A. A. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal raises a very interesting question of law whether the by laws framed by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act would be applicable to a person residing in an area which was subsequently included within the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal briefly stated are as under :- The present appellant are the owners of land bearing survey number 260 situated within the limits of Paldi village. They had constucted rooms houses garage workshop etc. and installed machinery thereon for oil mill cloth printing works and other trades. The land bearing survey number 260 was not within the limits of the Corporation when the Act was enacted and came into force in the city of Ahmedabad. The said land was included within the city limits on 13-8-1958. The Plaintiff had made certain construviz. a chimney with a platform and a boiler with a platform and the shed thereon without giving an intimation about the construction to the Corporation as required under sec. 254 of the Act and rule 6. The Corporation thereupon served notices on the plaintiff directing him to show cause why the said unauthorised construction should not be removed. The plaintiff by his reply ex. 36 informed the Corporation that the construction was prior ro the incorporation of the Paldi area within the municipal limits and hence the question of giving any notice for new construction did not arise. As the Corporation contemplated action against him after giving a statutory notice the plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration that the notices served on him by the Corporation were illegal ultra vires and bad in law and for a permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 Corporation and its officers servants and agents from removing or pulling down or otherwise affecting the buildings and work on plaintiffs survey numbers 260 260 and 260 The defendant Corporation by its written statement ex. 13 resisted the suit. 13 resisted the suit. It contended that the notices were legal; that the disputed construction came in existence after the area was included within the city limits on 13-8-1958; that a prohibitory order in fact was issued and served on the plaintiff and the 4th defendant on 4-10-1963 when the construction was being put up; that inspite of the said prohibitory order construction was completed in violation thereof and hence the notices were issued against them:- that all the provisions of the rules regulations and by laws under the Act would apply to the facts of the present case and it is not correct to say that the disputed construction had been put up prior to the area being included within the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation; that the Commissioner had delegated all the powers to the Estate and City improvement Officer under sec. 69 (1) of the Act to perform duties and functions under sec. 260 of the Act and hence the notices issued by him were legal and valid. From the pleadings of the parties the learned Judge framed the following issues:-1 Whether the notices exhibits 17 and 18 are bad in law illegal and ultra vires ?2 Whether the disputed constructions were in existence prior to 13th August 1958 when the area concerned got included within the Corporation ?3 Whether there was a valid delegation in favour of the Estate and city Improvement Officer to issue notice under sec. 260 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 ?4 Whether the plaintiffs entitled to the permanent injunction as prayed for ?4 What decree and order ?the learned Judge decided issues Nos. 1 2 and 4 in the negative and issue No. 3 in the affirmative. On these findings the learned Judge dismissed the suit. Against the said judgment and decree the piaintiff has preferred the present appeal. ( 3 ) MR. 1 2 and 4 in the negative and issue No. 3 in the affirmative. On these findings the learned Judge dismissed the suit. Against the said judgment and decree the piaintiff has preferred the present appeal. ( 3 ) MR. S. K. Zaveri learned Advocate for the appellant made the following submissions:-1 The construction was made prior to the land being incorporated within the municipal limits and therefore the said construction cannot be unauthorised and cannot be ordered to be removed;2 The by law under which the construction is sought to be declared unauthorised was not reenacted after this land came within the municipal limits and hence the same cannot be applicable in the case of the plaintiff;3 that the notices issued by the Estate and City Improvement Officer were not valid as he cannot be said to be an officer as contemplated in sec. 45 of the Act and therefore the powers delegated to him by the Commissioner cannot be said to be properly delegated;4 that the said officer before issuing notices had not heard the plaintiff and hence the notices were illegal being violative of the principle of natural justice. ( 4 ) IN support of his submissions Mr. Zaveri invited my attention to the relevant provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corportations Act 1949 hereinafter referred to as the Act. Before considering the question of law involved in this appeal it will be worthwile to refer to the evidence on record in order to find out whether the impugned construction was made by the plaintiff prior to his land being incorporated within the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad. It is not disputed that the Paldi area in which the suit land is situated was included within the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad on 13th August 1958. The plaintiffs case is that all the construction mentioned in the said notices was in existence prior to the said date. In support of his case the plaintiff examined himself and one Amritlal Hathibhai ex. 45. The plaintiff no doubt in his examination in chief reiterated what he had stated in his plaint. According to him all the construction was made prior to 13th August 1958. In