ORDER.- This petition is filed by one Veerappa Chettiar, respondent in E.A. No. 479 of 1971, against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, directing rateable distribution of the assets in Court between him and the petitioner in E.A. No. 479 of 1971. 2. The petitioner herein filed the suit O.S. No. 1 of 1970, in the Sub-Court, Devakottai, obtained a decree and brought the property to sale. The property was sold on 14th June, 1971. On that day itself a sum of Rs. 1,435 was deposited in Court and the balance of Rs. 4,275 was deposited on 25th June, 1971. The sale was confirmed in favour of the auction-purchaser on 17th July, 1971. 3. The respondent herein filed the suit O.S. No. 581 of 1970, against the same judgment-debtor as in O.S. No. 1 of 1970, in the District Munsif’s Court, Melur, and obtained a decree on 18th January, 1971. He got the decree transferred to the District Munsif’s Court, Devakottai, on 10th June, 1971. He took out an execution application and had the property attached on 23rd June, 1971. He applied for rateable distribution of assets in the Sub-Court, Devakottai, on 5th August, 1971. 4. As already stated, after the sale in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 1 of 1970, the sale proceeds, a sum of Rs. 1,425 on 14th June, 1971 and the balance of Rs. 4,275 on 25th June, 1971 were deposited in the Sub-Court, Devakottai, and the sale was confirmed on 17th July, 1971. The auction-purchaser in this case is the decree-holder in O.S. No. 581 of 1970, who got the decree transferred to the District Munsif’s Court, attached the property in execution of the decree and who applied for rateable distribution of the assets. The lower Court allowed the petition filed by the respondent holding that he is entitled to rateable distribution of the assets in the Sub-Court, Devakottai. The question that arises for consideration in this revision petition is whether the respondent is entitled to rateable distribution either under section 63 or under section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code. The decree-holders, who in execution of their decree in more than one Court have attached the same property of the judgment debtor not in the custody of any Court, can claim the benefit of section 63, Civil Procedure Code. The decree-holders, who in execution of their decree in more than one Court have attached the same property of the judgment debtor not in the custody of any Court, can claim the benefit of section 63, Civil Procedure Code. The highest Court between the Courts in which the property is attached, or, if there is no difference in grade between such Courts, the Court under whose decree the property was first attached, will decide the claims of the attaching decree holders. In order to apply section 63, Civil Procedure Code, the same property of the judgment-debtor should have been attached by decree-holders in more than one Court. In this case, it is common ground that the respondent herein attached the property in dispute on 23rd June, 1971, after the property was sold on 14th June, 1971. The sale was confirmed on 17th July, 1971. The contention of Mr. Rajagopala Iyer, the learned Counsel for the respondent, is that, as the auction-purchaser who purchased the property on 14th June, 1971 had no vested right on the date of sale, the subsequent attachment by the respondent after the date of the sale but before its confirmation would confer right on the respondent and he could enforce his decree against the property. I cannot agree. Section 65, Civil Procedure Code, provides that, when immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the date when the property is sold and not from the date when the sale becomes absolute. Under section 65, Civil Procedure Code, the title in the property sold in a Court sale vests in the purchaser from the date of sale only after the confirmation of the sale, though the confirmation of the sale is on a date subsequent to the date of sale. The validity of a Court sale can be questioned under the provisions of Order 21, rules 89 to 91. If the challenge in not successful, the sale is confirmed under Order 21, rule 92, Civil Procedure Cod , and the confirmation of the sale relates back to the date of the sale. Mr. Rajagopala Iyer, referred to the decision in Ramachandra Bhagat v. Mrs. If the challenge in not successful, the sale is confirmed under Order 21, rule 92, Civil Procedure Cod , and the confirmation of the sale relates back to the date of the sale. Mr. Rajagopala Iyer, referred to the decision in Ramachandra Bhagat v. Mrs. Eva Mitra1and contended that, where the property has been sold but before, the confirmation of the sale the interest of the mortgagor vested in the State, the auction-purchaser would not derive any benefit. what happened in the case cited was that, after the sale of the proprietary interest in execution of a mortgage decree, the Bihar Land Reforms Act, came into force and, according to the provisions of clauses (d) and (e) of section 4 of the Act, all suits and proceedings for recovery of money which may be pending on the date of the vesting were 10 be dropped. Therefore, the Court in that case could not proceed with the confirmation of sale, and the sale was not confirmed. Section 65, Civil Procedure Code, would not be applicable to the facts of that case. Mr. Rajagopala Iyer’s contention is that the decision cited is authority for the proposition that the purchaser’s title is inchoase and, therefore, any intervention of subsequent event which takes away the right of the mortgagor will not confer any right on the auction-purchaser even on the date of sale. whatever may be the nature of the right of the purchaser in Court sale on the date of sale, once the sale is confirmed under Order 21, rule 92, the title in the property sold vests in the purchaser from the date of sale and whatever has happened subsequent to the date of sale cannot in any way affect the right of the purchaser. In this case, the sale had been confirmed on 17th July, 1971 and it relates back to the date of sale on 14th June, 1971. Therefore, the subsequent attachment of the property by the respondent on 23rd June, 1971 would not confer any right on the respondent. Nor can he claim any benefit under section 63, Civil Procedure Code. 5. The question now arises whether the: respondent is entitled to rateable distribution under section 73, Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, the subsequent attachment of the property by the respondent on 23rd June, 1971 would not confer any right on the respondent. Nor can he claim any benefit under section 63, Civil Procedure Code. 5. The question now arises whether the: respondent is entitled to rateable distribution under section 73, Civil Procedure Code. Section 73, Civil Procedure