Per Shri K.S. Ujwal—A Division Bench of this Board, which heard the appeal by Surajmal against the Revenue Appellate Authoritys order of 11th March, 66, has referred the following question for consideration by a larger Bench of the Board :— "Does the power of the village Panchayat to decide mutations in consequence of Government Notification No. F. (185) Rev. B/157 dated 11-9-57 extend to cases arising out of the operation of sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act?" The Honble Members constituting the Division Bench felt that the decision of the appeal depended upon the decision of the question whether the power of deciding mutation cases resulting from the acquisition of Khatedari rights under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act vest in village Panchayats as a result of Notification of 27th October, 1956 and 11th September, 1957 issued under clause (b) of sec. 260(1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and quoted in the decision of (his Board in the case of Balu vs. Ramdeo reported as 1969 R.R.D. page 66 or not ? In the arguments before the Division Bench, the question was raised that the decision of the Board in the case of Balu vs. Ramdeo was an authority for the view that the jurisdiction to decide mutation case, falling under sec.135 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, vested in village Panchayats were the lands forming the subject matter of mutation proceedings were located within the territorial limits such of Gram Panchayats. The learned Members constituting the D. B. which has made this reference took note of the fact that mutations are not occasioned merely by transfer and succession, but also, for instance, as a consequence of acquisition of khatedari rights under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and observed that since mutations covered by sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act involved an enquiry of a varied nature relating to acquisition of khatedari rights, it could hardly be intended that this enquiry should be held and the matter be decided by Gram Panchayats. The D.B. has in the order of reference also observed that mutation in such cases follows an enquiry which will have to be made by the Assistant Collector and since this aspect of the matter was not considered by the L.B. which decided the case of Balu vs. Ramdeo, the matter needed reference to a Larger Bench of the Board. The D.B. has in the order of reference also observed that mutation in such cases follows an enquiry which will have to be made by the Assistant Collector and since this aspect of the matter was not considered by the L.B. which decided the case of Balu vs. Ramdeo, the matter needed reference to a Larger Bench of the Board. Initiating the discussions, Shri R. G. Sogani supported the proposition, that the Gram Panchayats cannot decide matters failing under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and record acquisition of khatedari rights conferred by this section, by contending that the report, contemplated by sec. 133 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, and the procedure to be followed, on receipt of such report, laid down in sec. 135(1) and (2) of the Act do not include, in their purview, the acquisition of khatedari rights under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act by the person in possession, because : Firstly, sec. 133 comes into play only when the need for mutation arises as a result of the obtaining of possession by succession, transfer or otherwise and where the claimant has not obtained possession, sec. 133 would not apply. Elaborating this argument, he said that person claiming to have acquired khatedari rights by virtue of sec. 19, does not obtain possession by succession, transfer or otherwise of any property or other right or interest in any land or profits thereof within the meaning of sec. 133. Secondly, it was contended that though the word "otherwise" used after the words "succession and transfer" in sec. 133 enlarges the scope of the section to cover obtaining of possession by modes other than succession or transfer, the increase in scope will be only to the extent of obtaining of possession by modes similar to succession and transfer because the principle of interpretation of statues, incorporated in the doctrine of ejusdem generis, permits the construction of the word " or otherwise" to mean only a mode, at least, analogous to those specified immediately previously i.e. analogous to "transfer and succession". It was further stated with reference to this argument that acquisition of khatedari right by operation of sec. 19 is not analogous to the obtaining of possession by transfer and succession and hence sec. 133 has no application in such cases. Thirdly, it was contended that sec. It was further stated with reference to this argument that acquisition of khatedari right by operation of sec. 19 is not analogous to the obtaining of possession by transfer and succession and hence sec. 133 has no application in such cases. Thirdly, it was contended that sec. 133 requires the reporting of only such matter as can be decided by the authority to which the report is made by virtue of sec. 135. Now sec. 135 authorises the Gram Panchayat after the delegation of the powers of the Tehsildar to the Gram Panchayats to make such enquiry as appears necessary and (1) intundisputted cases, if the succession or transfer or other acquisition appears to have taken place, record the same in annual registers or, (2) if the succession or transfer or other acquisition is disputed, to decide such dispute according to law if it is competent under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act or any other law for the time being in force so to do. Developing the third point, the learned counsel contended that the authority to decide that khatedari rights have been acquired by virtue of sec. 19 having not been vested in the Gram Panchyat, the provisions of sec. 133 cannot be interpreted, to require, the reporting of the acquisition of such right to the Gram Panchayat, its deciding, after necessary enquiry, whether such rights have been acquired and ordering, in mutation proceedings, that the person who acquired such rights, should be recorded as a khatedar in the annual register; i.e. his name be entered in place of the name of the person who enjoyed such rights before such acquisition. Fourthly, it was contended that in Uttar Pradesh, the Revenue Courts have held that mutation is warranted only where possession has been obtained and since sec. 34 and sec. 35 of the U.P. Revenue Act are para-material, respectively, with secs 133 and 135 of our Act, the assumption that secs 133 and 135 do not contemplate the reporting and deciding, respectively, of acquisitions under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, is justified. Fifthly and lastly Shri Sogani urged that this Board has in the case of Shri Sukhdan vs. Shrimati Anchi reported as 1970 R. R. D. page 65 and in the case Nathilal vs. Radhakishan, reported as 1971 R.R.D. page 9, held that the enquiry envisaged in sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, is justified. Fifthly and lastly Shri Sogani urged that this Board