( 1 ) PLAINTIFF is the appellant in the present second Appeal. He filed a suit for a perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the land held by him. The case of the plaintiff was that he had taken the suit lands from defendant 1 on lease basis on payment of half crop share as rent and he was consequently put in possession of the suit lands in the year 1963. It was contended that as a result of the lease in his favour he has been in lawful possession of the suit lands, but, the defendants are trying to evict the plaintiff from the suit lands, and therefore, he was entitled to a decree for perpetual injunction. ( 2 ) THE suit was resisted by the defendants. It was contended by them that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant existing between the plaintiff and defendant 1. It was also contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for perpetual injunction. ( 3 ) THE learned trial Judge framed the following two issues: " (1 ). Does the plaintiff prove his lawful possession of the suit lands on the date of the suit? (2 ). What order, what decree " ? holding that the plaintiff was not in lawful possession of the suit lands on the date of the suit, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit. It was held that the plaintiff was in physical possession of the suit lands on the date of the suit, but that possession cannot be termed as lawful since under the piovisions of the Hyderabad Tenacy and Agricultural Lands act, 1950, the lease claimed by the present appellant was not a valid lease and he was not cultivating the land" as a tenant and therefore he was not entitled to a decree for injunction against respondent 1. ( 4 ) THE correctness of this decision was challenged before the appellate court in R. A. No. 115 of 1971 and by the judgment dt. 14th of October 1971, the learned appellate Judge has affirmed the findings of the trial court holding that the plaintiff was no doubt in actual possession, but he was not in possession lawfully, and therefore, he was not entitled to a decree for in junction against defendant 1, true owner. 14th of October 1971, the learned appellate Judge has affirmed the findings of the trial court holding that the plaintiff was no doubt in actual possession, but he was not in possession lawfully, and therefore, he was not entitled to a decree for in junction against defendant 1, true owner. The learned appellate judge also held that the appeal filed before him was not maintainable. In the view he took, the learned appellate Judge affirmed the decision of the trial Court. Therefore, the plaintiff has preferred the present second appeal. ( 5 ) IN my view, it is unnecessary to consider the correctness of the view taken by the learned appellate Judge as to whether the appeal filed before him was maintainable or not The learned appellate Judge considered both the questions i. e , whether the appeal was maintainable and whether he was entitled to succeed on merit? of the case. Holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed on merits, also recorded a finding that the appeal was not maintainable. In my view, it would be sufficient for me to consider whether the finding recorded by the learned appellate Judge on merits that the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed is sound. ( 6 ) THE submission that is made by Sri B. S. Raikote, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that the lease entered into between the plaintiff and defendant 1 was a valid lease, and in any event, non-compliance with some of the provisions of the Act would not render jt as an invalid one. It was further contended by him that in any event he was entitled to claim the benefit ot S. 4 of the Mysore Land Reforms act as he must be deemed to be a deemed tenant. the question is as to whether there is any substance in any one of these contentions. ( 7 ) UNDER the provisions oi the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act, 1950, there is a general pronibition for creation of leases alter three years from the commencement ol the Act. that is why it has been specifically stated that " Alter the expiry ol three years from the commencement ol this Act, no land shall, save as provided in S. 7, be leased for any period whatsoever and, save as aforesaid, no tenancy shall be created in respect ol any land ". that is why it has been specifically stated that " Alter the expiry ol three years from the commencement ol this Act, no land shall, save as provided in S. 7, be leased for any period whatsoever and, save as aforesaid, no tenancy shall be created in respect ol any land ". It is thus clear that the Act bars the creation of tenancy m respect of any land. Consequently, the Act also provides that no land could be leased for any period whatsoever. The only exception that is made is contained m the provisions of R. 7 of the said Act and s. 7 (l) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) and in S. 6, a land-holder who (a) is a minor or female, (b) is permanently incapable of cultivating land by reason of any physical or mental infirmity (c) is serving in the Naval, Military or Air Force of India, (d) is temporarily prevented by any sufficient cause from cultivating land may after three years from the commencement of this Act, with the permission of the Collector, lease the land held by him for such period as the Collector may fix. Therefore, under the provisions of S. 7 (2) of the Act, the lease for such period as the Collector may fix may be permissible m certain circumstances. S. 8 provides that " Every lease made within three years from the commencement of this Act shall be for a period of ten years, and notwithstanding that it may be expressed to be a lease for a longer or a shorter period shall be deemed to be, and shall have effect as, a lease for ten years". S. 9 provides that "every lease made under S. 7 or 8 shall