JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of an order of externment passed against the petitioner on July 19, 1971 by the District Magistrate, Bilaspur, under the Madhya pradesh Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1965 (hereinafter called the Act ). By that order the District Magistrate directed the petitioner to remove himself outside the revenue district of Bilaspur and the contiguous districts of Raigarh, sarguja, Shahdol, Mandla, Raipur and Durg or any part thereof within a period of three days from the date of receipt of that order and not to enter or return to the aforesaid districts or any part thereof for a period of one year from the date of that order. ( 2. ) ON information being received from the Superintendent of Police, bilaspur, and on the material placed before him the District Magistrate informed the petitioner in writing of the allegations against him and gave him an opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. He filed a written statement denying most of the allegations and examined ten witnesses in his defence. On a consideration of the material and appraisal of the evidence produced before him, the District Magistrate was satisfied that the activities of the petitioner were calculated to cause alarm and danger to person and property. He further found that the petitioner was responsible for indulging in activities details of which have been given in the preliminary order showing that the petitioner was engaged or was about to be engaged in the commission of offences punishable under Chapters 16 and 17 of the Penal Code and that he had created such a terror that witnesses were not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against him. The District Magistrate confirmed his preliminary order in which, on a consideration of the particulars enumerated in that order and the material placed before him, it appeared to him that the petitioner, having formed a gang, was carrying on terrorising activities and committing offences against body and property in the district of Bilaspur, particularly in the areas within the City Kotwali and Civil Lines Police Station of bilaspur; and further that the petitioner and his companions were committing theft, robbery, dacoity, causing hurt, murder, affray, depriving people of their money and possession of land, assaulting Government servants; and that prosecutions were initiated against him but because of the terror created by him, no independent witness could muster courage to give evidence against him and his companions ; further that having created terror in the general public, he is in the habit of threatening people with assault so that no one, even when injured, approaches the police nor dare institute a case in the Court and that witnesses turn hostile because of fear and threats: and that the petitioner having been convicted under Chapters 16 and 17 of the Penal Code, has become an anti-social element, causing alarm to the general public and engaging himself in commission of crimes and he commits breach of peace by taking law in his own hands. His own words may be reproduced here :- ( 3. ) AGGRIEVED by the final order dated July 19. 1971, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the State Government under section 8 of the Act. Although this appeal was filed on July 23, 1971, no date of hearing was fixed by the government. In this petition which was filed on October 25, 197), the petitioner raised that point. However, during the pendency of the petition a date in December 1971 was fixed for hearing of the appeal, but the petitioner refused to avail himself of that opportunity. He informed the appellate authority that since this petition was pending in this Court he would not appear before the appellate authority. Learned Government Advocate informed us that the appeal has not been dismissed and is still pending and it is open to the petitioner to appear before the appellate authority which will hear him and decide the appeal. He informed the appellate authority that since this petition was pending in this Court he would not appear before the appellate authority. Learned Government Advocate informed us that the appeal has not been dismissed and is still pending and it is open to the petitioner to appear before the appellate authority which will hear him and decide the appeal. But the learned counsel for the petitioner emphatically stated that he did not hope to get any relief from the appellate authority so that the petitioner had decided not to appear before it. ( 4. ) REALISING the scope of a writ petition, as distinguished from an appeal, the learned counsel for the petitioner restricted his contentions to questions of law. It is urged that sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 4 of the Act are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. ( 4. ) REALISING the scope of a writ petition, as distinguished from an appeal, the learned counsel for the petitioner restricted his contentions to questions of law. It is urged that sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 4 of the Act are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The section reads as follows : - "whenever it appears to the District Magistrate- (a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property; or (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII or under section 506 or 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) or in the abetment of any such offence, and when in the opinion of the District Magistrate witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property; or (c) that an outbreak of epidemic disease is likely to result from the continued residence of an immigrant; the District Magistrate may, by an order in writing duly served on him or by beat of drum or otherwise as the District Magistrate thinks fit, direct such person or immigrant- (a) so as to conduct himself as shall seem necessary in order to prevent violence and alarm or the outbreak of spread of such disease; or (b) to remove himself outside the district or any part thereof or such area and any district or districts, or any part thereof, contiguous thereto by such route and within such time as the District Magistrate may specify and not to enter or return to the said district or part thereof or such area and such contiguous districts, or part thereof, as the case may be, from which he was directed to remove himself. " It is urged for the petitioner that both these clauses (a) and (b) have no nexus with "public order" so that the impugned legislation is outside Entry 1, List 2 of the Seventh Schedule. " It is urged for the petitioner that both these clauses (a) and (b) have no nexus with "public order" so that the impugned legislation is outside Entry 1, List 2 of the Seventh Schedule. The argument is that if the movements or acts of a person are causing or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to any person or property it is a wrong against an individual or individuals, and "public order" has nothing to do with it. The emphasis is on the words "person or property". The petitioner reads these words as meaning an individual or individuals, and his or their property. In our opinion, clause (a) of section 4 does not speak of an individual, or property of an individual, either in the singular or in the plural number. The word "person" here means human body. Thus the movements or acts of any person would be within the purview of clause (a) if they are causing or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to human body or to property of the public or of a section of it or of unspecified individuals. The words "person or property" do not refer to the body or property of a specified individual. The word "person" not only means an individual human being, a man, a woman or a child, but also "the living body of a human