has in the case of Shri Sukhdan vs. Shrimati Anchi reported as 1970 R. R. D. page 65 and in the case Nathilal vs. Radhakishan, reported as 1971 R.R.D. page 9, held that the enquiry envisaged in sec. 19 before conferment of khatedari rights has to be made by the Tehsildar or Assistant Colletor, as the case may be, and the disposal of such an application by the Gram Panchayat was without jurisdiction. Shri S. N Parikh who appeared on behalf of Surajmal, who was appellant in the appeal from which this reference has arisen, contended that the use of the word "acquisition" in sec. 135 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act shows that the word otherwise" used is sec. 133 covers cases of acquisition of khatedari rights also, that mutations arising out of the acquisition of khatedari rights under sec, 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act are, therefore, covered by sec. 133 Further it was averred by Shri Parik that since whatever powers were vested in the Tehsildar, under sec. 133 and sec. 135 and the powers of the land Records Officer in sec. 125 have been delegated by the Government, in exercise of powers vested in it, to the Gram Panchayat, in respect of cases, relating to lands situate in their territorial jurisdiction, the Gram Panchayats have powers, co-extensive with those of the Tehsiidars, in mutation cases and since the Tehsiidars have been held by the Board in the Boards two decisions last mentioned to have the jurisdiction to record such mutations, the Gram Panchayats have now got the powers to do so. Secondly, it was argued that the obtaining of possession of a property is not the only circumstance in which the provisions of sec 133 would apply, the report contemplated by the section would be necessary also where a person obtains other rights or interests in any land and since a person acquiring khatedari right u/s. 19 obtains a right and interest in land, sec. 133 would apply and by virtue of sec. 135 and the Notifications delegating powers to Gram Panchayats, the latter would be competent to decide such cases. 133 would apply and by virtue of sec. 135 and the Notifications delegating powers to Gram Panchayats, the latter would be competent to decide such cases. Thirdly, it was contended that the U.P. analogy and the Rule propounded by the U.P. courts would not be applicable to cases covered by the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, because sec 34 of the U.P. Act which corresponds to sec. 133 of our Act, is different from our sec. 133 in one very important respect and this difference is very material. Under the U.P. Law as contained in sec 34, a report has to be made only where possession of any land is obtained by succession or by transfer. The words "otherwise of any property or other right or interests" which appear in sec. 133 of our Act, do not find a place in the U.P. Law. Lastly, it was contended that every charge in rights in respect of a land has to be recorded and since sec. 133 and 135 are the only provisions relating to the mutations, the mutation under sec 19 would also fall under these sections and the authority empowered to decide matters under these sections would decide mutation case under sec. 19 also. Shri P.D. Kudal thought there was no valid reference before the Board because the reference order does not say that the power of deciding such mutations does not vest in the Panchayat but merely contains an apprehension and secs. 11 and 13 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act do not envisage reference in such cases. Shri P. D. Kudals objection that we do not have valid reference before us, because the Division Bench which made the reference has not given its finding on the question whether the power vests in the Panchayat or does not vest in it, can be taken up first. The reference is undoubtedly not covered by sec 13 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act because it was not a question of Members constituting the Division Bench being equally divided in Opinion as to the order to be made. The other provision for reference, to a Bench of the Board, is contained in sec. 11. This section empowers the Chairman or any other Member of the Board sitting singly, to refer any question of law for reasons, to be recorded, for the opinion of the Bench. The other provision for reference, to a Bench of the Board, is contained in sec. 11. This section empowers the Chairman or any other Member of the Board sitting singly, to refer any question of law for reasons, to be recorded, for the opinion of the Bench. A Larger Bench of the Board consisting of four Members ruled in the case of Panney Singh vs. Guman Singh, reported as 1964 R.R.D. p. 101, that "there is nothing to prevent a Bench referring a point of law to a Larger or F. B. and such a Larger Bench is fully competent to take a decision on an important point of law on a reference made by a D.B." The point is thus settled by this decision of the Board, and we are of the opinion that we need not further go into it. Reverting to the other points we may at the outset state that it is common ground between the learned counsel that dispute under reference is confined to cases falling under sub-sec. (1) (a) of sec. 19. There is no dispute regarding acquisition of khatedari rights by virtue of the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of that section because the powers under sub-sec. (2) have been given to the Assist. Collector whose powers not having been delegated by the relevant Notification to the Gram Panchayat, the latter would not be competent to decide cases falling under sub-sec. (2) Another common ground is that, as held by this Board, in the case of Balu vs. Ramdeo, (1969 R.R.D. page 66), whatever powers have been given by secs. 133 and 135 of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act to the Tehsildar, stand delegated by the relevant notifications to the Gram Panchayat in respect of areas falling in its jurisdiction. Gram Panchayats can decide all those, disputed and undisputed, cases where, as a consequence of the provisions of sec. 133 and sec. 135, the Tehsildar could have ordered mutation. In other words the Gram Panchayat has the same powers as the Tehsildar has under these sections; only the territorial jurisdictions of the two authorities differ. The Gram Panchayat would, therefore, be acting without jurisdiction in exercising the powers of the Tehsildar in sec. 19(1) cases only if it could be shown, and it is held, that the Tehsildars powers to decide such cases are not the result of the provisions of secs. The Gram Panchayat would, therefore, be acting without jurisdiction in exercising the powers of the Tehsildar in sec. 19(1) cases only if it could be shown, and it is held, that the Tehsildars powers to decide such cases are not the result of the provisions of secs. 133 & 135, but of some other provisions. The possibility of the enquiry being complicated would not stand in the way of the Gram Panchayats deciding a mutation case if the Tehsildar could have decided it, before such a delegation, in exercise of powers vested in the Tehsildar by sec. 133 etc. We are unable to subscribe to the view that these notifications could not have intended the