JUDGMENT - (After stating the facts given above, the judgment proceeds-) What is argued by Mr. Lalit, however, is that as the structures built on the plot belonged to defendant No.1, he had every right to induct defendants. Nos. 2, 9, 13 and 17 even after January 1, 1962 as the tenants of the structures in which the plaintiff had no interest whatsoever. He argued relying on Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen & Tourbo Ltd1, Bhatia Co-operative Sociecty v. Patel2, Vinayak Golpal v. Laxman Kashinath3 and Dossibai v. Khemchand4, and an unreported decision of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ., in S. R. Shetty v. Phirozshah Nasserwanji Colabawalla5, that defendants Nos. 2 to 17, who occupied the structure built by defendant No. 1, were merely licensees in respect of the suit plot. He argued that no interest of defendant No.1 was assigned or transferred or conveyed to the said defendants Nos. 2 to 17 by making them tenants of the structures. Although the question did not specifically arise for consideration in the other cases, in S. R. Shetty v. Phirozshah Nasserwanji Calabawalla, Patel and K. K. Desai JJ., did hold as follows: ". As held by the learned trial Judge, with whom we agree since the petitioner was merely a tenant of the superstructure belonging to opponent 2, it cannot be said that by that reason alone he was also a sub-tenant in respect of the open piece of the plot. As the learned Judge says, it only means that he was a licensee of the land and a tenant of the superstructure. Once it is held that he was merely a licensee of the land there can be no question of application either of section. 14 or of Ordinance III of 1949 or the subsequent amended section 15 of the, Rent Registration Act." As this question did not directly arise for consideration in the other cases, it is unnecessary to discuss them. The decision of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ., is binding on me. The leave granted to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision in S. C. C. A. 155/1963 was revoked on April 5, 1963 as the value was inflated in the application. It must, therefore, follow that Mr. Lalit is right in his contention that none of the defendants Nos. 2 to 17 became the subtenants of the suit plot. 2. It must, therefore, follow that Mr. Lalit is right in his contention that none of the defendants Nos. 2 to 17 became the subtenants of the suit plot. 2. However, the decision of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ., was given in the context of the question as to whether the petitioner in that case, who was the obstructionist, could set up a plea of sub-tenancy. A reference in this connection was also made before me to the decision of Bal J., in Ibrahim Ahmed Welder v. Ramesh Janardan Shroff6, and the decision of Bhasme J., in Dina Manekji Mody v. Malshi Bharmal7 Bal J., was of the view that the question as to whether a person, who was inducted in the structure built by the lessee of a plot, is or is not a sub-tenant depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, observing as follows with reference to the judgment of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ. : "The ratio of this decision ill that a tenant of the superstructure belonging to a lessee does not automatically by operation of law, become a sub-tenant of the lessor. The alternative contention of Mr. Nariman stated above must therefore, be rejected. The decision does not however, go so far as to say that a tenant of the superstructure can never be a sub tenant of the land under it. It is possible to let out the structure along with the land under it, It is also possible to let out the structure alone and to allow the land under it to be used by way of licence. What has been actually done is a question of fact to be determined in each case" Bhasme J., also referred to the said decision of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ., and the decision of Bal J., in the context of the definition of the word lease in section 105 of the. Transfer of Property Act and in the light of the facts of the case before him and concluded: "In the present case Khambatta was the lessee of the open plot of the land. He had built the super structure on the land. When he let out the various portions of the built structure to the several occupants he can do so only when he parts with his lease-hold interest in the land. He had built the super structure on the land. When he let out the various portions of the built structure to the several occupants he can do so only when he parts with his lease-hold interest in the land. He owned the structure and therefore, there was no difficulty in handing over the possession of the structure to the several occupants who were his tenants. But when he inducted the several tenants on the land to occupy the structure then in law he was creating the subleases in favour of the several tenants in respect of the portions of the land under the structure. The legal consequence of the transaction effected between Khambatta and the several occupants is that the occupants become the sub-lessees in respect of the land. It is not possible in the absence of any evidence to break up the transaction in the manner in which Mr. Andhyarujina suggests that it should be done. It is not possible to hold that the several occupants were licensees in respect of the land and tenants in respect of the structure. In fact it is possible to hold in the reverse order. The various occupants can be the sub-tenants in respect of the land with the right to occupy the structure. In other words, in law they can be licensees of the structure and sub-tenants in respect of the open land." The context, in which the question arose before Bhasme J., was the finding of the appellate Bench that under the terms of a consent decree, Khambatta had relinquished his rights or interest in the superstructure erected by him and immediately Khambattas tenants became sub-tenants of the owner of the plot who had released the plot to Khambatta. As stated above, the Division Bench decision is binding on me and it is unnecessary for me to consider the validity of the view taken by Bhasme J. 3. When applying precedents, we can never for get the warning given by Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem8, as follows (p. 506) ".. As stated above, the Division Bench decision is binding on me and it is unnecessary for me to consider the validity of the view taken by Bhasme J. 3. When applying precedents, we can never for get the warning given by Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem8, as follows (p. 506) ".. every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to he proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found a case is only an authority for what it actually decides." It cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from the decision. Lord Halsbury commented on this mode of reasoning as follows (p. 506) : “ Such a made of reasoning assumes that the law is necessary a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." 4. With respect, what Patel and K. K. Desai JJ. decided was also in the context of the question before them as to whether the obstructionist could be regarded as a sub-tenant under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 194-7 of the plot of land in dispute in that case. It is clear that they have laid down that the tenant of a structure built by a tenant could never claim the sub-tenancy in respect of the plot of land. That decision must apply in the present case also. 5. In para. 3 of the written statement filed by defendant No. 1 he the contended that he had a right to sublet the plot to defendants Nos. 2 to 17 and his sub-letting was not prohibited by section 15 and, therefore, he could not be evicted for unlawful subletting. He did not contend that merely because he sublet the structure to defendants Nos. 2 to 17, they automatically became the sub-tenants of the plot. Clause 9 under the registered lease deed, which permitted the petitioner to induct defendants Nos. 2 to 17, permitted him to do so only in respect of the structure and not in respect of the plot of land. The contention of Mr. 2 to 17, they automatically became the sub-tenants of the plot. Clause 9 under the registered lease deed, which permitted the petitioner to induct defendants Nos. 2 to 17, permitted him to do so only in respect of the structure and not in respect of the plot of land. The contention of Mr. Lalit that the lease deed gave defendant No.1 the right to sublet the plot also to defendants Nos. 2 to 17 is not borne out by the terms of the lease deed. In the absence of any such terms, following the decision of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ. I must hold that defendants Nos. 2 to 17 were not the sub-tenants of the suit plot. 6. The main question, however, is as to whether by inducting defendants Nos. 2, 9, 13 and 17 after January I, 1962, defendant No. 1 rendered his tenancy liable to be terminated by the landlord under section 130) (e). Mr. Lalit submitted relying on the aforesaid decision of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ, that since the letting out of the superstructure, as held by them, did not attract the provisions of section 14 or of Ordinance III of 1949 or of the subsequent amended section 15 of the Rent Restriction Act, it would not amount to an unlawful subletting of the whole or part of the premises or assignment or transfer in any other manner of defendant No. 1’s interest in the plot within the meaning of section 13 (1) (e). 7. The argument made by Mr. Lalit is undoubtedly very attractive at the first blush. But, as stated above, the decision of Patel and K. K. Desai, JJ. must be confined to the facts and the issues raised before them. Logical extensions and corollaries from the observations made in the judgment cannot be permitted so as to defeat the provisions of section 13 (1) (e) and section 15. It is true that they have referred to section 14, Ordinance III of 1949 and also section 15 of the Rent Restriction Act. But all these references were in the context of the plea of the obstructionist in the case that he was a sub-tenant. That was not a case where a tenant was sued on the ground that the tenant had rendered himself liable to be evicted under section 13 (1) (e) as in the present case. But all these references were in the context of the plea of the obstructionist in the case that he was a sub-tenant. That was not a case where a tenant was sued on the ground that the tenant had rendered himself liable to be evicted under section 13 (1) (e) as in the present case. In the facts of the present case, however, the main question, as stated above, is whether the landlord has established the ground under section 13 (1) (e). It may be that in view of the decision of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ., which binds me, I must hold that defendant No.1 did not unlawfully sublet the plot to defendants Nos. 2, 9,13 and 17 and that he merely granted them a licence to use the portions of the land on which the structures let out to them stood. 