Judgment B.D.Singh, J. 1. In these two applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have prayed for directing the respondents to consider their case for admission to the 1st Year M. B. B. S. Class in the Prince of Wales Medical College, Patna, after quashing the condition imposed by the Principal under clause z of the Instruction for admission of students to the First Year M. B. B. S. Course of the said College on the basis of which the petitioners were refused admission therein. Shobha Kumari Mohanka is the petitioner in Case No. 39 whereas Kusum Verma is the petitioner in the other case No. 49. In both, the applications more or less common questions of law are involved although the facts are slightly different. Therefore, for the sake of convenience both the applications were heard together and this judgment will govern both of them. 2. In order to appreciate the points of law involved it will be necessary to state briefly the relevant facts. The petitioner in case No. 39 passed secondary school examination in 1968 and she is recipient of scholarship. In the same year she joined the Patna University and passed Pre-University examination in science with Biology in the year 1969 from Womens College, Patna. She applied for admission in the 1st Year of M.B.B.S. Class in 1969. She would have been admitted but then she was not eligible for the same as she was under-age, i.e., below 17 years. Therefore, she joined B.Sc. class. In 1970 she passed B.Sc. Part I from Magadh Mahila College with Biology securing first position. In 1970 the system of competitive examination was introduced for admission in the various medical colleges. On the 12th April, 1971, a notice under the signature of the Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi, was published for competitive test for admission to the 1st Year Class of M.B.B.S. in the Colleges at Darbhanga, Ranchi, Bhagalpur and Patna Dental College for the session 1971-72 vide Annexure 1. On the 25th May, 1971, the petitioner made an application on the basis of the said notice. On the 25th May, 1971, the petitioner made an application on the basis of the said notice. On the 28th May, 1971, by an Ordinance the State Government took over administration of the Prince of Wales Medical College and a notice was published for combined admission test for medical colleges (vide Annexure 2), the relevant portion of which reads as: "with the Government of Bihar taking over Patna Medical College, the combined competitive examination will now be held for admission to the Darbhanga, Ranchi, Bhagalpur and Patna Medical Colleges and the Patna Dental College. The last date for submission of application for appearing at the competitive examination has therefore been extended by 21 days." On the 5th June, 1971, it was further notified under the signature of the Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi, regarding admission to M.B.B.S. course, Patna Medical College. It has been stated therein that as a result of taking over of the Patna Medical College it had been decided that admissions to the M.B.B.S. Course in the College for session 1971-72 would be on the basis of the same test which would be held on the 4th July, 1971, for other State Medical and Dental Colleges and Government nominees to other Medical Colleges as notified earlier and that the last date for receiving applications was extended from 4th June, 1971 to 25th June, 1971. It was further stated in the said notice that such candidates, who had already submitted their applications would indicate their preference for Patna Medical College (if they so desired) giving the names of the colleges in order of their preference by registered letter addressed to the Principal of the College where he had submitted his application (vide Annexure 3). 3. On the 7th June, 1971, the petitioner sent a letter (Annexure 4) to the Principal, Darbhanga Medical College, and therein she indicated her preference as follows:- - (i) Patna Medical College, Patna--First choice. (ii) Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi -- 2nd choice. (iii) Darbhanga Medical College, Laherisarai -- 3rd choice. (iv) Bhagalpur Medical College, Bhagalpur -- 4th choice. (v) Dental College, Patna-- 5th choice. On the 19th June, 1971, a news item was published in the Indian Nation that the Government decision to hold test examination for Patna was postponed to the 10th October, 1971. (iii) Darbhanga Medical College, Laherisarai -- 3rd choice. (iv) Bhagalpur Medical College, Bhagalpur -- 4th choice. (v) Dental College, Patna-- 5th choice. On the 19th June, 1971, a news item was published in the Indian Nation that the Government decision to hold test examination for Patna was postponed to the 10th October, 1971. The last date for submission of application for the Prince of Wales Medical College was the 12th September, 1971, and by that time the result of the earlier test dated the 4th July, 1971 had not been published. The petitioner appeared on the 4th July, 1971, at the competitive test for the medical college and she was selected securing third position among the girl candidates. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi, informed the petitioner by a registered letter dated the 20th September, 1971, to appear for interview on the 2nd October, 1971, and that the admission was to be taken immediately thereafter. The petitioner filled up the form for competitive test for Prince of Wales Medical College, Patna, and her application was received by the Principal, Darbhanga Medical College on the 1st September, 1971. That competitive test was to commence from the 10th October, 1971. Instructions for admission of students to the 1st Year of the M.B.B.S. Course of the Prince of Wales Medical College, Patna, are contained in Annexure 5. The relevant portion is to be found in clause Z thereof, which reads as: "Such candidates who are selected for admission to the various medical colleges of the State or in other college on the basis of test held on 4-7-1971 will not be considered for admission at the P. W. Medical College, Patna unless they have foregone their claims in above mentioned colleges at the time of admission to these colleges." On the 24th September, 