Judgement This is an appeal by the contesting defendant No. 1 Adhikarimayum Brapamohon Sarma, against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge Manipur in C. A- No. 17/ 70/17/70 dated 11-1-1971, by which he decreed the plaintiffs suit reversing the decree of the trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs case was that late R. K. Chandrahas Singh, father of pro forma defendant No. 5, was the original owner of the suit land. He allowed late Ramnath Sarma, the father of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to live in the suit land as its Manager on condition of delivering half of the produce of the land. Ramnath Sarma used to give half of the crop of the land every year to late R. K. Chandrahas Singh, and after his death which took place about 35 years ago, to his son, pro forma defendant No. 5. After the death of Ramnath Sarma, which took place about 25 years ago, his sons Brajamohon Sarma, defendant No. 1, and Bangsidhari Sarma also used to give half share of the crop raised on the land, every year, to the pro forma defendant No. 5 till 1955. Since 1956 they have refused to pay such share to the pro forma defendant No. 5. At this pro forma defendant No. 5 asked them to vacate the land, but to no effect Thereafter, the pro forma defendant No. 5 sold the suit land to the plaintiff on 23-4-1956 for a consideration of Rs. 800/- under a registered sale deed. When the plaintiff went to take possession over the land, it is alleged, defendant Nos. 1 to 4, who are in possession of the land, did not allow him to do so and denied his title. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of his title to the suit land, and for recovery of possession by evicting the defendants therefrom. 3. The pro forma defendant No. 5, filed a written statement admitting the claim of the plaintiff. The suit was contested by defendants Nos. 1 to 4, who filed a joint written statement. It was not denied by them that the suit land originally belonged to late R. K. Chandrahas Singh. 3. The pro forma defendant No. 5, filed a written statement admitting the claim of the plaintiff. The suit was contested by defendants Nos. 1 to 4, who filed a joint written statement. It was not denied by them that the suit land originally belonged to late R. K. Chandrahas Singh. According to them, late R. K. Chandrahas Singh, made an oral gift of the suit land in favour of late Ramnath Sarma about 41 years ago with delivery of possession and that since then Ramnath Sarma and after his death his sons have all along been in possession of the land by their own right, adversely against R. K. Chandrahas Singh, and his successors-in-interest. They also contested the suit on the ground that pro forma defendant No. 5 alone had no right to sell the land to the plaintiff as R. K. Chandrahas Singh left some other sons besides pro forma defendant No. 5, and that the suit was barred by limitation under Art. 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. 4. Upon the pleadings, as many as. 13 issues were framed, including the following issues, which were issues Nos. 5, 10, 11 and 12 respectively : "5. Is the suit barred by limitation and adverse possession? X X X X X 10. Was the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest in possession of the suit land within 12 years before the institution of the suit? or Was late Ramnath Sarma and after him were the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 the permissive possessors of the suit land paying half of its produce to late R. K. Chandrahas Singh and after his death to R. K. Angousana Singh till 1955? 11. Was the suit land a joint property of R. K. Lukhoisana Singh, R. K. Angousana Singh and the heirs of late R. K. Gopalsana Singh on 23-4-1956, if so, can the plaintiff sue for recovery of possession of the suit land on the basis of purchase from R. K. Angousana Singh? and 12. Did late Adhikarimayum Ramnath Sarma acquired the suit land by gift from late R. K. Chandrahas Singh?". 5. Eight witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff, and five witnesses on behalf of the defendants were examined in the suit, and a number of documents were also proved. and 12. Did late Adhikarimayum Ramnath Sarma acquired the suit land by gift from late R. K. Chandrahas Singh?". 5. Eight witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff, and five witnesses on behalf of the defendants were examined in the suit, and a number of documents were also proved. On a consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Munsiff held in favour of the plaintiff on all the issues except issues Nos. 5 and 10. In deciding these two issues, the learned Munsiff held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, is applicable, and that the plaintiff failed to prove that they were in possession of the land, either actually or constructively within 12 years before the institution of the suit. The suit was accordingly held to be barred by limitation under the said Article, and in the result the suit was dismissed. 6. Being aggrieved by the decree of the learned Munsiff, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the District Judge, which was transferred to the Additional District Judge for disposal. It appears from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge that only three points were urged before him, viz., (1) Whether the suit land was the separate property of defendant No. 5 Shri R. K. Angousana Singh on partition amongst his brothers so as to give him a right to convey the suit land to the plainttiff; (2) Whether the suit land was gifted orally by Shri R. K. Chandrahas Singh to Shri Ramnath Sarma, so as to confer the right of ownership or at least a colour of such right to the latter and his successors-in-interest, and (3) Whether the suit is barred by Article 142 or 144 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, in the circumstances of the case. 7. Upon the evidence on record, the learned Additional District Judge answered all the three points in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. In deciding the third point the learned Judge held that the suit was governed by Art. 144 and not by Article 142 of the Act, and that the defendants failed to prove their adverse possession. He accordingly decreed the suit, reversing the decree of the trial Court. 