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1972 DIGILAW 60 (GAU)

Saraswati Goswami and others v. Railway Administration

1972-08-02

R.S.BINDRA

body1972
Judgement JUDGMENT:- This appeal by Saraswati Goswami and Padma Goswami, respectively the mother and the sister of Mahendra Goswami, under Section 82-F of the Indian Railways Act is directed against the judgment dated 22nd November, 1969 of the Ex-Officio Claims Commissioner by which the latter disallowed a claim for compensation arising out of the alleged death of Mahendra Goswami in a railway accident that took place at the Railway Station Diphu on 23rd April, 1966. 2. It is commonly admitted that a passenger train, 20 Down Tinsukia-New Jalpaiguri, was involved in an accident, caused by bomb explosion, at Diphu Railway Station on 23-4-1966 and there were a number of casualties including a few fatal. Mahendra Goswami, it is said, had boarded the ill-fated train at Amguri Railway Station, District Sibsagar, on his way to Silchar and that he died at Diphu in consequence of the railway accident. It is stated further that Padma Goswami received a telegram on 25th April, 1966, which was addressed by one Sitaram to her brother Mahendra Goswami, enquiring if the latter had safely reached Silchar. Since by the time of receipt of the telegram Mahendra Goswami had not reached Silchar, his relations including Padma Goswami and Saraswati Goswami felt exercised and so contacted Sri Tarapada Bhattacharjee, who was a member of the Assam Legislative Assembly in those days, for help in the matter. Sri Bhattacharjee is said to have addressed a letter to the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, requesting for immediate enquiry about the welfare of Mahendra Goswami. That letter, it appears, remained unattended until after the appointment of Sri B.S. Sarao as the ad hoc Claims Commissioner on 5-11-1966. Sri B.S. Sarao acknowledged that letter by his own letter dated 11th April, 1967, suggesting that if unfortunately Mahendra Goswami had been involved in the accident and had sustained injuries, he should be requested "to file a claim and appear in my Court any day between 17th and 30th April, 1967". This letter of Sri Sarao was responded to by a letter dated 20th April, 1967, by Sri T.P. Bhattacharyya. This letter of Sri Sarao was responded to by a letter dated 20th April, 1967, by Sri T.P. Bhattacharyya. The latter mentioned in that letter that it was not possible for Padma Goswami or any member of her family to file the claim by 30th April, 1967, and so he requested Sri Sarao to allow the members of the family of Mahendra Goswami to file claim and to appear in his Court on some "future date". The material on record shows that Saraswati Goswami addressed a petition to the Claims Commissioner on 2-9-1968 detailing the facts known to her. alleging that her son Mahendra had died on 23rd April, 1966, at Diphu as a result of the bomb explosion causing accident to the train, and claiming compensation of Rs.20,000/-. In the last para. of the petition a prayer was made that the first report of Sri Tarapada Bhattacharjee should be treated "as the original claim petition on my behalf and direct the Railway administration to submit their statement". Probably after receipt of this petition the Claims Commissioner summoned the Railway administration and proceeded to determine if Mahendra Goswami had died as a result of train accident and if so what compensation was payable to his dependants. The Railway administration pleaded, while controverting liability to pay compensation, that Mahendra was not involved in the accident and that the claim made by Saraswati Goswami was barred by time. 3. By his judgment dated 22nd November, 1969, the Claims Commissioner rejected the petition for payment of compensation on the double finding that it had not been proved that Mahendra Goswami had died at Diphu on 23rd April, 1968, in the railway accident and that the claim had not been made within time. 4. Sri Senapati urged for the appellants three points for consideration of this Court. In the first place he submitted that the ex-officio Claims Commissioner, who decided the petition for claim, had no jurisdiction in the matter and as such the entire proceedings conducted, and the order made, by him stand vitiated. His second contention was that there is sufficient evidence available on the record to establish that Mahendra Goswami died due to the railway accident at Diphu on 23rd April, 1966. Lastly, Sri Senapati challenged the finding that the claim was barred by time. His second contention was that there is sufficient evidence available on the record to establish that Mahendra Goswami died due to the railway accident at Diphu on 23rd April, 1966. Lastly, Sri Senapati challenged the finding that the claim was barred by time. Sri Duara, who appeared for the Railway administration, joined issue with Sri Senapati on all the three points. 