cross examination however he had to admit that he had not asked for any permission for making this construction from any authority having jurisdiction over the area. 45. The plaintiff no doubt in his examination in chief reiterated what he had stated in his plaint. According to him all the construction was made prior to 13th August 1958. In cross examination however he had to admit that he had not asked for any permission for making this construction from any authority having jurisdiction over the area. According to him he had asked for permission to put up a factory building. But he had to admit that while seeking permission to put up a factory building he had not shown the disputed construction specifically According to the plaintiff he had submitted before the City Survey Officer a plan for that purpose. But he was not able to produce a copy of his application or the plan. He could not say whether the disputed construction was shown in the map produced by him along with the application. He the suggestion that the boiler and the chimney and shed were subsequently constructed by himhe admitted that on the complaint being filed by the Corporation he was sentenced to pay fine. He however denied the suggestion that in November 1959 the disputed construction was not there and that it came into existence thereafter. According to him the platform and chimney were put up by a person named Dinubhai in 1956 and that he had entered the amount paid to Dinubhai in his books of account. However when he produced the books of account no such entry was found regarding any payment made to Dinubhai for the construction of the platform or the chimney. The plaintiff was then confronted with an application received by the Corporation on 6-10-1958. He was shown a plan acompanying the said application. The plaintiff denied that the application bore the signature of his brother who was the applicant in that case. He however admitted that the two plans bore his signature in the middle portion. He also admitted that the property was jointly owned by him his brother and their father. The plaintiffs witness Amritlal Hathibhai is running a hotel in the vicinity of the said land. He supported the plaintiff in his version that the disputed construction was there prior to the area being included within the city limits. He also admitted that the property was jointly owned by him his brother and their father. The plaintiffs witness Amritlal Hathibhai is running a hotel in the vicinity of the said land. He supported the plaintiff in his version that the disputed construction was there prior to the area being included within the city limits. Thus barring the bare word of the plaintiff and his witness Amritlal Hathibhai no tangible evidence has been led by the plaintiff in support of his case that the impugned construction was on the land prior to Paldi area being included within the city limits of Ahmedabad. ( 5 ) ON the cortrary the defendant Corporation by oral as well as documentary evidence has proved that this construction was made after the said area was incorporated in Ahmedabad city limits. The defendant relied on the evidence of Damubhai Chhaganlal Ex. 47; Thushar Ambalal ex. 48; Ramchandra Dayabhai ex. 54 and Bharatkumar Ambalal ex. 56. According to Damubhai after the said area was included in the limits of Ahmedabad city he and other members of Jawaharnagar society had made an agitation for converting the area into residential zone; that during that time he saw the disputed chimney on the land which according to him was not there prior to the area being included in the municipal limits. This witness is completely corroborated by the evidence of Bharatkumar Ambalal ex. 56 who was Jilla Inspector at the time when the area was included within the limits of Ahmedabad city. According to him an application along with two maps was received for sanction of new construction to be put up in the suit property and that these papers were forwarded by his department to the town development officer for his opinion for the proposed construction; that pursuant to the opinion of the town development officer a reply was proposed to be sent to the engineer of the party concerned that the permission sought could not be granted as the property was situated within the residential zone. According to this witness the plaintiffs engineer was orally told about this decision and thereupon he took away these maps saying that necessary correction will be made therein. Thereafter these maps were not resubmitted and instead when he had gone on the site he found that new construction was already made thereon which did not exist before. According to this witness the plaintiffs engineer was orally told about this decision and thereupon he took away these maps saying that necessary correction will be made therein. Thereafter these maps were not resubmitted and instead when he had gone on the site he found that new construction was already made thereon which did not exist before. He thereupon submitted his report ex. 57. Witness Ramchandra Dahyabhai who was also a Jilla Inspector in November 1962 has stated on oath that when he visited the site in 1962 he did not find any of the disputed construction on any part of the plaintiffs land. According to him the only constuction which was found on the spot was as stated in the sketch ex. 55. It is interesting to note that the contents of the report ex. 57 are incorporated in the notices which were served on the plaintiff in respect of the unauthorised construction made by him. Tusar Ambalal Upadhyaya who was in charge of the area in January 1963 stated when he visited the place on 11-1-1963 the situation was as per the particulars shown in the sketch on the reverse of the notice ex. 44. Ramchandra Dahyabhai who was Jilla Inspector in the Estate Department of the Corporation visited the site on 30-11-1962 to take inspection of the unauthorised construction under the instructions from the Estate and City Improvement officer Mr. Gandhi. At