1971, the petitioner being a minor, her father, Dr. Mahadeo Chand, protested under a letter Annexure 6, to the Government of Bihar against the provision of clause Z contained in Annexure 5, referred to above. No reply was sent to his letter contained in Annexure 6. Then on the 30th September, 1971, he sent another reminder. On the 2nd October, 1971, the petitioner appeared at Ranchi for interview, without prejudice to her objection regarding clause Z, and she was selected and she took her admission there on that date. No reply was sent to his letter contained in Annexure 6. Then on the 30th September, 1971, he sent another reminder. On the 2nd October, 1971, the petitioner appeared at Ranchi for interview, without prejudice to her objection regarding clause Z, and she was selected and she took her admission there on that date. On the 4th October, 1971, admit card for examination for admission to the Prince of Wales Medical College, Patna, to be held on the 10th October, 1971, was refused to her on the ground of clause "Z", as she had already taken admission in the Ranchi Medical College. The petitioners father thereafter on the 5th October, 1971, had an interview with the Health Commissioner, and the Deputy Director of Health Services and they assured that appropriate authority would be advised to issue admit card. The Principal of the Darbhanga Medical College thereafter issued admit card to the petitioner (vide Annexure 7), which she received on the 6th October, 1971. On the 10th October, 1971, the petitioner appeared at the test held at Darbhanga for admission at the Prince of Wales Medical College, Patna, hereinafter referred to as the Patna Medical College and she secured 5th place in the said examination among the girl candidates. On the 27th December, 1971, the Professor in charge of admission of the Patna Medical College informed her through a letter of the date that she was selected provisionally for admission and directed her to report before the medical board on the 18th January, 1972, vide Annexure 8. However, the said letter also imposed a condition on the basis of clause Z, referred to above, to the following effect: "If you had already been selected for admission to the various Medical Colleges of the State or in other College on the basis of previous competitive test held in July, 1971, your name will not be considered for admission at the P. W. Medical College, Patna-4 unless you had foregone your claim in the above mentioned colleges at the time of admission to these colleges." The petitioners father again protested to the Government by filing an application addressed to the Health Commissioner on the 3rd January, 1972--vide Annexure 9. Her father also wrote to the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar by another letter dated the 10th January, 1972--Annexure 10, but to no effect. Her father also wrote to the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar by another letter dated the 10th January, 1972--Annexure 10, but to no effect. The petitioner was left with no alternative than to come to this Court. 4. I will now proceed to state briefly the facts in the other case, i.e. No. 49. The petitioner in this case passed B.Sc. Part I examination from Bhagalpur University with biology in the year 1968 and according to her, she was eligible for being admitted to any medical college in Bihar. On the 4th July, 1971, she appeared at the combined competitive examination for admission at Medical Colleges at Darbhanga, Ranchi, Bhagalpur and Patna Dental College and was duly selected for admission at Darbhanga Medical College and took her admission there on the 19th September, 1971. On the 10th October, 1971, she appeared at the competitive examination for admission at the Patna Medical College and secured 16th position in order of merit. She was provisionally selected for admission by a letter dated the 27th December, 1971 (Annexure 1), which was received on the 3rd January, 1972, by her father, whereby she was asked to appear before the medical board and for interview on the 19th January, 1972. But the said letter also contained the same condition as referred to in clause Z. According to her also that clause is invalid, arbitrary and unreasonable restriction on her being admitted to the Patna Medical College. 5. Both these applications were admitted by this Court on the 24th January, 1972. The petitioners have also prayed for ad interim relief, namely, that two seats should be kept reserved for them in the Patna Medical College so that there may not be any difficulty in their admission in the event of their applications being allowed by this Court. Mr. Tara Kant Jha, Standing Counsel No. 2, appearing on behalf of the respondents conceded that two seats in the said college shall be kept reserved for them. In that view of the matter the petitioners had not pressed for ad interim relief. In both the applications the petitioners have impleaded the State of Bihar, Principal and Prof, in charge for admission of the Patna Medical College as respondents. In case No. 39 the Health Commissioner has also been impleaded as one of the respondents. After receiving the notice all the respondents have shown common show cause. In both the applications the petitioners have impleaded the State of Bihar, Principal and Prof, in charge for admission of the Patna Medical College as respondents. In case No. 39 the Health Commissioner has also been impleaded as one of the respondents. After receiving the notice all the respondents have shown common show cause. 6. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in case No. 39 has assailed the condition laid down under clause Z on three grounds, viz. (i) the condition could not have been imposed by the Principal, who had no legal authority and it can be imposed only under a statute or by a notification to be issued by the State Govern- ment; (ii) the condition contained under clause Z has no reasonable nexus with the principle of admission to institutions and, (iii) the condition itself was waived by respondent No. 3, Health Commissioner, by directing the Principal to issue admit card to the petitioner and on the basis of the admit card she had already appeared on the 10th October, 1971. 