5. Section 82-B of the Railways Act, hereinafter called the Act, gives power to the Central Government to appoint any person, by a notification in the official Gazette, to be a Claims Commissioner for such local area as may be specified in the notification. It is not denied that the Deputy Commissioner of the Mikir and North Cachar Hills District had been appointed an ex officio Claims Commissioner by the Central Government by a notification dated 28th January, 1960. The Rules framed by the Central Government under Section 82-J of the Act envisage appointment of ad hoc as well as ex officio claims commissioners. Rule 4(1) of the Rules provides that the Central Government may appoint any District Judge or District Magistrate as an ex officio Claims Commissioner for enquiring into and determining claims arising out of a minor accident occurring in the area within the jurisdiction of such District Judge or District Magistrate. Sub-rule (2) of the same rule states: "In the case of a major accident, the Central Government shall appoint a person who is qualified under Rule 3 as an ad hot Claims Commissioner". Sub-rule (3) then provides that where an ad hoc Claims Commissioner appointed under sub-rule (2) has ceased to function, all additional and further claims arising out of the major accident may be preferred to the ex officio Claims Commissioner appointed under sub-rule (1) for the area in which the accident occurred. To appreciate the point raised by Sri Senapati it is necessary to point out the distinction between a minor and major accident. The two terms are defined in Rule 2. To appreciate the point raised by Sri Senapati it is necessary to point out the distinction between a minor and major accident. The two terms are defined in Rule 2. According to clause (c) of that rule major accident means an accident of the nature described in Section 82-A of the Act- "(i) which according to the report of the accident made to the Central Government by the railway administration concerned has resulted in the death of more than ten passengers or in more than twenty casualties; or (ii) which the Central Government by order published in the official Gazette declares to be a major accident," In the next clause (d) of Rule 2 the expression minor accident is defined to mean "an accident which is not a major accident." 6. Sri Senapati submitted that since according to sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 the Central Government, in the case of a major accident, is commanded to appoint an ad hoc Claims Commissioner and since such a Commissioner had been appointed in the present case, this Court may legitimately presume that the accident which occurred at Diphu on 23rd April, 1966, was a major accident with the consequence that it was the ad hoc and not the ex-officio Claims Commissioner who could have decided the claim filed in respect of the alleged death of Mahendra Goswami. Sri Duara urged, on the other hand, that sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 does not stand in the way of Central Government appointing an ad hoc Commissioner even when the accident is minor and not major, and at any rate there is absolutely no material on the present record to establish that the accident we are concerned with falls in the category of major accident. Sri Duara then submitted that the District Magistrate of Mikir Hills having been appointed as an ex officio Claims Commissioner he had the jurisdiction to dispose of a claim made by Saraswati Goswami or Padma Goswami. After weighing the arguments for and against the point at anvil I have reached the conclusion that the submissions made by Sri Duara are sound in law and so must prevail. 7. Section 82-B of the Act authorises the Central Government to appoint, by a notification in the official Gazette, any person to be a Claims Commissioner for such local area as may be specified in the notification. 7. Section 82-B of the Act authorises the Central Government to appoint, by a notification in the official Gazette, any person to be a Claims Commissioner for such local area as may be specified in the notification. This section obviously does not speak of either ex-officio or ad hoc Claims Commissioner, nor about major or minor accident. The expressions major accident and minor accident were introduced only by the Rules framed under Section 82-J by the Central Government. Their definitions have been reproduced above. Rule 3 lays down the qualifications for Claims Commissioner while Rule 4 covers the subject of appointment of Claims Commissioner. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 states that in the case of a major accident, the Central Government shall appoint a person who is qualified under Rule 3 as an ad hoc Claims Commissioner. This sub-rule on its plain reading does not interdict the appointment of an ad hoc Claims Commissioner in the case of a minor accident. In terms it only requires the appointment of an ad hoc Claims Commissioner in the event of a major accident. The power to appoint Claims Commissioner is given by Section 82-B of the Act and that section ex facie neither commands the Central Government to appoint necessarily an ad hoc Commissioner to deal with claims for compensation arising out of a major accident nor states that the ad hoc Commissioner cannot be appointed in case of a minor accident. By sub-section (1) of Section 82-J the Parliament has given power to the Central Government to make Rules "to carry out the objects of Sections 82-B to 82-H inclusive". This sub-section read with Section 82-B also does not, in my opinion, inevitably force the conclusion that an ex officio Claims Commissioner has no jurisdiction to deal with claims arising out of a major accident or that if an ad hoc Commissioner is appointed the jurisdiction of the ex officio Claims Commissioner is completely ruled out. 8. Material available from within the four corners of Sections 82-A to 82-J and the Rules framed under Section 82-J indicates that the Parliament envisaged the appointment of Claims Commissioner much in advance of the occurrence of an accident, major or minor. 