( 1 ) THE Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hidkal Dam Project, Ghataprabha is the appellant in these appeals, filed under S. 54 (2) of the Land acquisition Act. . All the three cases were clubbed together before the trial court and a common judgment was given by the I Additional Civil Judge belgaum. The learned District Judge has also disposed of all the three appeals by a common judgment and that is why all these three appeals have been heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) LANDS of the claimants were required for the purpose of construction of Hidkal Dam and for working space in respect of the Dam at hidkal. The notification was published on the 18th of October 1962 and the claimants being not satisfied with regard to the award of compensa tion, requested that the matter should be referred to the Court of the Civil judge. On the refernce being made, the learned Civil Judge enhanced the compensation in all these cases. The correctness of the decisions were challenged before the appellate Court and the learned appellate Judge has" confirmed the decision of the trial Court. That is how the appellant special Land Acquisition Officer has preferred these three appeals before this Court. ( 3 ) THE learned Government Pleader argues that the claims made by the claimants were untenable as petitions under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition act were filed beyond the period of limitation provided in the Act. It was also contended that as the claimants had not preferred any claims in pursuance of the notices issued to them under S. 9 of the Act, they were debarred from making such claims under S. 25 (2) of the Act. It was finally urged that the award of compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer was proper and enhancement was not called for Under the provisions of S. 18 of the Act, the claimants have to take steps for making a reference to the court within 90 days as prescribed in sub-sec. (2) of the S. 18 of the Act. , the award was made on the 20th of November 1967. The case of the Land acquisition Officer is that he issued notices under S. 12 (2) of the Act, on the date of the declaration of the award. (2) of the S. 18 of the Act. , the award was made on the 20th of November 1967. The case of the Land acquisition Officer is that he issued notices under S. 12 (2) of the Act, on the date of the declaration of the award. But it was admitted that in the notice he had not mentioned the grounds of the award but had only mentioned the amount awarded. It has also come on record that claimants obtained certified copies of the awards and thereafter they have filed their petitions. It is also not disputed that the claimants took the amount under protest. It was, therefore, held by the Courts below that the request for reference was in time. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Mst Qaiser Jehan begaum, AIR. 1963 SC. 1604. as follows: " Knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under S. 12 (2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. . . . . . . Having regard to the scheme of the Act knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. " tkis Court in the case of Kamalajammanmvaru v. Special Land Acquisition officer, Mysore, 1968 Mys. L. J. Sh. N. 96. has also taken a similar view. The legal position, therefore, is that the limitation starts when the claimants had the knowledge of the award either actually or constructively and the knowledge of the award must relate to the essential contents of the award. As it is undisputed that in the present cases such notices have not been given, the requpst made for reference is clearly in time. That is the view that has been maken by both the Courts below and I do not find any error of law in the said decisions, ( 4 ) IT was further argued that in any event the claim made by the claimants was barred under S. 25 of the Act. That is the view that has been maken by both the Courts below and I do not find any error of law in the said decisions, ( 4 ) IT was further argued that in any event the claim made by the claimants was barred under S. 25 of the Act. It was submitted that the claimants who had been served with the notice under S. 9 of the Act, must be treated as either having refused to make such claim or have omitted without sufficient reason to make such claim, and therefore, they are not entitled to enhanced compensation. It is necessary to note that this objection was specifically raised in the objection statement filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, but it has been noticed by both the courts below that the appellant-LAO. has not placed before the Court any relevant material on what date they were served with such notices. The copy of the notices which are said to have been issued to the claimants was not placed before the Court at all. That is the reason why the Courts below considered the ether material placed before them and took the view that these are cases in which the claimants have omitted for sufficient reasons to make their claims and therefore thev are entitled to enhanced compensation both the Courts below have mentioned that the claimants were rustic villagers, they were ignorant of the matters and most of them did not have their school education and only some of them know how to sign. It was stated by the Courts below that the claimants have failed to putforth their claims on account of sheer ignorance being illiterate villagers. It was further held bv both the Courts below that the claimants had acted in good faith and there does not appear to be any negligence on their part. ( 5 ) IN the case of A. 57. Subbaramania Chettiar v. State of Madras, AIR. 1963 Mad. It was further held bv both the Courts below that the