delegation of the power to decide disputed cases entailing complicated or protected enquiry to the Gram Panchayats which are by their character and constitution not equpied to do justice to this job. It is not for the courts to decide whether the authority which is invested with certain power by legislation, is in possession of the qualifications which the Court considers necessary for properly exercising that authority. The courts are there to interpret the law and Legislature has the power to decide which authority should exercise certain powers and where the legislature has invested an authority with certain powers, the courts cannot take that power away or diminish it because of the apprehension that such authority may not be equipped to conduct a complicated enquiry. If the legislation has given the powers, the Gram Panchayats shall enjoy them notwithstanding any reservations that any one may have about a particular Gram Panchayat or Gram Panchayats in general, because the language used in the Notifications delegating the powers of the Tehsildar to the Gram Panchayat have been interpreted to mean that the powers given by sec. 133 etc. to the Tehsildar have been delegated to the Gram Panchayat for the lands falling in its territorial jurisdiction. In view of what has been stated above, the question to be examined is whether the acquisition of khatedari rights by a person under sec. 19 (1) (a) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is covered by sec. 133 and requires to be reported. If we find that it is covered by sec. 133, the Gram Panchayats shall have jurisdiction to determine the acquisition of such rights, and order necessary mutations. 19 (1) (a) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is covered by sec. 133 and requires to be reported. If we find that it is covered by sec. 133, the Gram Panchayats shall have jurisdiction to determine the acquisition of such rights, and order necessary mutations. On the other hand if we come to the conclusion that disputes about the acquisition of khatedari right under sec. 19, as distinct from the recording of the decision in such disputes in mutation proceedings, fall outside the scope of sec. 133 and sec. 135 etc., the delegation aforementioned would not include the delegation of the powers to decide disputes regarding acquisition of rights under sec. 19 (1) (a) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Sec. 133 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act reads as under : — "133 Report of succession and transfer possession. (1) Every person obtaining by possession succession, transfer, or otherwise of any property or other right or interest in any land or the profits thereof, which is required by this Act, or any rules made thereunder to be recorded in the annual registers, shall bring the fact to the notice of the village Patwari and report it to the Tehsildar of the Tehsii in which such land is situated either direct or through the village Patwari or Land Record Inspector, within three months from the date on which he obtains such possession." Where mutation proceedings are a consequence of transfer or succession, the possession of the land forming the subject matter of the mutation proceedings comes to the person who seeks mutation from the person whose name is recorded in an annual register as the holder of the right. The possession before such succession or transfer takes place, is with the original holder and as a result of the succession or transfer, the possession is transferred to the claimant. Thus there is invariably transfer of possession and in every such case, the claimant obtains possession as a as a result of the transfer or succession. The position is some what different vis-a-vis possession in cases u/s. 19(1)(a). A claimant u/s. 19.1 (a) is in possession from before the point of time when he acquires khatedari rights by the operation of law and hence there is no obtaining of possession by him as a result of operation of sec. 19, or by acquisition of the right conferred by it. A claimant u/s. 19.1 (a) is in possession from before the point of time when he acquires khatedari rights by the operation of law and hence there is no obtaining of possession by him as a result of operation of sec. 19, or by acquisition of the right conferred by it. Shri Sogani has in this connection cited the U.P. decision reported as 1936 R.D. page 287 (Habibulla vs. Kulbul) holding that :— "A revenue court has to be satisfied not only that a transfer has taken place but that the applicant has obtained possession by transfer." The U.P. Board has in other cases also expressed the view that the object seems to be to compel person who comes into possession by any sort of valid legal transaction, to report the transaction so that it may be recorded in the annual registers and persons who have not obtained possession are not subject to any disability but may report under sec. 33(2). The U.P. case of Kr. Bhanpartab Singh vs. Shrimati Biran Kaur reported as 1935 R.D. page 438 is very much to the point and lays the rule that :— "Before a person, claiming title by succession, can file an application for mutation under sec. 34, of Land Revenue Act, he must obtain possession arising out of or based on such succession." These U.P. decisions are based upon sec. 34(1) of their Act which is given below: — "34. Report of succession or transfer of possession— (1) Every person obtaining possession of any land in a village— (a) by succession and such succession has not been recorded in the annual register under sec. 33-A or (b) by transfer : shall report such succession or transfer to the Tehsildar of the Tehsii in which the land is situate." On comparing sec. 34(1) with sec. 133 of our Act we at once notice that the words "or otherwise of any property or other right or interest" of sec. 133 do not find a place in sec. 34 of the U.P. Act. Since sec. 34 of the U. P. Act comes into play only when there is obtaining of possession, the U. P. authorities would not apply to Rajasthan unless we conclude that the words "or otherwise etc." in our Act do not enlarge the scope of sec. 133 beyond including transactions analogous to transfer and succession in it. Since sec. 34 of the U. P. Act comes into play only when there is obtaining of possession, the U. P. authorities would not apply to Rajasthan unless we conclude that the words "or otherwise etc." in our Act do not enlarge the scope of sec. 133 beyond including transactions analogous to transfer and succession in it. We, therefore, take up the effect of the word "otherwise" used in sec. 133. The words "or otherwise" follow the words "succession and transfer" in sec, 133 of our Land Revenue Act. Shri Sogani relying upon A. I. R. 1922 Privy Council page 112, A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court and A. I. R., 1968 Rajasthan page 72 reiterated the well know doctrine of ejusdem generis that a general word following particular words should be presumed to belong to the same genus as the particular and to take its meaning from the latter. On this basis the words "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Rule 1 of order 47 have been held to mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule. In