Judgment :- ISMAIL, J. 1. These applications came up for hearing before N.S. Ramaswami, J., on 3rd August 1972 and since the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 was questioned by the respondents herein, notice already having been given to the Advocate-General of the State the learned Judge referred the applications to a Bench and hence they have come up before us. We shall first refer to the circumstance under which these applications came to be filed. Respondents 1 to 6 herein are the landlords in respect o f property abutting on the General Patters Read, and forming part of premises Nos. 2 and 3/18, Mount Road, Madras, measuring an extent of 11 if grounds or thereabouts. By a registered lease deed, dated 17th November 1938, they leased the said lands to the applicant herein for a period of 15 years and 3 months from 1st December 1938 free of rent for the first three months and from 1st March 1939 on a rent of Rs. 560/- per month on the terms and conditions set out in the lease deed, with an option for renewal in favour of the applicant as lessee for a further term of 10 years from 1st March 1954 at an enhanced rate of rent of Rs. 630/- per month, and subject to all other stipulations contained in the lease deed. For the purpose of these applications, the following clauses in the lease deed are important. Under Clause 2(c), the lessee covenanted with the lessor as follows:— “Within a reasonable period from the date hereof, at his own cost and charges, under the supervision of the Lessors and in accordance with plans, elevations, sections and specifications to be first approved by the lessors, erect, cover in and complete in a substantial and workman like manner on the demised plot of land, a theatre with all proper offices and out-buildings, such as bazaars, restaurants, motor and dynamo sheds etc., and fences, drains, sewers to be used for production and exhibition of films and for staging drama therein and to expend in building such theatre a sum of not less than Rs. 50,000/-. 50,000/-. The lessee shall be at liberty to put up other buildings in addition to the above.” Under clause 2(1), the Lessee convenanted with the Lessors as follows:— “As soon as the proposed buildings are completed, to insure the same in the name of the lessee against loss or damage by fire in an insurance Office to be approved by the lessors in a sum amounting to at least Rs. 50,000/- and to keep the same insured during the subsistence of this tenancy, and on request to produce to the lessors the policy or policies of insurance and the receipts for premiums and to cause all moneys received by virtue of any such Insurance to be forthwith laid out in rebuilding or reinstating the buildings and to make up any deficiency out of his own moneys; further, not to assign, hypothecate or create any manner of security on such policy or policies of Insurance without the written consent of the lessors and on the expiry of ten years from the commencement of this lease to forthwith assign the policy or policies of Insurance in favour of the lessors.” Under clause 4(d) of the lease deed, it was agreed between the parties that at the expiration or sooner determination of the tenancy, the lessors shall have the option of buying the buildings to be erected on the demised land, the basis of valuation being as follows; “The buildings shall be valued at Rs. 50,000/- irrespective of the actual cost of construction and the lessee shall allow a depreciation of 3 per cent per annum, the period being calculated for the purposes of this valuation from 1st March 1939. If within a week from such termination of tenancy the lessors do not signify their willingness to purchase the building or erections at the aforesaid valuation from the lessee, the lessee shall within three months thereafter remove and carry away any buildings o r erections on the demised plot of land and shall cause to be restored to its original or natural level state and condition the demised plot of land. In accordance with the stipulations in the said lease deed, the applicant constructed a theatre on the said plot of land known as “The Globe Theatre” and started using the lame for exhibition of cinema films. In accordance with the stipulations in the said lease deed, the applicant constructed a theatre on the said plot of land known as “The Globe Theatre” and started using the lame for exhibition of cinema films. The applicant exercised the option of renewal of the lease for a further period of ten years from 1st March 1954 by his letter dated llth August 1952 and was continuing in possession as lessee for the full further term of ten years from 1st March 1964, expiring on February 29, 1964, paying enhanced rent of Rs. 630/- per month, as provided in the lease deed. The lessors exercised the option of baying the buildings erected on t he demised land by the applicant herein, in terms of clause 4(d) of the lease deed. By their lawyers letter dated, 27th February 1964, enclosing therewith a cheque for Rs. 50,000/-, without deducting any amount for depreciation as provided in clause 4(d) of the lease deed, the lessors stated that they had decided not to stand on their strict legal rights to deduct the depreciation but to pay the full price of Rs. 50,000/-, as the buildings had been maintained and kept in good repair. By his lawyers letter, dated 12th March 1964, the applicant intimated the lessors that he was refusing to accept the sum of Rs. 50,000/- sent by cheque and was returning the same. By his lawyers further letter dated 16th March 1964, the applicant stated that the lessors were not entitled to claim any rights on the footing of clause 4(d) of the lease deed, dated 17th November 1938 or to offer a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as the price for purchasing the superstructure put by the applicant on the land leased to him. The lease deed expired on 29th February 1964. Thereafter, on 15th April 1964, respondents 1 to 6 herein instituted C.S. No. 28 of 1964 on the original side of this Court and also deposited a sum of Rs. 50,000/- into Court since the applicant had returned the cheque sent to him. The lease deed expired on 29th February 1964. Thereafter, on 15th April 1964, respondents 1 to 6 herein instituted C.S. No. 28 of 1964 on the original side of this Court and also deposited a sum of Rs. 50,000/- into Court since the applicant had returned the cheque sent to him. They prayed in that suit for a decree: “(a) declaring that the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 herein) are as from 1st March 1964 the owners of the buildings and superstructures constructed by the defendant (applicant herein) on the lands leased to him according to the terms of the lease deed dated 17th November 1938 and specified in item 1 of the schedule hereunder: (b) that the defendant (applicant herein) do pay plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 herein) as and for rent for the buildings, superstructures and the plots of land being items 1 to 4 in the plaint schedule in his possession is from 1st March 1964 at Rs. 12,000/- per month and the sum of Rs. 12,000/- as and for rent for the month of March 1964”. It may be mentioned in this context that the schedule to the plaint contained four items of properties out of which item No. 1 atone was the subject matter of the lease deed dated 17th November 1988. The other three items were other pieces and parcels of land which were also leased out to the applicants herein by respondents 1 to 6 herein under separate lease deeds, and prayer (b) dealing with recovery of rents referred to all the four items, while prayer (a) was confined only to item No. 1. 2. In the written statement filed by the applicant herein, the applicant put forward several defences. He contended: (1) He continued to be the owner of the buildings and superstructures and the suit for a declaration was wholly unsustainable and the Court could not be called upon to grant any declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act as prayed for and, in any event the suit for a bare declaration was not sustainable. He contended: (1) He continued to be the owner of the buildings and superstructures and the suit for a declaration was wholly unsustainable and the Court could not be called upon to grant any declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act as prayed for and, in any event the suit for a bare declaration was not sustainable. (2) The rights of the parties are governed only by the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended by Act 12 of 1960 and the clauses in the lease deed relied on by the respondents 1 to 6 herein cannot take away the rights of the applicant to purchase the land leased to him, as and when any suit for eviction is filed against him by the landlord. The applicant was and had always been ready and willing to purchase the land exerting his option under S. 9 of the aforesaid Act and the provisions in the lease deed for the sale of the buildings for the value of Rs. 50,000/- irrespective of the actual cost of the building and that too calculating depreciation at 3 per cent per annum for the purpose of valuation from 1st March 1939 was repugnant to the provisions of the Act. (3) Even assuming that the clauses in the agreement were legal and operative and could be enforced, the right of respondents 1 to 6 would be not to ask for a declaration of ownership, but to enforce the said agreement, if it was legally capable of being specifically enforced.” In view of the third defence referred to above, respondents 1 to 6 herein by application No. 1933 of 1965 sought to have the plaint amended by adding the following prayer in the plaint: “and if necessary directing the defendant (applicant herein) to execute and register a deed vesting the same in the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 herein) as from 1st March 1964.” This application was ordered on 13th October 1965. 3. 3. Meanwhile, on the pleadings of the parties, this Court framed the necessary issues and in view of the reliance of the applicant on the provisions of the Madras Act 19 of 1955 amending the Act, respondents 1 to 6 herein by application No. 1932 of 1965 prayed for the framing of an additional issue as to the constitutional validity of Madras Act 19 of 1953. That application also was allowed by the Court on 13th October 1965 and the State of Madras was impleaded as the second defendant in the suit. 4. In the meantime, the applicant herein filed Application No. 7 of 1965 on 20th June 1964 purporting to be one under S. 9 of the Act, as amended by Madras Act 19 of 1955 for a direction to the landlords to convey to the applicant the plaint mentioned lands and described in the schedule to the application at a valuation to be arrived at by the Court. In the affidavit filed in support of this application, he stated: “As I am anxious to avoid any contentions that though the present suit is not inform one for ejectment, since it has the effect of questioning my title to the superstructure the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 herein) may contend on a future date that I should have applied for sale of the land to me within thirty days of service of summons under S. 9 of the Act. I am therefore taking out this application by way of abundant caution for directions of this Honble Court to direct the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 herein) to sell the vacant land mentioned in the plaint schedule on which I have put up the superstructure of the Globe Talkies to me on a valuation to be arrived as per the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act if necessary by appointment of a Commissioner.” This application came up for hearing before Sadasivam J., on 16th April 1965 and the learned Judge directed the same to be posted along with the suit in the second week of July 1965. The suit itself came to be disposed of by Kunhamed Kutti, J., on 20th February 1967. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the suit for specific performance in terms prayed for by the lessors had to fail. The suit itself came to be disposed of by Kunhamed Kutti, J., on 20th February 1967. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the suit for specific performance in terms prayed for by the lessors had to fail. With regard to the clauses on which the lessors relied, the learned Judge took the view that any stipulation to surrender possession of the property with the superstructure or to accept any value other than the value to be determined under S. 3 of the Act would not be such a term as would fall within the proviso to S. 12 disentitling the tenant to the benefits of S. 9 of the Act. The learned Judge also took the view that the assumption of the lessors that on the exercise of their option they had become the purchasers or owners of the property on payment of Rs. 50,000/- would not be accepted. Traating the suit as a suit for specific performance, the learned Judge entertained the view that to grant such a relief was inequitable in the circumstances and in exercise of the discretion he should refuse to grant that relief to the lessors. The learned judge further pointed out; “Their (the lessors’) remedy would be to file a suit for eviction when the question as to the compensation payable to the first defendant (applicant herein) under Sec. 3 or his right to purchase the property under Sec. 9 could be gone into.” It does not appear that any independent order was passed on Application No. 7 of 1965 referred to already. 5. Against the dismissal of the suit, the lessors preferred O.S.A. No. 35 of 1967 and the said appeal was dismissed by Veeraswami, C.J., and Gokulakrishnan, J., on 17 June 1970. The learned Judges also took the view that the option available to the lessors under clause 4(d) of the lease deed was inoperative, as it would be contrary to the rights of the applicant herein protected under the Act, as amended by Madras Act 19 of 1955. The learned Judges also took the view that the option available to the lessors under clause 4(d) of the lease deed was inoperative, as it would be contrary to the rights of the applicant herein protected under the Act, as amended by Madras Act 19 of 1955. As a suit for specific performance also, the learned Judges took the view at the applicant herein could not be compelled to execute a conveyance in favour of the lessors, since in the view of the learned Judges, “By granting a decree for specific performance, the appellants (lessors) would not only gain an fair advantage over the 1st respondent (applicant herein) but the Court would be enabling them to enforce a contract which is unenforceable under S. 12 of the City Tenants Protection Act, as amended in 1955”. 6. Respondents 1 to 6 herein took up the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in its judgment dated 18th August 1971 in Haridas Girdhardas and others v. Varadaraja Pillai and another A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2365-84 L.W. S.C. (S.N.) 107 reversed the decisions of the learned trial judge as well as the Letters Patent Bench and (2) held that the Lessors were entitled to enforce the covenant in the lease deed. For the purpose of coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in. The Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd., v. K.S. Subramania Iyer 84 L.W. 109 (D.B.) holding that a stipulation like the one contained in clause 4(d) of the lease deed was a stipulation as to the erection of buildings within the meaning of the proviso to Sec. 12 of the Act. Before the Supreme Court, respondents 1 to 6 herein filed C.M.P. No. 4048 of 1971 for amendment of the plaint. Before the Supreme Court, respondents 1 to 6 herein filed C.M.P. No. 4048 of 1971 for amendment of the plaint. By that amendment, they wanted to have the following words added to the third prayer in clause (a) after the words “as from 1st March 1964”:— “and direct the defendant No. 1 (Applicant herein) to deliver possession to the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 herein) of the sites leased out to the defendant No. 1 (applicant herein) under the aforesaid lease deeds and the buildings and superstructures built thereupon in good and satisfactory condition.” By the same application, they wanted the deletion of the prayer (b) in the original plaint and substitution of the following in its place: “The defendant No. 1 (applicant herein) do pay the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 herein) the sum of Rs. 12,000/- (twelve thousand) per month as mesne profits for use and occupation of the buildings and superstructures built upon the demised premises from 4th August 1968 till possession is handed over to the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 6 herein).” The Supreme Court allowed this petition for amendment of the plaint and in terms of the prayers in the plaint so amended, passed the following decree: “And this Court in decreeing the suit doth declare that the plaintiffs-appellants herein (respondents 1 to 5 herein) are as from 1st March 1964 the owners of the building and superstructures constructed by Respondent No. 1 herein (Defendant No. 1) (applicant herein) on the lands leased to him according to the terms of the lease deed dated 17th November 1938 and specified in item No. 1 of the schedule to the plaint and Further order (1) That the Respondent No. 1 herein (Defendant No. 1) (applicant herein) do deliver possession to the plaintiffs-appellants therein (respondents 1 to 6 herein) of the sites leased out to Respondent No. 1 herein (applicant herein) under the lease deeds in question and the buildings and superstructures built thereupon in good and satisfactory condition (2) That Respondent No. 1 herein (applicant herein) do pay to the plaintiffs-appellants herein (respondents 1 to 6 herein) the mesne profits for use and occupation of the buildings and superstructures built upon the demised promises from the 4th August 1968 till possession is handed over to the plaintiffs-appellants herein (respts. 1 to 6 herein) (3) That the Trial Judge of the Madras High Court do determine the mesne profits referred to in clause (2) supra for use and occupation by the defendant (respondent No. 1 herein) (appellant herein) from the 4th August 1968 till possession is handed over to the plaintiffs-appellants herein (respondents 1 to 6 he rein) in accordance with law (4) That respondent No. 1 herein (appellant herein) do hand over possession within six months from this, the 18th August 1971 and that in the meantime Respondent No. 1 herein (appellant herein) shall not induct any tenant or other person or otherwise create any interest in the properties in question”. After the disposal of the matter by the Supreme Court the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 called the Madras City Tenants Protection (amendment) Act, 1972 was passed and the same received the assent of the President on 9th February 1972. Basing his claim on this Act, the applicant herein filed the present applications on 14th February 1972. 7. Application No. 437 of 1972, purports to have been made under S. 9 of the Act as amended by the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972. The second and the third prayers in this application are as follows; “(2) Why this application should not be treated as one fully in compliance of Section 9 of the Act and why the respondents should not be directed to sell the lands sanctioned in schedule of this petition to the applicant at the valuation to be arrived at by this Honble Court; (3) Why a Commissioner should not be appointed as per the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act to arrive at and fix the market value of the property in the schedule.” The main prayer in Application No. 438 of 1972 which purports to be under S. 9 of the Act and O. 14, R. 8, O.S. Rules and Section 151 C.P.C. is: “why stay of execution of the decree dated 20th February 1967 pursuant dt. 18th August 1971 on the file of the Supreme Court should not be ordered.” The main prayer in Application No. 439 of 1972 which purports to be under the same provisions is: “why suitable orders for taking up for considering the Application No. 7/65 already filed under Sec. 9 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act as amended by Act 4 of 1972 should not be passed.” There is a common affidavit sworn to by the applicant herein in support of the above three applications. In the said affidavit, the applicant has briefly narrated the prior course of the proceedings upto the disposal of O.S.A. No. 35 of 1967 and stated “In which view it becomes unnecessary to pass any order on my application under S. 9 of the Act.” In Paragraph 11 of the affidavit, while referring to the application for amendment of the plaint made by respondents 1 to 6 herein before the Supreme Court and the orders passed thereon by the Supreme Court, the applicant states: “Apparently the application was treated as formal matter in view of their construction of the Act and the Supreme Court allowed the amendment for recovery of possession but restricted the claim for mesne profits for a period of 3 years and directed the applicant to deliver possession of the properties to respondents 1 to 6 within 6 months from the date of judgment. The Supreme Court directed that the claim for mesne profits for a period of 3 years provided by the amendment of plaint should be gone into by this Honble Court. After amendment and conversion of the suit into one for ejectment, there was no further notice to me or anything in the shape of summons of the changed plaint.” In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the affidavit, the applicant refers to the provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972. Thereafter in paragraphs 13 to 15 he contends: “13. By reason of this provision, the contract in the present lease that the landlord should take the building at a value of Rs. 50,000/- irrespective of the huge cost of over Rupees three lakhs (lakhs) constructed, spent by the tenant on the building, has become void and the tenant is declared to be entitled to the benefit of Ss. 3 and 9 of the Act. 50,000/- irrespective of the huge cost of over Rupees three lakhs (lakhs) constructed, spent by the tenant on the building, has become void and the tenant is declared to be entitled to the benefit of Ss. 3 and 9 of the Act. Having thus become entitled to compensation under S. 3 as per the market value, I have clearly a right to the benefit of S. 9 to purchase the lands. 14. I have already filed anticipating any change that may be adopted by the landlord a protective application No. 7/63 which is now available and the same should be taken up and orders should be passed. If some formal orders have been made, by the express reservation contained in my above petition, I should be given the benefit by revising the same in the events that have come about. 15. Even otherwise, in the circumstances the present application should be treated as good and in time. The Amending Act has restored the benefit of S. 3 and S. 9 to the tenant notwithstanding the decree for ejectment. I, therefore, submit that I am entitled to purchase the land demised to me under S. 9 of the Act.” Respondents 1 to 6 herein have filed a counter affidavit. Dealing with the allegation contained in the affidavit of the applicant that the application for amendment before the Supreme Court was treated as a formal matter, and after amendment, there was no further notice to him or anything in the shape of summons of the changed plaint, the deponent of the counter affidavit stated: “I have been informed that as a matter of fact it was stated in the course of the arguments on our behalf as appellants that the proper relief of possession and mesne profits could be had by an amendment and after conclusion of arguments on behalf of the appellants, the Petition for amendment was filed. The applicant herein as 1st respondent had notice of the application and his counsel submitted arguments on his behalf and no representation was made to the Court for filing any counter-affidavit or for any other procedure being followed but the defendants counsel advanced arguments before the Supreme Court against the proposed amendment, Which are referred to by the Supreme Court in their judgment, with reference to limiting the claim for mesne profits for use and occupation from a date 3 years before the date of the application for amendment. The statement now made in para 11 that “apparently the application was treated as formal matter” is not correct. As clearly admitted in paragraph 11 of the affidavit the suit as filed was one for specific performance and for the defendant (applicant) to pay the fair rent for the buildings and the land. In the view taken by the Supreme Court and as stated above, the amendment application was made, arguments heard on both sides, the amendment was allowed and the appeal was disposed of. As already stated no request having been made for any further notice by way of summons on the amended plaint and further pleading and the entire matter having been argued on behalf of the defendant-applicant herein, it is not open to the applicant to put forward now the averment that “there was no further notice to me or anything in the shape of summons of the changed plaint”. In paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit, it is further averred: “The Supreme Court having directed the defendant-applicant herein to deliver possession within 6 months from 18th August, 1971 i.e., before 18th February 72 it is apparently at the instance and through the efforts of the applicant that the State Government was persuaded to introduce the amendment to the Madras City Tenants Protection Act., 1922 by deletion of the proviso to S. 12 and enacting Act IV/1972. There was no previous publication of the intended amendment or of the objects sought to be achieved thereby. There was no previous publication of the intended amendment or of the objects sought to be achieved thereby. The Bill was put forward and moved in the Legislative Assembly on 31st January 72 and was passed into an Act contrary to the rules on 1st February 72 and the a assent of the President was also assured on 9th February, 72 and published on the same date in the Tamilnadu Government Gazette Extraordinary.” In the counter-affidavit, a further contention is put forward that “Application No. 7 of 1965 stood disposed of with the suit, C.S. No. 28 of 1964 which was dismissed and was not before the appellate Courts in any form cannot now be taken up and no orders can be passed thereon, nor can the said application be revived as submitted by the applicant, at this stage after the conclusion of the proceedings by the decree of the Supreme Court.” The deponent of the counter-affidavit also states that the Tamil Na du Act 4 of 1972 has no application to this case and the Plaintiffs having already paid the stipulated price for the buildings and become owners thereof, the applicant cannot have any claim under S. 3 in respect of the very same building and no claim under S. 9 can arise. While repeating the contention that Madras Act 19 of 1955 was itself void and ulta vires , in paragraph 19 of the counter-affidavit, the deponent avers: “In any event, even if the amendment Act is viewed as affecting plaintiffs rights, it is submitted that the provisions of the said amendment Act are ultra vires the and infringe the fundamental rights of the plaintiffs guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The Amending Act IV of 1972 is, it is submitted, a colourable piece of legislation enacted mala fide , in haste, apparently to deprive the plaintiffs of the valuable property vested in them as owners from 1st March 64 as declared by the Supreme Court.” 8. So far, we have referred to the circumstances under which these applications have been filed and the contentions of the parties in the affidavit and counter-affidavit in those applications. 9. Before dealing with the points raised before us, it is necessary to refer to the Act and its subsequent amendments. So far, we have referred to the circumstances under which these applications have been filed and the contentions of the parties in the affidavit and counter-affidavit in those applications. 9. Before dealing with the points raised before us, it is necessary to refer to the Act and its subsequent amendments. The Act (Madras Act 3 of 1922) received the assent of the Governor on 3rd January 1922 and that of the Governor-General on 8th February 1922 and was first published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated 21st February 1922. The Preamble to the Act stated: “Whereas it is necessary to give protection to tenants who in many parts of the City of Madras have constructed buildings on others lands in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they pay a fair rent for the land.” Sub-S. (2) of S. 1 provided that the Act extended to the City of Madras. Sub-S. (3) of S. 1 provided that the Act shall apply only to tenancies of land created before the commencement of the Act, that is, the tenancies created before 21st February 1922. S. 3 of the Act provided: “Every tenant shall on ejectment be entitled to be paid as compensation the value of any building, which may have been erected by him, by any of his predecessors in interest, or by any person not in occupation at the time of the ejectment who derived title from either of them, and for which compensation has not already been paid. A tenant who is entitled to compensation for the value of any building shall also be paid the value of trees which may have been planted by him on the land.” Ss. 4 and 5 deal with determination of compensation referred to in S. 3. S. 9(1) of the Act provided: Any tenant who is entitled to compensation under S. 3 and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted or proceeding under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, taken by the Landlord, may, within fifteen days after the date of this Act coming into force, or within fifteen days after the service on him of the summons, apply to the Court for any order that the landlord shall be directed to sell the land for a price to be fixed by the Court. The Court shall fix the price according t o the market value of the land on the date of the order and shall order that, within a period to be determined by the Court, not being less than three months and not more than three years from the date of the order, the tenant shall pay into Court or otherwise as directed the price so fixed in one or more installments with or without interest.” Section 12 was: “Nothing in any contract made by a tenant shall take away or limit his rights under this Act, provided that nothing herein contained shall affect any stipulations made by the tenant in writing registered as to the erection of buildings, in so far as they relate to buildings erected after the date of the contract.” Section 13 provided; “In its application to the City of Madras, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall, to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been repealed or modified.” The Act was amended by Madras Act 6 of 1926 and the only relevant thing to be noticed in this behalf is that instead of 15 days originally provided for in S. 9(1) of the Act for the making of an application by the tenant, one month was substituted. The Act was substantially amended by Madras Act 19 of 1955. By this amendment, the provisions of the Act were made applicable to Municipal towns and adjoining areas in the State of Madras also. Sub-S. (2) and (3) of S. 1 of the Principal Act were amended so as to provide: that the Act extended to the City of Madras and the State Government might, by notification in the Fort St. George Gazette, extend this Act to any other municipal town and any specified village within five miles of the City of Madras or such municipal town with effect from such date as might be specified in the notification; that the Act shall apply, in the City of Madras, only to tenancies of land created before the commencement of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1955, and in any Municipal town or village to which this Act is extended by notification under Sub-S. (2), only to tenancies created before the date with effect from which this Act is extended to such town or village. The other amendments made by this Act are not relevant for the purpose of this case. The Act was again amended by Madras Act 13 of 1960 and Madras Act 16 of 1964 and the provisions of the said amending Acts also are not relevant for the purpose of the present applications. In view of the controversy raised in the present case, it is necessary to give at length the Tamil Nadu Act No. 4 of 1972: “Tamil Nadu Act No. 4 of 1972 (Received the assent of the President on the 9th February, 1972, first published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extra ordinary on the 9th February, 1972 (Magha 20, 1893) An Act further to amend the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Tamil Nadu in the Twenty-third year of the Republic of India as follows:— 1. Short title : This Act may be called the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972. 2. Amendment of Preamble, Tamil Nadu Act 3 of 1922 : In the preamble to the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (Tamil Nadu Act 3 of 1922) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), for the portion commencing with the words “Whereas it is necessary to give protection ‘and ending with the words ‘fair rent for the land’, the following shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been substituted, namely:— “ Whereas it is necessary to give protection against eviction to tenants, who in Municipal towns and adjoining areas in the State of Tamil Nadu have constructed buildings on others lands, so long as they pay a fair rent for the land. 3. Amendment of S. 12, Tamil Nadu Act 3 of 1922 : In S. 12 of the principal Act, the portion commencing with the words ‘Provided that’ and ending with the words ‘date of the contract’ shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been omitted. 