claimants had acted in good faith and there does not appear to be any negligence on their part. ( 5 ) IN the case of A. 57. Subbaramania Chettiar v. State of Madras, AIR. 1963 Mad. 942 it was held that when there was no claim made under S. 9 (2) of the Act and the claim had not been given up and the claimant not represented by counsel if the Land Acquisitjon Officer has not informed the claimant about the consequence of the failure to state the amount of the claim, the claimant would not be disentitled from claiming the enhanced amount and penal provisions of S. 25 (2) of the Act ought not to be applied. This court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, CITB. v. Chikkaboranna (1968) 1 Mys. L. J. 369, held as follows: " Serving of the notice seems to be a pre-requisite to making a claim for compensation. There is no evidence on record to show that the requisite notice under S. 9 of the Act had been served on the respondent. If the Land Acquisition Officer wants to plead that sub-sec. (2) of S. 25 of the Acts acts as a bar from asking enhanced compensation, it is up to him to prove that the mandatory requirements mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of S. 25 are complied with. In N. M. Venkatarama lyer v. Collector of Tanjore, Chief Justice, Beasley speaking for the Bench at page 840 of the judgment has observed as follows: the stringent provisions of S. 25 (2) of the Act can only be applied after a notice which is strictly in compliance with S. 9 sub-sec. (2) and (3) has been served upon the land owner___i am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the appellant has not proved that as per mandatoory provisions of sub-sec. (1) of S. 25 of the Act, the requisite notice under s. 9 of the Act has been served on the claimant; what has to be proved under S. 25 (1) is that the applicant had not made claim to compensation and not that the applicant had not filed statements in writing before the Collector. There is no obligation in the interested person to file statements in writing. There is no obligation in the interested person to file statements in writing. Similar view has been expressed by another Bench of the Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Jehal mahto (AIR. 1964 Pat. 207 ). From what has been stated above, it is clear that the stringent provisions of S. 25 of the Act do not apply to the instant case. The requisite notice under S. 9 of the Aet has not been proved to have been served on the respondent. . . " ( 6 ) THE appellate Court, in the present case has held that when the trial Court has in exercise of its jurisdiction held that omission to make a claim in the circumstances may be condoned, the appellate Court ought not to interfere with the exercise of such discretion and when the discretion has been exercised in favour of the party stringent provisions of S. 25 (2) of the Act are not applied. If the appellate Court has declined to interfere with the order, it is clear that I would also not be justified in interfering with the same. It is also necessary to note that it is for the appellant special Land Acquisition Officer to raise the plea under S. 25 (2) of the act. In these cases, that plea has been raised by him. But, in support of that plea, the copy of the notices issued had not been produced before the court at all. The result, therefore, is that it is not possible to say whether the notices issued satisfy the statutory requirements of S. 9 of the Act. Unless it is shown that legal and valid notices satisfying the requirement of the Act have been served, it is not possible to invoke the provisions of S. 25 (2) of the Act. As already stated, in the absence of notice, since it is not possible to say that the requisite notice according to S. 9 of the Act was issued, it is clear that the provisions of S. 25 (2) of the Act could not be invoked. Further as already stated when the Courts below have found it appropriate to condone the default, it is not a matter on which this Court can take a contrary view and set aside the decisions of the Courts below. Further as already stated when the Courts below have found it appropriate to condone the default, it is not a matter on which this Court can take a contrary view and set aside the decisions of the Courts below. In my view, it would be unnecessary to consider the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Nalamvari annasatram v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR. 1959 AP. 139 as I am not dealing in this appeal with the question as to whether the failure to inform about the penal consequences would render the notice invalid. ( 7 ) ON the question of determination of compensation, it was contended that the enhancement was not justified. The only basis on which the market value could be fixed in the present case is by adopting the capitalisation method i. e. , multiplying the 20 years net income. Evidence placed before the Court shows that the value of the land will be more than what has been actually claimed by the claimants. The Courts below have also referred to the evidence placed by the Land Acauisition Officer and held that the yield of jowar per acre was 6 bags and of the groundnut was 8 bags and the price of jowar was Rs. 60 per bag and groundnut was rs. 40 per bag. Taking into consideration these figures the Courts below have held that the total income would be Rs. 1480 in one case and the net income would be Rs. 730 in one case, in another case it would be, Rs. 850 and in the third case it would be Rs. 390. The Courts below therefore awarded compensation on this basis in all these cases. No error to take a contrary view. ( 8 ) THE result, therefore, is that all the three appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. --- *** --- .