JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal by an accused who was convicted u/s 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The appeal came in the first instance before my learned brothren Ray and Acharys, JJ. Acharys, J. was of the view that the charge has been fully established against the Appellant. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. Ray, J. took a contrary view and opined that the appeal should be allowed. It is in these circumstances that u/s 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the appeal has been referred to me for disposal. The prosecution case in short is that very early on the morning on 22-4-1968, Manguli Dei the deceased had been to a Chua (a ditch dug out in the dried out bed of a tank for the purpose of collecting percolating water there from) at a little distance from her house to forth water for domestic purposes. Four or five days prior to the date of occurrence, the accused Sanatan had lost his daughter and he entertained a suspicion that it was due to the witchcraft practised on her by Manguli. He sent for Manguli but she did not turn up and this appears to have confirmed the suspicion of the accused that Manguli was responsible for the death of his daughter. On the date of occurrence when Manguli was near, the Chua washing her face, the Appellant came there from the nearby hillock and quashed Manguli as to why she did not come to his house when he sent for her. So saying; he assaulted Manguli with the stick M.O. If a branch of a Karma tree, 4? feet in length and 6 inches in girth which he had in his hand and thus being assaulted Manguli fell down dead at the spot. Sita p.w. 6 the younger sister of the deceased Manguli who was at that time coming towards the Chua seeing the occurrence raised an alarm on hearing which her mother p.w. 9 came to the spot and found Manguli lying there dead. Several other persons of the village also gathered at the spot and after seeing Manguli lying dead there and coming to know that it is the Appellant who had caused the death went to the latter's house and questioned him about it. The Appellant confessed before them as having killed Manguli. Several other persons of the village also gathered at the spot and after seeing Manguli lying dead there and coming to know that it is the Appellant who had caused the death went to the latter's house and questioned him about it. The Appellant confessed before them as having killed Manguli. P.w. 4 the father of the deceased then went to the Police Station at Bangriposi and lodged the F.I.R. Ext. 8 at about noon, which is 25 kilo meters off from the village where the occurrence took place. The Investigating Officer p.w. 11 reached the spot at 5 P.M. that day and took up investigation, and in due course, the Appellant was sent up for trial to answer a charge u/s 302, Indian Penal Code. The Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied all knowledge about the occurrence. 3. The doctor p.w. 12 who held the postmortem examination over the dead body of Manguli found a lacerated injury on the occipital region with fracture of the occipital bone and another lacerated injury on the right side of the parietal bone and a bruise on the right temporal region. On dissection it was found that the occipital and parietal bones were fractured and blood clots were found in the right term poral region. In the opinion of the doctor, all the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is not disputed that the death of the deceased was homicidal. 4. The prosecution relied on the following items of evidence to prove the of large against the Appellant: (i) Evidence of two eye-witnesses, namely, p.ws. 5 and 6, aged about 12 years and 9 years, respectively; (2) Extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the Appellant before p.ws. 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9; (3) Production by the accused of M.O. I which was subsequently found to be stained with human blood; and (4) Seizure from the person of the Appellant of the Lungi M.O. II which was found to be stained with human brood. 5. 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9; (3) Production by the accused of M.O. I which was subsequently found to be stained with human blood; and (4) Seizure from the person of the Appellant of the Lungi M.O. II which was found to be stained with human brood. 5. So far as the third item is concerned, it appears from the evidence that the lathi M.O. I. was not in the custody of the Appellant when it was seized by the police, but that it was in the custody of p.w. 1 who stated that he had seized it from the accused on the morning of the date of occurrence. In these circumstances, both my learned brothren took the view that the blood stains found on the lathi cannot be safely relied upon as an incriminating circumstances against the Appellant. I find myself in entire agreement with this view. 6. Regarding the fourth item, the seizure list Ext. 5 shows that a green coloured Lungi had been seized from the Appellant, the prosecution case being that it is this Lungi which the Appellant was wearing at the time he committed the murder. From Ext. 10, the letter dated 17-9-1968 from the Chemical Examiner addressed to the Sub-divisional Officer, Baripada it appears that amongst the articles sent for