8. Material available from within the four corners of Sections 82-A to 82-J and the Rules framed under Section 82-J indicates that the Parliament envisaged the appointment of Claims Commissioner much in advance of the occurrence of an accident, major or minor. Sub-section (2) of Section 82-C provides that no application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within three months of the occurrence of the accident, while sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 states that every application for compensation shall be sent to the Commissioner by registered post or may be presented to him or to any of his subordinates authorised by him in this behalf. If there is no Claims Commissioner just on the date of the occurrence of the accident or if no Commissioner is appointed for a period of three months after the date of occurrence, the would-be claimants will be faced with a situation which I believe was never, nor could be, contemplated by the Parliament. Applications for claim can be made under the Rules only to a Commissioner and if there is no Commissioner on the date cause of action for a claim arises, the claimants shall be faced with dismal vacuum, a situation which Parliament could not have looked out with equanimity. In the present case the ad hoc Commissioner was appointed on 5-11-66 which was almost six and half months after the train was blown up. The ex officio Commissioner had of course been appointed on 28th January, 1960. I therefore see no legal bar against holding that the claimants for compensation have the sanction of law to submit their applications, pertaining to major accidents, to the ex officio Commissioner instead of waiting the appointment of ad hoc Commissioner and that such a Commissioner is possessed of jurisdiction to dispose of such claims. It can bear repetition to state that Section 82-B makes no distinction between ex officio and ad hoc Claims Commissioners and the corollary that proposition easily yields is that any Commissioner appointed under Section 82-B will have jurisdiction to entertain and deal with claims made for payment of compensation. Hence, I reject the contention of Shri Senapati that the ex officio Commissioner had no jurisdiction to try the claim made by the mother of Mahendra Goswami. 9. However, Rule 4 framed under Section 82-J does call for some comment. Hence, I reject the contention of Shri Senapati that the ex officio Commissioner had no jurisdiction to try the claim made by the mother of Mahendra Goswami. 9. However, Rule 4 framed under Section 82-J does call for some comment. That rule apparently assumes the immediate appointment of an ad hoc Claims Commissioner in case of a major accident but in practice that is not always possible as happened in the instant case. And in case immediate appointment of an ad hoc Commissioner is not made, the rule does not indicate to whom the applications for claims shall be made, nor whether the applications can be submitted to an ex officio Commissioner if there is one. The expression "additional and further claims" respecting a major accident is also not defined and it is not easy to comprehend what this expression means. It is equally not clear whether the ex officio Commissioner can take up some claims which had been dealt with originally by the ad hoc Commissioner but which he could not decide before ceasing to function as such. Rule 4 also does not specifically provide whether the claims arising out of a major accident, if received by an ex officio Claims Commissioner, are to be made over by the latter to the ad hoc Commissioner, if and when appointed. I hope that the Government of India, Ministry of Railways, would examine these points and amend the Rules if considered necessary. Any uncertainty about the procedural matters in the Rules framed under legislative enactment of socio-economic nature and of such vital importance to the public at large as the one we have to deal with in the present case, it is desirable, should be removed at the very earliest. 10. It remains to be said that the argument of Shri Senapati postulates that the accident the train met with was major. However, there appears to be no warrant for that conclusion. Undeniably, it was for the claimant to establish that the accident was a major accident. Major accident is one which has resulted in the death of more than ten passengers or in more than 20 casualties, or, alternatively, which the Central Government by an order published in the official Gazette declares to be a major accident. Undeniably, it was for the claimant to establish that the accident was a major accident. Major accident is one which has resulted in the death of more than ten passengers or in more than 20 casualties, or, alternatively, which the Central Government by an order published in the official