Judgement PATHAK, J.:- These two appeals are from the decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge L.A.D. at Nowgong in Title Suit No.5 of 1961. The Plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of their right, title and interest in the lands described in the schedule to the plaint, hereinafter referred to as the suit land, and for recovery of khas possession thereof. 2. The plaintiffs case may briefly be stated:- The plaintiffs are daughters of late Brindaban Chandra Goswami; Pro forma Defendants Nos.11 and 12 are the sons of plaintiff No.1; Pro forma Defendant No.13 is the son of plaintiff No.2; Pro forma Defendants Nos.14 and 15 are the minor sons of plaintiff No.3; Pro forma Defendant No.16 is the widow of late Golok Chandra Goswami, brother of late Brindaban Goswami; and Defendant No.2 is the son of Pro forma Defendant No.16. Defendant No.1 is the widow of late Bimal Goswami, a predeceased son of Brindaban Chandra Goswami. Defendant No.1 remarried after the death of Brindaban Chandra Goswami. That the suit land originally belonged to late Brindaban Chandra Goswami who died on 20th April, 1949 leaving the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 as his heirs. The defendant No.1 inherited the suit properties as the widow of the predeceased son of Brindaban Chandra Goswami. Defendant No.2 though not an heir of late Brindaban Chandra Goswami got his name mutated fraudulently and in collusion with defendant No.1. That the suit land was the self-acquired property of late Brindaban Chandra Goswami. Defendant No.1 has remarried in February, 1958 and for that reason she had disentitled herself of all the suit land which she inherited from late Brindaban Chandra Goswami as the widow of his predeceased son and therefore the plaintiffs have inherited the suit lands left by their father late Brindaban Chandra Goswami. That the suit lands have devolved on the plaintiffs on the remarriage of defendant No.1. That the defendant No.1 transferred some of the suit land to Defendants 3 to 10 by Registered sale deeds Exts.A, B, C, D and E dated 8-11-1953 without any legal necessity and without any consideration and therefore those transfers are invalid and after the remarriage of defendant No.1, defendants 3 to 10 have no right to retain the portions of the suit land purchased by them from defendant No.1. The plaintiffs asked defendants Nos.3 to 10 to give up possession which they refused to do and they also denied the plaintiffs right, title and interest in the suit land. Hence the plaintiffs have filed the present suit. 2-A. Defendant No.1 has not contested the suit and she has not filed any written statement. Defendant No.2 being insane is represented by guardian ad litem who filed a written statement contesting the suit. The Pro forma Defendant No.16 also filed a written statement. The main contention of defendants No.2 and No.16 is that the suit land was the ejamali property of 3 brothers, namely, (1) Jagat Chandra Goswami (2) Golok Chandra Goswami and (3) Brindaban Chandra Goswami, who inherited it from their father late Chandrahash Goswami and as such defendant No.2 is entitled to 1/3rd share of the suit land, he being the sole heir of late Golok Chandra Goswami. It is further averred in their written statements that the suit is bad for non-joinder of all the heirs of Jagat Goswami, Golok Goswami and Brindaban Goswami, for multifariousness and it is barred by limitation and the principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence. It was further stated that Defendant No.1 became the title holder of ½ share of the suit land. Pro forma Defendants Nos.14 and 15 filed a written statement supporting the plaintiffs. Defendants Nos.3, 5, 6, 8 and 10 filed a joint written statement and defendants 4, 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) who are the heirs of deceased defendant No.4 Jabed Ali and defendant No.9 filed a joint written statement contesting the suit. Their contentions briefly are that there is no cause of action for the suit. That the suit is not maintainable in its present form and that it is bad for multifariousness. That they are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration from defendant 1 who sold portions of the suit land to them for legal necessity. That defendant No.1 acquired absolute title in the suit land under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. That the plaintiffs are not entitled to challenge the transfers made in favour of these defendants by defendant 1. 3. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues have been framed:- 1. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the properties devolved on the plaintiffs on the remarriage of Kalpana (defendant No.1)? 3. That the plaintiffs are not entitled to challenge the transfers made in favour of these defendants by defendant 1. 3. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues have been framed:- 1. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the properties devolved on the plaintiffs on the remarriage of Kalpana (defendant No.1)? 3. Whether the properties were transferred for legal necessity as alleged in W.S. and whether defendants rights are protected? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration as prayed for? 5. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? 6. Whether the suit is bad for multifariousness? 7. To what relief, if any, the plaintiffs are entitled? 8. Whether the suit land was self-acquired property of late Brindaban Chandra Goswami or it was the ejmali property of brothers, Jagat Goswami, Golok Goswami and Brindaban Goswami? 4. The plaintiffs have examined 4 witnesses including plaintiff 1. For the defenants only one witness has been examined. On consideration of the evidence on record the learned Subordinate Judge has found that the plaintiffs have cause of action for the suit and it is not bad for multifariousness. That the suit land did not devolve on plaintiffs on the remarriage of defendant No.1. That the defendants have failed to prove that Kalpana Debi (defendant No.1) sold the lands to defendants Nos.3 to 10 for any legal necessity and the transfers made by defendant No.1 under Exts.A to E are invalid for want of legal necessity. That the plaintiffs are entitled to challenge the invalid transfers by defendant No.1, that the suit land was exclusively owned by late Brindaban Chandra Goswami, and that his brothers Jagat and Golok had no share in it. Thus the learned Subordinate Judge has held that plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration of their reversionary right and title in the suit land and to get khas possession from defendants Nos.3 to 10 after the death of Kalpana, defendant No.1. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiffs suit accordingly and has declared plaintiffs reversionary right and title in the suit land and has declared that they are entitled to get khas possession of the suit land on the death of defendant No.1. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiffs suit accordingly and has declared plaintiffs reversionary right and title in the suit land and has declared that they are entitled to get khas possession of the suit land on the death of defendant No.1. 5. Against the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, First Appeal No.10 of 1965 has been filed by the plaintiffs and First Appeal No.60 of 1965 has been filed by the legal heirs of defendants Nos.3 and 4 (since deceased) and defendants 5 to 10. The following facts are undisputed and proved by the evidence on record.- Brindaban Goswami, Jagat Goswami and Golok Goswami were 3 brothers. Brindaban Goswami died on 20-4-49 leaving as his heirs Kalpana Debi, widow of predeceased son Bimal, Annapurna, Lila and Sailabala, who are daughters of Brindaban Goswami. Bimal, son of Brindaban Goswami, died in 1948. Kalpana, defendant No.1 re-married in February, 1958. The genealogy is not disputed. 