examination, there were two packets marked 'D' and 'E'. The packet marked 'D' contained a green coloured Lungi and the pocket marked 'E' contained a soiled blue coloured Lungi both bearing dark brown stains. It is not clear from the prosecution evidence as to wherefrom the Investigating Officer got the blue coloured Lungi. The report of the Chemical Examiner shows that human blood was found only in the Lungi contained in the pocket 'E', namely, the blue coloured lungi. There is no evidence to show that the green coloured Lungi contained in the packet 'D' seized under Ext. 5 was stained with human blood. In the circumstances, I agree with my learned brothern that the seizure under Ext. 5 of the green coloured Lungi from the Appellant does not in any way help the prosecution case. 7. Regarding the two other items of evidence enumerated above, Acharya, J. considered that p.ws. 5 and 6 although child witnesses are reliable. He also believed that the Appellant confessed his guilt in the presence of p.ws. 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9. 7. Regarding the two other items of evidence enumerated above, Acharya, J. considered that p.ws. 5 and 6 although child witnesses are reliable. He also believed that the Appellant confessed his guilt in the presence of p.ws. 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9. In his view, if any corroboration was needed for the evidence given by p.ws. 5 and 6, that is afforded by the evidence regarding extra-judicial confession. Ray, J., however, was of the opinion that it was not safe to base the conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of p.ws. 5 and 6 and that such corroboration is lacking in this case. Discussing the evidence about the extra-judicial confession, he came to the conclusion that the confession having been made before a Chowkidar, it is inadmissible in evidence and consequently cannot be utilised to lend corroboration to the evidence of the two child witnesses. In the circumstances, I would confine myself to a discussion of the evidence under items (1) and (2). P.ws. 5 and 6, as already indicated, were 12 years and 9 years old respectively when they were examined in Court. From the certificate appended by the learned Sessions Judge to their depositions it appears that the Court was satisfied about their capacity to understand the questions put to them and to give answers to the same. Their competency therefore to testify as witnesses was not challenged before him. P.w. 5 has deposed that early in the morning before the occurrence took place, she and the deceased Manguli had been to the Chua to bring water. While she was drawing water from out of the Chua and the deceased Manguli was washing her face, the Appellant Sanatan came from the side of the nearby hillock with a stick in his hand and enquired from Manguli as to why she did not go to his house about 4 or 5 days before the occurrence when his daughter expired. So saying, he threatened to assault Manguli who begged of him not to do so. But in spite of her entreaties, the Appellant assaulted Manguli with a stick. She says that she left the spot, obviously out of fear, while the Appellant was still assaulting Manguli. P.w. 6 is Sita, the sister of the deceased. She also had been to the Chua that morning to bring water. But in spite of her entreaties, the Appellant assaulted Manguli with a stick. She says that she left the spot, obviously out of fear, while the Appellant was still assaulting Manguli. P.w. 6 is Sita, the sister of the deceased. She also had been to the Chua that morning to bring water. After she filled up a vessel with water, her elder sister asked her to go home and empty the same in a bigger vessel. This she did and was coming back to the Chua to take water again. As soon as she reached the top of the embankment of the tank, she found the Appellant giving blows to Manguli by means of a Karma stick on her back as well as right side of her head. On receipt of the blows, Manguli fell down and this witness shouted out to her mother to come to the place immediately saying that her sister had been assaulted. 8. The only criticism levelled against the evidence of p.w. 5 is that on returning home after seeing the assault she did not utter a word about it to any body before she was examined by the Police the next day. It is stated in respect of the evidence of p.w. 6 that after seeing the assault when she shouted out to her mother saying that her elder sister had been assaulted, she did not specify that it was the Appellant Sanatan who assaulted her sister. It was also pointed out that she admitted in answer to a question by the Court that she had not personally seen the assault but she only heard Manguli being assaulted. In fact, she has stated in cross examination that while returning back from her house, she heard the sound of assault from the embankment of the tank. The truth appears to be that on her way to the tank, she heard the Bound of beating which obviously had stopped by the time she came up to the top of the embankment and what she actually saw was her sister lying on the ground at the Chua and Sanatan standing near the spot. If on the basis of what she saw she bad deposed that Sanatan had assaulted he, sister, it cannot be said that her statement is false and that she was drawing only on her imagination. If