the instant case the word "otherwise" which is a general word follows the particular words "succession & transfer". The word "otherwise" of course means any different way or manner, but there is nothing to present that different way from having analogy with the words "succession or transfer." Succession and transfer do not exhaust the various ways in which, in the opinion, of the Legislature, possession can be obtained and the word "otherwise has been introduced to bring such of these other ways within the ambit of sec. 133 as are analogous to "transfer and succession." The contention that the word "otherwise" in this context cannot be given the meaning given to "any other sufficient reason" by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court is supported, in the opinion of Shri Parik, by the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Baijnath Prasad vs. State of U.P. reported as 1968 A I.R. 288. The Allahabad High Court has in this Single Bench decision, according to Shri Parik, held that the expression "otherwise" does not mean that the procedure must be of the same nature as that of "public auction, which words preceded the word otherwise in the relevant law. The Allahabad High Court has in this Single Bench decision, according to Shri Parik, held that the expression "otherwise" does not mean that the procedure must be of the same nature as that of "public auction, which words preceded the word otherwise in the relevant law. On going through the above mentioned Allahabad decision, we find that the language of the head note, to the following effect, of course, supports the contention of the learned counsel to an extent:— "By public auction or otherwise-expression otherwise does not mean that the procedure must be of the same nature as that of a public auction." That case was under the North India Ferries Act, Sec. 8 of the Act provides— "The tolls of any public ferry may, from time to time, be 1ft by public auction for a term not exceeding five years, with the approval of the Commissioner or by public action or otherwise than by public auction for any term with the previous sanction of the State Government." The judgment itself does not any where use the exact words which have been used in the Head Note. The relevant portion of the judgment is : — "The language is clear. The tolls may be let by public aution or otherwise than by public auction. Where the procedure of a public auction is, not accepted, any other procedure is open There is no indication that this procedure must be of the same nature as that of a public auction." The words used "being otherwise than by public auction", the Allahabad High Court decide that tolls may be let by public auction or otherwise than by public auction. It was not a case of explaining the scope of the word "or otherwise" used as a general term following particular terms like "succession" or "transfer" and hence the Allahabad decision would not be applicable to the present case. The rule laid down in the Privy Council, the Supreme Court and the Rajasthan Revenue Decisions mentioned earlier, would more appropriately apply and hence we can safely say that the words "or otherwise" mean in the context of sec. The rule laid down in the Privy Council, the Supreme Court and the Rajasthan Revenue Decisions mentioned earlier, would more appropriately apply and hence we can safely say that the words "or otherwise" mean in the context of sec. 133 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, a mode of obtaining possession, at least analogous to "transfer" and "succession." If the intention had been otherwise, the legislature could have well used the words "in any manner whatsoever" after the words "succession" and "transfer" The relevant portion of Rule 1 of Order 47, is so to say, para materia with this part of sec. 133 and decisions governing the interpretation of the said Rule 1, can be used as the basis of decision in cases falling under sec. 133, so far as the scope of the words or otherwise* is concerned. Now "transfer" is inter-vivous while "succession" is transfer by operation of law and the inclusion of the word "succession" can be taken to covey the implied intention of the legislature to include this transfer of possession by operation of law. Reverting to sec. 19 (1) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, we find that the rights given by sec. 19 are acquired when the circumstances mentioned therein are shown to exist. Acquisition of right by operation of law under sec. 19 cannot be accepted as obtaining possession in a manner analogous to that of obtaining possession by transfer or succession. In this connection we can usefully refer to the decision of Madras High Court reported as A.I.R. 1958 page 576. In this case distinguishing adverse possession from transfer, the following rule was propounded : — "A claim by adverse possession is in negation of the right of the owner while a claim as a transferee is one under him In the former case the title of the owner is extinguished by virtue of sec. 28 of the Limitation Act. The title of the adverse possessor is one acquired by him, in his own right by virtue of long possession. Such an acquisition of title cannot amount to a transfer within the meaning of sec. 9-A (10) (ii) (b) of the Act." Acquisition of a right u/sec. 19 cannot, be said to be included in sec. 133 on account of the use of the words "or otherwise." We can look at the matter from yet another angle. Such an acquisition of title cannot amount to a transfer within the meaning of sec. 9-A (10) (ii) (b) of the Act." Acquisition of a right u/sec. 19 cannot, be said to be included in sec. 133 on account of the use of the words "or otherwise." We can look at the matter from yet another angle. Khatedari rights can be acquired, for instance, by a trespasser also, by prescription, as a result of adverse possession when the rights of the previous khatedar extinguish by virtue of the land prescribing limitation for enforcing claims against such trespasser. If sec. 133 is deemed to apply to conferment of khatedari rights under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, it will be difficult, indeed, to exclude from the operation of sec. 133 and 135, the acquisition of right by a trespasser in the manner aforsaid. No one can, with any degree of plausibility, contend that the Gram Panchayat has, under sec. 135, the power of deciding such disputes by way of mutation proceedings. In such cases it is not merely a question of correcting entries but also a question of deciding whether the right entitling the person to be recorded in the annual registers, has been acquired by him. A distinction has to be made between the acquipition of khatedari rights by a person and the request of a person who has acquired that khatedari right to have such right recorded in the annual registers. The law governing the mutation proceedings as contained in sec. 135, does not confer powers of deciding the former. It merely prescribes the procedure to be followed for the recording of the name of the person and his right by way of a mutation proceedings where the authority competent to decide whether the right has been acquired, has after following the prescribed procedure come to