7. Mr. Brahmdeo Narayan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in case No. 49, has also adopted the argument advanced by Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha, the grounds of attack, being Nos. (i) and (ii) are common in both the applications. Mr. Narayan submitted that the condition is also arbitrary, unjust and was inserted mala fide in order to shut out meritorious candidates from being admitted to the college. He has also attacked clause Z on the ground that it amounts to encroachment upon item No. 66 of List I--Union List under Seventh Schedule, of the Constitution of India, which deals with co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions. He contended that the State had no right to impose that condition in view of the aforesaid item No. 66, which falls within the Union List. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of opposite party, submitted that the condition contained under clause Z is reasonable in order that there may be even distribution of students in various colleges in the State of Bihar and to prevent unnecessary rush for admission in Patna Medical College. Therefore it is in the larger interest of the educational institution. Therefore it is in the larger interest of the educational institution. If the condition imposed under clause Z is not adhered to, there will be some practical difficulty also. 1st Year M.B.B.S. is a course of about 18 months. The sessions started from, near about 1st February, 1972. Colleges other than Patna Medical College started their classes much before the regular class began in the Patna Medical College. If the petitioners are allowed to be admitted in the Patna Medical College, the two seats, which the petitioners have already occupied in Darbhanga and Banchi Medical Colleges, would fall vacant and they will remain unfilled as it would not be advisable to take fresh students now, since teaching in the 1st Year class in those colleges has already gone much ahead and it will be difficult for the new students to keep pace with the progress. Hence, in the interest of the institution as well as those students it would not be desirable to do so. He further contended that the petitioners have no fundamental right to be admitted. 9. It was also submitted that instruction for admission, which is Annexure 5 in case No. 39, is nothing but the prospectus wherein the said condition is mentioned in clause Z. It is an offer or an invitation. The petitioners accepted to appear at the Patna Medical College with full knowledge of that condition. The option was with the petitioners. Both of them exercised their option, while taking admission in Darbhanga and Ranchi Medical Colleges. Once they had exercised their option it is not open to them now that they do not want to continue as students in the respective colleges and instead they now want admission in the Patna Medical College. On that ground also their applications should fail. Their applications under Article 226 of the Constitution are not entertainable on the ground that they have no legal right enforceable by the Court. The petitioners have failed to point out what law has been infringed. On that ground also their applications should fail. Their applications under Article 226 of the Constitution are not entertainable on the ground that they have no legal right enforceable by the Court. The petitioners have failed to point out what law has been infringed. According to the learned Advocate-General there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which reads as:- - "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." None of the students, who had already taken admission in some colleges other than the Patna Medical College, has been admitted in the Patna Medical College. Therefore, there is no question of discrimination. He emphasised that unless the petitioners have established that their rights have been in any way affected, their applications are not maintainable at all. In order to substantiate his contention, he relied on Rani Umeshwari Suthoo V/s. Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa, (1967) 1 SCA 413. He drew our attention to page 427 where their Lordships observed that it is well established no writ will be issued to cancel an order however illegal it may be, unless the applicant can show that the order affected his rights. This has been held by the Supreme Court in a number of cases Kalyan Singh V/s. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1183 . There it was said that a petition for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution postulates a subsisting personal right in the claim which the petitioner makes and in the protection of which he is interested and that in the absence of such a personal right, the petition would not be maintainable. He also referred to another later judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh V/s. Lavu Narendranath, (1971) 1 SCC 607 = AIR 1971 SC 2560 . In that case the petitioners contended that the entrance test prescribed by the Government for the selection of candidates to Medical College was not justified in law, was discriminatory, was invalid for want or publication and amounted to undue interference with the personal liberty of the candidates. The appellate Court held the Government action unjustified. The State thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court, Learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 18 at page 614. The appellate Court held the Government action unjustified. The State thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court, Learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 18 at page 614. While dealing with the contention that it has affected the personal liberty of the candidates secured under Article 21 of the Constitution, their Lordships observed that they failed to see how refusal of an application to enter a medical college can be said to affect ones personal liberty guaranteed under that article. Everybody, subject to the eligibility prescribed by the University, was at liberty to apply for admission to the medical college. The number of seats being limited compared to the number of applicants every candidate