6. The first question that requires consideration in this case is whether the suit land was the self-acquired property of Brindaban Goswami or the joint family property of the 3 brothers, Jagat Goswami, Brindaban Goswami and Golok Goswami. On this issue no witness has been examined on behalf of the defendants 2 and 16. P.W. Nabahash Goswami who has been examined on commission has stated that late Brindaban Goswami was his first cousin and he is the living eldest member of both the families. That Brindaban, Jagat and Golok were 3 brothers and they lived jointly during their fathers lifetime, but they were separated about 30/40 years back and their properties were partitioned. Brindaban had self-acquired land at Laogaon (meaning the suit land) purchased by him long after he separated from his brothers. He possessed the land through adhiars. Jagat Goswami and Golok Goswami had no right, title and interest or possession over that land. Brindaban had a son, namely, Bimal who predeceased him. Bimal married Kalpana. In cross-examination on behalf of defendant 2 Nabahas Goswami categorically denied the suggestion that the suit property was joint property of the 3 brothers. P.W.3 Jogendra Nath Bhattacharjee stated that he Knew Brindaban Goswami who bore his educational expenses and he lived at his house for a pretty long time. He had two brothers, Jagat Goswami (elder brother) and Golok Goswami (younger brother). Since 1928 he lived there. P.W.3 Jogendra Nath Bhattacharjee stated that he Knew Brindaban Goswami who bore his educational expenses and he lived at his house for a pretty long time. He had two brothers, Jagat Goswami (elder brother) and Golok Goswami (younger brother). Since 1928 he lived there. When he used to live there, the 3 brothers were separate. He however did not know the date of separation. He knew the suit land which was the property of Brindaban Goswami and it was his self-acquired property and he used to possess the suit land by letting it out on Adhi terms. In cross-examination on behalf of defendant 2, P.W.3 denied that the suit land was the paternal joint property of the 3 brothers. P.W.2 Bongsidhar Sarma has stated that he knew Brindaban Goswami and his 2 brothers Jagat and Golok since 1930 and they were separate from before 1930. P.W. 3 is the brother-in-law (sister-in-laws husband) of late Brindaban Goswami. He had close relation with him and he knew his family affairs. That the suit land was the self-acquired property of Brindaban Goswami. The heirs of Jagat and Golok had no interest in the suit property. The witness denied the suggestion that the suit property was the paternal property of Golok, Brindaban and Jagat. P.W. Srimati Annapurna Chakravarty who has been examined on commission has stated that the suit land was purchased by her father and her fathers brothers had no right, title and interest therein. D.W.1 Promode Ram Bhattacharjee has stated that he has been a practising pleader at Nowgong for about 26 years. That the suit land originally belonged to Rai Bahadur Brindaban Goswami, father-in-law of Kalpana Debi alone. That Golok Goswami who died more than 25 years ago had no share in the suit land. Golok and Brindaban were separate. That after the death of Brindaban Goswami defendant No.2 and defendant No.16 were living in the house of Brindaban Goswami and he could not say when they were separated. Jagat Goswami died when they were living jointly. He has however denied the defence suggestion that the suit land was the ejmali property of the 3 brothers. That he knew definitely about the land and Brindaban Goswami took settlement of the suit land in his own name and at the time of acquisition of the suit land. Defendants 2 and 16 were separate from Brindaban. 7. He has however denied the defence suggestion that the suit land was the ejmali property of the 3 brothers. That he knew definitely about the land and Brindaban Goswami took settlement of the suit land in his own name and at the time of acquisition of the suit land. Defendants 2 and 16 were separate from Brindaban. 7. P.W. Nabahas Goswami, P.W.3, P.W.2, D.W.1 and P.W.1 are all respectable persons and there is no reason to discard their evidence. All of them have clearly stated that the suit land was acquired by Bnndaban Goswami while he was separate from his two brothers and that the suit land belonged to Brindaban Goswami alone. There is no evidence on the side of defendants 2 and 16 to show that the suit land was the joint family property of the 3 Goswami brothers. Accordingly we hold that the suit land was the self-acquired property of late Rai Bahadur Brindaban Chandra Goswami and his two brothers had no share in it. Issue No.8 is thus decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against defendants Nos.2 and 16. 8. The next question that falls for decision is who inherited the property of late Brindaban Chandra Goswami, who died on 20-4-49. On his death Brindaban Chandra Goswami left his legal heirs Kalpana Debi, the widow of predeceased son, Annapurna Debi, Lila Debi and Saila Bala Debi, the daughters. The family is governed by Dayabhaga law of inheritance. The Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937 (Act XVIII of 1937 as amended by Act XI of 1938) introduced important changes in the law of succession. This Act came into force with effect from 11th April, 1937. Relevant provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 5 of the Act may be quoted:- "2. Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu Law or custom to the contrary, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate. 3(1). This Act came into force with effect from 11th April, 1937. Relevant provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 5 of the Act may be quoted:- "2. Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu Law or custom to the contrary, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate. 3(1). When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu Law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow all his widows together, shall subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son: Provided that the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a sons son if there is surviving a son or sons son of such predeceased son; Provided further that the same provision shall apply mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. (2) . . . . . . . . (3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu Womans estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. (4) . . . . . . . . (5) For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to die intestate in respect of all property of which he has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect. Thus as provided by the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, under the Dayabhaga law of succession if there be no son, grandson or great grandson or widow, but there is a widow of predeceased son when the succession opens as in the instant case, the widow of the predeceased son will inherit the property left by a Hindu in preference to daughters. The interest thus devolved on a Hindu widow, under the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act, is only the limited interest known as a Hindu womans estate. The interest thus devolved on a Hindu widow, under the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act, is only the limited interest known as a Hindu womans estate. Hence under the Dayabhaga law of succession as it stood in 1949 when Brindaban Chandra Goswami died, Kalpana Debi, the widow of the predeceased son of Brindaban Goswami inherited the suit land as his legal heir and she acquired the limited interest known as a Hindu womans estate in the suit land. The plaintiffs who are daughters of late Brindahan Chandra Goswami being only next reversioners could not inherit the suit land when the succession opened on the death of their father in 1949. Under the Hindu Law of Succession in Dayabhaga School, the defendant No.1 inherited the suit land on the death of Brindahan Chandra Goswami. 