the conclusion that the right has been acquired. The jurisdiction to decide whether a person has or has not acquired the rights conferred by sec. 19 will be determined by the provisions of the Tenancy Act and not the provisions of sec 135 of the Land Revenue Act. In respect of rights acquired under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 19, the II Schedule the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provides that the Assistant Collector shall be the court competent to decide the matter. No specific provision has been made for matters falling under sub-sec. In respect of rights acquired under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 19, the II Schedule the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provides that the Assistant Collector shall be the court competent to decide the matter. No specific provision has been made for matters falling under sub-sec. (i) but it has been held by this Board in the case Sukhdan vs. Mst. Anchi (1970 R.R.D. page 65) that an enquiry as envisaged under sec. 19 must be held by the Tehsildar before conferment of khatedari rights. The nature of the enquiry that has to be conducted for deciding whether the rights conferred by sec. 19 have or have not accrued is obviously quite different from the nature of the enquiry contemplated by sec. 135. Acquisition of the khatedari rights under sec. 19 is subject to the proviso to the section. Khatedari rights would not accrue under sec. 19 if (1) the land is held from any of the persons enumerated in sec. 46 or (2) if any such rights cannot accure on account of the proviso to sec. 15 (1) or because of the provisions of secs. 15A, or 15B or 16, or (3) if there is a case of surrender or abandonment in accordance with the provisions of this Act or ejectment under the Act. The authority compentent to decide whether the rights conferred by sec. 19 has or has no* been acquired, has to make sure that the case is not covered by the proviso. Where the tenant or the Khudkasht holder contends that the case comes under the proviso to sec. 19 and, a dispute is thereby raised, the decision will have to be given by the authority which has been empowered by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act to decide questions of surrender and abandonment and other matters enumerated in the proviso and since Gram Pancha-yats manifestly do not have this authority it would be safe to say that sec. 135 is no authority for the assumption that the jurisdiction to decide disputes regarding acquisition of rights under sec. 19(l)(a) have been delegated to the Gram Panchayats by the notifications mentioned earlier. We can now consider the contention that sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act contemplates the reporting of a change only when there is obtaining of possession and that since there is no obtaining of possession, as such, in a matter under sec. 19(l)(a) have been delegated to the Gram Panchayats by the notifications mentioned earlier. We can now consider the contention that sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act contemplates the reporting of a change only when there is obtaining of possession and that since there is no obtaining of possession, as such, in a matter under sec. 19(l)(a), such acquisitions would not be covered by sec. 133. We have in earlier paragraphs given our reasons for the view that the U. P. authorities cited by Shri Sogani are not applicable to cases covered by the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, because the words "or otherwise of any property or other right or interest in any land or interest" do not occur in the corresponding U.P. law. On account of the words mentioned above which find a place in our sec. 133, the obtaining of possession of any other right or interest in any land also comes within the purview of sec. .133. The acquisition of a right u/sec. 133 is the same thing as obtaining possession of that right of interest in that land and hence acquisition of such right would come under sec. 133 if it is as a result of succession or transfer or some other mode at least analogous to succession and transfer. The mattter would, therefore, in the ultimate analysis, hinge upon the determination of the extent of enlargement of the scope of the section by the use of the words "or otherwise" and we have already stated on the authority of the 1922 judgment of Privy Council, that the acquisition of khatedari rights under sec. 19 is not covered by the words "or otherwise" occurring in sec. 133. We next take up the contention of Shri Parik that since every change in rights in respect of land has to be recorded and since secs. 133 and 135 are the only provisions relating to mutations, the recording of the change resulting from the operation of sec. 19 (1) (a) would also be covered by these sections. We considered the implications of the matter in the light of these views. We are unable to agree with the contention that there is no other mode of recording a change other than that laid down in sec. 19 (1) (a) would also be covered by these sections. We considered the implications of the matter in the light of these views. We are unable to agree with the contention that there is no other mode of recording a change other than that laid down in sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act or with the view that the Panchayats should be held to have this jurisdiction because this is the only section which talks of mutation. There is no denying the fact that where possession of any property or other right or interest in any land is obtained by succession, transfer or otherwise and such obtaining of possession is required by the Land Revenue Act or any rules made thereunder to be recorded in annual registers, the case would fall under sec. 133 and mutation proceeding would be necessary, but where the possession of such property or right or interest has been obtained in a manner not included in the words "succession, transfer, or otherwise", sec. 133 would not be applicable. Now changes in khatedari rights whether such changes have come about as a result of change in law or as a result of succession etc., must be recorded in the khatoni which is an annual register. But that does not mean that sec. 133 provides that a report under this section should be submitted for a matter that is required to be recorded in annual registers even if such change is not the result of the obtaining of possession by succession, transfer, or otherwise within the meaning of sec. 133. In other words, S. 133 does not come into play in the case of all the changes affecting any of the lights or interests recorded in the annual registers. Sec. 133 would be limited to the matters falling under it and for matters that fall outside sec.133, we will have to refer to the other provisions of law. In the opinion of Shri Sogani, sec. 132 would apply to cases not falling u/sec. 133 where the recording of the change is required by the Act. Sec. 132 is as follows : — "132. In the opinion of Shri Sogani, sec. 132 would apply to cases not falling u/sec. 133 where the recording of the change is required by the Act. Sec. 132 is as follows : — "132. Annual register—(1) The Land Records Officer shall maintain the record of rights and for the purpose shall annually or at such longer intervals as the State Government may prescribe, cause to be prepared a set or an amended set, as the case may be, of the registers enumerated in secs. 114 and 120 and the registers so prepared shall be called the annual registers. (2) The Land Records Officer shall cause to be recorded in the annual registers in the prescribed manner, all changes that may take place and any transaction that may affect any of the rights or interests recorded." A perusal of sub sec. (2) will show that the powers of making all changes that may take place and any transaction that may affect any of the rights or interests recorded in the annual registers, has been given to the Land Records Officer. The power given to the Land Records Officer under this sub-section is different from the power given by sec. 125 to enquire into a dispute under that section viz sec. 125 while the powers of deciding a dispute covered by sec. 125 have been delegated to the Tehsildar whose powers of deciding such dispute have been delegated to the Gram Panchayat, the power of causing the changes that takes place and transactions that affect the rights or interests recorded in the annual registers given by sub-sec. (2) of sec 132, have not been delegated to the Gram Panchayats. Notification No. F. (185) Rev/B/157 dated 11-9-57 delegates the powers of sec. 125 and not those of 132. For deciding a matter falling under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 135, the delegation of the powers under sec. 125 alone was considered sufficient by the Legislature for fulfilling its intention of authorising the Gram Panchayat to deal with reports covered by sec. 133 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. If the intention had been to delegate, the power of making all changes, to the Gram Panchayats, Government would have delegated the powers of sec. 132 also to the Gram Panchayats. 133 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. If the intention had been to delegate, the power of making all changes, to the Gram Panchayats, Government would have delegated the powers of sec. 132 also to the Gram Panchayats. The fact that this has not been done goes to show that the Government wanted the jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayats to be limited to matters where a person obtained possession of any property or other right or another mode atleast analogous to succession and transfer. Other matter, the Legislature thought, would be taken care of by sec. 132. In this view of the matter, it would be evident that the contention of Shri Parik that sec. 133 and 135 are the only provisions which allow the recording of a change in rights over land resulting from any transaction or decree or operation of law, cannot be sustained. The scope of sec. 132 is indeed much wider than that of sec. 133 and where a change or transaction has to be recorded in annual registers and does not fall with in the purview of sec. 133, it would be proper to proceed u/sec 132 which authorics-the Land Records Officer to record the change or the transaction in the annual registers. Hence the forceful contention of Shri Sogani that disputes about acquisition of khatedari rights by operation of sec. 19, do not fall within the ambit of sec. 133 and cannot be decided by Gram Panchayat, does not lose force on account of the other partys contention that there is no other way of recording such a change, because as we have seen above, the way out is provided by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 132. From what has been stated above, it is clear that the Government Notification No. F. (185) Rev/B/157 dated 11-9-57, does not delegate to the village Panchayats the powers given by sub sec. (2) of sec. 132, to the Land Records Officer; that this notification merely delegates the powers given by sec. 135 to the Tehsildar and also delegates to the Village Panchayats the powers of deciding disputed cases referred to in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 135; that the powers given by sec. 135 would be limited to the matters that those covered by sec. 132, to the Land Records Officer; that this notification merely delegates the powers given by sec. 135 to the Tehsildar and also delegates to the Village Panchayats the powers of deciding disputed cases referred to in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 135; that the powers given by sec. 135 would be limited to the matters that those covered by sec. 133 and that disputes relating to acquisition of khatedari rights, by operation of sec 19, of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act do not fall within the purview of sec. 133. The notifications do not. therefore, delegate to the village Panchayats the power of deciding whether, in a disputed case, a person has acquired khatedari rights by operation of sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. In other words the village Panchayats have not been empowered to decide matters arising out of the operation of sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in mutation proceedings under secs. 133 and 135 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. The answer to the reference would, therefore, be :— "Government Notification No. F. (185) Rev. B/157 dated 11-9-57 does not empower the Village Panchayts to decide disputes regarding the acquisition of khatedari rights under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in mutation proceedings." Per Shri G.B.K. Hooja—With due respect I find myself unable to agree with the finding of my learned colleague that Govt. Notification No. F. (185) Rev. B/157 dated 11-9-1957 does not empower the village Panchayats to decide disputes regarding the acquisition of khatedari rights under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in mutation proceedings. To my way oil thinking, before answering this question, it is necessary to appreciate the scope of mutation proceedings. This is best laid down in Badru vs. Thakru (1963 R.R.D. 144). According to this judgment an enjury into a mutation proceeding is more in the nature of a fiscal enquiry to ascertain which of the several claimants for the occupation of agricultural land may be put into possession, so that the State Revenue may not suffer and the purpose of this summary enquiry is to put some person in legal possession of the land as soon as possible, so that the dues of the State may be recovered from him without any difficulty and to leave the final adjudication as to the rights of the parties to the competent courts of law. This authority further goes on to say that it would be little less that a travesty of judicial proceeding to regard the orders of mutation authorities as judicial determination expel-ling proprio vigore any individual from any proprietary right or interest he claims in agriculture land. Sec. 125(3) makes it clear that the decision of the authority dealing with mutation is not intended in law to decide questions of a title to the property involved therein. (A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 100 followed.) It will thus be seen that in conferring the powers to decide mutation cases upon the Panchayats, the Legislature has not conferred upon the Panchayats powers to determine the question of title to the property which is left with the court of competent jurisdiction. The Panchayat merely undertakes a fiscal enquiry to determine from whom of the several contenders land revenue is leviable. It is, of course true that mutation is the process whereby alteration in Record of Right is subsequently carried out. In order to confer veracity on these proceedings it is required that these proceedings shall be carried out in an open public gathering (Jalsa-Ae-aam) and that the party whose name is proposed to be superceded shall be heard. After a mutation has been duly attested and has stood the test of time for a number of years, the entries so substituted are recorded in the next jamabandi (annual register) when it comes to be prepared according to the programme set down by the Collector. As these entries too are required to be read out in Jalsa-Ae-aam, this places them on the high pedestal of Record of Right which carries with it the presumption of truth as laid down in sec. 140 of the Land Revenue Act. Since the alterations in the land records follow mutations, the mutation proceedings have come to acquire considerable weight and notwithstanding the legal proposition that they are merely fiscal entries and do not seek to confer any proprietary rights on the party seeking the alteration in its favour. Now, as has been stated by my learned colleague there is no dispute regarding the manner of acquisition of khatedari rights by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 19, which covers rights accruing under sec. Now, as has been stated by my learned colleague there is no dispute regarding the manner of acquisition of khatedari rights by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 19, which covers rights accruing under sec. 19 (1) (b), because the powers under this sub-section have been conferred upon the Assistant Collectors and these powers have not been delegated by the relevant notification to the Gram Panchayat. As such, the latter would not be competent to decide cases falling under sub sec. 2 of sec. 19. The confusion arises with regard to the exercise of powers relating to matters falling under sec.l9(l)(a) as no authority has been specifically designated for this purpose. According to sec. 19 (1) (a) every person who, at the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act— (a) was entered in the annual registers then current as a tenant of khudkasht or sub-tenant of land other than grove land. shall, as from the date of the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act 1959. hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the appointed date, become the khatedar tenant of such part of the land held by him subject to the several provisions laid down in sub-sec. (1) By virtue of this enactment, khatedari rights accrue to the tenants of khudkasht or sub-tenants of land other than grove land provided they fulfill certain conditions. The question arises, who shall determine whether a person has acquired these rights. It is proposed that this can be done only by the Tehsildars through the process of mutation, whereby the previous entries shall be substituted by fresh entries enthroning the persons so qualifying on the pedestal of khatedars. In view of the fact that the powers to decide mutation have been conferred upon the Panchayats, I fail to appreciate how we can hold that the Tehsildars shall continue to discharge this function. This would deprive the Panchayats of the powers conferred upon them by the Legislature. Of course, if the Panchayats fail to dispose of the mutations within the specified period, the S.D.Os. are competent to transfer them to the Tehsildars, but not until then. My learned colleague has held that the competence of the Panchayat to decide complicated issues shall not weigh with us in determining this question. Of course, if the Panchayats fail to dispose of the mutations within the specified period, the S.D.Os. are competent to transfer them to the Tehsildars, but not until then. My learned colleague has held that the competence of the Panchayat to decide complicated issues shall not weigh with us in determining this question. I fully agree with him and in this view of the matter, I find myself unable to hold that the Panchayat is denuded of the power to entertain and decide mutations arising under sec. 19(l)(a) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. I also find myself unable to agree with the interpretation of the word otherwise proposed to be made by my learned colleague. The word otherwise according to Websters Third New International Dictionary means as follows— "Otherwise—1. in a different way or manner : Differently. 2. in different circumstances: under other conditions." According to this definition, it will not be correct to invoke the doctrine of ejusdem generis to interpret the word otherwise on the analogy of the phrase any other sufficient reason appearing in R. 1, O. 47 C.P.C. The word otherwise clearly means : in a different way or manner. This definitely widens the scope of sec. 133 and seeks to embrance other modes of obtaining possession as distinct from succession, transfer etc. However, this question assumes merely an academic complexion in view of the reasoning advanced earlier which, to my mind, clinches the issue. Per Shri D. C.. Joseph—My learned colleague, Shri K. S. Ujwal, is of the opinion that the scope of secs. 133 and 135 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act are limited to cases of possession arising out of succession, transfer or tansactions of an allied nature and that sec. 132 (2) covers other changes required to be carried out in the annual registers. Because sec 132 is not mentioned in the notification transferring the powers of the Tehsildar to the gram panchayat, he feels that the latter is not competent to effect a change in the records in respect of a case falling under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. With utmost respect, I find that I cannot subscribe to these views. In the first place, the word "otherwise" occurring in sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act should in my opinion be assigned its natural meaning of "any other manner", lawful of course. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. With utmost respect, I find that I cannot subscribe to these views. In the first place, the word "otherwise" occurring in sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act should in my opinion be assigned its natural meaning of "any other manner", lawful of course. The doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot by applicable because there appears to be no valid reason why certain types of possession should be deemed to be within the purview of the section and others excluded. If there is a lawful change of possession of any type, it must be reported else the record would not be correct and the collection of land rent from the proper persons unnecessarily hampered. I am also unable to agree that possession is a since qua non for action to be taken under secs. 133 and 135 of the Land Revenue Act A reading of sec. 133(1) shows that the phrase "possession by succession, transfer or otherwise of any property" and the phrase " other right or interest in any land or the profits thereof are in fact separate though both governed by the words "any person obtaining". It was the case of Shri Sogani in his arguments before us that the word possession occurring in sec. 133 relates to actual physical possession and that the section is not attracted unless a physical transfer of possession has taken place. Shri Sogani cited case law on the U.P. Act in support but, as Shri Pareek pointed out, the scope of sec. 133 of the Rajasthan Act is much wider than that of the corresponding provision in the U.P. Act, which mentions only possession. To my mind, the word "possession" in sec. 133 cannot be said to govern the pharse "other right or interest in any land or the profits thereof" since a right or interest in the land or the profits can very well exist in the absence of physical possession. In other words, what the section lays down is that the obtaining of lawful possession of property or the acquisition of other right or interest in any land which is required by the Land Revenue Act or the Rules made thereunder to be recorded in the annual registers, should be reported. The wording clearly indicates that the section covers all changes that are required to be recorded and not merely certain types of possession. The wording clearly indicates that the section covers all changes that are required to be recorded and not merely certain types of possession. It is significant that Rule 119 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Land Records) Rules 1957, which relates to mutations, does not contain the word "possession" but says that "the mutation register (Form P-21) is prescribed for the entry of every acquisition of any right or interest in an estate as an estate-holder...or tenant (except those of a sub-tenant) and for disputed acquisition of other rights". I must, therefore, respectfully disagree with the view that mutations based on certain types of possession are to be carried out under secs. 133 and 135 of the Land Revenue Act and that sec. 132 (2) provides a separate method for making other changes in the annual registers, which can be done by the revenue officers themselves. Sec. 132 (2« of the Act reads as follows : "The Land Records Officer shall cause to be recorded in the annual registers in the prescribed manner all changes that may take place and any transaction that may affect any of the rights or interests recorded". The significant words to my mind are "in the prescribed manner" and "all changes". Taking the latter first, the reference to all changes cuts at the root of the argument that this provision relates only to certain changes not covered by sec. 133. The words "in the prescribed manner" indicate that a set procedure has to be followed and the only procedure laid down is found in Rule 119 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Land Records) Rules 1957, i.e through the formality of a mutation. Rule 166 of the same Rules makes it clear that entries in the Jamabandi cannot be varied in subsequent records "without first obtaining orders for their variation on mutations entered for this purpose, except where the variation merely consists in the removal of a clerical mistake". It may, therefore, be said that sec. 132 calls for the maintenance of annual registers and makes the Land Records Officer responsible to see that all changes which take place are recorded in the prescribed manner. Sec. 133 makes it incumbent on the person in whose favour a change has accrued to bring it to the notice of the revenue officials and sec. 135 is the procedural section under which mutations are carried out. Sec. 133 makes it incumbent on the person in whose favour a change has accrued to bring it to the notice of the revenue officials and sec. 135 is the procedural section under which mutations are carried out. There is a logical sequence in these section which, to my mind, leaves no room for doubt. Besides, if sec. 132 were the section covering residual changes, it would come after sec. 133 and not before To sum up, if any change is required to be made in annual registers in respect of the lawful possession, right or interest of any person, this can be done only through a mutation. The power of carrying out mutations, undisputed as well as disputed, has been conferred on the Gram Panchayats in place of the Tehsildars by the notification of 11 9-57. The question before us is whether cases falling under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provide an exception to this rule. My learned colleague is of the opinion that the nature of the enquiry contemplated by sub-sec. (1) a) of sec. 19 is quite different from that mentioned in sec. 135 of the Land Revenue Act. The reason he has given is that the acquisition of khatedari rights under sec. i9(l)(a) of the Tenancy Act is subject to the conditions laid down in the proviso to the sub-section and that, since the Panchayats have no power to decide some of the issues involved, they cannot conduct enquiries under this sub-section. With great respect I am unable to subscribe to this view. A mutation does not confer any right but merely records the acquisition of any right or interest or lawful possession which is required to be entered in the annual registers. It follows that, if a person makes a report under sec. 133 that he has obtained lawful possession or some right or interest in land, including khatedari rights, whether under sec. 15 or sec 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or through court order or registered sale or through any other lawful means, the Gram Panchayat will make an enquiry under sec. 135 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and, if the right or interest or lawful possession appears to have been acquired, a mutation will be effected. 15 or sec 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or through court order or registered sale or through any other lawful means, the Gram Panchayat will make an enquiry under sec. 135 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and, if the right or interest or lawful possession appears to have been acquired, a mutation will be effected. If there is a dispute and the panchayat,in exercise of the powers of the Tehsiidar is able to decide the dispute it will do so and if not so competent will refer the case to the authority concerned. In the latter case, the mutation will not be carried out till the dispute is settled. This answers the objection of my learned colleague and I see no reason why mutations arising out of cases under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act should be deemed to be outside the jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayats. In any case, if the Panchayat cannot carry out a mutation for want of authority to decide a particular issue, there is absolutely no justification for supposing that the Tehsildar can do so, a since the latters powers to carry out mutations have been withdrawn by the notification of 11.9.57. For the above reasons, I would answer the reference in the affirmative. Per Shri R. Mookerjee.—I agree with the above judgment. Pronounced in open court.