on the basis of what she saw she bad deposed that Sanatan had assaulted he, sister, it cannot be said that her statement is false and that she was drawing only on her imagination. Regarding the other criticism against her evidence, she was not specifically asked in cross examination whether or not she had uttered the name of the Appellant when she shouted out for her mother. Her mother examined as p.w. 9 stated that while she was at her house which, as evidence shows, is situate at a short distance from the tank, she heard her daughter p.w. 6 shouting out from the tank that her elder sister was killed by Sanatan and that on hearing this she hastened towards the tank. P.w. 9 says that while she was proceeding towards the tank and was in the paddy field near the Hari of Sunamani (p.w. 8), she met the Appellant who was coming from the direction of the tank and that on seeing her, he raisd his stick saying that he would kill her as he had killed her daughter. So saying, he raised the stick but p.w. 8 who was then in her Hari shouted out to Sanatan not to assault p.w. 9. on account of this interference by p.w. 8, the Appellant did not assault p.w. 9 who then proceeded to the tank and found her daughter lying dead near the Chua with bleeding injuries on her head, and skull. P.w. 8 has stated that on the morning of the date of occurrence, while p.w. 9 the mother of the deceased was going towards the tank, the Appellant Sanatan who came from the side of the tank met p.w. 9 in the paddy field situated nearby and raised his stick to assault p.w. 9. It seems, p.w. 8 shouted out asking the Appellant to refrain from assaulting her and due to this interference by p.w. 8, Sanatan did not actually assault her. 9. There is no rule of law that the evidence of a child witness cannot under any circumstances be acted upon without corroboration. It seems, p.w. 8 shouted out asking the Appellant to refrain from assaulting her and due to this interference by p.w. 8, Sanatan did not actually assault her. 9. There is no rule of law that the evidence of a child witness cannot under any circumstances be acted upon without corroboration. But the rule which according to decided oases has hardened into one of law is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction based on the evidence of a child witness but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the Judge before a conviction without crroboration can be sustained. The Supreme Court in Rameshwar Vs. The State of Rajasthan, in dealing with the case of a young girl eight years old who was alleged to have been raped observed: The tender years of the child which is the victim of a sexual offence, coupled with other circumstances appearing in the case, such for example, as its demeanour, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand. Dealing next with the extent of corroboration required, when it is not considered safe to dispense with it, their Lordships thought that it was impossible to formulate the kind of evidence which should, or would, be regarded as corroboration because its nature and extent must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged. Nonetheless, the following principles have to be borne in mind while seeking for such corroboration: (1) It is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case, apart from the testimony of the child witness should in itself be sufficient to sustain conviction. Nonetheless, the following principles have to be borne in mind while seeking for such corroboration: (1) It is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case, apart from the testimony of the child witness should in itself be sufficient to sustain conviction. All that is required is that there must be some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of the child witness is true and it is reasonably safe to act upon it; (2) The independent evidence must not only take it safe to believe that the crime was committed but it must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some material particular the testimony of the child witness that the accused committed the crime. (3) The corroboration must come from independent sources and thus ordinarily the testimony of one child witness would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another. But of course, the circumstances may be such as to make it safe to dispense with the necessity of corroboration and in those special circumstances a conviction so based would not be illegal. (4) The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime. Judged in the light of the principles enuruerated above, the first question is whether the evidence of the two child witnesses in this case is such that it can be accepted without any independent corroboration. No suggestion has been made to any of the witnesses that any body in the village had any grudge against the Appellant and would therefore have tutored p.ws. 5 and 6 to depose against him Practically in this case, the first person who saw the accused Appellant committing the crime is p.w. 6, because it is now clear that on hearing her shouts that the Appellant killed her sister, her mother hurried to the spot. It cannot, therefore, be said that before she shouted that the Appellant had killed her sister any third person had any opportunity to tutor her to say so. It cannot, therefore, be said that before she shouted that the Appellant had killed her sister any third person had any opportunity to tutor her to say so. Although she has not seen the actual beating, it is clear from her evidence that she was on the embankment of the tank immediately after the beating had stopped and while the accused was still at the spot and her sister was lying on the ground near the Chua. As I would presently show, many of the villagers gathered at the spot immediately thereafter and every body came to know from p.w. 9 that the Appellant had committed the murder. There was, therefore, no occasion thereafter either for the villagers to question p.w. 5 the other child witness about it or for the latter to volunteer the information. The non-disclosure of the event p.w. 5 had witnessed near the Chua, to any body in the village till she was examined by the Appellant cannot, in the circumstances of the case, be viewed with suspicion. As the Investigating Officer came to the village on the evening of the date of occurrence and obviously for the rest of the night was engaged in holding the inquest and making preparations for the despatch of the dead body for post-mortem examination, he took up the examination of witnesses early next morning and that explains why p.ws. 5 and 6 were examined by the Police on the next day. If p.ws. 5 and 6 had not seen the occurrence and the prosecution wanted to falsely implication the Appellant, there is no reason why they should have pitched upon two young girls for the purpose. It, therefore, appears to me that this is a case where the evidence of p.ws. 5 and 6 can be accepted without necessity for corroboration. 10. Even if corroboration becomes necessary, I feel that it is sufficiently afforded by the evidence of p.ws. 8 and 9. Immediately after p.w. 9 heard the shouts of her daughter that the Appellant had assaulted her sister, p.w. 9 hastened towards the tank and on the way in a field situated near the Hari of p.w. 8 met the Appellant who was coming from the side of the tank. 8 and 9. Immediately after p.w. 9 heard the shouts of her daughter that the Appellant had assaulted her sister, p.w. 9 hastened towards the tank and on the way in a field situated near the Hari of p.w. 8 met the Appellant who was coming from the side of the tank. That the Appellant was coming from the side of the tank is also spoken to by p.w. 8 and this is a piece of evidence which renders it probable that the story told by the child witnesses that the Appellant assaulted the deceased near the Chua, situated on the bed of the tank is true. The statement of p.w. 9 that on meeting her the Appellant raised his stick to assault her saying that she would kill her as he had killed her daughter lends further corroboration to the story told by the child witnesses. I, therefore, feel that even if corroboration is sought for the evidence given by p.ws. 5 and 6, such corroboration is afforded by p.ws. 8 and 9. 11. I would now turn to the extra judicial confession said to have been made by the Appellant before some of the villagers. One of such witnesses is p.w. 9 the mother of the deceased who deposed that when the Appellant met her in the field near the Hari of p.w. 8, he threatened that he would kill her as he had killed her daughter. The four other witnesses who speak about extra-judicial confession are p.ws. 1, 2, 3 and 7. P.w. 1 is the Ex-Sarpanch. On the morning of the date of occurrence, be got information that the Appellant had assaulted the deceased by the side of the tank and had caused her death and immediately proceeded to the spot where he found a large number of villagers including p.ws. 2, 3, 7 and 9. He found Manguli lying dead near the Chua with bleeding injuries on her bead. From there, p.ws. 1, 2, 3, 7 and some others proceeded to the house of the Appellant where a few more persons of the village had also gathered. P.w. 1 says that on being questioned by them, the Appellant confessed before an present that be assaulted Manguli to death as he suspected that she caused the death of his daughter four or five days before the date of occurrence. P.w. 1 says that on being questioned by them, the Appellant confessed before an present that be assaulted Manguli to death as he suspected that she caused the death of his daughter four or five days before the date of occurrence. P.w. 1 says that besides making the confession, the Appellant also produced the stick by means of which he had assaulted Manguli and that thereafter the Chowkidar was sent for and the stick was made over to him. P.w. 3 corroborates the testimony given by p.w. 1 in 80 far as the making of extra-judicial confession by the Appellant is concerned. His evidence, however, is silent as to when the chowkidar was sent for and when the latter arrived at the house of the Appellant. P.w. 7 corroborates the testimony given by p.ws. 1 and 3 on this point. It was, however, elicited from him in crossex amination that after reaching the house of the Appellant this witness (p.w. 7) and another entered into the room of the Appellant and caught hold of his hands and enquired from him as to why he assaulted Manguli to death. It seems, he was threatened that if he would not tell the truth, he would be handed over to the Police and he was bound with a rope. P.w. 2 stated that it is he who was sent by the villagers to can the Chowkidar and after he came back with the Chowkidar, the latter asked the Appellant in presence of the villagers as so why be killed Manguli and the Appellant relied that he did so because four or five days before the occurrence his daughter expired and Manguli did not turn up at his house in spite of being sent for. 12. Referring to the extra-judicial confession about which p.ws. 1, 2, 3 and 7 have deposed, Ray, J. came to the conclusion that there was only one extra-judicial confession which the Appellant had made and that too in the presence of the Chowkidar, and consequently it is not admissible in evidence as the Chowkidar is a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Acharya J. on the other hand came to the conclusion that at the house of the Appellant, he made the confession on two different occasions, the one spoken to by p.ws. Acharya J. on the other hand came to the conclusion that at the house of the Appellant, he made the confession on two different occasions, the one spoken to by p.ws. 1, 3 and 7 before the arrival of the Chowkidar and the other after the Chowkidar came to the spot and about which p.w. 2 has deposed. After scanning the evidence on record, I am inclined to agree with the view taken by Acharya, J. The evidence given by p.w. 1 is specific on the point when he stated that after the accused made the extra-judicial confession in presence of the villagers, the Chowkidar was sent for. If at all the accused had only once made an extra-judicial confession at his house and it was made only after the Chowkidar arrived at the spot, p.ws. 1, 3 and 7 would have been cross-examined on this point to establish that it was so. Knowing as we do the habits of our villagers, it is also not likely that the villagers who bad gathered at the boose of the Appellant obviously with a view to question him about the incident would have waited patiently till the arrival of the Chowkidar. Natural curiousity would have prompted them to question the Appellant immediately about it. I, therefore, believe that the accused made the extra-judicial confession twice once before the arrival of the Chowkidar and about which p.ws. 1, 3 and 7 have deposed and the other after the arrival of the Chowkidar and about which p.w. 2 had deposed. 13. It was next argued, relying on the evidence of p.w. 7 that the confession from the accused was extracted under threat and consequently is inadmissible in evidence. u/s 24 of the Evidence Act, a confession is rendered irrelevant if it is caused by inducement, threat or promise only if such inducement, threat or promise has proceeded from a person in authority and sufficient to give the accused person reasonable grounds for supposing that by making the confession he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature with reference to the proceedings against him. There is nothing in the evidence of p.w. 7 to show that any of the persons who gave the threat to the accused was a person in authority the condition enumerated in Section 24 are therefore not satisfied and consequently the confession cannot be held to be irrelevant. 14. Doubtless, an extra-judicial confession is a very weak type of evidence, but in the present case, it is sufficient to afford further corroboration to the evidence given by the two eye witnesses p.ws. 5 and 6. 15. It was argued on behalf of the State that of the Chowkidar system has been abolished, there are no Chowkidars at present and the person who has been loosely referred to by p.ws. 1 and 2 as Chowkidar is in fact the Grama Rakshi who, as is evident from the F.I.R. Ext. 8 had accompanied p.w. 4, the father of the deceased to the Thana to lodge information, and that although a Chowkidar had been held to be a Police Officer, a Grama Rakshi is not so and consequently even if the extra-judicial confession had been made in presence of the Grama Rakshi, it is not inadmissible in evidence. In support of this contention, elaborate reference was made to the provisions of the Orissa Grama Rakshi Act, 1967 and the Rules framed there under and also to the provisions of the Village Chowkidary Act, 1870 (Bengal Act VI of 1870) and the Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act, 1922, and it was pointed out that the provisions in, the latter two Acts on the strength of which the Courts have held that a Chowkidar is a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act are absent from the Orissa Grama Rakshi Act and the Rules framed there under and consequently a Grama Rakshi should not be deemed to be such a Police Officer. In the view I take that the Grama Rakshi was not present when the Appellant made the first of the two extra-judicial confession in presence of the villagers, it is unnecessary to decide in this case, whether a Grama Rakshi is or is not a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 16. On a careful consideration of the evidence and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the charge against the Appellant has been established beyond doubt. 16. On a careful consideration of the evidence and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the charge against the Appellant has been established beyond doubt. I would accordingly uphold the conviction of the Appellant and the sentence imposed on him and dismiss the appeal.