9. The next question that arises for consideration is whether Kalpana Debi the defendant No.1, who acquired the Hindu womans estate in the suit land could alienate the same and if so whether the right of alienation is absolute or conditional. Under Article 176 of Mullas Hindu Law, 13th Edition, Widows estate has been described as under on the basis of decided case law: "A widow or other limited heir is not a tenant-for-life, but is owner of the property inherited by her, subject to certain restrictions on alienation, and subject to its devolving upon the next heir of the last full owner upon her death. The whole estate is for the time vested in her, and she represents it completely. As stated in a Privy Council case "her right is of the nature of a right of property; her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited; but . . . . . . . . so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession." The principles relating to the nature of a widows estate were stated by the Supreme Court in Kalishanker Das v. Dhirendra Nath, AIR 1954 SC 505 as follows:- "The interest of a Hindu widow in the properties inherited by her bears no analogy or resemblance to what may be described as an equitable estate in English law and which cannot be followed in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. From very early times the Hindu widows estate has been described as qualified proprietorship with powers of alienation only when there is justifying necessity, and the restrictions on the powers of alienation are inseparable from her estate; vide- Collector of Masulipatnam v. Cavaly Vencate, 8 Moo Ind App 529 (PC) (D). For legal necessity she can convey to another an absolute title to the property vested in her. If there is no legal necessity, the transferee gets only the widows estate which is not even an indefeasible life estate for it can come to an end not merely on her death but on the happening of other contingencies like re-marriage, adoption, etc. If an alienee from a Hindu widow succeeds in establishing that there was legal necessity for transfer, he is completely protected and it is immaterial that the necessity was brought about by the mismanagement of the limited owner herself. Even if there is no necessity in fact, but it is proved that there was representation of necessity and the alienee after making bona fide enquiries satisfied himself as best as he could that such necessity existed, then as the Privy Council pointed out in-Hunooman Pershad v. Mt. Babooee Mundraj, 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC) (E), the actual existence of a legal necessity is not a condition precedent to the validity of the sale. The position therefore is that if there is no necessity in fact or if the alienee could not prove that he made bona fide enquiries and was satisfied about its existence, the transfer is undoubtedly not void but the transferee would get only the widows estate in the property which does not affect in any way the interest of the reversioner." 10. In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, AIR 1962 SC 83 the Supreme Court has laid down as follows:- "When a Hindu widow succeeds as heir to her husband, the ownership in the properties both legal and beneficial, vests in her. She fully represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being only spes successions. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. She fully represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being only spes successions. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. If is true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of the estate as known to Hindu law. It is for this reason it has been held that when Crown takes the property by escheat it takes it free from any alienation made by the widow of the last male holder which is not valid under the Hindu Law, vide: 8 Moo Ind App 529 (PC). Where, however, there is necessity for a transfer, the restriction imposed by Hindu law on her power to alienate ceases to operate, and the widow as owner has got the fullest discretion to decide what form the alienation should assume. Her powers in this regard are as held in a series of decisions beginning with 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC) those or the manager of an infants estate or the manager of a joint Hindu family." In the instant case under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, the interest in the suit land that devolved on Kalpana Debi is the limited interest known as Hindu womans estate, and thus she had limited power of disposal of the suit land. 11. The law regarding the power of the widow for disposal of the immovable properties as laid down in decided cases has been summarised in clause 178 of Mullas Hindu Law as follows:- "To uphold an alienation, by a widow or other limited heir, of the corpus of immovable property inherited by her, it should be shown- (1) that there was legal necessity; or (2) that the alienee, after reasonable inquiry as to the necessity acted honestly in the belief that the necessity existed; or (3) that there was such consent of the next reversioners to the alienation as would raise a presumption that the transaction was a proper one; or (4) that it was a surrender by her of her whole interest in the whole estate in favour of the nearest reversioners at the time of alienation. Where any one of the first three positions is established, the alienation may be of the whole or any part of the estate; but where the fourth alone is proved then the alienation must be of the whole estate." In the instant case the clauses (3) and (4) above do not arise on the pleadings and on the evidence on record. We are therefore required to consider clauses (1) and (2) above with respect to the alleged alienations made by defendant No.1 under Ext.A to Ext.E. 12. Regarding the alienation of a widow the law has been summarised in clause 181 of the Mullahs Hindu Law as follows- "A widow or other limited heir has no power to alienate the estate inherited by her from the deceased owner except for the following purposes, namely,- (i) Religious or charitable purposes. (ii) Other purposes amounting to legal necessity." A widow or other limited heir has no power to alienate the estate inherited by her from the deceased full owner except- (i) for religious or charitable purpose; (ii) for legal necessity; and (iii) for the benefit of the estate." 13. The plaintiffs in the instant case have stated that defendant No.1 has transferred some portions of the suit land to defendants Nos.3 to 10 without any legal necessity and without any consideration. The case of the defendants Nos.3 to 10 is that they purchased portions of the suit land from defendant No.1 for valuable consideration and defendant No.1 made the transfers under Exts.A to E in their favour for legal necessity. In the written statement of the defendants 3 to 10 it was stated that defendant No.1 as per law in vogue at that time sold out 20 B, out of the suit lands by five different registered deeds on November 8, 1953 in favour of the defendants 3 to 10 for legal necessity and for valuable consideration as recited in the sale deeds. That the purchasers-defendants on enquiry about the necessity were satisfied about it and believed the words of defendant No.1 and therefore made the purchases under Exts.A to E. In substance the purchasers-defendants pleaded legal necessity and they also pleaded that they made reasonable enquiry about it from defendant No.1. That the purchasers-defendants on enquiry about the necessity were satisfied about it and believed the words of defendant No.1 and therefore made the purchases under Exts.A to E. In substance the purchasers-defendants pleaded legal necessity and they also pleaded that they made reasonable enquiry about it from defendant No.1. None of the defendants 3 to 10 who purchased lands under Exts.A, B, C, D and E examined himself in the case to support their statements made in their written statement regarding legal necessity. Thus from the side of the defendants-purchasers there is only the evidence of D.W.1 regarding legal necessity. 