( 1 ) THE above civil revision petition is filed against an order dt. 7-10-1971 in O. S. No. 282 of 1969 on the file of the Addl. Munsiff, Hubli recording a finding on issue No. 3 in the said suit holding that the trial of the said suit was barred by the provisions of Sec. 84 (4) of the Mysore Agricultural produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the act), Since no decree was drawn up pursuant to the said finding, the plaintiff has filed the above civil revision petition. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are briefly these: the plaintiff is an agriculturist. He supplied certain quantity of agricultural produce to the first defendant firm which was carrying on the business of Commission Agents within the market area as defined by s. 2 (19) of the Act at Hubli. According to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 4,000 was due and payable by the defendants to the plaintiff. It may be mentioned here that defts. 2 and 3 are the partners of the first deft. firm. The above suit was instituted on 2-8-69. Before instituting the above suit the plaintiff had applied to the Market Committee at Hubli on 14-6-1969 to settle the dispute. As no action appears to have been taken on the said application till 2-8-1969, the plantiff instituted the above suit on that date. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendant, it was contended inter alia, that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the above suit in view of the provisions of S. 84 (4) of the Act, because the plaint was not accompanied by the previous sanction of the Market Committee as required by the said provision. Thereafter on 19-8-1970 the petitioner applied to the Market Committee for the necessary sanction to institute the suit against the defendants. The sanction was accordingly accorded by the committee on 21-10-1970 and the letter of the Market Committee accord ing sanction was produced before the lower Court on 28-10-1970. There after, the "court below framed issues on 14-12-1970 and took up for consi deration issue No. 3 which read as follows:"whether the defendant 2 proves that the jurisdiction of thi court is ousted under S. 84 of the Mysore Agricultural Produc marketing Act of 1966? ". There after, the "court below framed issues on 14-12-1970 and took up for consi deration issue No. 3 which read as follows:"whether the defendant 2 proves that the jurisdiction of thi court is ousted under S. 84 of the Mysore Agricultural Produc marketing Act of 1966? ". ( 3 ) AFTER hearing the parties, the Court below came to the conclusion that th sanction which had been accorded by the Market Committee was not legal and of no effect and that the trial of the suit could not be proceeded with in view of the provisions of S. 84 (4) of the Act. Aggrieved by the said finding recorded on issue No. 3, the plaintiff has filed this revision petition before proceeding to consider the contentions urged by the parties before me, it is necessary to set out the provisions of S. 84 of the Act, which reads as follows:" 84. Provisions for settlement of disputes. (I) For the purpose of settling disputes between producers, buyers and sellers, or their agents, including any disputes regarding the quality or weight of, or payment ior, any agricultural produce, or any matter in relation to the regulation of marketing of agricultural produce in the market area the market committee of that area shall appoint a panel of arbitrators periodically consisting of agriculturists, traders and commission agents, and constitute a disputes Committee from among its members in such manner as may be prescribed. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be entertained by any Court in respect of disputes referred to in sub-sec. (1), without the previous sanction of the market committee. " ( 4 ) ON behalf of the defendants, both in the Court below and in this Court emphasis was placed on the Expression entertained appearing in sub-sec. (4) of S. 84 and it was argued that the suit instituted on 2-8-1969 before the sanction was accorded was ineffective and the said suit could not be heard even after the sanction was accorded by the Market Committee and the same was produced before the Court below during the pendency of the suit. (4) of S. 84 and it was argued that the suit instituted on 2-8-1969 before the sanction was accorded was ineffective and the said suit could not be heard even after the sanction was accorded by the Market Committee and the same was produced before the Court below during the pendency of the suit. Sri K. S. Savanur, the learned Counsel for the defendants, urged that the expression ' shall be entertained' should be read as ' shall be instituted' and in the instant case as admittedly there was no sanction of the market committee to institute the suit prior to 2-8-1969, the suit was liable to be dismissed. Sri W. K. Joshi, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, however, contended that the expression ' shall be entertained' appearing in sub-sec. (4) of S. 84 means ' shall be dealt with' or shall be judicially considered' or ' shall be taken up for consideration' and so understood, it was argued by Sri Joshi, that the suit must be deemed to have been validly instituted, at least on 28-10-1970 when the letter containing the sanction of the Market Committee was produced before the court. He urged that even on that date the suit would have been in time, and, therefore, the Court below should have proceeded with the hearing of the suit. ( 5 ) SRI Joshi in support of his submission relied upon a decision of S. R. Das Gupta, CJ. in Janardhan Manjappa Hegde v. Ramakrishna Ganappayya hegde, 1961 Mys. L. J. 526. in which the expression 'entertain' appearing in S. 51a of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act of 1947 was interpreted by the learned Chief Justice as meaning 'dealt with' and not 'instituted. He rejected the contention urged on behalf of the appellant in that case that the expression ' shall not entertain the application' meant ' shall not receive the application. In the course of the said decision it was observed that there was no doubt that the word 'entertain' in the said section can only mean 'deal with' or 'dispose of and could not mean 'receive' and that the words may proceed to entertain' meant 'may proceed to deal with. ( 6 ) SRI Joshi next relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Lalta prasad Khinni Lal v. Asst. Commr. (Jud.) Sales Tax, AIR. 1972 SC. 401. ( 6 ) SRI Joshi next relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Lalta prasad Khinni Lal v. Asst. Commr. (Jud.) Sales Tax, AIR. 1972 SC. 401. In the said case the question which came up for consideration was whether