Gazette declares to be a major accident. Sri Senapati was unable to state at the bar that the Central Government had declared the accident dated 23-4-66 to be a major accident. Therefore it could be considered as a major accident only if it had resulted in the death of more than 10 passengers or in more than twenty casualties. Here again Sri Senapati could not invite the attention of this Court to any material on the present record to show that the number of deaths was more than ten or casualties were in excess of twenty. Therefore it is not possible for this Court to hold that the accident was really of the nature of a major accident. Sri Senapati failed to satisfy this Court that an ex officio Claims Commissioner cannot deal with a claim arising out of a minor accident once an ad hoc Commissioner is appointed. Hence there is no escape from the conclusions that the accident was minor in category and the ex officio Claims Commissioner had the necessary jurisdiction to settle a claim arising out of it. I therefore reject the principal point raised by Sri Senapati. 11. The Claims Commissioner had rejected the claim for compensation, as mentioned before, on the grounds that it was barred by time and that it had not been proved that Mahendra Goswami had died in the accident which the train suffered. To decide the question of limitation we have first to determine when was the claim, as contemplated by the rules, made and by whom. Section 82-C of the Act provides that an application for compensation can be made either by the person who sustained the injury or by his dependant in case he dies. According to the Explanation appended to Section 82-C the word "dependant" has the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Workmens Compensation Act. Section 82-C of the Act provides that an application for compensation can be made either by the person who sustained the injury or by his dependant in case he dies. According to the Explanation appended to Section 82-C the word "dependant" has the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Workmens Compensation Act. "Dependant", as defined in Section 2(d) of the latter Act, includes a widow, a minor legitimate son, an unmarried legitimate daughter or a widowed mother, and also a minor brother or an unmarried sister provided the latter were wholly or in part dependant on the earnings of the workman at the lime of his death. Saraswati Goswami is indisputably the widowed mother of Mahendra and so she is a dependant. Padma Goswami is an unmarried sister of Mahendra but it is not proved that she was wholly or in part dependant on her brother. This Padma admitted in her statement before the Claims Commissioner that she was employed as an Assistant in the office of the Deputy Commissioner at Silchar on the date of the accident, but she did not affirm further that she depended on her brother either wholly or in part. Therefore, she is not entitled to claim any compensation arising out of the alleged death of her brother Mahendra. No claim was made on behalf of the minor brothers and so the claim has to be considered to have been made only by the widowed mother Saraswati Goswami. 12. The next point that requires decision is when was the application for compensation made by Saraswati Goswami. Sri Senapati canvassed that the application by Saraswati Goswami should be considered to have been made per letter dated 6th May, 1986, addressed by Sri T.P. Bhattacharyya to the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar. That letter has not been produced before this Court, but its contents can be reasonably ascertained from what is stated in the letter dated 11th April, 1967, sent by the ad hoc Claims Commissioner Sri Sarao to Shri Bhattacharyya. That letter is printed at page 19 of the Paper Book. It recites that Sri Bhattacharyya had informed the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, that Mahendra Goswami of Ithkhola, Silchar, was working under a contractor at Jorhat and that he was reported to have travelled by 20 Dn. Tinsukia-New Jalpaiguri Passenger Train, which was involved in accident at Diphu on 23rd April, 1966. It recites that Sri Bhattacharyya had informed the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, that Mahendra Goswami of Ithkhola, Silchar, was working under a contractor at Jorhat and that he was reported to have travelled by 20 Dn. Tinsukia-New Jalpaiguri Passenger Train, which was involved in accident at Diphu on 23rd April, 1966. It appears that Sri Bhattacharjee wrote that letter to the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, Silchar, when the distress arising out of the telegram received by Padma from one Sitaram enquiring about the welfare of Mahendra came to his notice. That letter must have been written merely to enquire if Mahendra was involved in the accident rather than to lay claim to compensation. It was too early at that point of time to think on the line of compensation because the question for compensation would arise only if it was confirmed on enquiry that Mahendra Goswami was one of the victims of the unfortunate occurrence. That no compensation was claimed in that letter by Sri Bhattacharjee can be easily gathered from two pieces of evidence on record. Firstly, in the aforementioned letter dated 11-4-67 