14. The recitals in Exts.A, B, C, D and E regarding legal necessity are as follows:- "Said Kalpana Devi is the sole heir of late Brindaban Goswami. Her husband died soon after her marriage. She now after her husbands death is studying up-till now staying in Benaras. Many cases were going on in the Court regarding the left out properties of her father-in-law while she was getting education at Benaras and her father was indebted in huge amount while maintaining and protecting the left-out properties of her father-in-law and as such money is badly needed in order to repay the said loan. While she was a minor her father managed the left out properties of her father-in-law. At present she has attained majority and has approved all the works whatever he did for her welfare and for protection of the properties. Now it has become necessary to spend a good deal of money for her education in Benaras. Besides due to break down of her health, a huge amount is necessary for her treatment. Finding no other means of getting money, she by selling the schedule land below under her title and possession to the aforesaid persons at a consideration of Rs.1000/- (one thousand) in cash and on receipt of the said entire money delivered the title and possession of the land and relinquished her title and possession of the sold out land from today" vide Ext.A. Similar are the recitals in Exts.B, C, D and E. 15. The settled law is that the burden of proof of legal necessity is on the alienee. The law has been summarised on the basis of reported decisions in Mullas Hindu Law under Article 182 as follows:- "182. Burden of proof of necessity. The settled law is that the burden of proof of legal necessity is on the alienee. The law has been summarised on the basis of reported decisions in Mullas Hindu Law under Article 182 as follows:- "182. Burden of proof of necessity. Those who deal with a person who has only a limited interest in the property and who proposes to dispose of a larger interest, are prima facie bound to make out the facts which authorize such a disposition. The power of a widow or other limited heir to sell or mortgage the estate inherited by her is a limited and qualified power. She is at perfect liberty to dispose of her own life-interest in the estate, but if she proposes to alienate the corpus of the estate either by way of sale or mortgage, the purchaser or mortgagee is bound to inquire into the necessity for the sale or mortgage. If the sale or mortgage is impeached, the burden lies on him to prove- (a) either that there was legal necessity in fact; or (b) that he made proper and bona fide inquiry as to the existence of the necessity, and did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. If he proves that there was a necessity in fact, the alienation will be upheld, even though the necessity was brought about by the mismanagement of the limited heir, unless it be shown that he himself contributed to the mismanagement. Even if he fails to prove that there was a necessity in fact, the alienation will be upheld, if he proves that he made such inquiry as aforesaid, and that the facts represented to him were such as, if true, would have justified the transaction. In no case, however, is he bound to see that the money paid by him is applied to meet the necessity. The reason is that he can rarely have the means of controlling the actual application, unless he himself enters on the management." 16. The recitals in the deeds of sale of the existence of necessity are admissible in evidence but they are not evidence by themselves of its existence. To substantiate the alienation of the existence of necessity there must be some evidence aliunde. The recitals in the deeds of sale of the existence of necessity are admissible in evidence but they are not evidence by themselves of its existence. To substantiate the alienation of the existence of necessity there must be some evidence aliunde. The Supreme Court in Smt. Rani v. Smt. Santa Bala, (1970) 3 SCC 722 : ( AIR 1971 SC 1028 ) has observed as follows:- "Legal necessity to support the sale must however be established by the alienees . . . . . . Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion: it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity- Recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove legal necessity. The recitals are, however, admissible in evidence, their value varying according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. The recitals may be used to corroborate other evidence of the existence of legal necessity. The weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances." We have already observed that none of the alienees on whom the burden of proving legal necessity lies has examined himself. On the other hand P.W. Nabahas Goswami stated that Brindaban Goswami gave enough money to his daughter-in-law Kalpana after the death of Bimal. To his knowledge Brindaban himself gave Rs.5000/- of the Insurance Policy in the name of Bimal and another Rs.5000/- in cash and also some gold. Nabahas Goswami further stated from his personal experience that three thousand rupees were sufficient in 1960-61 for taking M.A. Degree from the Benaras University, i.e. Rs.1,500/- per year. In cross-examination the witness stated that he personally saw Brindaban Goswami giving about ten tolas of gold to Kalpana. We have found that Sri Nabahash Goswami is a respectable retired Government servant and he is aged about 67 years at the time of his deposition and there is no reason to discard his evidence. 17. P.W. Srimati Annapurna Chakravarty, plaintiff No.1 stated that she had one older brother, Bimal Chandra Goswami by name. We have found that Sri Nabahash Goswami is a respectable retired Government servant and he is aged about 67 years at the time of his deposition and there is no reason to discard his evidence. 17. P.W. Srimati Annapurna Chakravarty, plaintiff No.1 stated that she had one older brother, Bimal Chandra Goswami by name. He died about 3 years before her fathers death which took place on 20th April, 1949. Bimal was a married man and his widow is Kalpana Debi, defendant No.1. Kalpana Debi did not come to her husbands house as the post-puberty marriage was not celebrated and lived in her fathers house. After the death of Brindaban Chandra Goswami she got re-married to another person in February, 1958. The witness stated that after her fathers death Kalpana Debi the widow of her elder brother became the heir. She further stated that after the acceptance of second husband by Kalpana Debi, they (the plainliffs) became lawful heirs in respect of the properties including the suit and left by her father. Out of 30 Bighas of the suit land Kalpana Debi had sold 20 Bighas after her fathers death. That there was no legal necessity for Kalpana Debi to sell the said lands and in fact she received no consideration money for the alleged sales. There was no necessity to sell the land for the maintenance of Kalpana Debi who used to live with her father both before and after the death of Brindaban Goswami. Kalpana Debi got about 10,000/- for her maintenance and education of children, if any, from the Life Insurance Policy and other commissions and cash amounts left by deceased Bimal Chandra Goswami. Over and above the said amount, Kalpana Debi had also received ornaments of gold worth about Rupees 3000/- left at the time of death of her husband Bimal Goswami. In cross-examination Srimati Annapurna Chakravarty stated that her father left 30 Bighas of land in the suit Patta in addition to other lands in other Pattas at different places. After her fathers death Kalpana Debi used to manage the properties through Promode Ram Bhattacharjee and others. She admitted that they possessed some lands and houses left by her father and the witness further stated that she came to know from enquiry that Kalpana Debi did not receive any consideration money. 