4. 3. Amendment of S. 12, Tamil Nadu Act 3 of 1922 : In S. 12 of the principal Act, the portion commencing with the words ‘Provided that’ and ending with the words ‘date of the contract’ shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been omitted. 4. Validation : Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority to the contrary, any stipulation made by a tenant in writing registered as to the erection of buildings, in so far as they relate to buildings erected after the date of the contract shall, to the extent such stipulations take away or limit his rights under the principal Act as amended by this Act, be and shall be deemed always to have been, null and void and accordingly the tenant shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, entitled to the rights under the Principal Act as amended by this Act. 5. Ss. 3 and 4 not to apply, if the landlord has already taken possession : The amendment made to S. 12 of the Principal Act by S. 3 of this Act and the provisions of S. 4 of this Act shall not apply to any case where the landlord has, before the date of the commencement of this Acs, taken possession of the land and building from the tenant.” 10. From the above it is clear that in the first place, the Act as originally enacted applied only to the City of Madras and that too to tenancies of land created before the commencement of the Act. Secondly, it sought to alter the law relating to lease as provided for in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Under Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, even after the determination of the lease, a lessee can remove all superstructures and buildings erected by him on the demised land whilst he is in possession of the property leased, but not afterwards. Under that Section, there is nothing any building or superstructure erected on the land by him to the lessor without receiving any compensation. Under that Section, there is nothing any building or superstructure erected on the land by him to the lessor without receiving any compensation. Though under that Section a lessee had a right to remove the building, by contract he may agree to hand over the same to the lessor without a right to receive compensation at the end of the lease period, the matter being entirely one of contract between the parties. This normal rule under the Transfer of Property Act has been interfered with by the provisions of the Act. Thirdly, such interference with the Transfer of Property Act was made only for the benefit of those tenants, who, in many parts of the City of Madras, had constructed buildings on others lands in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they paid the fair rent for the land. Fourthly, it is in view of this objective only, Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 1 of the Act provided that the Act shall apply only to tenancies of land created before the commencement of the Act. Fifthly, even with regard to tenancies created before 21st February, 1922, a tenant could have given away or limited his rights under the Act by a stipulation made by him in a contract between him and the lessor, in writing, registered as to the erection of buildings, in respect of the buildings erected after the date of such contract. Sixthly, by Madras Act 19 of 1955, when Sub-Ss. (2) and (3) of Sec. 1 of the Act were amended so as to make the provisions of the Act applicable also to the tenancies in the City of Madras created before the commencement of Madras Act 19 of 1955, the same could not have been for saving the hopes of the tenants referred to in the preamble to the Act, because any person, who, in the City of Madras, constructed buildings on others lands, subsequent to 21st February, 1922, could not have entertained the hope that he would not be evicted so long as he paid fair rent for the land, as on the date of such construction he knew that the benefits of the Act were not available to him. Seventhly, as far as the present case is concerned, the lease came into existence subsequent to 21st, February, 1922 and, therefore, on the date when the lease was entered into, the applicant herein was not entitled to any of the benefits of the Act. Consequently, when clause 4(d) was agreed to between the parties, it could not be said that the applicant herein was contracting out of his rights under the Act or the said stipulation was in any way contrary to the hope that be was entertaining, namely, that he would not be evicted so long as he paid fair rent for the land. It is in view of this alone, the Supreme Court in the very decision between the parties herein observed: “It must be remembered that the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, was passed in 1922 to give protection to certain classes of tenants who had constructed buildings on others lands in the hope that they would not be evicted so long they paid a fair rent for the land. It was not the object of the Act to cover a hope if the ‘hope’ was entertained contrary to express stipulations as to erection of buildings.” Haridas Girdhardas and others v. Varadaraja Piltai A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2366 and another. It is in view of this position only Mr. V.K.T. Chari, learned counsel for the respondents herein, put forward the following contentions before us: (1) The Madras Act 14 of 1955 is unconstitutional and ultra vires as offending Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India. (2) For the same reasons, the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 is also ultra vires and unconstitutional. (3) In addition, the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 is inoperative as having been enacted mala fide and in colourable exercise of the powers of the Legislature. (4) In any event, the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 has no application to the present case, since it does not purport to reopen any final decree, judgment or order of a Court as in the present case. 11. (4) In any event, the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 has no application to the present case, since it does not purport to reopen any final decree, judgment or order of a Court as in the present case. 11. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel drew our attention to some of the curious and extraordinary features present in the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972, such as the Preamble to the original Act itself having been amended with retrospective effect and the marginal note to S. 4 denoting “Validation”, while the said Act has really validated nothing. Since we are accepting the fourth of the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents as enumerated above, it is unnecessary for us to go into the other contentions and as a matter of act, during the course of the hearing itself, we indicated our view on this aspect to both sides and did not allow Mr. V.K.T. Chari to elaborate his first three points. 12. As far as the fourth point is concerned, the simple argument of Mr. Chari is that the decree of the Supreme Court declared that respondents 1 to 6 herein had become the owners of the superstructure with effect from 1st March 1964, onwards and consequently even on the date when C.S. No. 28 of 1964 was instituted on the file of this Court, the respondents were the owners of the superstructure and the applicant herein not being the owner of the superstructure could not have claimed any rights either under S. 3 or under S. 9 of the Act. Mr. Chari further contended that if the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 is held to apply, it could be only on the basis of transferring the ownership of the building which has been declared by the Supreme Court to belong to the respondents herein with effect from 1st March 1964, to the applicant herein and that cannot be done without paying compensation to the respondents herein and in so far as the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 has not provided any such compensation, the Act is unconstitutional and as a matter of fact, the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 has no such effect. The further contention of the learned counsel is that the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 neither expressly nor by implication authorises the reopening of any final decree or judgment or order of any Court or authority or Tribunal and, therefore, as far as the present case is concerned, the matter has become final as between the parties by the judgment of the Supreme Court and hence the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 cannot be of any avail to the applicant herein in support of the present applications. 13. Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Ayyar, learned Counsel for the applicant, contended that the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 has conferred a new right on the applicant for the first time and the applicant must have a remedy to enforce that right, because there cannot be a right without a remedy and therefore, the present application (Application No. 437 of 1972) filed by him must be held to be one under S. 9 of the Act. The further argument of the learned counsel is that in any event, Application, No. 7 of 1965 preferred by the applicant, has not been finally disposed of and though the applicant would not have succeeded in that application, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court on the scope of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act, the said application cannot be disposed of, in the light of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that Application No. 437 of 1972 cannot be considered to be one made in compliance with the requirements of S. 9 of the Act, since the same has not been filed within the period of limitation prescribed by that Section itself, the teamed Counsel contended that a right could not be said to have been barred even before it came into existence, and therefore, the said application having been filed within one month from the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 must be deemed to have been filed as required by S. 9 of the Act. 14. We are unable to accept any of these contentions of the learned counsel for the applicant. As far as Application No. 437 of 1972 is concerned, we are clearly of the opinion that that application is not sustainable at all. 14. We are unable to accept any of these contentions of the learned counsel for the applicant. As far as Application No. 437 of 1972 is concerned, we are clearly of the opinion that that application is not sustainable at all. The learned Counsel for the applicant frankly conceded that the application was preferred only because of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972, and but for the said Act, the applicant would have no right to call upon the respondents to sell the land to the applicant, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court on the scope of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act. Even with reference to the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972, the only Section on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel is S. 4 which we have extracted already. We are clearly of the opinion that that Section does not enable the reopening of any judgment or decree or order of any Court or authority. On it sown terms, all that it says is that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree, or order of any court or other authority to the contrary, the stipulations which originally came within the scope of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court shall be and shall be deemed always to have been null and void and accordingly a tenant shall be and shall be deemed always to have been entitled to the rights under the principal Act as amended by this Act. The Section itself does not either expressly or by necessary implication invalidate or nullify the judgment or decree or order of a Court which has become already final. We asked Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Ayyar expressly to tell us whether it was his contention that S. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 has not the effect of nullifying the decree of the Supreme Court in the present case or whether that Section enabled us to set aside the judgment and decree of the Supreme Court or to ignore it. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar unambiguously represented to us that he was not in a position to take any such stand and that all that he could submit was that in view of the new right conferred on the applicant, the decree of the Supreme Court has ceased to be effective. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar unambiguously represented to us that he was not in a position to take any such stand and that all that he could submit was that in view of the new right conferred on the applicant, the decree of the Supreme Court has ceased to be effective. We are usable to accept any such argument. 15. The Supreme Court in Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara etc. v. The Central Provinces syndicate Ltd., and another A.I.R. 1971 S.C 57 held: “On the words used in the Act, it is plaint that the Legislature attempted to overrule or set aside the decision of this Court, That, in our judgment, is not open to the Legislature to do under our constitutional scheme. It is open to the Legislature within certain limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not open to the Legislature to say that a judgment of a Court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court That judgment ( Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd.s case A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1013 was binding between the parties and also by virtue of Art. 141 binding on all courts in the territory of India. The Legislature could not say that the declaration of law was either erroneous, invalid or ineffective either as a precedent or between the parties”. 16. Dealing with Sub-S. (3) of S. 152-A of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, as amended in 1969, after the decision of the Supreme Court in New Manak Chowk Spinning and Weaving Mills, Co., Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmeda-bad A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1801, the Supreme Court observed in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and another v. The New Shrock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd., etc. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1292 as follows: “This is a strange provision. Prima facie that provision appears to command the Corporation to refuse to refund the amount illegally collected despite the orders of this Court and the High Court. The State of Gujarat was not well advised in introducing this provision. That provision attempts to make a direct inroad into the judicial powers of the State. Prima facie that provision appears to command the Corporation to refuse to refund the amount illegally collected despite the orders of this Court and the High Court. The State of Gujarat was not well advised in introducing this provision. That provision attempts to make a direct inroad into the judicial powers of the State. The Legislatures under our Constitution have within the prescribed limit powers to make laws prospectively as well as retrospectively. By exercise of those powers, the Legislature can remove the basis of a decision rendered by a competent court thereby rendering that decision ineffective. But no legislature in this country has power to ask the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the decision given by courts”. 17. In view of this legal position alone, Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar submitted that be could not contend that the decree and judgment of the Supreme Court have become null and void or have been nullified by S. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972. yet, he contended that the Legislature has powers to retrospectively delete the proviso to S. 12 of the Act and the consequence of the deletion is, as if the proviso never existed and the decision of the Supreme Court based upon such proviso cannot be operative or effective any longer. We are clearly of the opinion that there is no substance in this argument. What the Legislature cannot do directly, it cannot do indirectly also. If it is contended that by virtue of the retrospective deletion of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act by the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972, the Courts will have to deal with any controversy arising before it in this behalf on the basis that the said proviso never existed, there cannot be any objection to the same. If, on the other hand, the argument is that by virtue of the said retrospective deletion, the decisions already rendered have to be reviewed or reopened, the same cannot be accepted unless the statute itself has expressly provided for such reviewing or reopening of the decisions in the light of the amended law. As we have pointed out already, S. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 neither expressly nor by necessary implication provides for or authorises review of reopening of any judgment or decree or order of any court already rendered. Mr. As we have pointed out already, S. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 neither expressly nor by necessary implication provides for or authorises review of reopening of any judgment or decree or order of any court already rendered. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar referred to a few decisions dealing with Validation Acts in this context. In our opinion, these decisions have no bearing on the question before us. In all those cases, some actions taken by the State or its officers or authorities or by Tribunals were declared to be illegal or void on the ground that they had no power to take such action in law, or the law which empowered them to take such action was ultra vires ; and subsequently the Legislature amended the law retrospectively so as to confer the required power or to cure the defect or remove the vice pointed out by the Court and declared that all such actions must be deemed to have been taken by the State or its officers or the authorities or the Tribunals concerned as if the said power was available, and the law was as it had been subsequently amended, on the date when such actions were taken, and made consequential provisions. That is not the situation in the present case. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the marginal note ‘Validation’, S. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 does not validate anything at all. On the other hand, it invalidates the stipulations in any contract entered into between a landlord and a tenant falling within the scope of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act; which proviso had been retrospectively deleted by the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972. Even assuming that the effect of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 is to under the judgment and decree of the Supreme Court null and void or non-est in law, one or the other of the following two consequences must ensue. One is that as a result of the judgment having become void, the appeal stands dismissed, and consequently the suit itself stands dismissed. If so, there is no provision in the Act for filing any such application under S. 9 after the dismissal of the suit in such circumstances. One is that as a result of the judgment having become void, the appeal stands dismissed, and consequently the suit itself stands dismissed. If so, there is no provision in the Act for filing any such application under S. 9 after the dismissal of the suit in such circumstances. The other is that as a result of the judgment and decree having been rendered void, the appeal before the Supreme Court is pending, and in such an event the application under S. 9 of the Act ought to have been made before the Supreme Court in the appeal and not before this Court at this stage. 18. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar made some reference to S. 9(3) of the Act. We have already extracted S. 9(1) as contained in the original Act giving power to the tenant to apply, on a suit for eviction having been instituted, for a direction to the landlord to sell the land to him. S. 9(1) has been subsequently amended and sub-S. (1) of S. 9 now contains two Clauses as (a) and (b). Cl. (b) obliges the Court to decide the minimum extent of land which may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment by the tenant and then fix the price of such minimum extent of the land on the average market value of the three years immediately preceding the date of the order. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 9 again contains the Cls. (a) and (b), and they are as follows: (3)(a) On payment of the price fixed under; Clause (h) of Sub-Sec. (1) the Court shall pass an order directing the conveyance by the landlord to the tenant of the extent of land for which the said price was fixed. The Court shall by the same order direct the tenant to put the landlord into possession of the remaining extent or the land, if any. The stamp duty and registration fee in respect of such conveyance shall be borne by the tenant. (b) On the order referred to in clause (a) being made, the suit or proceeding shall stand dismissed and any decree or order in reject men t that may have been passed therein but which has not been executed shall be vacated.” It is in view of clause (b) mentioned above that we asked Mr. (b) On the order referred to in clause (a) being made, the suit or proceeding shall stand dismissed and any decree or order in reject men t that may have been passed therein but which has not been executed shall be vacated.” It is in view of clause (b) mentioned above that we asked Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar to state whether he contended that this Court is competent to vacate the decree already passed by the Supreme Court. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar frankly conceded that he cannot call upon this Court to vacate the decree passed by the Supreme Court. If the decree passed by the Supreme Court is not vacated, we are unable to see how we can pass an order-in favour of the applicant in the present, applications, since such an order and the decree the Supreme Court cannot simultaneously stand. As the language of clauses (a) and (b) of sub Sec. (3) of Sec. 9 of the Act stands, once an order in favour of a tenant is passed and the tenant pays the price fixed under Clause (b)x of Sub Sec. (1) of Sec. 9 of the Act, the Court has no option in the matter but to, vacate any decree or order in ejectment that may have been passed already. That itself is a clear indication to show that a decree or order in ejectment as well as the order in favour of a tenant directing the landlord to convey the land to the tenant cannot stand together. 19. Apart from this, there is yet another difficulty in this case. We have already extracted the decree of the Supreme Court. The first clausetherein declares that the respondents 1 to 6 herein have become the owners of the building and the superstructures with effect from 1st Mach, 1964. The second clause alone directed the applicant herein to deliver possession of the property with the obligation to pay mesne profits as provided for in clause (8). It is therefore only clause (2) of the decree which can be said to be a decree or order in ejectment coming within the scope of Sec. 9(3) (b)of the Act and even assuming that this Court is competent to vacate that part of the decree, still the first cause of the decree cannot be vacated even under See, (9)(3)(b) and the same will have to stand. If so, the position will be that the landlords, namely, respondents 1 to 6 herein have become the owners of the superstructure, and yet they are being compelled to sell the land on which the superstructure has been built to the tenant, namely, the applicant herein. Certainly, that is not working the Act, but driving a coach and pair ( sic (?) six) through the same. 20. There is another way of looking at the same question. A tenant who is enabled to apply for a direction to the landlord to sell the land to him under S. 9 of the Act, only on the basis that he is the owner of the super structure on the date when he applies under S. 9 of the Act. If the tenant is not the owner of the superstructure on the date when the purports to apply under S. 9 of the Act, the very application is not competent and consequently, the tenant will not be entitled to any relief. In view of the decree of the Supreme Court declaring that the respondents 1 to 6 herein are the owners of the superstructure with effect from 1st March 1964 on 14th February 1972 when these applications were filed, the applicant, was not the owner of the superstructure, and consequently, Application No. 437 of 1972 is not competent. 21. We shall also consider the question whether Application No. 437 of 1972 can be said to be in accordance with S. 9(1) of the Act. The said provision, as amended upto-date state that ‘any tenant who is entitled to compensation under S. 3 and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted or proceeding under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, taken by the landlord may, within one month of the date of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1953 coming into force or of the date with effect from which this Act is extended to the Municipal town or village in which the land is situate, or within one month after the service of him on summons, apply to the Court for an order that the landlord shall be directed to sell for a price to be fixed by the Court, the whole or part of the extent of the land specified in the application”. Thus, it will be seen that this Section provides for the two alternative periods of limitation for filing an application under that Section. One is, within one month of the date of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment Act 1955 coming into force, and the other is within one month after the service on him of summons in the proceedings mentioned in the opening part of the clause. Admittedly, Application No. 437 of 1972 has not been’ filed within one month from the date of the Madras City Tenants Protection Amendment Act, 1955 coming into force, nor has it been: filed within one month after the service on him of the summons in any such proceedings as referred to in the opening part of the clause. Therefore, in terms, Application No. 437 of 1972 does not comply with the requirements of S. 9(1) (a). 22. It is only in this connection that Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar contended that the applicant has secured a new right under the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972, and therefore in order to provide for a remedy for the enforcement of that right, the Court must hold that the application can be filed within a reasonable time. We are unable to accept this argument. So long as the5 applicant purports to enforce a statutory right, that right cane be enforced only in accordance with the provisions of the concerned statute and subject to the limitations imposed by the statute itself. It is significant to note that the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 does not in any way alter S. 9(1)(a), at all with regard to the period of limitation for the filing of an application. Therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that even assuming that notwithstanding the judgment and decree of the Supreme Court, the applicant has a right in view of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 to apply for the relief provided in S. 9 of the Act, still the application not having been preferred in accordance with the provisions of S. 9(1)(a) of the Act baa necessarily to fail. 23. In this context, Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar relied on a few decisions of this Court arising under the Act itself and certain other decisions dealing with the question of limitation generally. Padmanabha Naidu v. Ponnuswami Naicker 1959 (1) M.L.J. 210 L.W is a decision with S. 9 of the Act. 23. In this context, Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar relied on a few decisions of this Court arising under the Act itself and certain other decisions dealing with the question of limitation generally. Padmanabha Naidu v. Ponnuswami Naicker 1959 (1) M.L.J. 210 L.W is a decision with S. 9 of the Act. In that case, the land lord instituted a suit for ejectment on the file of the court of Small Causes and the tenant took up the plea that the suit was not maintainable in that court. On 9th January 1954 the Court accepted the defence and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. Against that Order, a revision petition was preferred to the High Court, and the High Court on 3rd August 1956 set aside the order returning the plaint and directed the Court of Small Causes to take the plaint on file, when presented, and deal with the same according to law. On 13th September the Court of Small Causes issued notice to the parties for hearing on 1st October, 1956. Within 30 days of the service of this notice, the tenant filed an application under S. 9 of the Act as amended by Act XIX of 1955. The question was whether the said application barred by time. This Court observed that by the time, when the plaint was returned for representation on 9th January 1954, the tenant could not have filed an application under S. 3 of the Act, since Act XIX of 1955 had not come into force and the said Act came into force only during the pendency of the civil revision petition on the file of this Court, and after the civil revision petition was disposed of, within 30 days from the date of the notice issued by the Court of Small Causes for hearing the suit, the application was filed. On these facts, Rajamannar, C.J., held that the two periods of limitation prescribed in S. 9(1) of the Act ace alternative and the notice issued by the Court of Small Causes on 13th September, 1956 was in substance equivalent to a summons as contemplated by S. 9(1) of the Act and the application filed within 30 days from the service of such notice was not barred by time. The facts referred to above will clearly show that that decision is not of any assistance to the applicant herein. 24. The facts referred to above will clearly show that that decision is not of any assistance to the applicant herein. 24. In Kanniappa Chettiar and others v. Ramachandra Iyer and another 46 M.L.J. 407, a lessee from the trustees of a temple in the City of Madras obtained a decree in ejectment against his tenants in the City Civil Court. The tenants appealed to the High Court and stay of execution was ordered. During the pendency of the appeals, the Act came into force and the tenants applied to the High Court within 15 days thereof for directing the Landlord to sell the lands to them under S. 9 of the Act. With reference to these facts, this Court held that as the appeal is really a continuation of the proceedings in the suit and a stage in the same the application was properly made to the High Court. In coming to this conclusion, the Bench differed from the decision of another Bench of this Court in Latifa Bi and another v. Mottai Ammal and two others 46 M.L.J. 407 holding that when a decree had been passed before the Act came into force for ejectment of a tenant, he cannot thereafter apply to the Court under S. 9 of the Act for an order directing the Landlord to sell the land to him. The learned judges held that the very provisions contained in S. 9(3) for vacating the decree or order in ejectment contemplated the tenant filing an application under S. 9 after the decree in ejectment bad been passed, provided the said application complies with the other requirements of S. 9. This view of the Bench in Kanniappa Chettiar and another 46 M.L.J. 407 was approved by a Full Bench of this Court in Syed Gomer Sahib v. Copaul I.L.R. 46 Mad. 836. We are unable to see any relevancy of the decisions to the point before us. In these cases on the date when the Act came into force the decree in ejectment had already been passed, but not executed. In such a situation, the was Court held that the application by the tenant under S. 9 of the Act was competent, even though the decree had already been passed. None of the cases dealt with the question of limitation. 25. Mr. In such a situation, the was Court held that the application by the tenant under S. 9 of the Act was competent, even though the decree had already been passed. None of the cases dealt with the question of limitation. 25. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar then invited our attention to a decision of a Beach of this Court in Rangiah Gounden & Co. v. Naniappa Rao and others I.L.R. 47 Mad. 813. That case considered whether it was Art. 178 or 179 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act of 1877 that applied to the case and in so doing observed: “In construing Art. 179 one must not lay undue stress upon the entry in the first column, ignoring the entries in the third column. If the various starting points fixed in the third column of any article from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned do not cover all cases falling within the class of suits or applications described in the first column, it will be impossible to hold that the Article in question is exhaustive of the class. If the article is inapplicable to certain cases comprised in the class, those case will be governed, in the case of suits, by the residuary Art. 120 and in the case of applications by the residuary Article 179.” We are unable to see any relevancy of this observation, on which alone reliance has been placed, to the facts of the present case, since there is no question of any residuary Article prescribing a period of limitation with reference to an application made under S. 9 of the Act. 26. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar then relied on a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Mulla Veetil Seeti Kutti and six others v. KM. K. Kunhi Pathummaand three others I.L.R. 26 Mad. 780. That case considered the question as to when the period of limitation starts running in a case falling within the scope of Article 134 of Schedule I to the Limitation Art, 1908. Mr. K. Kunhi Pathummaand three others I.L.R. 26 Mad. 780. That case considered the question as to when the period of limitation starts running in a case falling within the scope of Article 134 of Schedule I to the Limitation Art, 1908. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar relied on the following passage of Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.: “As on principle no period of limitation can begin to run till there is a cause of action (the third column of the elaborate schedules in the Limitation Act of 1871 and onwards is based on this principle and the terminus a quo as far as possible is made to coincide with the earliest time at which an action could be brought). We ought not to construe the Article, if the language admits of it, in such a way as to bar the action before the cause of action arose or even, to cut short the period so as to give varying periods of time for the same suit, varying according to the time which elapsed between the date of the transfer and the accrual of the cause of action. In construing these Articles of the Limitation Act we should not lay undue stress on the first column of the Article which describes the nature of the suits, and hold that all suits of that class must be governed by that article, though the starting point fixed in the third column cannot be applied at all or cannot be applied without working injustice.” We are unable to see any relevancy of this observation to the present case, since the language of S. 9(1)(a) of the Act prescribing the period within which the application has to be made does not admit of any other construction. As we have painted out already, the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 has left S. 9 (1)(a) of the principal Act in tact. 27. We are unable to accept the argument of Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar that the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 confers a new right on the applicant herein; and therefore the period of limitation should not be an construed as to bar the right, before it has actually come into existence. In terms of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972, there is no question of creation of any new right at all. In terms of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972, there is no question of creation of any new right at all. All that S. 4 of that Act states is that the stipulations which would have come within the scope of the provision to S. 12 of the Act shall be and shall be deemed always to have been null and void and accordingly the tenant shall be and shall be deemed always to have been entitled to the rights under the principal Act as amended by the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972. If at all, instead of conferring a new right, the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 merely says that the right claimed by the applicant herein must be deemed to have always been available to him. For these reasons we hold that the applicant is not entitled to the relief prayed for in application No. 437 of 1972. 28. As far as Application No. 438 of 1972 is concerned, we are of the opinion that that application also does not lie. We have already extracted the prayer in that application. It is the common case of the parties that no independent orders were passed on Application No. 7 of 1963 preferred by the applicant herein in C.S. No. 88 of 1964. In our opinion, that application was incompetent, and in any event it must be deemed to have been dismissed. We are taking the view that that application was incompetent, because it is only the institution of a suit in ejectment that provides an occasion for the tenant filing an application under S. 9 of the Act, and having regard to the prayer contained in C.S. No. 28 of 1964 both as originally instituted and as subsequently amended by Application No. 1935 of 1965, the said suit was not a suit in ejectment. Originally, the prayers were for a declaration that respondents 1 to 6 herein were the owners of the superstructures with effect from 1st March 1964 and for a decree for recovery of rent. The amendment included a prayer for a direction, if necessary, to the applicant herein to execute and register a deed vesting the superstructure in respondents 1 to 6 therein as from 1st March 1964. That before the amendment, even the applicant himself did not treat the suit as one in ejectment is apparent from his written statement itself. The amendment included a prayer for a direction, if necessary, to the applicant herein to execute and register a deed vesting the superstructure in respondents 1 to 6 therein as from 1st March 1964. That before the amendment, even the applicant himself did not treat the suit as one in ejectment is apparent from his written statement itself. In the written statement he repeatedly contended that the rights of the parties were governed only by the provisions of the Act as amended and the clauses in the lease deed could not take away his rights to purchase the land leased to him at and when any suit for eviction was filed against him by the landlords: and he also expressed his readiness and willingness to do all such acts which were necessary on the part of the tenant desirous of purchasing the land under the said Act, if a suit for eviction were to be filed against him. He also put forward a contention that the suit as one for a bare declaration was not maintainable. It is in view of this latter contention alone that the plaint was amended by Application No. 1933 of 1965 and thereafter the suit was dealt with as one for specific performance. The Judgment of Kunhamed Kutti, J., makes it absolutely and abundantly clear that the suit was not dealt with and disposed of as one in ejectment, but only as a suit for specific performance. The averments contained in the affidavit filed in support of Application No. 7 of 1963 to which we have already made reference confirm this conclusion of ours. 29. Mr. Venkatarama Iyer contended before us that even though in form the suit was one for a declaration or for specific performance, the Court will have to ignore the form and look into the substance, and if the substance is looked into, it would be clear that the suit was one in ejectment, since it sought to take away the right of the tenant to the superstructure itself. Both in form as well as in substance, C.S. No. 28 of 1964 was only a suit for declaration of the title of respondents 1 to 6 herein to the superstructure based upon the prior exercise of option to purchase the superstructure, as provided for in the lease deed, and for a direction to the applicant herein to execute a deed of conveyance if such was necessary. The filing of such a suit could not have enabled the applicant herein to prefer an application under S. 9 of the Act. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar then contended that after the plaint was amended before the Supreme Court and the introduction of a prayer for recovery of possession, the suit became one in ejectment as from the date of the institution since an amendment of the plaint takes effect from the date of the original plaint itself. We are unable to accept this contention as well. An amendment of the plaint cannot be said to take effect from the date of the original plaint itself for all purposes. If the argument of the learned Counsel is taken to its logical conclusion, in many cases the same will be proved to be self-defeating or self-destructive. Suppose as in this case a suit is instituted as one for declaration of specific performance and the suit not being one in ejectment, the tenant does not file an application under S. 9 of the Act within the time prescribed thereunder. Assume further that subsequently the plaint is amended as one in ejectment, after notice to the tenant and hearing him, and such an amendment takes effect from the date of the original plaint itself. In such a case, in terms of S. 9 of the Act, the tenant should have filed the application under S. 9 of the Act within one month from the date of the service on him of the summons in the suit and that date having already passed and there being no provision for service of summons in the suit after the plaint has been amended, the tenant could not file a valid application at all. As far as the present case is concerned, if at all, the applicant should have taken steps before the Supreme Court, after the plaint was amended, to pursue Application No. 7 of 1965 or to file an independent application under S. 9 of the Act for a direction to respondents 1 to 6 herein to sell the land to him. Though we are not expressing any final opinion on this, if an application under S. 9 of the Act had been filed before the Supreme Court within one month after the amendment of the plaint converting the suit as one in ejectment was ordered, there might be some plausibility for contending that the period of one month provided for under S. 9 of the Act should be computed from the date of the order amending the plaint which itself was made after hearing the tenant and in his presence. In this ease, there is nothing to show that the applicant herein ever asked the Supreme Court for such an opportunity, when the application for amendment was made and ordered by that Court. The reason for the failure of the applicant to pursue any such course is obvious, because on the construction of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act put by the Supreme Court, such an application would have been immediately dismissed. As a matter of fact, having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court on the scope of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act, at no stage the applicant could have succeeded in any application made under S. 9 of the Act, and as admitted by Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar himself, the sole basis for the present claim of the applicant is only the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972. Hence, we are of the opinion that Application No. 7 of 1965 was incompetent and therefore, there is no question of reviving such an incompetent application at this stage. 30. Mr. Chari contended that Application No. 7 of 1965 was not maintainable for another reason as well. O.S. No. 28 of 1964 prayed for a declaration that respondents 1 to 6 here in became the owners of the building with effect from 1st March 1964. The Supreme Court has actually granted such a declaration. 