that time he did not find any of the disputed construction on any part of the plaintiffs property. He prepared a sketch about the construction which already existed on the plaintiffs property which is found in Tumar on page 27 produced by the Corporation. Thus the defendant has clearly established from the oral as well as documentary evidence that all this construction was made by the plaintiff after the Paldi area came to be incorporated within the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad on 13th August 1958. I do not agree with the learned Advocate for the appellants that the impugned construction was already there and that the said chimney and platform were already utilised for the oil mill which existed there at the relevant time. If this construction was made after the Paldi area came to be incorporated in the city of Ahmedabad the plaintiff has got to obtain permission of the Corporation before making any construction as provided in secs. If this construction was made after the Paldi area came to be incorporated in the city of Ahmedabad the plaintiff has got to obtain permission of the Corporation before making any construction as provided in secs. 253 and 254 read with rule 6 framed under the Act. Sec. 254 (1) states (1) Every person who shall intend (a) to make any addition to a building; or (g) to carry out any repairs to a building involving the construction of a floor or a room;shall give notice to the Commissioner in the form prescribed in the by laws and containing all such information as may be required to be furnished under the by-laws. RULE 6 states (1) No person shall commence to erect a new building or to execute any such work as is described in sec. 254 (A) until he has given notice of his intention as herein before required to erect such a building or execute such work and the Commissioner has either intimated his approval of such building or work or failed to intimate his dis approval thereof within the period prescribed in this behalf in rule 3 or 4. NO such notice seemed to have been given by the plaintiff to the Corporation before making this construction. It is therefore clear that whatever construction the plaintiff had made on the land without obtaining the permission of the Commissioner would be unauthorised and was liable to removal. Having failed in his effort to show that the said construction was made prior to the area being included within municipal limits the plaintiff submitted that there was no question of making an application to the Commissioner as contemplated under sec. 254 of the Act and the rule 6 made thereunder for the simple reason that the by laws under which the form of the application was prescribed were promulgated prior to the Paldi area being included within the municipal limits and as these bylaws were not re enacted after the area was included within Corporation limits these by laws would not be binding on the plaintiff and therefore no proceeding could be taken against him for not giving a notice to the Commissioner before making any construction. It was urged by the learned Advocate for the Corporation that this question regarding validity of the by laws does not directly arise in this case. Mr. It was urged by the learned Advocate for the Corporation that this question regarding validity of the by laws does not directly arise in this case. Mr. Desai invited my attention to the contents of the notices exs. 17 and 18 issued by the Estate and City Improvement officer. He urged that the plaintiff had made the construction in contravention of building regulation No. ( 6 ) AS stated in notices exs. 17 and 18. Mr. Desai urged that it was not the case of the Corporation that the plaintiffs act was unauthorised being contrary to the provisions of the by law. 6 Mr. Desai submitted that any person who intended to make a new construction or to carry out repairs to a building involving construction of a floor or a room was required to give a notice to the Commissioner in the form prescribed by the by law as stated in sec. 254 of the Act. He therefore urged that what was required to be done by the plaintiff was to give a notice and it was immaterial whether the by law under which the form was prescribed was valid or not. According to Mr. Desai if the plaintiff failed to give a notice altogether before making the construction he would be violating the provisions of sec. 254 read with rule 6 and therefore it would be competent for the Corporation to take appropriate proceedings against him. Mr. Zaveri on the other hand explained it away by saying that he could not give any notice to the Corporation for the simple reason that the by law under which the form was prescribed could not be said to be valid and would not be applicable in his case as the said by law was not reenacted after the Paldi area was included within the municipal limits. ( 7 ) MR. Zaveri referred to sec. ( 7 ) MR. Zaveri referred to sec. 460 of the Act which states :-NO by law shall be made by the Corporation unless (a) a notice of the intention of the Corporation to take such by law into consideration shall have been given in the official gazette and in the local newspapers atleast six weeks before the date on which the Corporation finally considers such by law; (B) a printed copy of such by law shall have been kept at the chief municipal office and made available for public inspection free of charge by any person desiring to peruse the same at any reasonable time for at least one month from the date of the notice given under clause (a); (c) xx xx xx xx xx (D) All objections and suggestions which may be made in 9writing by any person with respect thereto within one month of the date of the notice given under clause (a) shall have been considered by the Corporation. MR. Zaveri therefore urged that as required under sec. 460 of the Act no by law could be made by the Corporation until all the objections Suggestions which may be made in writing by any person in respect thereto were considered by the Corporation. He