Judgment :- 1. The appellants are four Councillors of the Corporation of Calicut; and they filed a petition for the issue of a writ of quo warranto calling upon respondents 3 and 4 to show under what title they were holding the offices of Mayor and Deputy Mayor respectively of the Corporation. The writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge on the grounds that the meeting at which the election of respondents 3 and 4 took place was legally convened and held; and that the appellants had an alternate remedy by way of an election petition so that this Court need not grant the discretionary relief by way of a writ of quo warranto. 2. Under the relevant rules, the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor bad to be elected for one year every November, and for that purpose, the Commissioner, the first respondent, had to convene a meeting of the Councillors at the Corporation Office. Accordingly, the first respondent issued notices dated 19th October 1971 to the Councillors intimating them that a meeting would be held at the Corporation Office on Saturday, the 6th November 1971, to elect the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor. The meeting was to elect the Mayor at 3 p. m. and the Deputy Mayor at 5 p. m. On 6th November, one of the Councillors by name Saidalikutty filed a suit before the Principal Munsiff, Kozhikode for injunction restraining the Commissioner from holding the meeting. He also filed an interlocutory application for interim injunction; and the Munsiff granted the interim injunction restraining the Commissioner "from holding the Council meeting on 6 111971 and electing the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor" pending disposal of the petition. The interim injunction was served on the first respondent; and consequently, he did not come to the Council hall in connection with the meeting. Out of the 45 Councillors of the Corporation, 23 came to the Council hall and the others did not. The first respondent is said to have intimated some of the Councillors on the telephone that there was an injunction against him restraining him from holding the meeting: the Commissioner also put up a notice to that effect at the Council hall: further, the Commissioner authorised the Secretary to read out the injunction order to the Councillors assembled in the Council hall. However, it is alleged that the Councillors who assembled prevented the Secretary from reading the order. The 23 Councillors who assembled in the Council hall chose one among them (the fifth respondent) to preside over the meeting and the meeting elected the Mayor. Thereafter, the Mayor presiding, the meeting elected the Deputy Mayor too. What is further disclosed is that the Collector (the second respondent), who bad to administer the oath of office to the Mayor, was intimated about the election and he, after consulting the local Government Pleader, came to the Council hall and administered the oath of office to the Mayor. Again, it is disclosed that, thereafter, the Mayor presiding over the meeting, the Deputy Mayor was again elected at about 7 is the evening, to whom the oath of office was administered by the Mayor. These are the facts admitted before us on which we have to proceed. 3. Now, the main question we have to consider is whether the meeting which elected the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor was properly convened and properly held, i. e., according to the relevant rules. The contention of the counsel of the appellants is that this meeting was not properly convened nor properly held under the relevant rules, so that the business done at the meeting was illegal with the result that the elections of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor were also illegal. The argument proceeds that, for that reason, the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor have no authority to hold the public offices and, therefore, this Court should prevent them from functioning as such by a writ of quo warranto. 4. The counsel has argued that the convening of the meeting by the first respondent did not come to an end by the mere issue of notices and that the convening could have come to a close only when the meeting commenced; and that, since the order of injunction passed by the Munsiff was served on the Commissioner prior to the commencement of the meeting, the Commissioner should not have convened the meeting in other words, the Commissioner should have recalled the notices issued by him and prevented the holding of the meeting. In this connection, one of the questions discussed by the Single judge comes into relief, viz., as to what is meant by convening a meeting The counsel of the appellants has argued that the power of the Commissioner to convene a meeting involves not only the power to issue notices for the meeting but should also contain the power to stop it, if necessary, before the meeting actually commences, because, according to him, the convening closes only when the meeting commences. He has also asked, "If, after the notices for the meeting were issued, some supervening impossibility to hold the meeting on the date mentioned occurs, should not the Commissioner have the power to recall the notices?". The learned Single Judge appears to have held that the power of the Commissioner to convene the meeting was exhausted when he issued the notices on 19th October and there remained nothing thereafter regarding the convening of the meeting. We are not sure about the correctness of this; but we are certain that, at any rate, in this case, the Commissioner need not have recalled the notices issued by him, because the order of injunction passed by the Munsiff only restrained the Commissioner "from holding the Council meeting on 6-11-1971 and electing the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor." 5. Authorities