Judgment :- (Appeal against the decree of the Sub Court Thanjavur in A.S. 31/65 preferred against the decree of the Dt. Munsif court Thiruvaiyaru in O.S. 42/64.) 1. The plaintiffs in O.S. No. 42 of 1964 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Thiruvaiyaru who lost before the courts below is the appellant herein. The plaintiff-Devastanam is admittedly the owner of the suit properties, namely, (1) an extent of 2 acres and 32 cents in R.S. 321/1; (2) an extent of 5 acres and 30 cents in R.S. 321/2; and (3) an extent of 7 acres and 26 cents in R.S. 321/3. Thiruvajyaru, which have been described as items 1 to 3 in the plaint schedule properties. Of these three items, item 1 is described as nanja, while items 2 and 3 are described as punja. All these three item of properties were leased out by the appellant to the respondent herein unit Ex. A.7 dated 18th February 1951 for a period of 3 years on the stipulation of a rent of 72 Kalams of paddy with respect to nanja lands and a cash rent of Rs. 800 with respect to punja lands Subsequently, it is admitted that the said rent was reduced to 54 kalams of paddy and Rs. 600 cash. The appellant herein instituted the present suit for recovery of possession of the spit properties and for arrears of rent with future profits. The defence put forward by the respondent was that under Madras Act 57 of 1961, namely, the Madras Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of agricultural lands) Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act the was entitled to continue in possession and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to evict him from the lands in question. The courts below have accepted this defence of the respondent and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff had come up to this court with the present second appeal. 2. It is necessary to set out the respective contentions of the parties, before I deal with the question of law that arises in this case. As far as the appellant is concerned, in paragraph 4 of the plaint it was stated that Rs. 321/1 comprising 2 acres 32 cents were originally dry lands but later on cultivated as wet and for some years post the said lands were again converted into plantain tope. As far as the appellant is concerned, in paragraph 4 of the plaint it was stated that Rs. 321/1 comprising 2 acres 32 cents were originally dry lands but later on cultivated as wet and for some years post the said lands were again converted into plantain tope. As far as R.S. 321/2 and R.S. 321/3 are concerned, it was stated in the same paragraph that they were dry lands and had been converted into tope containing a large number of coconuts mango and paimyrah trees. Ex. A.7 lease deed itself refers to the existence of 252 yielding cocoanut trees and 541 cocoanut plants on items 2 and 3 of the suit lands. Based upon these allegation, the case of the appellant was that the lan is were topes and therefore they were outside the scope of the Act and consequently it was entitled to recover possession thereof from the respondent herein in a civil court. As against this the case of the respondent was that the lands were not topes as defined in the Act consequently he was entitled to continue aid remain in possession of the lands and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to evict him. The question for consideration is which of these two rival contentions is correct. 3. As far as the facts are concerned, there is not much a controversy. Item one of the suit properties is admittedly nanja and has been described so. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination item 1 of the suit properties can be characterised to be a tope as defined in the Act and therefore the appellant, having regard to S. 18 of the Act, cannot seek to re-cover possession thereof from the respondent herein in the civil Court. Mr. M.S. Venkata Rama Iyer learned counsel for the appellant conceded this position and therefore did not press the appeal with regard to item 1 of the suit properties Consequently, the question has to be considered with regard to items 2 and 3 of the suit properties which have been described as dry lands in the lease deed itself and which according to the appellant, constitute topes as defined in the Act, and are therefore exempt from the operation of the Act. 4. For the purpose of considering this question, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Act. 4. For the purpose of considering this question, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Act. The term ‘agriculture’ has been described in S. 2(1) of the Act thus— “agriculture’ includes— (i) horticulture; (ii) the raising of crops, grass or garden produce, (iii) the use by an agriculturist of land held by him of (or) part thereof for grazing; (iv) the use of any land for the purpose of raising manure crops; (v) dairy farming; poultry farming; (vii) livestock breeding; (viii) growing of trees. and ‘agricultural’ shall be construed accordingly.” 