18. After her fathers death Kalpana Debi used to manage the properties through Promode Ram Bhattacharjee and others. She admitted that they possessed some lands and houses left by her father and the witness further stated that she came to know from enquiry that Kalpana Debi did not receive any consideration money. 18. P.W.2 Bongshidhar Sarma stated that he met Kalpanas father Kumud Sarma in the house of Brindaban Goswami when he came there on invitation by Brindaban Goswami for payment of Bimals insurance policy and also cash money. The policy was for Rs.5000/- which was handed over to Kumud Sarma. Rs.10,000/-was paid in cash including the sale proceeds of a car belonging to Bimal. The policy and cash were paid to Kumud Sarma to be paid to Kalpana for her education and maintenance. Jogen Bhattacharjee was also present at the time. The witness stated that he spent about Rupees 4000/- for his graduation and his brother Nagendra Nath Sarma, M.A., Assistant Lecturer, Gauhati University had to spend about Rs.6000/- upto his M.A. degree. Kalpana had no need of money after receipt of the policy amount and cash and the immovable properties. The residential house which was inherited by Kalpana was rented out to Prabhas Goswami and Golak Goswami and rents were realised from them. In cross-examination P.W.2 stated that when Bimal died, Kalpana was of Matriculation standard. He did not re-member when she passed Matriculation. She got her education at Benaras. She was in Benaras for about 6 years. Kalpana went to Benaras for study after the death of Bimal. He did not see the contents of the Insurance Policy, but Brindaban Goswami told that the policy was of Rupees 5000/- and that the car of Bimal was sold to a Marwari of Dibrugarh. That the cash of Rs.10,000/- was paid in G.C. Notes. No cheque was given. At that time, Kalpana was living at her fathers place at Tezpur. Brindaban Goswami died about a year after Bimals death. 19. P.W.3 Jogendra Bhattacharjee stated that after Bimals death he met Kumud Sarma at the house of Brindaban Goswami, where Brindaban Goswami gave the Life Insurance Policy of Oriental Company for Rs.5000/- and also paid cash of Rs.10,000/- to Kumud Sarma for Bimals widow Kalpana. P.W.2 Bongshidhar was also present at the time of the transaction. 19. P.W.3 Jogendra Bhattacharjee stated that after Bimals death he met Kumud Sarma at the house of Brindaban Goswami, where Brindaban Goswami gave the Life Insurance Policy of Oriental Company for Rs.5000/- and also paid cash of Rs.10,000/- to Kumud Sarma for Bimals widow Kalpana. P.W.2 Bongshidhar was also present at the time of the transaction. When Kalpana became the widow, Brindaban Goswami had a mind to give her education and Rs.10,000/- was paid in currency notes and no cheque was given. The witness said that he Knew Kumud Sarma was called by Rai Bahadur by sending him a letter. 20. From the evidence on the side of the plaintiffs as discussed above, it is seen that the Insurance Policy of Rupees 5000/- and a cash amount of Rs.10,000/-and about 10 tolas of gold were given by Brindaban Goswami to Kalpana Debi, defendant No.1 for her maintenance and education. The evidence on record shows that that some other immovable properties belonging to late Brindaban Chandra Goswami in addition to the suit land were also inherited by Kalpana some of which were rented out on her behalf. It is also clear from evidence that she, after becoming widow, prosecuted her studies at Benaras for about 6 years and took her M.A. Degree. The evidence on record also shows that the annual expenses for a college student at Benaras at the relevant time would be about Rs.1,500/-. Since it is found on the evidence on record that Kalpana Debi was given Rs.5000/- out of the Insurance Policy, Rs.10,000/- in cash and about 10 tolas gold by Brindaban Goswami for her maintenance and education and since there is evidence an record that some of the houses of Brindaban Goswami were also let out on behalf of Kalpana and rents were collected on her behalf, we do not find any further amount was necessary for education and maintenance and treatment of Kalpana Debi for which there was necessity for transferring the lands under Exts.A to E. There is nothing on record to show that the lands in question were sold for the benefit of the estate. 21. D.W.1 Promode Ram Bhattacharjee stated that the lands were sold for legal necessity. He further stated that after the death of Brindaban Goswami, the properties of Kalpana Debi were managed by him, as he was her maternal uncle and also under a Power of Attorney. 21. D.W.1 Promode Ram Bhattacharjee stated that the lands were sold for legal necessity. He further stated that after the death of Brindaban Goswami, the properties of Kalpana Debi were managed by him, as he was her maternal uncle and also under a Power of Attorney. Kalpana Debi was sent to Benaras just after the death of Rai Bahadur Brindaban Goswami for higher studies at Benaras after she passed her M.E. examination here. The cost of educational expenses at Benaras was high and she also fell ill sometime and for her medical treatment some amounts were spent. That there was litigations for which expenses were incurred. The witness stated in cross-examination that prior to 1952 there was a Power of Attorney executed in his favour by Kumud Sarma as father and natural guardian of minor Kalpana for managing the properties of Kalpana. D.W.1 stated that he maintained rough notes or jottings of the income and expenses of the properties of Kalpana Debi including costs of her litigations. But those accounts were not with him at that time and he could not say what was the total income received from the assets of Kalpana in the year he gave up management, nor of the previous years since the time of taking up the management of Kalpanas properties. Kumud Sarma is alive and is at Tezpur. Kalpana is also alive and is at Gauhati. Brindaban Goswami was one of the well-to-do men of the district. Bimal Goswami had a life insurance for Rs.5000/- in Oriental Insurance Company and succession certificate was obtained in the name of either Kalpana Debi or Kumud Sarma. These took place during the lifetime of Brindaban Goswami. That money was received from the Insurance Company by Kalpana D.W.1 further stated that Kalpana was married to Bimal Goswami at her age of 11 years in 1945 and she appeared in M.E. Examination in the year of her marriage. In the same year after 3 or 4 months Bimal died and Brindaban Goswami died within 3 or 4 years after Kalpanas marriage. About Rs.2000/- per year in the average was spent for her education at Benaras. Some lands of Kalpana which she inherited were sold by Kumud Sarma and he got about Rs.2,500/- from the sale. The witness collected produces from Laogaon lands of Kalpana for one year and it was about 25 or 30 mds. of paddy. About Rs.2000/- per year in the average was spent for her education at Benaras. Some lands of Kalpana which she inherited were sold by Kumud Sarma and he got about Rs.2,500/- from the sale. The witness collected produces from Laogaon lands of Kalpana for one year and it was about 25 or 30 mds. of paddy. He stated that for subsequent years he did not collect paddy but on his own admission he managed the properties and it is hardly possible to believe that he did not collect paddy for those lands from the tenants. Otherwise he would have filed rent suits against them for recovery of arrear rent which he did not do admittedly. The witness stated that Kalpana did not lake meat and fish after she became widow. There was no serious ailment during her college life till the dale of deposition. D.W.1 stated that he paid a bill for treatment of Bimal Goswami in Roberts hospital, which would be about Rs.200/-. After his death he paid all the arrear revenue for his properties, which might be about Rs.200/-.But he could not say the exact amount. D.W.1 also stated that about Rs.500/- or 600/- were spent in litigations, but there was no account and all these moneys he spent from the income from the assets of Kalpana. 