have been brought to our notice regarding the powers of a President or a Chairman of a meeting and his power to adjourn the meeting. For instance, Crew on Procedure at Meetings, 14th Edn says at page 35. "The chairman has no power to adjourn a meeting, unless with the consent of the members present, apart from express provision, or when the business for which it has been convened has been transacted. The chairman may, however, adjourn any meeting which is so disorderly that no business can be transacted thereat." The same author observes at page 37 of the same work "A properly convened meeting should not be postponed. The proper course to adopt is to hold the meeting as originally intended, and then and there adjourn it to a more suitable date. The proper course to adopt is to hold the meeting as originally intended, and then and there adjourn it to a more suitable date. If this course be not adopted there is a danger of certain members ignoring the notice of postponement, and, if sufficient to form a quorum, holding the meeting as originally convened and validly transacting the business thereat (See Catesby v. Burnett, ante, p. 25)." Yet another passage from the same work appearing at page 161 may also be noticed: "Postponement of Meetings. A meeting, if duly called, cannot be postponed by a subsequent notice issued before the meeting (Smith v. Paringa Mines, 1906, 2 Ch. 193). It can, of course, be adjourned before any business is done." Similar other observations of some other authors have also been brought to our notice (for instance, Frank Shackleton says in The Law and Practice of Meetings, second edition, at page 83, "The right to adjourn appears to be vested in the assembly itself, unless there are particular regulations which vest this power in the chairman.") These observations, if closely scrutinised, will reveal that they cannot be of much help to decide as to when the convening of a meeting comes to an end: that is why we have desisted from giving a ruling on this question, especially since there is no need for a ruling on this aspect in this case. As indicated already, the order restrained the Commissioner from "holding" the meeting; and the order did not also direct the Commissioner to withdraw the notices already issued by him. There was also no injunction restraining the Councillors from assembling or holding the meeting. Therefore, the meeting that was held in the Council hall would be a valid meeting if the holding of the meeting was proper under the relevant rules touching the matter; that is, the validity of the meeting could not be questioned on the ground that it was not properly convened. 6. The counsel of the appellants has drawn our attention to S.31 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, which reads: "Regulations for proceedings of Council and Standing Committees. 6. The counsel of the appellants has drawn our attention to S.31 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, which reads: "Regulations for proceedings of Council and Standing Committees. The Council and the Standing Committee shall observe the procedure laid down in Schedule I, and may make supplementary regulations, not inconsistent therewith or with other provisions of this Act or any rules made by the Government, for the conduct of their respective proceedings and also for the maintenance of order at their meetings." And Schedule I contains 20 rules Rules regarding proceedings of the Council and Committees: R.1 to 13 relate to the Council and R.14 to 20 relate to the Standing Committees. It is fairly clear that none of the rules among R.1 to 13, excepting R.6, if at all, can apply to the elections of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor; it is also clear that, even in R.6, it is only the latter part of the rule that can apply to the said elections. Now, we shall consider this question; and for that purpose, we may extract R.6: "6. If the offices of Mayor and Deputy Mayor are vacant, the duties assigned to the Mayor by R.2 to 5 shall be performed by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall also conduct the election of the Councillor to preside over the Council meeting in the absence of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor." 7. Under S.367 (1) of the Act, the Government has power to make rules to carry out all or any of the purposes of the Act; and sub-section (2) of the section provides that, in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the said power, the rules may, inter alia, "(b) provide for all matters not expressly provided for in this Act relating to the elections of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor or Councillors including the determination of the validity of elections and deposits to be made by candidates standing for election as Councillors and the conditions under which such deposits may be forfeited." (The proviso is omitted.) Taking power under this provision, two sets of rules, one called the Calicut City Corporation (Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor) Rules and the other called the Calicut City Municipal (Decision of Election Disputes) Rules, have been framed. The contention of the respondents is that the rules applicable to the election of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor are the rules contained in the Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor Rules and not the rules contained in Schedule I of the Act: the rules in Schedule I, according to the respondents, apply only to the other meetings of the Council and the meetings of the Standing Committees and not to the special meeting of the Council for electing the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor. R.2 (1) of the Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor Rules provides that the election of the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor shall be held in the Corporation Office at a meeting of the Council "specially convened" for the purpose. Sub-rule (2) then provides that such meeting shall be convened, as soon as possible after the constitution of a new Council or after the first day of November in each year or after the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor, by the Commissioner of the Corporation. Sub-rule (3) of the rule provides that notice of the day and hour of meeting shall be given at least seven clear days previous to the day of meeting: and then comes sub-rule (4), which is the relevant rule so far as this case is concerned. This sub-rule provides in clause (a) that such meeting shall be presided over, if held for the election of the Mayor, by the Deputy Mayor, or, if the Deputy Mayor himself intends to stand as a candidate at the election or in bis absence, by a Councillor, not intending to stand as a candidate at the election, chosen by the meeting to preside for the occasion. We are not concerned with clause (b) of the sub-rule and the proviso thereto. 8. The argument of the counsel of the appellants may now be noticed more closely. Under the latter part of R.6 in Schedule I, "the Commissioner shall also conduct the election of the Councillor to preside over the Council meeting in the absence of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor". 8. The argument of the counsel of the appellants may now be noticed more closely. Under the latter part of R.6 in Schedule I, "the Commissioner shall also conduct the election of the Councillor to preside over the Council meeting in the absence of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor". The counsel argues that the Councillor who presides over the meeting to elect the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor must be one who is elected at a meeting presided over by the Commissioner; and that, since the fifth respondent, who presided over the meeting for electing the Mayor, was not so chosen at a meeting presided over by the Commissioner, the meeting for electing the Mayor was illegally held and therefore, the business conducted by the meeting was also illegal. The contention on the other side is that R.6 in Schedule I does not apply to elections of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor: and this contention has been accepted by the Single Judge. As we have already indicated, this is the only provision in these Rules which has any semblance of application to the meeting held for electing the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor. And it is only reasonable to construe this part of R.6 to apply only to cases where the offices of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor become vacant, i. e., to cases mentioned in the first part of the rule, and the absence of the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor results as a consequence thereof. This is the only reasonable way of interpreting this rule harmoniously with the Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor Rules framed under S 367 (2) (b) of the Act, the language wherein, we repeat, is to "provide for all matters not expressly provided for in this Act relating to the elections of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor or Councillors" 9. This may indicate (though not necessarily) that the Act has not expressly provided for the elections of the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor or the Councillors, and that matters relating to such elections are to be provided for by separate rules: the rules in Schedule I are only for regulating the other meetings of the Council and the meeting of the Standing Committees not for regulating the meeting "specially convened" for the election of the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor. In this connection, one other circumstance may also be pointed out. In this connection, one other circumstance may also be pointed out. R.5 in Schedule I speaks of a "special meeting": and that should not be confused with a meeting "specially convened" for electing the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor. This is also clear from sub-rule (2) of this rule, for the time prescribed therein is different from the time prescribed under R.2 (3) of the Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor Rules relating to the meeting "specially convened." We, therefore, agree with the Single Judge and hold that, for the reason that the fifth respondent who presided over the meeting for electing the Mayor was not himself elected at a meeting presided over by the Commissioner, the meeting cannot be said to be illegally held. 10. In this connection, another argument has been advanced regarding the election of the Deputy Mayor. Under the relevant rules, the Deputy Mayor had to be elected at a meeting presided over by the Mayor: and in this case, the facts reveal that there were two elections of the Deputy Mayor, one before the oath of office was administered to the Mayor by the Collector and the other subsequently at about 7 p. m. Of course, the first election could not have been a validly held election, because the meeting for the purpose was not presided over by the Mayor after he was administered the oath of office: and the second election could not be impugned on this ground. But the attack on the second election is that, after the first election, the meeting came to an end so that the second meeting was not property convened for the purpose and the business conducted at the second meeting was therefore illegal. It has come out that the assembled Councillors waited at the Council hall, had consultations and, after such consultations, got the Collector there, who administered the oath of office to the Mayor, and thereafter the election of the Deputy Mayor took place, the Mayor presiding at the