8. That is, however, not the only ground on which the landlord can succeed under section 13 (1) (e). Unlawful subletting is one ground under that sub-section and under section 15. If the landlord establishes any other assignment or transfer of any interest of the tenant other than unlawful subletting, he is entitled to succeed under section 13 (1) (e). Reilying strongly on the decision of Patel and K. K. Desai JJ., Mr. Lalit submitted that if the tenant of the structure was merely a licensee in respect of the plot, it could not be said that he had any interest in the suit premises and, therefore, applying that very decision it must be held that defendant No. I did not transfer any interest which he had in the plot to defendants Nos. 2, 9, 13 and 17. This submission ignores the nature of a licence. It is true that for creating a lease, an interest in the land must be transferred. It is also true that under section 52 of the Easements Act, it is only when the right transferred as a licence is not an easement or interest in the property that the right is called a licence. It is true that for creating a lease, an interest in the land must be transferred. It is also true that under section 52 of the Easements Act, it is only when the right transferred as a licence is not an easement or interest in the property that the right is called a licence. But what is required to be established by the landlord under section 13 (1) (e) is that the tenant has "unlawfully sublet," which cannot be the case in respect of the superstructure, as in the present case, "or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein." The words "in any other manner" have reference to the unlawful subletting referred to earlier. In certain circumstances such other manner may be even creation of a sort of irrevocable licence. The licence, in cases like the present where a superstructure is let out, in respect of a plot of land is in the nature of an accessory licence referred to under section 55 as it is a licence necessary for the enjoyment of the tenancy rights of the superstructure Under section 60 (a) of the Easement Act, the licence cannot be revoked by defendant No. 1 because the licence is coupled with the transfer of property in the superstructure as long as such transfer is in force. It is true that defendant No. 1 has not transferred his entire interest in the land to the tenant of the superstructure. But it must be held to be a transfer or assignment included in the words "in any other manner" of the interest of defendant No. 1 In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, it must be held that although the plaintiffs are not entitled to succeed on account of the unlawful subletting, they are entitled to get possession under section 13 (1) (e) as it is established that defendant No. 1; who became a statutory tenant on January 1, 1962, transferred unlawfully a licence with respect to the suit plot to defendants Nos. 2, 9, 13 and 17, which was a transfer or assignment "in any other manner of his interest" within the meaning of section 13 (1) (e) .. 9. 2, 9, 13 and 17, which was a transfer or assignment "in any other manner of his interest" within the meaning of section 13 (1) (e) .. 9. Turning to the findings of the trial Court with regard to this ground of eviction, what I find is that the trial Court came to the conclusion that as defendant No. 1 had a right to take sub-tenants, the sub-tenancies created in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 17 were not unlawful. That is why the trial Court passed only a decree for symbolical possession against them while passing a decree for actual possession against defendant No. 1 on the ground of defaults. The learned Extra-Assistant Judge, on the contrary, reversed the said finding holding that defendant No I unlawfully sublet the suit plot or assigned or transferred his interest in the suit plot to defendants Nos. 2, 9, 13 and 17 after January I, 1962 holding inter alia as follows: "As the facts stand, defendant 1 has let out the various parts of his buildings to defendants 2, 9, 13 and 17. The portions of the buildings so let out by defendant 1 consist of the portions of the buildings and the portions of the land underneath them respectively. Under the circumstances, defendant 1 will have to he taken to have not only let out the structures to the aforesaid defendants but also the land beneath them respectively. Undoubtedly, in law, this cannot be considered as subletting, held In the two aforesaid rulings still section 13 (1) (e) is not restricted to subletting only, but it also includes transfer or assignment of the interest of the tenant in the premises or part of it, in any manner. When defendant 1 has let out the part of the suit plot to the aforesaid defendants though along with his structures thereon, he has to be held to have contravened provisions of section 13 (1) (e) of the Bombay Rent Act. And the plaintiffs are entitled to claim possession from him on that ground." For the reasons stated above, I agree with the said conclusion of the learned Extra Assistant Judge. The third contention of Mr. Lalit must also fail. 10. If that contention fails, then Special Civil Application No. 1839 of 1968 filed by defendant No.2 and Special Civil Application No. 1840 of 1968 filed by defendants Nos. The third contention of Mr. Lalit must also fail. 10. If that contention fails, then Special Civil Application No. 1839 of 1968 filed by defendant No.2 and Special Civil Application No. 1840 of 1968 filed by defendants Nos. 4 and 7 must also fail as they were mere licensees and if the landlord is entitled to recover possession from defendant No. 1, the decree for eviction can be executed against them also. Rules discharged