22. On consideration of the entire evidence on record, considering the age of Kalpana when she unfortunately became widow before her post-puberty marriage, and in consideration of the amounts in cash, gold and the incomes of landed properties given to her by her father-in-law Rai Bahadur Brindaban Chandra Goswami which she inherited from her father-in-law, we are clearly of opinion that for her maintenance and education at Benaras sufficient money was with her and there was no legal necessity for selling the suit land in question for her maintenance and education at Benaras and there was no legal necessity for these alleged sales by her. Defendants-Purchasers have not adduced any evidence to establish that they made any enquiries and that they were satisfied on representation made by either Kalpana or her guardian that there was legal necessity for selling the suit lands. In the circumstances the Defendants-Purchasers on whom the burden of proving the legal necessity lay completely failed to discharge their burden in the instant case. In the circumstances the Defendants-Purchasers on whom the burden of proving the legal necessity lay completely failed to discharge their burden in the instant case. In the cumstances we hold that there was no legal necessity for the sales of portions of the suit land under Exts.A to E, and as such the said sales are not binding on the reversioners Plaintiffs, though they may be binding on the Defendant No.1 during her life time, if these sales are found to be valid in law. 23. Let us now examine whether the sales under Exts.A, B, C, D and E alleged to be made by or on behalf of Defendant No.1 are valid in law Ext.A is the sale deed dated 8-11-53 executed by Promode Ram Bhattaeharjee, lawful Attorney of Srimati Kalpana Debi in favour of Naib Ali and Mustt. Jabhar Nessa. By this sale deed 4 B,of land out of 20 Bighas of Dag No.102 of K.P. Patt No.38 of Laogaon are purported to be sold for one thousand rupees. Similarly, Ext.B is a sale deed executed by lawful Attorney Promode Ram Bhattaeharjee on behalf of Srimati Kalpana Debi on 8-11-53 and by Ext.B another 4 B. of the same dag and patta has been sold in favour of Sabed Ali for one thousand rupees. Similarly Ext.C, Ext.D and Ext.E are the sale deeds executed on 8-11-53 by lawful Attorney Promode Ram Bhattaeharjee on behalf of Kalpana Debi in favour of Ahimuddin, Seraj Ali, and Ahmed Ali, Akhtar Ali and Akbar Ali respectively. By each of the documents Exts.C, D and E, 4 bighas of land of the same dag and patta have been sold for one thousand rupees each. The plaintiffs in their plaint alleged that Defendant No.1 transferred some suit lands to Defendants 3 to 10 without any legal necessity and without any consideration. Defendant No.1 did not file any written statement nor was she examined by any party in this case. Defendants 3 to 10 contested the suit and in their written statements they stated that they purchased 20 Bighas of land under Exts.A, B, C, D and E from Defendant No.1 who sold out the said lands to the Defendants validly and for legal necessity. Defendants 3 to 10 contested the suit and in their written statements they stated that they purchased 20 Bighas of land under Exts.A, B, C, D and E from Defendant No.1 who sold out the said lands to the Defendants validly and for legal necessity. They further stated in their written statements that Defendant No.1 informed them that she had necessity to sell the lands and accordingly the facts of legal necessity were recorded in the sale deeds, and that they also on enquiry could come to learn about the truth of the sufficiency of legal necessity. We have found that none of the Defendants-Purchasers was examined in the case as a witness. It is also settled law that the burden of proving the legal necessity is on these Defendants-Purchasers, and we have found that they failed to establish the legal necessity. 24. D.W.1 Promode Ram Bhattacharjee stated that a joint Power of Attorney in favour of himself and Kumud Chandra Sarma, the father of Defendant No.1 was executed by Defendant No.1 after she attained majority sometime in 1952. Prior to that there was another Power of Attorney executed in his favour by Kumud Sarma as father and natural guardian of the minor Kalpana Debi. That on the strength of the second Power of Attorney, D.W.1 executed Exts.A to E. D.W.1 asserted that the second Power of Attorney was executed by Kalpana Debi herself in favour of D.W.1 and Kumud Chandra Sarma. D.W.1 however stated that he ceased to act as the Attorney of Defendant No.1 after her remarriage. In the month of October, 1963, D.W.1 was summoned at the instance of the Defendants-Purchasers to appear with the registered Power of Attorney. He found that the General Power of Attorney was missing from his file and he did not make any attempt to take out a certified copy thereof from Tezpur, but on subsequent enquiries from time to time the Defendants stated that they would take necessary action. In the case neither the General Power of Attorney in original nor any certified copy thereof was filed by the Defendants. In the case neither the General Power of Attorney in original nor any certified copy thereof was filed by the Defendants. D.W.1 admitted that he had no papers to show on the date of deposition that he was the registered Attorney of Kalpana Debi and that he had nothing to show at that time that in the General Power of Attorney he had the authority to transfer the landed properties of Kalpana Debi. The witness stated that he was a practising lawyer for about 26 years in civil and criminal and revenue Courts at Nowgong. Since the Power of Attorney nor any certified copy thereof was produced before the Trial Court or even in this Court, it becomes difficult to hold that D.W.1 had any Power of Attorney executed either by Kumud Sarma, father and natural guardian of Minor Kalpana Debi or any Power of Attorney executed by Kalpana Debi herself when she attained majority sometime in 1952. All these 5 sale deeds were executed on 8-11-53 when according to D.W.1 Kalpana Debi was major. Moreover definite statement of D.W.1 is that he executed the sale deeds Exts.A to E on the strength of the second Power of Attorney which was executed by Kalpana Debi after attaining majority and this was a joint Power of Attorney in favour of D.W.1 and Kumud Sarma. From Exts.A to E we find that all these deeds were executed by only Promode Ram Bhattacharjee, on behalf of Kalpana Debi. Since the second Power of Attorney also has not been produced it is not known whether by that Power of Attorney Promode Bam Bhatacharjee and Kumud Chandra Sarma were authorised to execute the sale deeds of transfer properties of Defendant No.1. That apart if it was a joint Power of Attorney, Promode Ram Bhattacharjee alone could not have acted on behalf of Kalpana Debi. 25. Another salient fact which appears from the original sale deeds Exts.A to E is that on each of the first page of Exts.A, B, C, D the signature of Kalpana Debi appears, but it has been penned through. The Stamp papers were purchased at Nowgong on 3-11-53 in the name of Kalpana Debi of Tezpur. D.W.1 admitted in cross-examination that in Exts.A to E there were the signatures of Kalpana Debi which have been penned through. The Stamp papers were purchased at Nowgong on 3-11-53 in the name of Kalpana Debi of Tezpur. D.W.1 admitted in cross-examination that in Exts.A to E there were the signatures of Kalpana Debi which have been penned through. He gives the reason that the signatures were penned through on the advice and direction of the Sub-Registrar as she was not personally present. D.W.1 denied the suggestion from the Plaintiffs that Kalpana Debi herself penned through her signatures, as no consideration was paid by the Purchasers and she refused to execute the documents. D.W.1 seated that he could not say without seeing the registered deeds, what was the consideration received by him for each document. On the date of execution Kalpana Debi was not at Nowgong. D.W.1 stated that he executed Exts.A, B, C, D and E on behalf of Kalpana Debi and he received the consideration, in full for all the sale deeds. In his deposition however he did not state that he made over the sale prices received by executing Exts.A, B, C, D and E to Kalpana Debi or sent the money to Kalpana Debi either at Tezpur or Benares. 