meeting. In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the second election of the Deputy Mayor was also at the same meeting: it does not appear that the meeting convened for the purpose came to an end or was dissolved after the first election of the Deputy Mayor. Thus, this contention has also to be rejected. In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the second election of the Deputy Mayor was also at the same meeting: it does not appear that the meeting convened for the purpose came to an end or was dissolved after the first election of the Deputy Mayor. Thus, this contention has also to be rejected. This, we think, is sufficient for the disposal of the case. At any rate, since the other question has also been argued, we shall express our opinion on that question as well. 11. The learned Single Judge has held that the writ of quo warranto is a discretionary writ and, if there is an alternate remedy available to the appellants, the discretionary writ need not be issued. Our attention has been drawn to the following observation of Chagla C. J., who spoke for the Division Bench in Kashinath Laxman Bhide v. The State of Bombay (AIR. 1954 Bom. 41): "In our opinion it is the duty of the Court, as soon as its attention is drawn to the fact that a person who is not qualified is holding a public office, to declare that he is not entitled to that office and to prevent him from acting as such." Another observation by the same Beach in another case, Bhairulal Chunilal v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1954 Bom. 116), has also been brought to our notice. Chagla C. J. has said: "Now, the writ of 'quo warranto' is not issued as a matter of right. It is a discretionary relief and the Court has always to ask itself whether under the circumstances of each case the petitioner should be given the relief in the nature of 'quo warranto' which he seeks." And in that particular case, the Division Bench refused to issue the writ. We do not think we need go into the nature of the writ of quo warranto in England and In India. The learned Single Judge has considered the historical background of this writ. In England, he has observed, the writ in the nature of quo warranto was replaced by what is known is 'an information in the nature of 'quo warranto' even before 1938. He has also pointed out that in 1938 even this was abolished and provisions were made for the issue of injunction in such cases. In England, he has observed, the writ in the nature of quo warranto was replaced by what is known is 'an information in the nature of 'quo warranto' even before 1938. He has also pointed out that in 1938 even this was abolished and provisions were made for the issue of injunction in such cases. The Single Judge has referred to S. A. de Smith and his observation that there is a complete dearth of judicial precedent after 1938, which the learned author attributes to the prevalence and effectiveness of the alternate remedies prescribed by the relevant statutes. We may also mention that there is a very enlightening discussion regarding the nature of this writ in the decision of our Supreme Court in the University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao (AIR. 1965 SC. 491). 12. There can be no doubt that the writ of quo warranto is a discretionary writ more than the other writs which are also in the discretion of the Court, excepting the writ of prohibition and the writ of habeas corpus. We have already indicated at the commencement of this judgment that there are special rules framed under S.367 of the Act for deciding election disputes. And the appellants could have rather, should have resorted to the remedy under those rules and filed an election petition instead of seeking their remedy by way of a writ of quo warranto before this Court. We do not think that the learned Single judge has erred in the exercise of bis discretion in the matter of issuing a writ of quo warranto in this case: in other words, we feel that he was right in refusing to exercise the discretion in a case like this where there was available an alternate remedy. In the words of Chagla C. J. in Bhairulal Chunilal's case already referred to, "It is well settled that where you have statutory provisions dealing with the conduct of an election, the writ of 'quo warranto' is displaced. In the words of Chagla C. J. in Bhairulal Chunilal's case already referred to, "It is well settled that where you have statutory provisions dealing with the conduct of an election, the writ of 'quo warranto' is displaced. An election then can only be challenged in the manner laid down by the statute." Again, as pointed out by the Single Judge, there was another fact which should also weigh with the Court in a case like this: out of the 45 Councillors in the Corporation, 23 a majority took part in the election, and they unanimously elected the third and the fourth respondents as the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor respectively. Here again, we refer to a passage from the judgment of Chagla C. J. in the above case: "The Courts must always be reluctant to interfere with elections except on the clearest and strongest of grounds the Court should be loath to interfere with the decision of the people merely because some technicality has not been observed or gome irregularity has been committed. The matter would be entirely different if the irregularity has resulted in the people not being able to express their views properly, or if there was any corrupt practice which has materially affected the result of the election. It might have also been different if the election itself was held without any authority of law." Wherefore, the decision of the learned Single Judge is justified and is correct. And we confirm the said decision and dismiss the writ appeal with costs of respondents 3 to 5. AN K. Dismissed.