being" (Per Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ). Thus, "offences against person" refer to bodily attacks, assaults, etc. We have not the slightest hesitation in holding that the word "person" is used in this latter sense in section 4 of the Act. This is the only reasonable construction of the word "person". In M/s V. O. Tract. , Moscow v. M/s. Tarapore and Co. ( 1969 3 SCC 562 ) their lordships have remarked as follows : "a statute should not be construed as a theorem of Euclid but the statute must be construed with some imagination of the purpose which lies behind the statute. The doctrine of literal interpretation is not always the best method for ascertaining the intention of Parliament. The better rule of interpretation is that a statute should be so construed as to prevent the mischief and advance the remedy according to the true intent of of the makers of the statute. The doctrine of literal interpretation is not always the best method for ascertaining the intention of Parliament. The better rule of interpretation is that a statute should be so construed as to prevent the mischief and advance the remedy according to the true intent of of the makers of the statute. " (p. 586)In State of M. P. v. Dadabhoys Colliery (1972 MPLJ 680=1972 JLJ 222.) the Supreme Court has instructively laid down as follows :- "the rule of construction that a Court construing a provision of law must presume that the intention of the authority making it was not to exceed its power and to enact it validly is well settled. Where, therefore, two constructions are possible, the one which sustains its validity must be preferred. " ( 5. ) ON the true construction of section 4 it must follow that to prevent a person from movements or acts which are causing or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to human body or property is directly related to maintenance of public order as meaning public peace and tranquillity. The expression "public order" is of wide connotation. In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of bihar ( 1966 1 SCR 709 = air 1966 SC 740 ) Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) succintly pointed out the distinction between "law and order", "public order" and public security". He said that three concentric circles are to be imagined. The outermost circle represents "law and order" ; the middle one represents "public order" ; and the innermost represents "public security". In Raipur Municipality v. State of Madhya pradesh (1970 MPLJ 191= air 1970 SC 1923 .) their Lordships stated : "in our view, public order in this context means public peace and tranquillity. " in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 = (1970) 3 SCR 288 ) their Lordships were considering the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Hidayatullah C. J. , speaking for the Court, said : "public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. " His Lordship gave several instances to demonstrate the distinction. One of them may be reproduced here : "take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. " His Lordship gave several instances to demonstrate the distinction. One of them may be reproduced here : "take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. " ( 6. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner relies on Nagendra Nath v. State of west Bengal ( AIR 1972 SC 665 ), but in our opinion that decision does not help the petitioners contention. ( 7. ) IT is undoubted that maintenance of public order within a State is the primary concern of the State. We therefore hold that the provisions of section 4 (a) are within the legislative competence under Entry 1 of List 2 of the seventh Schedule. ( 8. ) SO also the provisions of clause (b) of section 4 are intra vires the Constitution. We therefore hold that the provisions of section 4 (a) are within the legislative competence under Entry 1 of List 2 of the seventh Schedule. ( 8. ) SO also the provisions of clause (b) of section 4 are intra vires the Constitution. For the reasons stated above and on the high authority cited above we are clearly of the view that where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence specified in that clause, and, further, witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public aginst such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property, the preventive action to be under the Act is for the maintenance of public order. It is implicit in clause (b) that the offences referred to in it refer not to offences against a specified individual, but against the community and their Lordships decision in Arun Ghoshs case (supra) applies to this clause also. It was an argument before, us that an offence under section 509 of the Penal Code, even if it was directed against several women, would not disturb public order although it may annoy those individual women. Section 509 reads thus : whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any women, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such women, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine or with both. " This argument is untenable, particularly in view of the illustrations we have reproduced above from the ruling in Arun Ghoshs case. We are therefore of the view that clause (b) of section 4 is also within the legislative competence, as relatable to maintenance of public order. ( 9. ) IT was next contended for the petitioner that the order of the District magistrate is bad inasmuch as it is based on past acts of the petitioner as if the petitioners externment is a punishment for those acts It was argued that past act could not be taken into consideration by the authority. ( 9. ) IT was next contended for the petitioner that the order of the District magistrate is bad inasmuch as it is based on past acts of the petitioner as if the petitioners externment is a punishment for those acts It was argued that past act could not be taken into consideration by the authority. No doubt, the impugned Act is a preventive, not punitive, measure. Its object is to prevent activity of an individual for maintenance of public order, and not to punish him for his past acts. But instances of past activities are certainly relevant and the authority can take them into account for the purposes of his satisfaction required by section 4. This is settled law. See, for instance, Bhim Sen v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1951 SC 481 ) ( 10. ) LASTLY it was contended that whereas there is a reference to section 5 of the Act in the final order of the District Magistrate, it was nowhere stated by him that he had reason to believe that the petitioner was likely to engage himself in the commission of an offence similar to that for which he had been previously convicted. On a careful perusal of the entire order of the District Magistrate we find that from the particulars stated by him and on the materials referred to by him he passed the order on a satisfaction under clauses (a) and (b) of section 4. His order is really under those two clauses and not under section 5, the mention of which seems to be inadvertent. Section 5 of the Act has nothing to do with the petitioners case. ( 11. ) IT was also an argument for Use petitioner that the particulars supplied to him by the preliminary order were vague. Reliance is placed on Debu ghose v. State of West Benqal (AIR 1973 SC 530 ). We have perused the preliminary order. It gives particulars as to date, time and place of every incident mentioned in it. That part of the order which the learned counsel for the petitioner called vague really states or summarises the conclusions reached by the District Magistrate. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel therefore does not apply. ( 12. ) THE petition is dismissed. No order for costs. Security amount be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.