urged that the Paldi area was not within the Municipal limits at the time the by laws were made and hence the question of giving any objections and suggestions with respect to the by laws by the plaintiff and other residents of the Paldi area would not arise. Thus any by law made with regard to the other areas of the Ahmedabad city could not be made applicable to an area which was incoporated within the municipal limits after the said by laws were framed. He urged that these by laws would not be binding on the plaintiff and would not govern his case. No action therefore could be taken against the plaintiff for making any construction without intimating the Corporation. In support of his case Mr. Zaveri referred to the case of Bagalkot City Municipality v. Bagalkot Cement company A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 771 wherein it was observed thata by law made without the previous publication of its draft to persons likely to be affected there by as required by sec. 48 (2) would be an invalid bye law. The publication contemplated by sec. Zaveri referred to the case of Bagalkot City Municipality v. Bagalkot Cement company A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 771 wherein it was observed thata by law made without the previous publication of its draft to persons likely to be affected there by as required by sec. 48 (2) would be an invalid bye law. The publication contemplated by sec. 48 (2) is publication to persons whom the bye law when made is likely to affect by its own terms and not to persons residing outside the municipal district as constituted when the bye law was made or who were not the rate payers of the municipality. Since a by law cannot be made under sec. 48 so as to affect people by its own terms or force unless to them it had been previously published the present by law cannot be read as including within the octroi limits the municipal district as extended from time to time. To do that would be to give it a meaning against its context and this the General Clauses Act does not warrant. RELYING on these observations Mr. Zaveri very forcefully urged that as the residents of the Paldi area could not give their objections and suggestions to the by law when it was amended because the Paldi area was not within the municipal limits the said by law could not affect their own rights and interest and therefore it could not de binding on them after the said Paldi area was included in the city limits without it being re enacted. Apparently this ruling would help Mr. Zaveri. But if it is minutely perused it would be seen that the observations made by the Supreme Court are with regard to the actual wording used in sec. 48 (2) of the Bombay District Municipalities Act where in sec. 48 (2) the words used were persons likely to be affected thereby. It is interesting to note that in sec. 460 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act no such words like persons likely to be affected thereby are found. In sub clause (d) it is merely stated no by law shall be made by the Corporation unless (D) all objections and suggestions which may be made in writing by any person with respect thereto within one month of the date of the notice given under clause (a) shall have been considered by the Corporation. In sub clause (d) it is merely stated no by law shall be made by the Corporation unless (D) all objections and suggestions which may be made in writing by any person with respect thereto within one month of the date of the notice given under clause (a) shall have been considered by the Corporation. THE use of the words by any person with respect thereto would include all the residents of the city of Ahmedabad and not necessarily any person likely to be affected thereby as stated in sec. 48 (2) of the Bombay District Municipalities Act. Besides sec. 462 sayswhen any by law has been confirmed by the State Government it shall be published in the official gazette and thereupon shall have the force of law. IN the instant case all the requirements of sec. 460 were followed by the Corporation before framing the by law. It is not the say of the learned Advocate for the plaintiff that proper procedure had not been gone into by the Corporation before enacting the said by law. His only greivance is that whatever by law may have been enacted prior to the Paldi area being included within the municipal limits would not be binding on the plaintiff because he had no opportunity to give objections and suggestions as required under sub-clause (d) of sec. 460. Thus the pertinent question which would arise for my consideration is whether when the by law has been duly confirmed by the State Government and after it is published in the official gazette and gets force of law would it be open to the plaintiff to say that this by law could not be applicable to him simply because at the time it was promulgated the place in which the suit property is situated was not within the city limits of Ahmedabad ? In my opinion after the by laws are duly enacted and published in the official gazette they get force of law and would be equally applicable to the new area which would be included in the municipal limits. The ratio of the case before the Supreme Court cannot govern the facts of the instant case. As already observed earlier the material words persons likely to be affected thereby as stated in sec. 48 (2) of the District Municipalities Act are not found in sec. The ratio of the case before the Supreme Court cannot govern the facts of the instant case. As already observed earlier the material words persons likely to be affected thereby as stated in sec. 48 (2) of the District Municipalities Act are not found in sec. 460 of the Act and secondly there is no such section like sec. 462 in the District Municipalities Act under which the by laws gets the force of law. In this connection it will be worthwhile to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in this very case wherein it is statedfrom what we have said it does not follow that a by law cannot under some provision in the Act other than sec. 48 affect people to whom it had not been published before it was made. All that we have said is that a by law cannot be made under sec. 48 so as to affect people by its own terms or force unless to them it had been previously published. WE are concerned only with the initial validity of a by law for interpreting the meaning of the words used in it. The argument for the appellant contemplates a situation where an existing valid by law is by an independent statutory provision made to affect people to whom it had not been published before it was made. With such a situation we are not concerned. We are unable to agree that if some provision of the Act exists which makes a valid by law applicable to the newly added areas of a municipality and to the residents there though to them the bylaw might not have been published before it was made it would follow that a by law could be validly made under the Act without previous publication to persons likely to be affected thereby. We repeat that if it cannot be so made the present by law cannot be read as including within the octroi limits the municipal district as extended from time to time. To do that would be to give it a meaning against its context and this the General Clauses Act does not warrant. ( 8 ) WITH respect I am in entire agreement with the principle of law enunciated therein. In the instant case the Corporation does not rely on the impugned by law for taking appropriate proceedings against the present plaintiff. ( 8 ) WITH respect I am in entire agreement with the principle of law enunciated therein. In the instant case the Corporation does not rely on the impugned by law for taking appropriate proceedings against the present plaintiff. The Corporation had given notices to the plaintiff for violation of the provisions of sec. 254 read with rule 6 of the Act. It is an admitted position that no notice was given by the plaintiff before making the impugned construction. The plaintiff therefore would clearly be liable for his acts done in contravention of the said provisions. I am unable to agree with Mr. Zaveri that the notices as issued by the Corporation were invalid because the by laws under which he was required to give an application were invalid. It may be noted that the plaintiff was not required to give a notice under by laws. The plaintiff was required to give notice under sec. 254 of the Act and rule 6 made thereunder. What sec. 260 contemplates was that the application should be given in the form prescribed under the by law. Having failed to give any such notice the plaintiff cannot be heard to say that the by-law which had prescribed the form was invalid and that precluded him from giving an application. The case of the plaintiff from the beginning was that the said construction was made prior to the area being included within the city limits of Ahmedabad and therefore it was not necessary for him to give any notice to the Commissioner before making the construction. As already observed earlier the plaintiff has failed to prove that the impugned construction was made prior to the said area being included within the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad. From the evidence on record I am satisfied that the said construction was made after the Paldi area came to be incorporated within the municipal limits. Therefore if the plaintiff wanted to make any new construction or any repairs which required construction of a floor or a room he was required to give a notice to the Commissioner in the prescribed form. I am unable to agree with Mr. Zaveri that the said by law which prescribed the form was invalid because it was enacted prior to the Paldi area being incorporated within the municipal limits. I am unable to agree with Mr. Zaveri that the said by law which prescribed the form was invalid because it was enacted prior to the Paldi area being incorporated within the municipal limits. I have already said that it was not necessary to invite objections from the persons affected thereby but it was open to any person to give objection to the Corporation. The plaintiff had at no time raised any objection to the said by law. Besides as stated earlier the by law having obtained the force of law it cannot be challenged by the plaintiff on the ground that the said by law was not reenacted after the Padli area was included within the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad. In my opinion it is not necessary to reenact the by law before applying the same to any new area which may be incorporated within the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad. There is no warrant for the submission made by Mr. Zaveri that in such a case it was obligatory on the Corporation to invite objections from the residents of the new area before applying the said by law to that area. Mr. Desai learned Advocate for the Corporation invited my attention to a judgment of this High Court in (Patel Kashibhai Jivabhai v. Manibhai Kashibhai) Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 1969 decided on 1st February 1971 wherein my learned brother A. D. Desai J. had negatived the contention raised by the accused that after application of the Act to the new area rules were not published and hence the accused could not be charged for committing breach of the rules. It was observedsec. 453 of the Act provides that the rules mentioned in the Schedule A as amended from time to time shall be deemed to be part of the section. There is no dispute and there cannot be any that the rules in respect of which the breach is alleged are contained in schedule A which was enacted with the Act. In view of the provisions of sec. 453 of the Act the rules become applicable as soon as the Act came into operation. A person is deemed to know the law. As the rules are part of the Act the accused was deemed in law to know the provisions thereof. MR. In view of the provisions of sec. 453 of the Act the rules become applicable as soon as the Act came into operation. A person is deemed to know the law. As the rules are part of the Act the accused was deemed in law to know the provisions thereof. MR. Zaveri however tried to distinguish this ruling by stating that the rule as soon as it was framed became part of the Act itself and therefore when the Act was applied to a particular area the rules automatically came to be applied which was not the case with regard to the by laws He urged that the by laws did not become part of the Act and therefore it would be open to the plaintiff to urge that the by law being invalid no action could lie against him for making the construction without obtaining prior permission. It is true that the by law does not become part of the Statute as in the case of a rule. As stated in sec. 453 of the Actthe Rules in the Schedule A as amended from time to time shall be deemed to be part of this Act. THUS the moment any new area came to be included within the municipal limits of the Corporation the whole Act would be applicable and all the parties residing in that area would be governed by the provisions of the Act. But even so far as the by laws are concerned even though they did not become part of the Act they get force of law as stated in sec. 462 of the Act. Once it gets force of law it cannot be challenged on the ground that the said by law was enacted prior to the area being included within the municipal limits. In my opinion the learned Judge below was right in holding that the notices issued by the Corporation were valid. ( 9 ) LASTLY it was urged by Mr. Zaveri that the notices were invalid because they were not issued by the Commissioner and were issued by the Estate and City Improvement Officer. He submitted that under sec. 69 of the Act the powers and functions of the Commissioner could be delegated to a municipal officer generally or specially empowered in this behalf. Mr. Zaveri that the notices were invalid because they were not issued by the Commissioner and were issued by the Estate and City Improvement Officer. He submitted that under sec. 69 of the Act the powers and functions of the Commissioner could be delegated to a municipal officer generally or specially empowered in this behalf. Mr. Zaveri submitted that the Estate and City Improvement Officer could not be said to be a municipal officer as contemplated in sec. 69 of the Act. He referred to sec. 45 of the Act which enumerates municipal officers. According to him municipal officers contemplated in sec. 69 would be city engineer medical officer of health municipal chief auditor and municipal secretary as enumerated in sec. 45 (1) of the Act. I am unable to agree with him. In fact there is no warrant for confining the use of the word municipal Officers to the four officers included in sec. 45 of the Act. That would be limiting the scope of sec. 69. That could not be the intention of the Legislature. Besides the municipal Officers are not merely four officers enumerated in sec. 45 of the Act but there would be other officers as would be determined by the standing committee from time to time as stated in sec. 51 of the Act. It is not disputed that the Estate and City Improvement Officer is attached to the Municipal Corporation and is an officer under the employ of the Corporation. It cannot therefore be said by any reasoning that the Estate and City Improvement Officer is not an officer whom the powers or functions of the Commissioner could not be delegated under sec. 69 of the Act. As already stated earlier sec. 69 is very wide in its scope and it would be open to the Municipal Commissioner to delegate these powers to any municipal officer of his choice. There is no warrant for the conclusion that the municipal officers contemplated in sec. 69 would be only those municipal officers who are included in sec. 45 of the Act. In my opinion any officer serving in the Corporation would be a competent person to whom delegation of the powers and functions of the Commissioner could be made. In my view the order passed by the Commissioner delegating his functions to the Estate and City Improvement Officer is valid and as the impugned notice exs. 45 of the Act. In my opinion any officer serving in the Corporation would be a competent person to whom delegation of the powers and functions of the Commissioner could be made. In my view the order passed by the Commissioner delegating his functions to the Estate and City Improvement Officer is valid and as the impugned notice exs. 17 and 18 were issued by this officer under the powers delegated to him by the Commissioner it cannot be said that the notices were invalid. ( 10 ) MR. Zaveri then made a grievance that the present plaintiff was not given an opportunity by the Corporation before issuing the impugned notices on him and therefore the notices were illegal and invalid being violative of the principles of natural justice. I fail to understand the reasoning of the learned Advocate for the appellant. The notices issued by the Estate and City Improvement Officer asked the plaintiff to show cause why the proceedings should not be taken against him and pursuant to these notices the plaintiff in fact gave a reply Ex. 36. There is nothing in the Act or in the rules made thereunder which any personal hearing was to be given. Merely because the plaintiff was not heard in person it cannot be said that any principles of natural justice were violated. Whatever the plaintiff had to urge was stated in his reply ex. 36 and if after perusing the reply the Corporation thought it fit to take proceedings against him it cannot be said that the Act of the Corporation would be in contravention of the principles of natural justice. Taking a cumulative picture of the oral as well as documentary evidence on record I am satisfied that the notices exs 17 and 18 issued by the Estate and City Improvement Officer were valid. ( 11 ) IN view of this state of affairs the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. .