Sri Sarao suggested to Sri Bhattacharjee that if Mahendra was involved in the accident and had suffered injuries he should be asked to file a claim and appear in the Court on some date between 17th and 30th April, 1967. If any compensation had been claimed in the letter dated 6th May, 1966, Shri Sarao may not have made the suggestion which he actually made. Secondly, we have the testimony of Sri Bhattacharjee himself that when he found Padma Goswami crying in the office she was employed in, he enquired from her what the matter was, and she narrated what accounted for her distress and requested him "to make enquiries about Mohendra Gosai". Sri Bhattacharjee affirmed further that he then wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, for immediate enquiry. Sri Bhattacharjee stated candidly, and I think very rightly, that he had written that letter to the Deputy Commissioner in his capacity as a member of the Assam Legislative Assembly. He testified further that after he had received a letter from Sri Sarao requiring him to furnish particulars about Mahendra Goswami, he "then lodged a formal claim before the Claims Commissioner on behalf of the surviving members of Mahendra Gosai". He testified further that after he had received a letter from Sri Sarao requiring him to furnish particulars about Mahendra Goswami, he "then lodged a formal claim before the Claims Commissioner on behalf of the surviving members of Mahendra Gosai". However, it is unfortunate, Sri Bhattacharjee did not furnish the date on which he had submitted a formal claim nor did he affirm that he had been authorised to do so. Nor, again, such a claim is to be found on the file of the compensation case. 13. According to sub-section (1) of Section 82-C an application for compensation can be made either by the injured or by his dependant in case he dies. It will be noticed that though Section 82-C permits the injured to make the application through an authorised agent, such facility is not given to the dependant. Probably it is for the reason that it is stated in sub-section (3) of Section 82-C that if in an application for compensation any person makes a statement which is false and which he knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. At any rate, the court statement of Sri Bhattacharjee that he had submitted a formal claim for compensation is belittled by the contents of the letter dated 29th April, 1967 addressed by him to Shri Sarao. In the last two paragraphs of that letter Sri Bhattacharjee expressed the inability of the members of the family of Mahendra to file a claim by 30th April, 1967, and on that account he requested Shri Sarao to allow Saraswati Goswami or some member of her family "to file a claim and appear in your court in any future date". This letter clearly brings out that no claim had been filed until 29th April, 1967, and I have stated earlier in this judgment that claim by Saraswati Goswami was actually made on 2-9-1968. It is in order to emphasise that Section 82-C does not contemplate the submission of a claim by a dependant of a deceased through an agent, duly authorised or not. Therefore, Sri Bhattacharjee could not have made the claim on behalf of Saraswati Goswami, nor, it looks evident, he had done so. It is in order to emphasise that Section 82-C does not contemplate the submission of a claim by a dependant of a deceased through an agent, duly authorised or not. Therefore, Sri Bhattacharjee could not have made the claim on behalf of Saraswati Goswami, nor, it looks evident, he had done so. It follows that there is no merit in the contention, legally or factually, that Shri Bhattacharjee had made any claim on 6-5-1966, or even thereafter, on behalf of Saraswati Goswami. 14. On page 6 of the Paper Book is printed the application dated 2-9-68 which was submitted by Saraswati Goswami to the Claims Commissioner. In that application she happened to pray that "the first report of Shri T.P. Bhattacharjee (now ex-M.L.A.) should be treated as original claim petition on her behalf. This prayer, it is not proved, was granted by the Claims Commissioner and since this application of Saraswati Goswami itself was much beyond the period of three months prescribed for submission of claims, the Claims Commissioner held the claim to be barred by time. I think he had no alternative but to do so. Sub-section (2) of Section 82-C prescribes a period of three months counted from the date of the occurrence of the accident, for submission of claims. It is stated further in that sub-section that the Claims Commissioner may on good cause shown allow any application to be made at any time within one year of such occurrence. It is apparent from the judgment under appeal that the Claims Commissioner was neither approached for condoning the delay nor he actually condoned the same. Moreover, the Claims Commissioner can entertain an application, at the best, within one year of the date of the accident, and since Saraswati Goswami had moved an application, which too was not in the prescribed form, on 2nd September, 1968, the Claims Commissioner did not have the sanction of law to entertain the same. The only alternative open to him was to dismiss that application under Section 3 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore I endorse the finding of the Claims Commissioner that the claim had been made beyond time and as such it could not be entertained, nor allowed. 