Order.- The petitioner before this Court was P.W.2 in C.C.No. 2341 of 1970 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, First Court, Bangalore. The respondent before this Court was the complainant in the said case and was examined as P.W.1. The Police filed a charge-sheet against A-1 and A-2 charging them with having committed offences under sections 40& and 414, Indian Penal Code. After the trial, the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused and directed that M.O. 1 to M.O. 3, jewels which were the subject matter of the complaint, be returned to the petitioner P.W.2, with whom these jewels had been pledged by A-2. This order passed by the learned Magistrate was challenged in Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2 of 1971 and the First Additional Sessions Judge of Bangalore, set aside the said order and directed the return of M.O.1 to M.O. 3 to the owner, P.W.1, the complainant in the said case. This order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is challenged in thisrevision petition. 2. Sri G.R. Doreswamy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, P.W.2, has argued that the Magistrate had found that there was no entrustment, and misappropriation by the accused and acquitted them. The petitioner in this case is the third party and he bona fide accepted the pledge of the jewels, M.O. 1 to M.O. 3. The learned Sessions Judge committed a mistake in thinking that P.W.1 did not come with A-2 at the time of the pledge. After being a party to the pledge, P.W.1 wants to get back the jewellery without paying the amount. It is open to P.W.1 to pay the money and redeem the pledge from P.W.2. It is contended that the petitioner being a pledgee, the Court erred in returning M.O. 1 to M.O. 3 to P.W.1, the complainant when the accused was acquitted in the criminal case. The learned Counsel has relied on Budhulal Harnarayan Agarwal v. Sukhman1, Pushkar Singh v. Madhya Bharat2and T.V. Krishna v. M/s. Andhra Prabha (Pvt.) Ltd.3, in support of the said contentions. 3. Sri C. Lakshminarayana Rao, learned Council appearing on behalf of P.W.1, complainant, has argued that it is admitted that P. W. I, Was the owner of the jewels M.O. 1 to M.O. 3. His initials, ‘K.S.B.‘are found on the jewels. The version given by P.W.2 that P.W.1 was present at the time of the pledge is false. 3. Sri C. Lakshminarayana Rao, learned Council appearing on behalf of P.W.1, complainant, has argued that it is admitted that P. W. I, Was the owner of the jewels M.O. 1 to M.O. 3. His initials, ‘K.S.B.‘are found on the jewels. The version given by P.W.2 that P.W.1 was present at the time of the pledge is false. In examination-in-chief, P.W.2 has stated that the accused 2 came and pledged the jewels but in the cross-examination he has stated that P.W.1 had come with A-2 for pledging the jewels. This statement made by P.W.2 is an after thought and made only to help himself and save the property. If P.W.1 had really come with A-2 at the time of pledge, it was open to him (P.W.2) to take the signature of P.W.1 on Exhibit P-2, pawn ticket taken by P.W.2 at the time of the pledge. Even in Exhibit P. 3 Mahazar prepared, there is no reference about P.W.1 being in the company of A-2 at the time of the pledge. The learned Counsel has strongly relied on Thangaswamy v. State4and Shantakumar v. Mohanlal5in support of his contentions. It is contended that P.W.1 was not in the company of A-2 at the time of the pledge and the conduct of P.W.2 clearly shows that knowing that A-2 Was not the owner of the jewels, he has accepted the pledge. The learned Counsel argued that there are no grounds to interfere with the order, and the learned Sessions Judge was fully justified in returning the jewels to P.W.1 the owner, 4. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has contended that the points for determination are whether P.W.2 came into possession of these jewels lawfully and whether P.W.1 was the owner of M.O.1 to M.O.3. He has cited before me in A. S. S. Ahmed V. Police Commissioner1, and Tousoof Marakair v. State of Mysore2. 5. There can be no doubt that jewels M.O.1 to M.O.3 belong to P.W.1, the complainant. Exhibit P-2, the pawn ticket, discloses that M.O.2 contains the initials of the complainant, “K.S.B.”. The name of the complainant is K.S. Basavarajappa. The learned Sessions Judge has stated that there is no dispute as to the ownership of the jewels and that P.W.1 is undoubtedly the owner of the jewels in question. It has not been argued before me that the jewels do not belong to P.W.1. The name of the complainant is K.S. Basavarajappa. The learned Sessions Judge has stated that there is no dispute as to the ownership of the jewels and that P.W.1 is undoubtedly the owner of the jewels in question. It has not been argued before me that the jewels do not belong to P.W.1. A-2 has not claimed that the jewels which he pledged, belong to him. It is therefore clear that P.W.1 is the owner of the jewels M.O.1 to M.O.3. 6. There cannot be any doubt also that A-2 pledged these jewels with P.W.2. Exhibit P-2, pawn ticket, clearly discloses that the pledge was by A-2. A-2 has signed on Exhibit P-2. As already pointed out A-2 at no time claimed that these jewels belonged to him. It is therefore clear that P.W.2 had taken the pledge of these articles from A-2 who had no right to the jewels. Before taking the jewels on pledge, P.W.2 should have questioned A-2 and satisfied himself whether the articles belonged to him. As already stated, the pawn ticket, Exhibit P-2 shows that the initials of P.W.1, ‘K.S.B.‘, were found on the jewels. When P.W.2 found the initials of somebody else on the jewels, he should have satisfied himself that A-2 had the right to pledge the jewels. P.W.2 himself says that he saw the initials on the jewels and if he had taken the risk of taking them from A-2, he cannot be said to be a bona fide pledgee. It is no doubt true that P.W.2 in cross-examination came with a new version that P.W.1 had also accompanied A-2 at the time of the pledge. Obviously it is only an afterthought. If only P.W. 1 had accompained A-2 at the time of pledge, one would expect P.W.2, when informed that P.W.1 is the owner of the jewels, to take the signature of P.W.1 in the pawn ticket. The fact that P.W.2 has given two different versions at different times indicates that he is not a bona fide pledgee. 7. If only P.W. 1 had accompained A-2 at the time of pledge, one would expect P.W.2, when informed that P.W.1 is the owner of the jewels, to take the signature of P.W.1 in the pawn ticket. The fact that P.W.2 has given two different versions at different times indicates that he is not a bona fide pledgee. 