JUDGMENT : Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. Uma Devi, wife of the petitioner, owns a house in the town of Muzaffarpur in this State the opposite party is a tenant of that house. He was inducted by a lease for a fixed term from 1.8.1959 to 31.7.1961. There was another lease in his favour again for a fixed term from 1.8.1961 to 31.7.1963. Uma Devi instituted Title Suit No. 266 of 1963 in the court of Munsif I, Muzaffarpur against the opposite party. It was partly decreed for Rs. 317.20 P. At the instance of the opposite party, the Munsif extended the term of the lease from 1.8.63 to 31.7.1964. On the failure on the part of the opposite party to vacate the house on the expiry of the extended term or to pay the decretal dues or subsequent dues, the petitioner, acting under the power of attorney from his wife, filed an application under Section 12 (3) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947- hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act.' This was numbered as Miscellaneous Case No. 103 of 1966. It was dismissed for default on 8.7.1967 and the ORDER :of dismissal was upheld by this Court on 24.1.1968. The petitioner then made a fresh application under Section 12 (3) of the Act for an ORDER :for eviction for the decretal dues, dues for the period of extended lease, i. e. from 1.8.1963 to 31.7.1964 and damages at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day for illegal occupation of the building from 1.8.1964 up to the date of filing of the petition. 2. This application was contested by the opposite party on the ground that it was barred by previous JUDGMENT :, waiver, estoppel, limitation and for want of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. He averred that the petitioner had filed a Miscel1aneous Case No. 91 of 1965 under Section 12 (3) of the Act and in that case the opposite party took the plea that Uma Devi had assured him that she did not want him to vacate the house. Under court's direction the opposite party adduced evidence in support of the above allegation, but the lawyer for the petitioner refused to cross-examine that witness and thereafter that application was dismissed. According to him, the application could not be filed in the name of the petitioner. Under court's direction the opposite party adduced evidence in support of the above allegation, but the lawyer for the petitioner refused to cross-examine that witness and thereafter that application was dismissed. According to him, the application could not be filed in the name of the petitioner. On this and other grounds, the opposite party claimed that the application was not maintainable and prayed for its dismissal and compensatory cost under Section 35A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The court below has held that the petitioner, though held power of attorney, could not file the application in his own name, it was barred by limitation, same type of petitions having been dismissed earlier the present petition under same cause of action was not tenable in the eye of law, and provisions of Section 12 of the Act were also not complied with and hence the application was not maintainable. It has accordingly dismissed the application with compensatory cost of Rs. 25/-. The petitioner has preferred this application in revision against this ORDER :. 4. It is not quite clear what the court below means when it says that the present petition is also not tenable as the provisions of Section 12 of the Act have not been complied with Section 12 of the Act as follows :- "12. (1) If a tenant in possession of any building, held on a lease for a specified period, intends to extend the period limited by such lease, he may give the landlord at least one month before the expiry of the period limited by the lease, a written notice of his intention to do so; and upon the delivery of such notice the said time shall, subject to the provision of Section 11, be deemed to have been extended by double the period covered by the original lease subject to a maximum or one year. 2. 2. Where the landlord to whom notice has been given under Sub-section (1) wishes to object to the extension demanded by the tenant on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (1) or Section 11 or on the ground that the landlord has any other good and sufficient cause for termination the lease on the expiry of period limited thereby he may, within fifteen days of the delivery of such notice, apply to the court in that behalf and the court after hearing the parties may terminate the lease or extend the same for such period as it deems proper in the circumstances. Provided that the tenant shall not in any case be allowed to remain in possession of the building beyond the period permissible under Sub-Sections (1) and (3) If the tenant fails to vacate the building on the termination of the lease or as the case may be, on the expiry of the period fixed. by the court under Sub• section (2), the court shall, on an application by the landlord, pass an ORDER :for ejectment, which shall be executed as a decree and may further ORDER :that the tenant shall pay to the landlord such amount as may be determined by it as daily compensation." Learned counsel for the opposite party was not able to point out in what respect the petitioner has failed to comply with the provisions of this section. Obviously Sub-sections (1) and (2) of this section have got no application to the present proceeding. In no event, the opposite party as a tenant could get the period of his lease extended for more than one year and the lease was extended by the court below for one year. In the circumstances, the landlord was not expected to take any further step under Sub-section (2) and failure on his part to take steps under Sub-section (2) could not deprive him of his right to make a petition under Sub-section (3) on the expiry of the extended term. 5. The application of the petitioner in the court below cannot also be held to be barred by time. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act does not fix any period of limitation for making the application. 5. The application of the petitioner in the court below cannot also be held to be barred by time. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act does not fix any period of limitation for making the application. Though the court below has not mentioned it specifically, perhaps, it was of the view that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a period of three years would apply to the case. That Article can have no application to a petition under Section 12(3) of the Act. In (1) Town Municipal Council, Athani V. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and others (A.I.R. 1969 Supreme Court 1335) it was laid down that the view expressed by that Court in (2) Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. V. Gopal Bhiva (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 752) that Article 181 of the old Limitation Act applied only to applications which were made under the Code of Civil Procedure must be held to be applicable even when considering the scope and applicability of Article 137 of the new Limitation Act. It was held that Article 137 was not applicable to applications under Industrial Disputes Act. In (3) (Letters Patent Appeal No. 31 of 1966 and Miscellaneous Appeal No. 208 of 1970), myself, B. D. Singh, J. concurring, have, also following the said decision of the Supreme Court, held that Article 137 does not apply to applications which were not under the Code of Civil Procedure. The applications which we were considering in those two cases were under Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act, one filed before this Court before the Judge exercising original jurisdiction and another before the Special subordinate Judge at Ranchi. On the authority of those decisions it has to be held that Article 137 cannot apply to a petition under Section 12 (3) of the Act. Further, there appears no good reason for taking the view that in case of tenant who takes advantage of the provision of Section 12(1) of the Act and does not vacate the building on the termination of the extended period of the lease, his landlord should be deprived of the rights conferred upon him under Sub-section (3) of that section after expiry of a certain period. He should be held entitled to avail of that right so long he is entitled to evict the tenant by a suit. He should be held entitled to avail of that right so long he is entitled to evict the tenant by a suit. The only purpose behind Section 12 (3) appears to be that in the case of a tenant who gets advantage of Section 12 (1) of the Act, the landlord may evict him under a summary proceeding instead of a suit. The court below, therefore, has erred in holding that the application of the petitioner was barred by limitation. 6. It is not in dispute that when Miscellaneous Case No, 91 of 1965 was filed by the petitioner, he had no power of attorney on behalf of his wife. Obviously, therefore he could not have maintained the application and it was dismissed on that score. That application by the petitioner cannot in the eye of law be an application on behalf of his wife as he could not represent her. A registered power of attorney was executed in favour of the petitioner by his attorney was executed in favour of the petitioner by his wife on 5.10.1966 after the dismissal of that case. The petitioner not suing under the same title, the ORDER :in that case cannot operate as res judicata against him in the present case, Miscellaneous Case No. 103 of 1966 having been dismissed for default, that ORDER :also cannot operate as res judicata against the petitioner in the present case. The court below therefore, is also incorrect in holding that since same type of petitions were dismissed twice, a third petition on the same cause of action was not tenable in the eyes of law. 7. The only question which now remains to be considered is whether by virtue of the power of attorney in the favour the petitioner can maintain the present application in his own name. According to Mr. A. G. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner, he could maintain the present application in his own name. He relied in support of his contention on Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882 (Act VII of 1882). According to Mr. A. G. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner, he could maintain the present application in his own name. He relied in support of his contention on Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882 (Act VII of 1882). The Section reads as follows :- "The donee of a power-of-attorney may, if he thinks fit, execute or do any assurance, instrument or thing in and with his own name and signature, and his own seal, where sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power; and every assurance, instrument and thing so executed and done, shall be as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in the name, and with the signature and seal, of the donor thereof. This section applies to powers-of-attorney created by instruments executed either before or after this Act comes into force." No doubt, this section proceeds on an assumption that there is power of delegation available or exercisable under the existing law, but it does not lay down that the attorney as an agent in absence of authority would do things in his own name for the principal. It was held in (4) Ram Das V. Dwarka Das (A.I.R. 1930 Allahabad 875) that the JUDGMENT : in a suit instituted by the general attorney of a minor's principal's guardian, without the guardian's knowledge and permission, both on his own behalf and for the minor's guardian, professedly as the guardian's authorised agent could not be conclusive as against the minor as he was not fully represented. The donee of a power of attorney is nothing but an agent and in absence of authority he cannot be said to have power to institute a legal proceeding in his own name. In (5)Municipal Board, Jaunpur, V. Banwari Lal (A.I.R. 1939 Allahabad 623) it has been held that an agent authorised to receive payment due to his principal has no right to institute the suit for the recovery of the same unless the amount is transferred and assigned to him. In my opinion, Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act cannot be read as to confer general power on the petitioner to institute a legal proceeding in his own name for the benefit of his wife. 8. In my opinion, Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act cannot be read as to confer general power on the petitioner to institute a legal proceeding in his own name for the benefit of his wife. 8. Reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in (6) Ravulu Subba Rao and others V. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (AI.R. 1956 Supreme Court 604). It was held in this case that because of provisions of Section 26A of the then Income-tax Act, an agent of a firm having power-of-attorney could not sign an application for registration of the firm. However, following observations were made on the scope of Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act which was relied upon before their Lordships: "The object of this section is to effectuate instruments executed by an agent but not in accordance with the rule of the common law and the enactment is more procedural than substantive. It does not confer on a person a right to act through agents. It presupposes that the agent has the authority to act on behalf of the principal, and protects acts done by him in exercise of that authority but in his own name....... Section 2, Powers of Attorney Act says that if there can be and, in fact there is, delegation it can be exercised in the manner provided therein." The above quoted observations which were strongly relied on