Code, provides that, where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to the Court for the execution of decress for the payment of money passed against the same, judgment-debtor and have not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting the costs of realisation, shall be rateably distributed among all such persons. The following conditions have to. be satisfied before section 73, Civil Procedure Code can be applied; (1) The decree-holder claiming rat able distribution should have applied for execution of his decree 10 he appropriate Court. (2) such application should have been made prior to the receipt of the assets by the Court. (3) The assets of which a rateable distribution is claimed must be asses held by the Court. (4) The decree holder should be holder of a decree for the payment of money. (5) Such a decree should have been obtained against the same judgment-debtor. In the instant case the sale proceeds of the property deposited in the Sub Court, Devakottai, are the assets held by the Court. The contention of Mr. Rajagopala Iyer, is that the respondent had applied for the execution of his decree before the assets were received by the Court and the respondent is entitled to the benefit of rateable distribution under section 73, Civil Procedure Code. It is not disputed that the respondent in this case had applied for execution of his decree on 23rd June, 1971, in the District Munsif’s Court, Devakottai, before the assets of Rs. 4275 were received by the Sub-Court, Devakottai. But the question is whether the respondent had applied to the proper Court for rateable distribution before the assets were received and hold by the Court. A reading of section 73 (1) shows that the application for execution of decree should have ben made to the Court, before it received and held the assets. But the question is whether the respondent had applied to the proper Court for rateable distribution before the assets were received and hold by the Court. A reading of section 73 (1) shows that the application for execution of decree should have ben made to the Court, before it received and held the assets. An application for execution of decree made to any Court other than the Court which received the assets would not be a sufficient compliance with the requirement of section 73. The wo ding of the section is “where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to the Court for execution,” which means that the application for execution of the decree should be made to the Court before it received and held the assets, Mr. Rajagopala Iyer, submits that under section 73 read with section 63, Civil Procedure Code, an attaching decree-holder is entitled to rateable distribution, even though he has applied for execution of his decree in a different Court. As already pointed out, section 63 states as to how the claims of several attaching decree-holders should be determined. Under that section if the decree-holders had attached the property that had been sold and sale proceeds realised, the distribution may be according to the provisions of section 73. But section 63 cannot bo invoked, if the decree-holders had not attached the property. Section 73, stands by itself and relates to distribution of assets in Court, whether the property had been attached by the concerned decree-holder or not. For the application of section 73, the property need not be attached; but an application for execution of the decree should have been taken in the Court which received and held the assets. Section 73 cannot be construed in such a way as to enable all the decree-holders, who have taken execution applications in different Courts to claim rateable distribution of assets received and held in one Court. Such a construction is not warranted. Nor is it workable, for the Court which has received and held the assets may not know the number of applications made for execution of decrees in various Court. In this case the execution application was taken out by the respondent not before the Sub-Court, Devakottai, which received and held the assets, but before a different Court, namely, the District Munsif’s Court,. In this case the execution application was taken out by the respondent not before the Sub-Court, Devakottai, which received and held the assets, but before a different Court, namely, the District Munsif’s Court,. Devakottai. Mr. Rajagopala Iyer submitted that, after amendment was introduced in section 73, Civil Procedure Code, the view taken by some Courts is that section 73, Civil Procedure Code, will be applicable even if application for execution of decrees are taken out in different Courts. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relied on the decision in Dhirendra Rao Krishna Rao v. Virbhadrappa1. In that case it has been held that section 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not determine the principle on which the Court is to act in’ determining claims of persons who have obtained attachments in execution of the decrees of inferior Courts to rateable distribution of the proceeds of sale, and it only lays down which Court is to decide the question. It has also been held in that case that, in determining whether rateable distribution is to be allowed or not, the Court has to look at section 73, that, in a case-such as the present, sections 63 and 73, must be read together and that, when so read, the true construction of section 73 is that an application need only have been made to the Court which granted the decree before the receipt of the assets and need not be made to the Court which holds such assets. In other words, “that the Court to which application for execution must be made”, means the appropriate Court and includes an inferior Court which granted a decree to be executed. In that case, the Court was dealing with the provisions of section 63 and referred to section 73 for distribution of the assets, when section 63,was found inapplicable. In fact the Court observed "but we are not concerned in this case with the construction of section 73, except in a case which is dealt with oy the Court under section 63", though earlier the Court stated that it was not so clear in the present section that the Court to which an application had to be made must be the Court which held the assets and might not be the Court which granted the decree. Therefore, the decision cannot conclude the matter in favour of the respondent. 6. Therefore, the decision cannot conclude the matter in favour of the respondent. 6. In the result I accept the contention of Mr. Venkataramani, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and hold that, in the circumstances of the case, the respondent is not entitled to rateable distribution. The petition is allowed with costs. P. S. P. ------------ Petition allowed.