an appeal filed under the U. P. Sales Tax Act was barred by time or not; S. 9 of the u. P. Sales Tax Act which provided for an appeal against an order of assessment prescribed that no appeal against an assessment should be entertained unless it was accompanied by satisfactory proof of payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due or of such instalments thereof as may have become payable. In the said case the assessee which had. been assessed to sales tax under that Act filed an appeal on October 21, 1965, which was three days before the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal was to expire. The assessee had admitted its tax liability to the extent of Rs. 3153-01 and that admitted amount was not deposited before the appeal was filed. On May, 27, 1966 the total amount payable was deposited and the treasury challen was produced. The assessee thereafter made an application under S. 5 of the indian Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. ( 7 ) THE Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales Tax rejected the memorandum of appeal as defective on the ground that the deposit of the amount of tax admitted to be due had not been made within the period of limitation and that the delay in doing so could not be condoned under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. A petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the said order before the High Court of Allahabad was dismissed. ( 8 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the High Court of Allahabad, the assessee took up the matter before the Supreme Court, in the above case. A petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the said order before the High Court of Allahabad was dismissed. ( 8 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the High Court of Allahabad, the assessee took up the matter before the Supreme Court, in the above case. Dealing with the observations of the High Court of Allahabad made in the course of the order passed on the petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution, holding that S. 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable when there was delay in depositing the admitted tax, the Supreme Court observed as follows:" We are wholly unable to comprehend and appreciate the above reasoning or the conclusions of the Allahabad High Court on the point under consideration. It is true that an appeal filed under S. 9 of the act cannot be entertained by the appellate authority unless satisfactory proof is adduced of the payment of tax admitted by the appellant to be due but in a case where the amount of admitted tax is deposited after the period of limitation has expired all that will happen is that the appeal will become entertainable only on the day on which satisfactory proof of payment of that amount is produced. In other words the appeal will be deemed to have been properly filed on the date on which the amount of admitted tax is paid. If that is beyond the period of 30 days the appeal will be barred by time. S. 9 (6) will immediately become applicable to that appeal and it will be open to the appellant to apply for condonation of delay under that provision. We are wholly unable to follow the argument that the deposit of the amount of admitted tax must be made within 30 days even though the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under sub-sec. (6 ). A proper and correct reading of S. 9 cannot justify such an approach. If a petition of appeal has been filed without proof of payment of tax accompanying it that appeal can be said to have been preferred only when proof of payment of tax is furnished. Such furnishing of the proof may take place within the period prescribed for preferring the appeal or after the lapse of that period. If a petition of appeal has been filed without proof of payment of tax accompanying it that appeal can be said to have been preferred only when proof of payment of tax is furnished. Such furnishing of the proof may take place within the period prescribed for preferring the appeal or after the lapse of that period. If the proof of payment of admitted tax is furnished within the peripd prescribed the appeal must be entertained. If the furnishing of that proof is done after the expiry of the period of limitation the question will arise whether the appeal should be entertained or not. In such cases S. 9 (6) will come into operation and the question will arise whether there has been) sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the statutory period. The correct approach is to treat the appeal as having been preferred on the date on which proof of payment of the tax was furnished and then to see whether under sub-sec. (6) of S. 9, there was sufficient cause for excusing the delay in preferring the appeal. " ( 9 ) THE Supremo Court in the above decision approved the view which was to the same effect expressed by the High Court of Kerala in Gangadharam pillai v. Sales Tax Officer (Res.) Ernakulam I am of the opinion that what has been observed by the Supreme Court in connection with an appeal is equally applicable to s case of a suit subject however to one point of distinction namely, that S. 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to a suit. It therefore, follows that when the document containing the sanction of the Market Committee was produced before the court, the suit must be deemed to have been validly instituted. The lower court should have therefore, considered whether the suit was in time on that day or not in the light of S. 15 (2) of the Limitation Act. and proceed to dispose of the case after giving opportunity to the defendants to file any additional written statement, if they were so advised. The lower court should have therefore, considered whether the suit was in time on that day or not in the light of S. 15 (2) of the Limitation Act. and proceed to dispose of the case after giving opportunity to the defendants to file any additional written statement, if they were so advised. The Court below was, therefore, wrong in holding that the trial of the suit was barred fin view of S 84 (4) of the Art. ( 10 ) UNDER Bve-law 66 of the Market Committee the decision of the Committee regarding the grant or refusal of permission to institute a suit is final The lower Court wrong in holding that the sanction given in this case was illegal and of no effect The reasons given by it in support of its view are untenable. ( 11 ) IN the result I set aside the findings recorded by the Court below on issue No. 3 and remit the case back to the Court below with a direction to dispose of the case in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. The petition is allowed. No costs. --- *** --- .