could not expect to be admitted- Once it is held that the test is not invalid the deprivation of personal liberty, if any, in the matter of admission to a medical college was according to procedure established by law. In that case everybody subject to the minimum qualification prescribed was at liberty to apply for admission. The Government objective in selecting a number of them was certainly not improper in, the circumstances of the case. 10. Learned counsel urged that the petitioners are excluded because they have already been admitted in Ranchi and Darbhanga Medical Colleges and all such students, who had taken admission elsewhere, have been shut out, so there is no scope at all for any discrimination. In this connection he relied on Ramchandra Vishnu V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 247. That case also relates to an admission to the Medical College in Madhya Pradesh. The main question for consideration before their Lordships was whether it was permissible for the State Government to accord selective or preferential treatment in the matter of admission, to medical colleges either to individuals like the respondents 3 and 4 or to a class of their own creation like the sons and daughters of political sufferers. The learned Advocate-General of that State actually claimed that it would be competent to the State Government to reserve one of the medical colleges for the sons and daughters of political sufferers, though perhaps it would, according to him, not be proper to do so. On the other hand, counsel for the petitioner of that case rested his case on the principle of equality before the law embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. On the other hand, counsel for the petitioner of that case rested his case on the principle of equality before the law embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. In paragraph 9 then Lordships observed that Article 14 ensured equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. That Article was in the form of admonition addressed to the State and did not directly confer any right on any person. The obligation thereby imposed enured for the benefit of all persons because a necessary result of its operation was that they all enjoyed equality before the law. That was, however, the indirect, though necessary and inevitable, result of the mandate. Their Lordships further held in paragraph 10 that it was obvious and was not also in dispute that Medical Colleges in Madhya Pradesh Rules for Admission, 1960, were merely executive or administrative instructions in a field which was not covered by any statute. If there had been statutory rules, their Lordships would not have hesitated to strike down such of those rules as offend against the provisions of Article 14 or quash any discriminatory action taken in pursuance, or even in disregard, of those Rules. Since those Rules were merely executive instructions and could not be classified as law, they did not attract the principle of equality before the law embodied in Article 14. 11. On the basis of the above observations learned Advocate-General contended before us that the condition imposed in clause of the prospectus is in the instant case also an executive instruction given by the Principal. Therefore, the petitioners have no right to come to this Court for quashing of the said condition on the ground of any discrimination, however illegal it may be. In order to find further support to his contention he placed reliance on D. N. Chanchala V/s. State of Mysore, (1971) 2 SCC 293 = ( AIR 1971 SC 1762 ). In that case the petitioner, who failed to be selected for admission in Government Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore, challenged the validity of selection rules. In order to find further support to his contention he placed reliance on D. N. Chanchala V/s. State of Mysore, (1971) 2 SCC 293 = ( AIR 1971 SC 1762 ). In that case the petitioner, who failed to be selected for admission in Government Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore, challenged the validity of selection rules. The main contentions were: (1) That once the petitioner was eligible for admission in accordance with University Ordinance, the Government could not make rules to deprive him of the right of admission; (2) That University-wise distribution of seats was discriminatory and violated Article 14; (3) That setting out a particular number of seats in favour of dependants of political sufferer is discriminatory and violates Articles 14 and 15 (4) and (4) That the reservation of seats for various category of persons was excessive and could not be permitted under Article 15 (4). Their Lordships held that (i) so long as the rules for selection applicable to the colleges run by the Government do not suffer from any constitutional or legal infirmity, they cannot be challenged as the Government can regulate admission to its own institutions. The objection that it cannot, by such rules, provide for requirements over and above those laid down by the Universities for eligibility cannot be sustained, and (ii) the Government which bears the financial burden of running the Government Colleges is entitled to lay down criteria for admission in its own colleges and to decide the source from which admission would be made, provided of course, such classification is not arbitrary and has a rational basis and a reasonable connection with the object of the rules. So long as there is no discrimination within each of such sources the validity of the rules laying down such sources cannot be challenged. Candidates passing through the qualifying examination held by a University form a class by themselves as distinguished from those passing through such examination from the other two Universities. Such, a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the rules, namely to cater to the needs of candidates who would naturally look to their own University to advance their training in technical studies. The rules do not violate Article 14. Such, a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the rules, namely to cater to the needs of candidates who would naturally look to their own University to advance their training in technical