8. In deciding the third point the learned Judge held that the suit was governed by Art. 144 and not by Article 142 of the Act, and that the defendants failed to prove their adverse possession. He accordingly decreed the suit, reversing the decree of the trial Court. 8. In the present appeal, Shri Y. Imo Singh, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the finding of the Additional District Judge on the first point mentioned above, but he vehemently attacked the findings on the other two points. 9. The question as to whether or not late R. K. Chandrahas Singh made an oral gift of the suit land to late Ramnath Sarma, predecessors-in-interest of the appellant is purely a question of fact, and that being so the finding of the learned Court below on that question cannot be assailed by the appellant in the second appeal even if the finding is erroneous. 10. The other question, viz., whether the suit is governed by Article 142 or by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, is undoubtedly a question of law, and the appellant is entitled to challenge the finding of the first appellate Court in this regard. 11. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Additional District Judge was entirely wrong in holding that the suit is governed by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, and thus throwing the entire onus of proof on the defendants. According to him, the suit is governed by Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act in which case, the plaintiff must prove his possession within 12 years prior to the institution of the suit to entitle him to get a decree for possession. It was submitted that in the present case, the plaintiff has failed to discharge this burden as rightly held by the Munsiff and so the lower appellate Court committed an error in law fay reversing the said decree. 12. It was submitted that in the present case, the plaintiff has failed to discharge this burden as rightly held by the Munsiff and so the lower appellate Court committed an error in law fay reversing the said decree. 12. In holding that the suit is governed by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, it appears from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge that he relied mainly on the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Qadir Bux v. Ramchand, AIR 1970 All 289 (FB), wherein it was held by their Lordships that if a plaintiff claims possession against a defendant alleging him to be his tenant and fails to prove the tenancy set up by him, Article 142 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. will not apply and the only Article that can apply is Article 144 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. 13. The question as to whether in such a case Article 142 or Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, is attracted came up for decision before a Division Bench of this Court in Premeswar Das v. Madhab Chandra Das, AIR 1950 Assam 55, where their Lordships decided as follows : "A plaintiff out of possession cannot succeed in a suit for possession without proof of a subsisting title. It would not be enough to prove that plaintiff had title 15 or 20 years before suit. A subsisting title would involve proof of title in addition to possession within 12 years. If, therefore, a plaintiff bases his case on the permissive character of defendants possession and fails to prove it, he may succeed if his title and possession within 12 years have been proved. It is only on proof of subsisting title that a defendant can be called upon to prove his adverse possession. It would not be necessary to go into the question of defendants adverse possession if plaintiff has not proved his subsisting title in the suit property. Article 142 covers cases of actual and constructive possession and dispossession. A person can remain in possession of the property through a licensee or a tenant. He is not in actual possession but his possession in law is there. Such a person can certainly be dispossessed and his dispossession in such a case would occur immediately his title is repudiated. Article 142 covers cases of actual and constructive possession and dispossession. A person can remain in possession of the property through a licensee or a tenant. He is not in actual possession but his possession in law is there. Such a person can certainly be dispossessed and his dispossession in such a case would occur immediately his title is repudiated. There is no reason why Article 142 should not apply to such a case." 14. In deciding the above case, their Lordships relied on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Official Receiver of East Godavari v. Govinda Raju, AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB), and also on the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Behari Lal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (FB). 15. In the Madras case, Horwill J., before whom the case came up for disposal first, in his order of reference formulated the question in these words : "Whether in a case where a plaintiff sets up a case of permissive possession and fails to prove it, the burden then lies upon the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of suit or whether the onus is upon the defendant to prove adverse possession for a period of 12 years." The Full Bench, after a careful consideration of the matter and reiving on three Privy Council cases, viz., Mohima Chunder v Mohesh Chunder, (1888) ILR 16 Cal 473 (PC), Mohd. Amanulla Khan V. Badan Singh, (1889) ILR 17 Cal 137 (PC) and Dharni Kanta v. Gabar Ali (1913) 18 Ind. Cas 17 (PC), held : "It is wrong to say that a person who could prove title in suit for ejectment has the right to a decree unless defendant proved adverse possession for 12 years. The plaintiff is not entitled to succeed unless he says in addition to his title that he has been in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit. The burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of suit; the onus is not. upon the defendant to prove adverse possession for a period of 12 years". 