26. On consideration of the entire evidence regarding the execution of the sale deeds Exts.A to E we find that since Defendants-Purchasers and D.W.1 could not and did not produce any Power of Attorney or copy thereof by which Promode Ram Bhattacharjee, D.W.1 was authorised to execute the sale deeds in question for and on behalf of Kalpana Debi and since there is not an iota of evidence to show that the sale prices were made over or received by Kalpana Debi, the Defendants alienees totally failed to prove that the sale deeds Exts.A to E were executed by or on behalf of Kalpana Debi for valuable consideration. That being the position Exts.A to E do not confer any title on the Defendants 3 to 10 in the lands alleged to have been purchased by them and the title to the lands remained with Kalpana Debi. D.W.1 has stated in cross-examination that the Vendees (Defendants 3 to 10) were already in possession of the lands as they were already rayats (tenants) for the previous years, may be for 2 or so, in respect of the lands in question and therefore he gave only formal delivery of possession. D.W.1 has stated in cross-examination that the Vendees (Defendants 3 to 10) were already in possession of the lands as they were already rayats (tenants) for the previous years, may be for 2 or so, in respect of the lands in question and therefore he gave only formal delivery of possession. D.W.1 stated that he got crops from these tenants for one year. It is thus clearly found on the evidence of D.W.1 that Defendants 3 to 10 were tenants in respect of the lands alleged to have been sold to them. But those sales having been found to be no sales by Defendant No.1 at all, those sales have no existence in the eye of law. Hence the Defendants 3 to 10 must be held to be in possession of the lands described in Exts.A to E as tenants under Kalpana Debi, Defendant No.1. 27. In the circumstances we hold that Defendants 3 to 10 who are in possession of 20 Bighas out of the suit land are in possession only as tenants under Defendant No.1. It is thus found that even in 1953 Defendant No.1 had the widows estate in the entire suit land and she was in possession thereof, in some portions through her tenants Defendants 3 to 10. This position continued till the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act XXX of 1956), which came into force on June 17, 1956. Relevant provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read as follows:- "14. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation - In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) .... .... .... .... .... .... Relevant provisions of Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read as follows:- "4. (2) .... .... .... .... .... .... Relevant provisions of Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read as follows:- "4. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,- (a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act; (b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act. (2) .... .... .... .... .... .... 28. At page 824 of Mullas Hindu Law, 13th Edition, while commenting on Section 14, it has been observed:- "This Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 gives explicit declaration of the law that a female holds all property in her possession whether acquired by her before or after the commencement of the Act as absolute owner and not as a limited owner. The rule applies to all property movable and immovable howsoever and whenever acquired by her but subject to the qualification mentioned in sub-sec.(2)." In Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veerawa, AIR 1959 SC 577 the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "In the case before us, the essential question for consideration is as to how the words "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act" in Section 14 of the Act should be interpreted. Section 14 refers to property which was either acquired before or after the commencement of the Act and that such property should be possessed by a female Hindu. Reference to property acquired before the commencement of the Act certainly makes the provisions of the section retrospective, but even in such a case the property must be possessed by a female Hindu at the time the Act came into force in order to make the provisions of the section applicable. . . . . . . . . . On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the words "possessed by" had a wider meaning than actual physical possession, although physical possession may be included in the expression. . . . . . . . . . On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the words "possessed by" had a wider meaning than actual physical possession, although physical possession may be included in the expression. In the case of Venkayamma v. Veerayya, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 280, Viswanatha Sastri, J., with whom Satyanarayana Raju, J., agreed, expressed the opinion that "the word possessed in Section 14 refers to possession on the date when the Act came into force. Of course, possession referred to in Section 14 need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female but may be possession in law. The possession of a licensee, lessee or a mortgagee from the female owner of the possession of a guardian or a trustee or an agent of the female owner would be her possession for the purpose of Section 14. The word "possessed" is used in Section 14 in a broad sense and in the context possession means the state of owning or having in ones hands or power. It includes possession by receipt of rents and profits." . . . . . . It is sufficient to say that "possessed" in Section 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in ones hand or power. In the case of Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samantha, AIR 1957 Cal 557 at p.559, P.N. Mookherjee, J., expressed his opinion as to the meaning of the words "any property possessed by a female Hindu" in the following words:- "The opening words "property possessed by a female Hindu" obviously mean that to come within the purview of the section the property must be in possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement of the Act. They clearly contemplate the females possession when the Act came into force. That possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognized by law, but unless the female Hindu, whose limited estate in the disputed property is claimed to have been transformed into absolute estate under this particular Section, was at least in such possession, taking the word "possession" in its widest connotation, when the Act came into force, the section would not apply". In our opinion, the view expressed above is the correct view as to how the words "any property possessed by a female Hindu" should be interpreted." In the instant case we find that Defendant 1 Kalpana Debi inherited the suit land as legal heir to Brindaban Goswami who was the original owner. Defendant 1 had the widows estate in the suit land and she is also found to be in possession through tenants and in law. We have also found that the alleged transfers under Exts.A, B, C, D and E are no transfers at all by Defendant 1 in the eye of law and they did not confer any title, even limited interest, to the transferees. That being the position when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force on June 17, 1956, Defendant No.1 who has been found to be in possession of the suit land must be held to be full owner of the suit land and her limited estate in the suit land transformed into absolute estate on and from June 17, 1956, under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently the Plaintiffs who were the next reversioners under the Hindu Law before the Hindu Succession Act 1956 came into force ceased to have any interest as reversioners with effect from June 17, 1956 from which date Defendant No. 1 became the absolute owner of the suit land. In the circumstances the Plaintiffs who claimed declaration of their reversioners right in the suit land by filing the suit in 1961 are not entitled to any decree whatsoever. 