5. S. 2(15) of the Act defines the expression ‘land’ in the following terms:— “land means agricultural land’ that is to say, land, which is used capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto and includes forest, pasture lands, plantations, orchard and tope, but does not include house site or land used exclusively for non-agricultural purposes”. S. 2(13) of the Act defines the expression ‘orchard’ as follows:— “Orchard’ means as enclosure on assemblage of fruit or nut-bearing trees, constituting the main crop therein, whether of spontaneous or artificial growth and includes nandavanams, but does not include trees or such bunds as are not within or adjunct to such enclosure or assemblage”. S. 2(29) of the Act defines the expression ‘tope’ thus— ‘Tope’ means any land containing groups of fruit or nut-bearing trees including palmyrah trees, constituting the main crop in such land, whether spontaneous or artificial growth and includes orchards, but dots not include trees on such binds as are not within or adjunct to such groups of trees” S. 18 of the Act is— “Subject to the provisions of S. 7, 15(2) and 19, no cultivating tenant under any public trust shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof by or at the instance of the public trust. Explanation—In this section, ‘holding’ means the parcel or parcels of lands held by any person as a cultivating tenant”. S. 51(iv) of the Act is? “51- Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to— (iv) lands converted into orchards or topes or are cannot gardens, whether or not such lands are contiguous or scattered; Provided that such lands shall be exempt only so long as they continue to be orchard, topes or peanut gardens”. S. 51(iv) of the Act is? “51- Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to— (iv) lands converted into orchards or topes or are cannot gardens, whether or not such lands are contiguous or scattered; Provided that such lands shall be exempt only so long as they continue to be orchard, topes or peanut gardens”. It can be seen immediately that the definition of the term ‘land’ contained in S. 2(15) is inclusive in the sense it includes forest, pasture land, plantation, orchard and tope. Whenever the statute uses ‘land’ in contradistinction with ‘orchard’ and ‘tope’, the definition of ‘land’ cannot include orchard or tope at all, because S. 2 opens by stating, ‘la this Act, unless the context otherwise requires’. Therefore, once S. 51(iv) of the Act exempts orchards or lopes or areeanut gardens from the scope of the Act itself, the expression ‘land’ occurring in the Explanation to S. 18 necessarily must exclude orchards, topes and areeanut gardens. Hence S. 18 will have no application to orchards, topes and areeanut gardens and it will apply only to agricultural land, that is to say, the land which is use or is capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto. Consequently, the question reduces itself to this, namely, whether the suit items 2 and 3 are topes or orchards or not. 6. Both the courts below have held that the respondent has not converted the agricultural lands into orchards or topes and therefore the suit items 2 and 3 did not constitute topes or orchards as defined in the Act. I am clearly of the opinion that the courts below misdirected themselves as to the scope of S. 51(iv) of the Act. The word ‘conversion’ is not a word of art and it has not been used in any technical sense in S. 51(iv) of the Act. The combined effect of Ss. 2 (15), 2(18) and 2(29) is that once an agricultural lands, that is to say, a land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes subservient thereto, is put to the use of raising fruit or nut bearing trees constituting the main crop therein, the said land immediately becomes orchard or tope as defined in S. 2(18) and S. (2). Once the land as defined in S. 2(15) so becomes an orchard or tope as defined in S. 2(18; and 2(29), the land becomes converted into orchard or tope as contemplated by S. 51(iv) and therefore, is outside the scope of the Act, in view of S. 51(iv). S. 2(18) and S. 2(29) themselves do not refer to any conversion and the said word occurs only in S. 51(iv) which does not say by whom the conversion should have taken place, and therefore the courts below erred in coming to the conclusion that the exemption will be available only when the conversion was effected by the tenant. 7. As far as the present case is concerned, even on the date when the respondent took the lands on lease, they were already containing fruit or nut bearing trees, constituting the main crop therein. Consequently, there was no question of conversion of the lands by the tenant himself. On the other band, when the lands even on the date of the lease, happened the an assemblage of fruit or nut-bearing trees, constituting the main crop therein, the question is whether the same can be said to fall within the scope of the definition ‘orchard’ or ‘tope’ as contained in the Act. In my opinion, it is wholly immaterial as to who converted the land orchard or tope and which conversion took p lace. All that the Act says is that so long as the land orchard mains as an orchard or tope as defined in the Act, that will fall outside the Act. This provision has been deliberately introduced by the Legislature with a view to avoid confusion or complication. If the Act has simply exempted tops and orchards from the operation of the Act, a question may possibly arise as to at what point of lime the land should be an orchard or tope so as to attract the exemption. Suppose on the date when the Act came into force, certain piece of land was an orchard or tope and the Act has simply exempted an orchard or tope from the operation of the Act. Suppose on the date when the Act came into force, certain piece of land was an orchard or tope and the Act has simply exempted an orchard or tope from the operation of the Act. In such a case, a question may possibly arise, if, subsequent to the commencement of the Act, the land is used for agricultural purposes as defined in S. (21) of the Act, whether the land will continue to remain outside the scope of the Act or the moment the land was put to such use, it will come within the scope of the Act. The converse case also will give rise to such a question. It is only for the purpose of avoiding any doubt or difficulty in the application of the Act in this behalf, SS. I (iv) has expressly stated ‘provided that such land shall be exempt only so long as they continue to be orchards, topes or are cannot gardens thereby contemplating the possibility of the land being put to different uses referred to above from time to time. Consequently, in my opinion, it is wholly immaterial as to who put the