30. Mr. Chari contended that Application No. 7 of 1965 was not maintainable for another reason as well. O.S. No. 28 of 1964 prayed for a declaration that respondents 1 to 6 here in became the owners of the building with effect from 1st March 1964. The Supreme Court has actually granted such a declaration. That means, that even on 15th April 1964, when O.S. No. 28 of 1964 was instituted, respondents 1 to 5 herein were the owners of the building, and the tenant who is competent to file an application under S. 9 of the Act must be one who is entitled to compensation for the building under S. 3 of the Act. In other words, he must be the owner of the building on the date of the application and as on 20th June, 1964, when Application No. 7 of 1965 was presented to this Court, the applicant herein was not the owner of the building, the said application was not maintainable. We hold that this argument is sound. It should be noted that what the Plaintiffs in C.S. No. 28 of 1964 (respondents 1 to 6 herein) prayed for and what they were actually granted by the Supreme Court was a declaration that they had become the owners of the building with effect from 1st March 1964. This assumed that in fact they were the owners of the building on 1st March 1964 and they wanted the declaration of that ownership by the Court and the Court actually declared it. We have already pointed out that that part of the decree of the Supreme Court declaring that respondents 1 to 6 herein had become the owners of the building with effect from 1st March 1964 has become final and cannot be ignored and set aside either under the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 or under S. 9(3) of the Act or in the exercise of any other power. Consequently, on the ground that on 20th June 1964, when Application No. 7 of 1965 was purported to be filed by the applicant herein under S. 9 of the Act, he was not the owner of the building, we hold that the said application was not maintainable. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar sought to argue that the mere exercise of the option to purchase the superstructure as provided for in Cl. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar sought to argue that the mere exercise of the option to purchase the superstructure as provided for in Cl. 4(d) of the lease deed will not make respondents 1 to 6 herein the owners of the superstructure in the absence of a registered conveyance by the applicant and therefore the applicant continues to be the owner of the superstructure. In our opinion, after the decree of the Supreme Court declaring that respondents 1 to 6 herein are the owners of the superstructure with effect from 1st March 1964, it is not open to the applicant to put forward this argument before us at this stage. 31. We are also of the opinion that having regard to what actually has happened, Application No. 7 of 1965 must be deemed to have been either dismissed or not pursued by the applicant. As we have pointed out already, Sadasivam, J., on 16th April 1965 passed an order directing the application to be posted along with the suit in July 1965. When the suit itself was disposed of by Kunhamed Kutti J., no independent orders were passed on the said application. Even when the judgment in the suit was taken up in appeal as O.S.A. 35 of 1967 the applicant herein had not made a whisper of the said Application No. 7 of 1965; nor was any reference made to the same even before the Supreme Court. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the appeal arising from O.S. No. 28 of 1964, the applicant was not entitled to claim the benefit of S. 9 of the Act and therefore even Application No. 7 of 1965 was said to be alive, it must be deemed to have been dismissed by the Supreme Court. 32. M. Venkatarama Ayyar contended that since the suit itself was dismissed by Kunhamed Kutti J. there was no need for any orders on Application No. 7 of 1965 and that was why no orders were passed and therefore, the said application must be revived now. We are clearly of the opinion that this argument is unsound. As the provisions of the Act make it clear and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in The Mylopore Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd. v. K.S. Subramania Iyer I.L.R. 40 Mad. We are clearly of the opinion that this argument is unsound. As the provisions of the Act make it clear and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in The Mylopore Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd. v. K.S. Subramania Iyer I.L.R. 40 Mad. 1040 at 1062-1063 a tenant is entitled to two rights under the provisions of the Act, one being a right to compensation for the buildings erected by him on the leased land under S. 3 of the Act before he is evicted, and the other being a right to exercise the option to require the landlord to sell to him the land covered by the lease for a price to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act under S. 9 of the Act. However, neither of these rights can be claimed by the tenant so long as no suit for eviction has been instituted or an application under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 is made and it is only the institution of such a suit or the filing of such an application which occasions the exercise of the said right. With regard to the right to compensation provided for by S. 3 of the Act, it is not even the institutions of the suit or the filing of the application under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, that enables the tenants to claim compensation but it is only the success of the landlord in the suit or the application which gives that right to the tenant. From the very nature of the case, the rights to claim compensation for the buildings put up by a tenant on the land leased to him can arise only when he is called upon or required to surrender and deliver possession of the land and not before. It in view of this alone, S. 3 of the Act starts by stating: “Every tenant shall on ejectment be entitled to be paid as compensation for any building” (Italics are ours). This is further amplified by S. 4 of the Act which deals with the disposal of suit for ejectment. It in view of this alone, S. 3 of the Act starts by stating: “Every tenant shall on ejectment be entitled to be paid as compensation for any building” (Italics are ours). This is further amplified by S. 4 of the Act which deals with the disposal of suit for ejectment. S. 4(1) states: “In a suit for ejectment against a tenant in which the landlord succeeds , the Court shall ascertain the amount of compensation, if any, payable under S. 3 and the decree in the suit shall declare the amount so found due and direct that, on payment by the landlord into Court, within three months from the dale of the decree, of the amount so found due, the tenant shall put the landlord into possession of the land with the building and trees thereon”. (Italics are ours). Sub-S. 2 of S. 4 makes similar provisions with regard to an application under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, if made by the landlord. Consequently, the right of the tenant to claim compensation for the building put up by him on the demised land becomes enforceable only when the landlord succeeds in a suit in ejectment or in an application under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, as the case may be. However, with reference to S. 9 of the Act, the position is different. It is the mere institution of a suit in ejectment or filing of an application under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, that gives the tenant a right to exercise the option conferred by that Section, provided he is a tenant entitled to compensation under S. 3. This position is made abundantly clear by the language of S. 9 itself and particularly by the period of limitation within which the application under the said Section should be made. Once the tenant is entitled to file an application under S. 9 on the institution of a suit or filing of an application under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, as the case may be, he is entitled to have his application decided on merits, irrespective of the facts of the suit instituted by the landlord or the application filed under S. 41 of the presidency small Cause Act, 1882 by him. Even if the suit or the application under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act comes to be dismissed for any reason, the tenant is entitled to pursue his application made under S. 9 of the Act and the dismissal of the suit or the application does not necessarily lead to the dismissal of the application under S. 9 of the Act. This conclusion flows directly from the language and the scheme of the Act and to the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Razack Sahib A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1683 L.W and in Vedachala Naicker v. P.N. Duraiswami Mudaliar (1950) 1 M.L.J. 29 . Therefore, if the applicant wants to contend that C.S. No. 28 of 1964 was a suit in ejectment and his Application No. 7 of 1965 was competently made under S. 9 of the Act, he ought to have pursued that application even when C.S. No. 28 of 1964 was dismissed. As we have pointed out already, he did not pursue the application either before the trial Judge or before the Letters Patent Bench or even before Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, it must necessarily be held that the applicant did not pursue his Application No. 7 of 1965 or he had abandoned the same, even on the assumption that the application was competent. 33. If Application No. 7 of 1965 was either dismissed or was not pursued or was abandoned, we are not told, how the present application, namely, Application No. 439 of 1972 for the purpose of reviving that application is competent. As a matter of fact, Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar was not able to draw our attention to any provision or principle of law which authorises such an application as the present one. All that Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar repeatedly contended before us was that the Tamil Nadu Act of 1972 has given the applicant a right to apply under S. 9 of the Act, and therefore he is competent to file this application and the “inherent procedure” of the Court enables such an application to be filed. We have already indicated our view that S. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 neither expressly nor by necessary implication authorises the reopening or review of any final judgment, decree or order of any Court competently made by it in the proceedings validly instituted before it. We have already indicated our view that S. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972 neither expressly nor by necessary implication authorises the reopening or review of any final judgment, decree or order of any Court competently made by it in the proceedings validly instituted before it. In the absence of any such provision in the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the said Act authorises the applicant to file the present application. Again, we are unable to appreciate what exactly the ‘inherent procedure’ of the Court is, which enables the applicant to prefer the present application and empowers this Court to allow it. Consequently, we are of the opinion that Application No. 439 of 1972 also must fail. Under these circumstances, Applications Nos. 437 and 439 of 1972 are dismissed. 34. Application No. 438 of 1972 being only for stay of execution of the decree passed by the Supreme Court during the pendency of Applications Nos. 437 and 439 of 1972, the same also is dismissed. The respondents shall be entitled to their costs in these applications. Counsels fee fixed at Rs. 1000/-, one set.