7. In a similar case, Thangaswamy v. State3, it has been pointed out that where the pledger had no title at all to pledge the goods and the property had been obtained by unlawful means, and where the pawn-broker’s conduct shows that he did not take any precaution to fortify his position by necessary enquiries about the antecedents of the pledger, it would be a proper exercise of the discretion on the part of the criminal Court to return the jewels to the owner. In paragraph 4 of the judgment, his Lordship has observed as follows; “It is not the province of the criminal Court to enter into any elaborate consideration of the relative rights of the pledger and pledgee under section 178 and other allied provisions of the Contract Act. In such cases, where it is clear, as in this case, that the pledger had no title at all to pledge the goods and on the other hand, the property had been obtained by him by unlawful means, and where the pawn-broker’s conduct shows that he did not take any precaution to fortify his position by necessary enquiries about the antecedents of the pledger, where he got the jew el from and so on, it will be a proper exercise of the discretion on the part of the criminal Court, in directing the return of the jewel to the person who had been deprived of his possession by the accused by unlawful means.” 8. In the above said case, Budhulal Harnarayan Agarwal v. Sukhman4strongly relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has been considered and distinguished. The facts of the Nagpur case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. In the said case, the owner’s wife, probably the real owner of the jewels, had authorised the pledger to pledge the jewels and in the said case the pledgee, before he took the pledge, made enquiries and satisfied himself that the person concerned had authorised the pledger to pledge the jewels in question. In the said case, the owner’s wife, probably the real owner of the jewels, had authorised the pledger to pledge the jewels and in the said case the pledgee, before he took the pledge, made enquiries and satisfied himself that the person concerned had authorised the pledger to pledge the jewels in question. As the pledge in that case was bona fide and the pledge had been taken after necessary precautions, the Court held that he was the person entitled to the possession. 9. I am of the opinion that the decision in Pushkar Singh v. Madhya Bharat1, relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is of no assistance to him. The question Their Lordships were considering in the case was the return of a sum of Rs. 463. As it was a case of money, it was not possible to identify it and say to whom the money belonged. The finding in the said case was that no offence of theft had been made out and that the sum of Rs. 463 did not belong to the complainant. In those circumstances the Court directed the return of the money to the accused as he had been acquitted of the charge of theft. Here, as already pointed out, there cannot be any doubt that the articles in question belong to P.W.1 and A-2, who pledged the jewels, had no right whatsoever to M.O.1 to M.O.3. 10. In A.S.S. Ahmed v. Police Commissioner2, at paragraph 10 of his judgment, His Lordship has observed as follows: “......normally, in cases where the offence is not made out the property should be delivered to the person from whom it is seized or taken. But, it will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In such cases, the actual possession of the property at the time it was seized may be a relevant factor but not conclusive to determine the entitlement of such possession. The words used in section 523 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, are ‘the person entitled to the possession of the property.‘These words cannot be equated with the actual possession. Nor can they be equated with the expression ‘the person from whom the property is seized or taken’. The words used in section 523 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, are ‘the person entitled to the possession of the property.‘These words cannot be equated with the actual possession. Nor can they be equated with the expression ‘the person from whom the property is seized or taken’. A person may be in unlawful possession at the time it was seized, though he has not committed the offence, and in that circumstance, it cannot be said that he is entitled to possession. It must be a lawful possession. The test therefore, is not the mere possession of property at the time of seizure, but as to who is entitled to lawful possession.. The expression ‘entitled to possession’ is the sine quo non for the delivery of property under section 523, Criminal Procedure Code”. It is no doubt true that his Lordship was considering the provisions of section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the said case. But the question for consideration in that case was also the very words used in section 517, i.e., ‘person entitled to the possession of the property’. Hence the abovementioned decision is also of assistance in deciding the point that arises in the instant case. 11. In Shantakumar v. Mohanlal3, in a case of charge of theft, though the accused was acquitted and though the property had been seized from, the accused, this Court, in view of the fact that the complainant was the owner of the vehicle, directed the return of the vehicle to the owner and not to the accused. His Lordship, Justice Ahmed Ali Khan, pointed out in that case, that having regard to the fact that the complainant’s ownership of the vehicle was not in dispute, the vehicle should have been returned to the complainant, and not to accused 1, merely on the ground that the car was produced from accused’s possession. His Lordship observed while determining the question as who is the person entitled to the possession of the property under section 517 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, it is for the Court to say from the. other circumstances as to who is the person entitled to get back possession of property as envisaged in section 517, Criminal Procedure Code. Since the ownership and the title of the complaint was not in dispute he was the person entitled to the car. 12. other circumstances as to who is the person entitled to get back possession of property as envisaged in section 517, Criminal Procedure Code. Since the ownership and the title of the complaint was not in dispute he was the person entitled to the car. 12. From what has been staled abrove the order of the learned Sessions Judge, directing the return of M.O.1 to M.O.3 to P.W.1, who was the actual owner of the jewels, cannot be said to be incorrect or illegal. There are no 1. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 508. ounds to interfere with the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge and the petition is dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.