however, more illusory than real, because the finding recorded by the court below is that cash could not be deposited as banks closed early on Saturday. 6. Further according to the rules regarding payment of money in courts provide for payment through a tender. The present case has to be considered with reference to the U.P. rules framed for making the deposit in courts. Rule 275 of the General Rules (Civil) provides that payment of money shall be made in cash or by postal money order or by cheques drawn on a recognised bank or by credit of some kind upon the treasury. Thus, the making of payment by credit upon the treasury is a recognised mode of payment. Rule 277 of the General Rules (Civil) provides that direct receipts of money which fall under head of account of Rule 273 shall, as far as possible, be avoided by courts. The normal rule, therefore, is that the money should be deposited in court through a credit upon the treasury. This procedure had been followed in the instant case. Hence, the making of the tender would in the present case, stand on the same footing as making of cash deposit and by not making cash deposit on the 15th or 16th January, 1971 in court will not mean that the decree-holders had not complied with the terms of the decree. 7. In any case, as the court below had accepted the tender and treated it as payment and had not insisted on cash payment, the judgment-debtor cannot be deemed to have failed to comply with the terms of the decree. 8. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs.