JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - This is an appeal u/s 417(3), Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal passed by Sri A.K. Patra, Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Balasore. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is that the accused (Respondent herein) was the proprietor of Sk. Diljan Bus Service which was an establishment covered under the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Inspite of registered notice from the Provident, Fund Commissioner the accused did not deposit the Provident Fund contributions and did not submit the statutory returns for the period between December, 1966 and February, 1967, and thus contravened the provisions' of paragraphs 36 and 38 of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme (hereinafter referred to as the Scheme), and was, therefore, punishable u/s 14 of the Act. 3. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. He specifically asserted that he never engaged 20 employees in his establishment at any time and specially during the period for which the prosecution was launched against him. 4. The prosecution examined only the Provident Fund Inspector. He states that the provisions of the Act were made applicable, under Notification No. G.S.R. 1013 dated 29.7.1961 published in the Gazette of India dated 6th August, 1961, to Sk. Diljan Bus Service, of which the accused Respondent was the proprietor. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner by notice No. 2172 dated 21-3-1967 (Ext. 1) asked the accused to deposit the Provident fund contribution and to submit the statutory returns for the period between December, 1966 and February, 1967, but the accused did not submit the aforesaid returns nor did he deposit the said contributions, and 80 this prosecution was launched against him. He states that on the date of his visit he found more than 20 persons in the employment of the aforesaid firm. P.w. 1 has admitted in cross-examination that he did not take any statement from any of the employees in the said establishment during his visit to the firm. The relevant registers of the firm showing the number of employees in the firm and/or their attendance or engagement therein have not been seized and exhibited in this case. His statement to the above effect is vague and indefinite as he does not state the exact number of persons he found employed on that date. The relevant registers of the firm showing the number of employees in the firm and/or their attendance or engagement therein have not been seized and exhibited in this case. His statement to the above effect is vague and indefinite as he does not state the exact number of persons he found employed on that date. He does not also state if the aforesaid indefinite number of more than 20 persons were in employment of the said establishment in the regular course of its business. The Court below has taken Into consideration the evidence of p.w. 1, an employee of the firm, to the effect that between December, 1966 and February, 1967 the accused had not employed 20 or more persons at any time, that during that period only 10 to 12 persons were working under the accused and that about 3 years back the accused applied to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner not to apply the provisions of the Act to his establishment and the said application bad not been disposed of. Mr. Murty, the learned Counsel for the State, has not been able to show from anything on record that either during the relevant period or at any time after the issue of the aforesaid Notification No. G.S.R. 1013 dated 29-7-1961, 20 or more persons were over in employment in the aforesaid establishment. P.w. 1 has admitted that, previous to this case another case under the same provisions of the Act was instituted against the accused, but he was acquitted of the same. As per Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 1, the Act applies to an establishment described therein only when it is shown that it had, in the regular course of business, employed 20 or more persons. Unless that fact is established the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable to such an establishment. In the decision reported in The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh Vs. Sri. T.S. Hariharan, it has been held: The word 'employment' must, therefore, be construed as employment in the regular course of business of the establishment; such employment obviously would not include employment of a few persons for a short period on account of some passing necessity or Rome temporary emergency beyond the control of the company. This must necessarily require determination of the question in each case on its own peculiar facts. This must necessarily require determination of the question in each case on its own peculiar facts. The approach pointed out by us must be kept in view when determining the question of employment in a given case. As the aforesaid fact has not at all been established in this case, it cannot be said that the provisions of the Act apply to the above establishment of which the accused Respondent was the proprietor. On this ground alone the prosecution against the accused for contravention of certain provisions of the Act and the Scheme is not maintainable in law, and fails on this account alone. 