Judgement JUDGMENT:- This application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order dated 10-3-71 passed by the Munsiff, Nalbari, in Title Suit No.27/70. The facts briefly are that the plaintiffs brought the suit for declaration of their title in respect of 2/3rd share of the land described in the schedule to the plaint and for confirmation of possession thereof. They valued the suit at Rupees 250/-, both for the purpose of courts pecuniary jurisdiction and for Court-Fee under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act. The contesting defendants (defendants No.2 to 9) in their written statement stated that the valuation of the suit land would be at least Rs.23,600.00 and therefore, according to them, the Munsiff had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The Munsiff framed three preliminary issues, namely Issues Nos.8, 4 and 5 which are as follows:- 3. Whether the suit is properly valued for determination of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court? 4. Whether proper Court-fee is paid? 5. Whether the Court has pecuniary Jurisdiction to try the suit? 2. The learned Munsiff after hearing the said preliminary issues passed the following order: "It appears from the plaint that the prayer in the suit is governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act and as such there is no dispute about it. In this suit, plaintiff has asked for a declaratory decree as well as for consequential relief, and for which he puts his value of relief claimed at Rs.250/-. This value will, in my opinion, meet the purpose of Court-fee and also for the purpose of jurisdiction and accordingly the Issues Nos.3, 4, 5 have been disposed of in favour of the plaintiff." 3. Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Counsel appearing for the defendants-petitioners submits that the suit is governed by Section 7(v)(b) of the Court-Fees Act and therefore for the purpose of Courts jurisdiction, the plaintiff is to value the suit at the market value of the suit property. The only question, therefore, for determination in this application is whether the suit will be governed by Section 7(iv)(c) or Section 7(v)(b) of the Court-Fees Act. 4. Section 7(iv)(c) and Section 7(v)(b) of the Court-Fees Act may now be quoted:- "7. The only question, therefore, for determination in this application is whether the suit will be governed by Section 7(iv)(c) or Section 7(v)(b) of the Court-Fees Act. 4. Section 7(iv)(c) and Section 7(v)(b) of the Court-Fees Act may now be quoted:- "7. The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:- (iv) In suits- (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of, appeal. In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. . . . (v) In suits for possession of land, houses and gardens-according to the value of the subject-matter: and such value shall be deemed to be where the subject-matter is land, and- (b) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid; and such revenue is settled, but not permanently five times the revenue so pay able." 5. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act which is relevant is as follows: "8. Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 7, Paragraphs v, vi and ix, and paragraph x. clause (d), court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-Fees Act (1870) the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. 6. Mr. D.K. Bhattacharjee a junior Advocate as he is, by an able argument, contends that when the dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and possession is merely consequential, Court-fee is paid under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act and the plaintiff can put any value for the purpose of the Court-fees, and in view of the provision under Sec.8 of the Suits Valuation Act, valuation put by the plaintiff for the purpose of Court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fees Act, will be the valuation for the purpose of Courts pecuniary jurisdiction also. The submission of learned counsel is substantial. The submission of learned counsel is substantial. In my opinion, when the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is declaration and possession is merely consequential, then the suit is to be valued for the purpose of Court-fee under S.7(iv)(c) and this valuation will be the valuation for the purpose of the Courts pecuniary jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. Mr. Bhattacharjee cites AIR 1958 SC 245 , which has explained the principle which underlies Section 7(iv) of the Court-Fees Act. It has held- "Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under Section 7(iv) the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. If the scheme laid down or the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-sections of Section 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under sub-section (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of Court-fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness. Take for instance the claim for partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property. The basis of the claim is that the property in respect of which a share is claimed is joint family property. In other words, it is property in which the plaintiff has an undivided share. What the plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the Court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Now it would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiffs alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness. That is why legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment of court-fees. Now it would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiffs alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness. That is why legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment of court-fees. It really means that in suits falling under Section 7(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be ac cepted by the Court in computing the Court-fees payable in respect of the said relief. .... What would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction in such suits is another question which often arises for decision. This question has to be decided by reading Section 7(iv) of the Act along with Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This latter section provides that, where in any suits other than those referred to in Court-fees Act, Section 7, paras 5, 6 and 9 and para 10, Clause (d), Court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. In other words, so far as suits falling under Section 7, sub-section (iv) of the Act are concerned, Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of Section 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of court-fees and that is natural enough. The computation of court-fees in suits falling under Section 7(iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees, and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for Court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for Jurisdiction must be determined." 7. The value for court-fees, and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for Court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for Jurisdiction must be determined." 7. In my opinion the interpretation put on Section 7(iv)(b), Court-Fees Act by the Supreme Court equally applies to Section 7(iv)(c). 8. Learned Counsel for the defendant-opposite-party does not, as he cannot, challenge the above proposition of law; but he submits that the primary purpose of the instant suit is for possession and therefore Section 7(v)(b) will apply. Let us therefore examine whether the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is declaration or possession. This has to be gathered from the averments made by the plaintiffs in the plaint and not from the averments made by the defendants in the written statement, wherein the defendants have averred that the land is situated in the Nalbari town and is worth Rs.23,600.00. 9. The substance of the plaintiffs plaint is that plaintiff No.1 and late Britti Ram, the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs No.2 to 9 and defendant No.1 were three brothers, constituting a joint Hindu family. Defendant No.1 was the Karta of the family. The land described in the schedule to the plaint was the joint family property purchased in the name of defendant No.1 with the income of the family. The 3 brothers jointly possessed the property for sometime, but later on they amicably divided the property and plaintiff No.1 and Britti Ram possessed 2/3rd share of the suit property and defendant No.1 1/3rd. Defendant No.1 sold 1B-OK-10L out of his share of 1B-OK-18L of the land to defendants Nos.10 and 11 and delivered possession to them. By different register deeds, defendant No.1 altogether sold 2B-1K-14L of the land and three different pattas were issued to the vendees after partition. But as defendants Nos.2 and 9 who were the vendees were unable to possess the land, they brought two criminal proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code in which possession was declared in their favour. The plaintiffs claim that the orders of the Magistrate in the said proceedings are erroneous and assert that they are in possession of their 2/3rd share of the suit property. The plaintiffs claim that the orders of the Magistrate in the said proceedings are erroneous and assert that they are in possession of their 2/3rd share of the suit property. They have prayed for a decree for declaration that they are entitled to 2/3rd share of the property and also for confirmation of possession. 10. After a perusal of the averments in the plaint there cannot be any doubt that primarily and essentially the present suit is one for declaration, namely, that the land in suit is the property belonging to a joint Hindu family, purchased in the name of the defendant No.1 who is alleged to be the karta of the family. If that he so, the plaintiffs claim of 2/3rd share will automatically follow and their relief for confirmation or possession will be merely consequential. 11. In the instant case, the plaintiffs valuation at Rs.250/- under Sec.7(iv) (c) of the Court-Fees Act for the purpose of Court-Fee and the same valuation for the purpose of Courts pecuniary jurisdiction are proper. 12. In the circumstances, this application has no substance and is rejected. I however leave the parties to bear their own costs. The rule is discharged. Application rejected.