15. The only point left for determination is whether Mahendra Goswami had died at Diphu on 23-4-1966 in the railway accident that took place there. Therefore I endorse the finding of the Claims Commissioner that the claim had been made beyond time and as such it could not be entertained, nor allowed. 15. The only point left for determination is whether Mahendra Goswami had died at Diphu on 23-4-1966 in the railway accident that took place there. The Claims Commissioner did not feel satisfied that Mahendra was a victim of that accident. On going through the entire evidence on record and on examining the reasons which weighed with the Claims Commissioner in holding that Mahendra was not a victim of that accident, I feel satisfied that the facts brought on the record do not establish that Mahendra Goswami had died at Diphu on 23rd April, 1966, as a result of the train accident. According to the original stand of the family, as evident from the letter dated 29th April, 1967, which Sri Bhattacharjee addressed to Shri Sarao (vide page 4 of the Paper Book), Mahendra Goswami was employed with a contractor at Jorhat. However, subsequently it was stated that Mahendra was a timber contractor at Amguri. Two witnesses, Nabin Bhuyan and Banshi Lal Sarma, both of Amguri, were examined to prove that Mahendra was working at Amguri on 23rd April, 1966. It is not possible to reconcile the plea of Mahendras employment with a contractor at Jorhat with the assertion subsequently made that he was doing timber business at Amguri. Further, the telegram which is said to have come to the hands of Padma on 25th April, 1966, and which was allegedly sent by Sitaram, has not been produced in Court. Padma said while in the witness box that she had mislaid that telegram. Assuming that it is so, Saraswati Goswami could have summoned Sitaram to prove that Mahendra was employed with him and that he had actually sent a telegram enquiring about his welfare after he had learnt about the railway accident on 23-4-1966. However no attempt in that direction was made. Therefore the statements of Nabin Bhuyan and Banshi Lal stand at discount. None of the two witnesses is proved to be a relation or a friend of Mahendra and so they appear to be suborned witnesses. For all these reasons, I agree with the Claims Commissioner that it remains unproved that Mahendra had died at Diphu on 23rd April, 1966, on account of the railway accident. 16. None of the two witnesses is proved to be a relation or a friend of Mahendra and so they appear to be suborned witnesses. For all these reasons, I agree with the Claims Commissioner that it remains unproved that Mahendra had died at Diphu on 23rd April, 1966, on account of the railway accident. 16. Before concluding I would like to dispose of one legal point raised by Sri Senapati. He invited my attention to Rule 9 which provides that as soon as a Commissioner is appointed, the General Manager or other executive head of the railway administration concerned shall furnish the Commissioner with the information about the total number of passengers killed or injured, about the nature of the injuries sustained by the injured passengers, and the number of unidentified bodies together with a brief description of each such body. In the background of this statutory rule Sri Senapati submitted that necessary material about the casualties, fatal and injured, having not been brought to the notice of the Claims Commissioner by the railway administration this Court should raise a presumption that Mahendra was one of the fatal casualties. I regret my inability to accept the submission as valid. Rule 9 does not enjoin that the particulars about the casualties should be placed on the file of each claim case. It only requires that the necessary information should be made available to the Commissioner immediately after his appointment. Therefore it was not obligatory on the railway administration to place the casualty list on the record of the present case. Of course, the Commissioner could have directed the railway administration to do so and it was also open to the claimant to summon that list from the railway administration. However nothing of the sort appears to have been done. Therefore the grievance voiced by Sri Senapati is sans merit. Moreover, I find from page 2 of the Paper Book that the Commissioner had directed the railway administration to submit the photographs of the casualties involved in the Diphu accident and so I can safely presume that the railway administration had complied with the direction given by the Commissioner. If so, then it is legitimate to presume that none of the photographs related to Mahendra Goswami. Therefore I hold, in agreement with the Commissioner, that it remains unproved that Mahendra Goswami was involved in the accident. 17. If so, then it is legitimate to presume that none of the photographs related to Mahendra Goswami. Therefore I hold, in agreement with the Commissioner, that it remains unproved that Mahendra Goswami was involved in the accident. 17. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed, but I make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.