5. The Court below in acquitting the acquitting has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of the defence counsel that the sanction for the prosecution (Ext. 2) u/s 14(2) of the Act does not specify the period in respect of which the prosecution is sanctioned, and so the said sanction is vague and therefore invalid. The Court below, in one sentence and without any consideration and discussion of the provisions of Section 14(3) of the Act, opined that the sanction order under Ext. 2 is vague and invalid. This finding is incorrect in how Section 14(3) of the Act is as follows: No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or under any Scheme except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made with the previous sanction of such authority as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, by as inspector appointed u/s 13. According to the above provisions a Court can take cognizance of an offence under the Act or the scheme, only when a report in writing containing the facts constituting the offence is made before it by an Inspector appointed u/s 18, And the Said report should have been made with the previous section of the appropriate authority. The Court, therefore, has only to Bee if the aforesaid report for prosecution is made with the previous sanction of the appropriate authority. Provision for sanction has been made to protect the person or persons concerned from vexatious, frivolous and/or mala fide prosecution. That being the object for the aforesaid protection it is for the appropriate sanctioning authority to see that no proceeding is started without good reasons to support the charge. Provision for sanction has been made to protect the person or persons concerned from vexatious, frivolous and/or mala fide prosecution. That being the object for the aforesaid protection it is for the appropriate sanctioning authority to see that no proceeding is started without good reasons to support the charge. The said authority, for his own satisfaction on the above question, may insist on the production of materials on which a prosecution is proposed. Once such satisfaction is reached and sanction granted it is not for the Court to insist that all the materials and the dates on which such a sa notion is granted should be stated therein so that the Court can examine the same in order to assess the propriety and correctness of the said sanction. All necessary details relating to the proposed prosecution are required to be stated in the written report to be made in that connection and not in the sa notion accorded for the same. It is for the Court to see if the prosecution instituted has been sanctioned by the appropriate authority. My aforesaid view gets support from the decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Central Hindustan Orange and Cold Storage Co. Ltd. Vs. Prafullachandra Ramachandra Oza, where various aspects of this matter have been dealt with. Certain observations in that decision in different paragraphs may profitably be quoted below: The satisfaction which the authority had was based on the report of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and this satisfaction would not be a subject of challenge in this Court. It was for the authority to be satisfied that there was a case to be reported and whether to give sanction for the making of the report or not. It is its satisfaction and this Court will not go into the question as to whether that satisfaction was proper or not, or based on sufficient material or not unless it is shown that the sanction was given mala fide, which is not the case here. x x x What is, therefore, required by Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act is that the inspector must make that report in writing to the Court with the previous sanction of such authority. The sanction, therefore, is required to the inspector to enable him to make a report. x x x What is, therefore, required by Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act is that the inspector must make that report in writing to the Court with the previous sanction of such authority. The sanction, therefore, is required to the inspector to enable him to make a report. What is required is that a report stating the facts constituting an offence committed should be with the previous sanction. Once a sanction is given, the inspector can make a written report to the Court and in that report he mayor may not indicate the persons who are liable for the offences that are committed. xxxx ...under Section 14(3) of the Act as soon as there is a report in writing by an Inspector stating the facts constituting that offence to the Court and there is a previous sanction for such report the Court is empowered to take cognizance of the offence. The above and other relevant observations and discussions in the aforesaid decision clearly go to show that all the facts constituting the offence and the details thereof need not be stated in the said sanction. 6.In the present case, as seen from Ext. 2, the Secretary to the Government in the appropriate Department sanctioned this prosecution against the Respondent on 21-7-1967 on the report dated 4-7-1967 to that effect submitted by the Inspector. The validity of the sanction was questioned in the Court below on the ground that the period of contravention was not specifically mentioned therein, and not on the ground that it did not relate to the present prosecution or the same was given mala fide. On the above facts and law on this aspect of the matter the Court below has gone wrong in holding that the sanction (Ext. 2) is invalid as the period of contravention is not specified therein. 7. On the above-mentioned finding that the prosecution has failed to establish that the provisions of the Act are applicable to the above-named establishment of which the Respondent was the proprietor, he cannot be held liable for contravention of the provisions of the Act or the Scheme, and accordingly the order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused is correct and justified. 8. There is, therefore, no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. The accused-Respondent who is said to be on bail, is hereby relieved of his bail bond.