land to the different uses referred to above and at what point of time it was so put and all fiat is relevant is that so long as agricultural land is used as an orchard or tope in the sense the land has been planted with fruit or not-bearing trees, the same constituting the main crop therein, the said land will be outside the scope of the Act. In this particular case, admittedly, even on the date of the lease, suit items 2 and 3 contained only coconut and mango trees And nothing else, because the lease deed itself in the description of the properties expressly refers to the existence of the coconut and mango trees on these lands. The respondent as D.W. 1 has stated in his evidence: “I cannot give the extent of suit item No. 2. Only mango and coconut trees are in this item. I cannot say in what extent these trees are. I cannot give the exact number of mango and coconut trees. I cannot give the number of trees in and the extent of the suit item 3”. In addition to this, there is Ex. A.14, a communication sent by the respondent to the appellant on 30th July 1933. I cannot say in what extent these trees are. I cannot give the exact number of mango and coconut trees. I cannot give the number of trees in and the extent of the suit item 3”. In addition to this, there is Ex. A.14, a communication sent by the respondent to the appellant on 30th July 1933. In that communication he has stated that as a result of the cyclone on 30th November 1952, all the mango trees, coconut trees and coconut plants on the suit lands had fallen and therefore he wanted permission of the appellant to plant afresh coconut as well as mango plants. These materials clearly establish that the suit items No. 2 and 3 are only topes or orchards as defined in the Act. As a matter of fact, the learned Subordinate Judge himself states in paragraph 7 of his judgment: “It at all, these two items can only be deemed as orchards if not topes”. Having regard to these materials, I do not have the slightest hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the suit items 2 and 3 are outside the scope of the Act, by virtue of the operation of Sec. 51(iv) of the Act. Consequently the respondent herein cannot seek the protection of the Act in respect of these two items and the appellant is entitled to recover possession thereof from him. 8. There was yet another argument that was advanced on behalf of the respondent before the courts below which found favour with the courts below and that was that in any event the civil court bad no jurisdiction to decide whether these items 2 and 3 were orchards or topes or not. I am of the opinion that the courts went wrong in holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction. The general principle is that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be provided for expressly or by necessary implication by the concerned statute. One way of finding, out whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication is to see whether the particular subject matter has been entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of any other statutory authority. One way of finding, out whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication is to see whether the particular subject matter has been entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of any other statutory authority. Only if the right to decide-whether a particular land is an orchard or tope is left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorised officer under the Act, it can be said that the civil court has no jurisdiction. If at all the question arises, the authorised officer will have to decide whether a particular piece of land is an orchard or tope or not, as incidental to determining the question whether the Act applied to the land and consequently whether the tenant is entitled to the protection of the Act or not. There is no provision in the Act expressly referring to such determination by the authorised officer and making such determination final. Therefore, it cannot be said that a decision on the question whether a particular land is an orchard or tope as defined in the Act is left to the executive Jurisdiction of the authorised officer under the Act and hence the civil court has no Jurisdiction, to decide the said question. Under these circumstances I hold that the civil court has jurisdiction to decide, when a dispute arises, whether a particular piece of land leased to a tenant is an orchard or tope as defined in the Act and are it is outside the scope of the Act or not. 9. As I have pointed out already, the appellant claimed arrears of rent also. As against this, the respondent contended that the rents were not in arrears. Having regard to the materials available, I am unable to hold that the respondent was in arrears of Cent with regard to suit items 2 and 3. However, since I am holding that the appellant herein is entitled to recover possession of the suit items 2 and 3 from the respondent herein, the appellant will be entitled to mesne profits in respect thereof from the date of the suit till delivery of possession, which will be determined in proceedings under O. XX, R. 12 C.P. Code. 10. However, since I am holding that the appellant herein is entitled to recover possession of the suit items 2 and 3 from the respondent herein, the appellant will be entitled to mesne profits in respect thereof from the date of the suit till delivery of possession, which will be determined in proceedings under O. XX, R. 12 C.P. Code. 10. Under these circumstances, the second appeal is allowed in put and the suit instituted by the appellant herein will be decreed as prayed for with regard to the recovery of Possession in respect of suit items I and 3, with future mesne profits from the date of suit till delivery of possession. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout. No leave.