studies. The rules do not violate Article 14. On the strength of these decisions learned counsel contended that the condition Z in the instant case is not arbitrary and is reasonable for preventing the exodus from other colleges and unnecessary rush for admission to the Patna Medical College. Learned Advocate-General emphasised that the petitioners have neither any right for admission, nor their any other right has been infringed. On that score alone their applications must fail. 12. In my opinion, the contention of the learned Advocate-General that the petitioners have not any right is not acceptable. The observations made by their Lordships in the various Supreme Court cases and in AIR 1961 Madh Pra 247 (supra) are not applicable on the facts of the instant cases. In my opinion, in the present case the petitioners have right to be considered for admission in the Patna Medical College. In Umesh Chandra Sinha V/s. V. N. Singh, AIR 1968 Pat 3 (FB) it was held that the applicant in that case was entitled to have his case considered in accordance with law, which was valid, but he could not go beyond that and claim admission as of right, the two rights being distinct and each of them being justiciable. In my opinion, Article 14 itself creates obligation, in the State and corresponding right on the citizen. In the State of West Bengal V/s. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 validity of Sec. 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was challenged on the ground of discrimination in criminal trials under Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that a rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Article 14 as any rule of substantive law and it is necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural right for relief and for defence with like protection and without discrimination. Therefore, it may be seen that in that case there was no other right independently of Article 14. 13. Therefore, it may be seen that in that case there was no other right independently of Article 14. 13. It may further be noticed that Sec.32 of the Patna University Act, 1961, does not empower the Principal to lay down such a condition as made in clause Z. It can only be done by the syndicate or by the State Government after it took over its management on the 28th May, 1971. The Advocate-Generals contention that it being an executive act can- not be interfered with under Article 226 is also on the facts of the instant case not sustainable. In Ram Krishna Dalmia V/s. S. R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SG 538 it was observed that Article 14 protects all persons from discrimination by the legislative as well as by the executive organ of the State. State is defined in Article 12 as including the Government and law is defined in Article 13 as including any notification or order. In a later case in A. K. Kraipak V/s. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 while dealing with the question of interference of an administrative order under Article 226 of the Constitution, their Lordships observed that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. In a welfare State like India which is regulated and controlled by the rule of law, it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate, if not ensure a just and fair decision. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate, if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-Judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back, is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power. With the increase of the power of the administrative bodies, it has become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these, public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. 14. In the light of the above observation if I test the condition imposed under clause Z in the instant cases, I do not find it just and fair, nor can it be said that at the time when the petitioners had chosen to take their admission at Ranchi and Darbhanga Medical Colleges, they had any option. Oxford English Dictionary Vol. VII, reprinted in 1961, gives the meaning of the word option at page 164 as the action of choosing, choice, option of two things. The meaning of the word election (in Vol. III of the said dictionary at page 74 is to pick out, choose, by preference select, choice. In the instant cases no doubt the petitioners had knowledge of clause Z, when they took the admission in the Ranchi and Darbhanga Medical Colleges, but it cannot be said that by taking their admission in those colleges they had exercised their option. Where was the question of option, as in the instant case competitive test examination for admission to the Patna Medical College, was to begin on the 10th October, 1971. They could not have known, when they took the admission in Ranchi and Darbhanga Medical Colleges, that they would pass in the competitive test examination and they would be sure to be admitted in the Patna Medical College in distant future. They could not have known, when they took the admission in Ranchi and Darbhanga Medical Colleges, that they would pass in the competitive test examination and they would be sure to be admitted in the Patna Medical College in distant future. They were not expected to take the risk and refuse the offer of being admitted to Ranchi and Darbhanga Medical Colleges on a mere chance of being admitted in the Patna Medical College. In my opinion, the petitioners have followed the old saying: a bird in hand is worth two in the bush; judged from any point of view, in my opinion, the condition imposed under clause Z is not sustainable. That has got to be ignored. Since the petitioners succeed on this ground alone, it is not necessary to deal with the various other grounds, which were urged by the counsel of the petitioners to show the illegality of tie condition contained under clause Z. 15. In the result, the applications of the petitioners -are allowed and the condition contained in clause Z in the prospectus is quashed, and I direct that since two seats are kept vacant, the petitioners be admitted in the Patna Medical College. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs. Anwar Ahmad, J. 16 I agree.