29. Another question was argued by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Plaintiffs suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 29. Another question was argued by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Plaintiffs suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In Radha Rani Bhargava v. Hanuman Prssad Bhargava, AIR 1966 SC 216 the Supreme Court held- "It is open to a reversioner to maintain a suit for a declaration that an alienation made by a Hindu female limited owner before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was without legal necessity and was not binding upon the reversioners." In the above view a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that an alienation made by a Hindu female before coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 on the ground that alienation was without any legal necessity and was not binding on the reversioners is maintainable. In the circumstances on the allegations made in the present suit, it is found to be maintainable though the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree as prayed for on merits. 30. Another point was raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the present suit (Title Suit 5 of 61) was filed on 1-2-61 and it was decreed on 14-8-64, but it is found that Seraj Ali, Defendant No.3 died on 18-11-61 before the decree in Title Suit 5 of 1961 was passed. That being the position so far as Seraj Ali or his legal heirs are concerned the Title Suit 5 of 1961 abated and the decree passed in that suit on 14-8-64 had no force against Seraj Ali or his legal heirs; and the decree being a joint decree, the entire T.A.10/65 abated as a whole. It is found from the record that joint written statement was filed on behalf of Defendants 3, 5, 6, 8 and 10 on 1-7-61. The last witness was examined in the suit on 19-4-65 and he was cross-examined on behalf of Defendants 3 to 10 and the decree was passed on 14-8-64, but till that date it was not brought to the notice of the trial Court by any of the Defendants 3 to 10 that Defendant 3 was dead. The last witness was examined in the suit on 19-4-65 and he was cross-examined on behalf of Defendants 3 to 10 and the decree was passed on 14-8-64, but till that date it was not brought to the notice of the trial Court by any of the Defendants 3 to 10 that Defendant 3 was dead. On 18-11-61 when the notices were issued in F.A.10 of 1965 it is found from Jarikaraks report dated 28-4-65 that Seraj Ali was dead and therefore the Appellants in F.A.10 of 1965 filed an application for substitution of the legal heirs of Seraj Ali with a prayer for condonation of delay for making the application for substitution. Even though there may be sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, another difficulty arises in this regard. The order for substitution of the legal heirs of a party to a suit or appeal or any other proceeding may be made by the Court before which the suit, appeal or proceeding was pending and during the pendency of which the party died. In the instant case Seraj Ali died while Title Suit 5 of 1961 was pending before the learned Subordinate Judge, L.A.D. So substitution could have been ordered by the trial Court within time and even beyond time if there were sufficient cause for condonation of the delay but the decree was passed by the trial Court on 14-8-1964 against Seraj Ali, who was already dead on 18-11-61. That being the position there is legal difficulty in substituting the legal heirs of Seraj Ali in F.A.10 of 1965 even though there were sufficient grounds for condonation of the delay. Hence the said decree in T.S. 5/61 may not be binding on the legal heirs of Seraj Ali. Even then F.A.10 of 1965 will not abate as a whole because Seraj Alis interest could be easily separated from the interest of the other Defendants-Purchasers. The Plaintiffs in the instant case brought the suit for declaration of their right, title and interest in the suit land on the ground that they were the reversioners and legal heirs and the alleged sales under Exts.A, B, C, D, E were invalid for want of legal necessity. The Plaintiffs in the instant case brought the suit for declaration of their right, title and interest in the suit land on the ground that they were the reversioners and legal heirs and the alleged sales under Exts.A, B, C, D, E were invalid for want of legal necessity. The cause of action in the instant case is capable of being separated even though Seraj Ali who claimed interest under Ext.D is dead and his heirs were not substituted in the suit itself before the decree was passed. The decree would have been binding against the other Defendants. Consequently the T.A.10 of 1965 would not abate as a whole though it abated so far as the legal heirs of Seraj Ali were concerned. 31. The learned Counsel for the Appellants also submitted that since Defendant 1 remarried, she was divested of the property inherited by her as limited owner. In this connection Section 2 of the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act, 1856 has been referred which reads as follows:- "2. Rights of widow in deceased husbands property to cease on her remarriage- All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husbands property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his legal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to remarry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall upon her remarriage cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same." 32. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants in T.A.10/65 is however not acceptable. Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides that any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act and that any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act. So Section 14 has the overriding effect on previous laws regarding widows estate. So Section 14 has the overriding effect on previous laws regarding widows estate. It is quite clear that on and from June 17, 1956 the Defendant No.1 became the absolute owner of the suit land by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as discussed hereinabove. That being the position Defendant No.1s subsequent re-marriage in 1958 cannot divest her of the property in view of Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Section 2 of the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act, 1856 has no effect regarding widows estate with effect from 17-6-56. 33. In the result the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside and the Plaintiffs suit stands dismissed in toto. 34. Consequently both F.A.10 of 1965 as well as F.A.60 of 1965 stand dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their costs of the suit as well as of these appeals. 35. BAHARUL ISLAM, J.:- I agree. Appeals dismissed.