by learned counsel him for the petitioner are of no help to unless it is found that the power-of-attorney to the petitioner by his wife authorised him without any reservation to institute legal proceeding. Therefore, in ORDER :to ascertain whether the petitioner has got power to institute legal proceedings in his own name as an agent of his wife, the deed of power-of-attorney has to be examined. While counsel for the petitioner maintained that the deed does confer such a power on the petitioner, counsel for the opposite party submitted that it does not. A perusal of the deed of power-of-attorney (Ext. 1) shows that learned counsel for the opposite party is correct in his submission. While counsel for the petitioner maintained that the deed does confer such a power on the petitioner, counsel for the opposite party submitted that it does not. A perusal of the deed of power-of-attorney (Ext. 1) shows that learned counsel for the opposite party is correct in his submission. The relevant sentence in the deed is- "Be it stated that my attorney named above shall have power to defend or prosecute all suits, cases or other proceedings in any of the places named above, to sign and verify plaints and written statements and petitions on my behalf, to appoint Advocate, Solicitors, Mukhtears for me, to compromise cases, to withdraw money in deposit in court. or Revenue offices and to grant receipts therefor by signing his name and in fact to do all that may be necessary for proper conduct of cases and other proceedings on my behalf." The use of the words 'on my behalf' at two places in the above quoted sentence shows that it was not the intention of the executant that the attorney could institute legal proceedings in his own name which could bind the executant. The proceedings were to be instituted in the name of the executant and in such proceedings the attorney, i.e., the petitioner could do all what is mentioned in the above quoted sentence. It is not, therefore possible to hold that petitioner could file and maintain this application in his own name because of Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner however, further submitted that the petitioner could institute the proceeding in his own name on account of provisions of Section 2 (d) of the Act. It is not, therefore possible to hold that petitioner could file and maintain this application in his own name because of Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner however, further submitted that the petitioner could institute the proceeding in his own name on account of provisions of Section 2 (d) of the Act. Section 2 (d) defines landlord as follows : "In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, 'landlord' includes the person who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant." It is not disputed that under the deed of attorney the petitioner is entitled to receive the rent of the building in question on behalf of his wife. He is, therefore, a landlord for the purposes of the Act. Section 12 (3) says that an ORDER :under that Subsection can be passed on an application by the landlord. Prima facie, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to make an application under Section 12 (3) of the Act. It was, however, contended by learned counsel for the opposite party that 'the landlord' in Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act meant the landlord to whom a notice was given under Sub-section (1) of that section and as in the instant case, the term of the lease was extended in presence of wife of the petitioner, the petitioner could not be deemed to be the landlord within the meaning of Sub-section (3) by virtue of the powers-of-attorney in his favour. I am not inclined to accept this contention. "The landlord" in Sub-section (3) must include the landlord to whom notice is given under Sub-section (1) as well as his legal representatives, transferees, assignees and the like. The petitioner was not entitled to receive the rent on behalf of his wife when the ORDER :for extension of the term of the lease was passed. "The landlord" in Sub-section (3) must include the landlord to whom notice is given under Sub-section (1) as well as his legal representatives, transferees, assignees and the like. The petitioner was not entitled to receive the rent on behalf of his wife when the ORDER :for extension of the term of the lease was passed. By a subsequent deed he was conferred power to receive rent, on behalf of his wife, of the building in question. He thus became the landlord from the date of the deed and could do all what the person who conferred such power upon him could do as a landlord for the purposes of the Act. 10. Our attention was also drawn by learned counsel for the opposite party to Explanation to Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act which says- "In this clause the word 'landlord' shall not include an agent referred to in Clause (d) of Section 2." This explanation, in my opinion, does not favour the contention of the opposite party; rather it supports the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. The only effect of this explanation is that a tenant cannot be evicted from a building on the ground that it is required for own occupation of a person who has been empowered by the owner to receive rent. For all other purposes such an agent remains a landlord for the purpose of the Act. I am accordingly of the opinion that the petition filed by the petitioner was maintainable and the court below has erred in holding otherwise. 11 Even if I would have held that the application filed by the petitioner in his own name was not maintainable there being no period of limitation for the application, I would have allowed amendments to make it an application on behalf of his wife. After all this is a mistake of procedure and procedural law is not meant for hampering justice but to advance it. 12. In the result, the application is allowed, the ORDER :of the court below is set aside and the case is sent back to it for rehearing on merits in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law. I would, however, add that Section 12 (3) of the Act contemplates only an application for ejectment and for determination of daily compensation. I would, however, add that Section 12 (3) of the Act contemplates only an application for ejectment and for determination of daily compensation. Daily compensation must relate to the period after the date on which the tenant was expected to vacate the house on the expiry of the term extended under Sub-section (2) of that section. Any claim for rent or compensation relating to a period prior to that date cannot be made (Sic) and compensation can be realised only under the general law and that must be subject to limitation. The petitioner is entitled to his costs for this Court. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 64/-. S. P. SINHA, J. I agree Application allowed.