16. The burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of suit; the onus is not. upon the defendant to prove adverse possession for a period of 12 years". 16. In AIR 1935 Lah 475 also their Lordships held : "Where in a suit for possession, plaintiff pleads possession and dispossession, the suit is governed by Article 142, it cannot be said that in all cases Article 144 is to govern the case once the plaintiff has proved a title to the property. Dispossession may be either actual in the sense of an existing actual possession being forcibly terminated by actual dispossession, or it may be a legal constructive possession being terminated by a legal dispossession." 17. The same question came up for decision before the Judicial Commissioner Manipur, in K. K. Singh v. E. I. Singh, AIR 1962 Manipur 36 , and it was held that "where the plaintiff files a suit for ejectment of the defendant from the land in suit on the basis of his title on the allegation that the defendant was his tenant, had not paid any rent and had refused to vacate the land and the allegation of tenancy denied by the defendant is not proved, the suit virtually amounts to one for possession on the ground of dispossession by the defendant and would be governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act and not by the residuary Article 144." 18. The Mysore High Court in a Full Bench case in Lingamma v. Putte Gowda, AIR 1863 Mys 1 (FB), decided to the same effect, viz., that the plaintiff who files a suit for possession, has to prove not only his title to the suit property but also his possession over the same within 12 years from the date of the suit. If a person having title to the property sues for possession of the suit property on the allegation that the defendant was his tenant but fails to establish the tenancy pleaded, then it follows that he must have either been dispossessed or that he had discontinued his possession prior to the suit. 19. The decision of the Judicial Commissioner. Manipur in AIR 1962 Manipur 36 , was binding on the Courts at Manipur at the time when the first appeal was disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge. 19. The decision of the Judicial Commissioner. Manipur in AIR 1962 Manipur 36 , was binding on the Courts at Manipur at the time when the first appeal was disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge. Now, also after Manipur has come under the High Court of Gauhati, the decision of the Assam High Court in, AIR 1950 Assam 55, which has not been overruled is binding. That apart, these two decisions are in consonance with the view of several other High Courts, as mentioned above. Under the circumstances, the finding of the learned Additional District Judge that Article 144 of the Limitation Act (old) is applicable to the present case, cannot be sustained. 20. Whether the present suit is governed by Article 142 or by Article 144 of the Limitation Act is purely academic in my opinion. Because, the findings arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge are sufficient to hold that the suit is not barred by limitation even if the suit held to be governed by Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The learned Additional District Judge has found that the defendants have admitted that Shri Ramnath Sarma was allowed by late R. K. Chandrahas Singh to reside in the suit land before the alleged gift. He has disbelieved the story of the alleged gift. It has been held by him that whether Ramnath Sarma entered the suit land as a favourite servant of R. K. Chandrahas Singh or as his Manager or tenant, the position is quite clear that he was an Agent of the true owner. He has also believed the evidence of defendant No. 5, who was examined as P. W. 5 that after the death of Ramnath Sarma, his sons including defendant No. 1 paid to him half of the produce of the land till one year before the sale of the suit land to the plaintiff. From these findings of the learned Additional District Judge, it is quite clear that the plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest R. K. Chandrahas Singh and after his death his son defendant No. 5 was in constructive possession of the land through the defendants, whose possession was only permissive. This clearly goes to show that the plaintiff or for that matter his predecessors-in-interest was in possession of the disputed land within 12 years prior to the institution of the suit. This clearly goes to show that the plaintiff or for that matter his predecessors-in-interest was in possession of the disputed land within 12 years prior to the institution of the suit. If that be so, the suit is evidently not barred by Limitation even if Article 142 of the Limitation Act is applied. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Additional District Judge committed an error in law by placing reliance on the recitals in the judgment of a Criminal Case, viz., Criminal Case No. 203 of 1955, which was instituted by the pro forma defendant No. 5 against defendants Nos. 1, 4 and others including P. W. 7 Salam Ibomcha Singh, alleging that the accused persons in that case used criminal force against him when he went to demand his share of the crop in respect of the suit land. This judgment was marked Ext. A-16 and it is seen from the judgment that the accused took the plea in that case that they were regularly delivering the share of crop due to the complainant. The learned Additional District Judge took into consideration this admission of the defendants in the criminal case, from the said judgment. 22. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of a criminal Court is relevant in a civil suit only for a limited purpose, to show that there was a case between the parties and that in such case the accused were either convicted or acquitted. It is not evidence of the fact proved or disproved in such a case nor can the recitals be used as evidence of the fact alleged in such recitals. In support of this contention he relied on the decisions in Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Devi. AIR 1955 SC 566 and Onkarmal v. Banwarilal. AIR 1962 Raj 127 . 23. There can be no two opinions that a previous judgment in a criminal case can be used only for the limited purpose, as mentioned above, and that the recitals in such judgment cannot be used as proof of the fact alleged in such recitals. But, such judgment is admissible, in my opinion, under Section 13 of the Evidence Act, as evidence of a particular instance in which the right was claimed. But, such judgment is admissible, in my opinion, under Section 13 of the Evidence Act, as evidence of a particular instance in which the right was claimed. This, no doubt, cannot be a proof of the fact mentioned in the recital but it can be looked into along with other evidence, for whatever worth it may be, in my opinion. As observed by the learned Judge in Gobind Chandra v. Upendra Padhi, AIR 1960 Orissa 29 : "It is not that the judgment of the Criminal Court has to be ignored altogether but it should not be relied upon as conclusive for deciding the civil suit for malicious prosecution. A Civil Court has to go into the matter on the evidence adduced before it in the civil suit independently of the view expressed by the Criminal Court. The sense in which it is said that the Criminal Court judgment is not admissible in evidence is that apart from the fact of the result of the Criminal Court judgment, namely, its termination in favour of the accused persons, the observations of the Criminal Court of the reasoning on which the order of acquittal is based is not to be accepted as conclusive." 24. Even if this judgment is left out of account, there is the admission of the defendants themselves that their father Ramnath Sarma was allowed to occupy the land by R. K. Chandrahas Singh. This clearly goes to show that the possession of the defendants was permissive. Once the possession is found to be permissive, it is to be presumed that it continues to be so unless there is clear evidence of assertion of hostile title at some stage. The learned Additional District Judge has held that there was no evidence of such assertion of hostile title by the defendants against the true owner at any stage. Then there is the evidence of P. W. 5 (pro forma defendant No. 5) that the principal defendants used to deliver his share of crops till about 1955, P. W. 7 Salam Ibomcha Singh who was a co-accused with the defendants in the said criminal case stated in his evidence about the demand of his share of crop by pro forma defendant No. 5. The learned Additional District Judge took into consideration all these evidence and he believed the same. The learned Additional District Judge took into consideration all these evidence and he believed the same. If believed these are sufficient evidence to prove constructive possession of the plaintiff and his predecessor till 1955. 25. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if Ramnath Sarma came to occupy the land with permission from R. K. Chandrahas Singh, it cannot be held that the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 also are in possession of the land in the same capacity. According to him, a licence does not create any heritable right as in the case of tenants. Hence, if a person was permitted by the owner of a property to be in occupation of it, the possession of the heirs of such occupier after his death will not be permissive but adverse against the owner. In support of this contention he relied on the decision in Chinnan v. Ranjithammal, AIR 1931 Mad 216, where it was held : "A license is not annexed to the property in respect of which it is enjoyed, nor is it a transferable or heritable right, but is a right purely personal between grantor and licensee. Unless a different intention appears it cannot be exercised by the licensees servants or agents. Representatives of a tenant on sufferance are mere trespassers, since they cannot be regarded as succeeding to any interest in the tenancy; and what is true of a tenant on sufferance is true also of a licensee. From the date of licensees death the possession of his heirs becomes adverse to the owner of the property." 26. I do not find any force in this concontention as well. From the evidence of P. W. 5, who has been believed by the learned Additional District Judge, it is seen that even after the death of Ramnath Sarma, the defendants continued to deliver the share of crop to R. K. Chandrahas Singh, and after his death to pro forma defendant No. 5. The question as to whether this evidence is sufficient or not cannot be gone into by the second appellate Court. In view of the evidence of P. W. 5, it cannot be said that after the death of Ramnath Sarma, the possession of the defendants has become adverse. 27. The question as to whether this evidence is sufficient or not cannot be gone into by the second appellate Court. In view of the evidence of P. W. 5, it cannot be said that after the death of Ramnath Sarma, the possession of the defendants has become adverse. 27. As a result of the foregoing discussions, I find that although the finding of the learned Additional District Judge that Article 144 is applicable in the present case cannot be said to be correct, there is nothing wrong in the ultimate decision. His findings of fact are sufficient to hold that the suit is not barred under Article 142 of the Limitation Act as well. That being the position, the decree appealed against must be affirmed, and I do accordingly. The appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case. I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.