be in writing and the land-holder shall and the tenant may file a copy thereof in the office of the Tahsildar within thirty days of the date on which the lease is executed". S. 10 provides that "if in respect of any land a lease is made otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of S. 6 or s. 9, the Collector may summarily eject any person in possession of the land under such lease if, in his opinion it is necessary to do so to protect the interest of any tenant who previously held the land. For the purpose of interpretation of these provisions, in the manner in which it was claimed, reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Rama Pujari v. Venkatesh Bhatta, 1962 Mys. L. J. 678. . Considering the provisions of s. 4b of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (25 of 1955) which is similar in terms of S. 9 of the Act, it was held that " S. 4b of the act does not prescribe the procedure by which a contract may be entered into between a landlord and a tenant". It was further stated that " It does not deal with the formation of a contract, but what it does is to enjoin the recording of the lease which has come into existence between a tenant and a landlord in a lease deed which should be executed in the manner provided by that section". It was also noticed that "s. 4b does not forbid the creation of a lease except by execution of a lease deed in triplicate, followed up by the lodging of one of those copies in the Taluk Office. Noncompliance with S. 4b does not bar a suit by the landlord for arrears of rent". In my view, the principles laid down by this Court in Rama pujary's case (l) would not apply to the cases arising under the provisions of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. Provisions of section 4b of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act do not forbid the creation of the lease, whereas S. 6 of the Hyderabad Act specifically forbids creation of a lease. However, after forbidding the creation of leases. S. 6 of the Hyderabad Act permits creation of leases, in certain circumstances with the sanction of the Collector. It is not disputed and at cannot be disputed that in the present case the permission of the Collector as provided under S. 7 (2) of the Hyderabad Act has not been obtained. That being the position, if the lease was not permissible to b. e created, and even as regards the lease said to come under S. 7 (2) of the hyderabad Act, it is found that S. 7 (2) of the Hyderabad Act is not complied with, it is clear that plaintiff cannot claim the protection of S. 7 (2) of the Act. It will be a lease under S. 6 and if the lease comes under S. 6, then as provided the tenancy created in favour of the tenant would be a void one and the tenant claiming the tenancy right will not be entitled to force it. ( 8 ) IT is true that under Sec. 9 of the Act what is provided is that the land-holder shall and the tenant may file a copy in the office of the tahsildar of the lease deed executed under S. 7 or 8. Under the provisions of S. 9 of the Act it is provided that the land-holder shall file a copy. The legislature thought that it was not necessary to make one more mandatory provision requiring the tenant to file another copy. The object of the provision of S. 9 of the Act was to keep on record the valid lease made between the land-holder and the tenant. Therefore, when the landlord is compelled by the provisions of law, it was considered that it was not necessary to compel the tenant also to file a copy of the lease. But that fact would not be of any assistance for the purpose of considering as to whether the lease in the present case is a valid or void one. S. 10 of the Act provides that if a lease has been created contrary to the provisions of S. 6 or 9 of the Act, for the purpose of protecting the interest of any tenant who previously held that land, the Collector has been conferred with the power to summarily eject the person who is holding the property in contravention of S. 6 of the Act. S. 10 is not an exhaustive section of all the rights of the landlord. What was provided under section 10 is that the power is given to the Collector to summarily eject the person who is holding the land contrary to S. 6 or 9 and that is required to be done for the purpose of protecting the interest of the tenant. As already stated since the Legislature intended to make specific provision in regard to particular class only, the entire provision with regard to other classes is not made. As already stated since the Legislature intended to make specific provision in regard to particular class only, the entire provision with regard to other classes is not made. The result is so far as the or owner of the land is concerned, S. 10 will not be of any assistance and he has to take other appropriate proceedings. The finding recorded in the present case is that the present petitioner was a person who was holding the land under a void lease. In the result, it cannot be stated that he is a person who is lawfully cultivating the land belonging to other. Even for the purpose of claiming the benefit of S. 4 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, it must be shown that the person is lawfully cultivating the land belonging to the other person. If the appellant is a person who is holding the land under a void lease, it cannot be stated that he is a person who is lawfully cultivating the land, and therefore, entitled to protection under S. 4 of the Act. In that view of the matter, it is clear that since the plaintiff was not in lawful possession of the property on the date of the suit and since he was seeking a decree for injunction against the owner i. e. , respondent 1 he is not entitled to the decree prayed for. The Courts below were therefore right in dismissing the suit. ( 9 ) THIS appeal therefore fails and the same is dismissed wth costs. --- *** --- .