I. P. HUNSRAJ v. G. S. PANNALAL — 1972 DIGILAW 68 (KAR)

( 1 ) THE questions involved in these revision applications are similar and therefore they are disposed by this common order. ( 2 ) CRP. 163/1972 arises out of HRC. 11/1967. That is an application filed by the landlord for eviction of the petitioner-tenant. Pending hearing and disposal of the main petition, an order was passed on the 31st of march 1970 by the Court directing the tenant to deposit within one month certain amount which was found to be the arrears of rent due from him. The tenant deposited that amount on the 25th of May, 1970. Thereafter, the landlord filed an application for stopping further proceedings and requesting the Court to direct the tenant to vacate the premises in question. Objections were filed to that application. The learned trial Judge by his order dt. 23rd November, 1971, has considered it proper to stop the further proceedings and direct the tenant to vacate the premises in question. ( 3 ) CRP. 164/1972 arises out of HRC. 42|1967. In that case also, the application for eviction has been filed and pending hearing of the main matter an order was passed on the 30th of March 1970 to deposit the amount and the tenant deposited that amount on the 25th of May, 1970. An application IA. No. VIII was filed to stop the further proceedings and the trial Judge has passed an order stopping further proceedings and directed the tenant to vacate the premises in question. ( 4 ) THE short question therefore, that arises for consideration in the present case is as to whether the order passed by the learned trial Judge, stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant in these petitions to vacate the premises is correct or not. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to S. 29 (4) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, if a tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent, then the Court shall stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause as to why the order should not be passed. As to what is sufficient cause to the contrary has been the subject matter of consideration by this Court. In the case of Thomas Veigas v. Leelavathl, (1965) 2 Mys. L. J. 374. As to what is sufficient cause to the contrary has been the subject matter of consideration by this Court. In the case of Thomas Veigas v. Leelavathl, (1965) 2 Mys. L. J. 374. it has been held that the sufficient cause to be shown by the tenant under S. 29 (4) of the Act, is not for the failure to pay or deposit the rent, but cause to be shown against the stopping of further proceedings and making an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises. In the course of the judgment, it has been stated that the object of S. 29 of the Act is to secure prompt payment of rent by the tenant to the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction under the Act, and to discountenance any attempt on the part of tenants from stopping payment. So if a tenant is not prompt in payment of rent, then provision had to be made in that regard and the Legislature did not consider it proper to provide that on account of mere non-payment of rent, the tenant is liable to vacate. That is why what has been provided is that the tenant must show sufficient cause as to why an order under S. 29 (4) of the Act should not be made. It is for this reason that this Court held that the sufficient cause has to be shown not for the failure for payment but as to why further proceedings should not be stopped. What circumstance constitutes sufficient cause has been considered at page 374 and the following is the relevant passage:" What circumstances would constitute 'sufficient cause' to afford relief to the tenant under sub-sec. (4) not having been laid down by the Act, the Courts have to exercise the discretionary power taking all the facts and circumstances of the case. In the consideration of the facts and circumstances, one of the relevant considerations would be the circumstances under which the tenant failed to pay or make the deposit. But that would not amount to saying that the sufficient cause' has to be shown for the default. The tenant has to show cause by submitting all the facts and circumstances of the case including the circumstances under which he made default. The Court in exercising its jurisdiction under the said sub-sec. But that would not amount to saying that the sufficient cause' has to be shown for the default. The tenant has to show cause by submitting all the facts and circumstances of the case including the circumstances under which he made default. The Court in exercising its jurisdiction under the said sub-sec. must judge each case on its facts. The delay, the conduct of the parties and the difficulties to which the landlord has been put to, should all enter into the consideration. If the delay is not great and from the conduct of the tenant no want of bona fides can be imputed to him. and if he makes payments by paving or depositing into Court all the rent in arrears together with interest and costs I do not see why the Court will not be justified in granting relief to the tenant. In dealing with S. 5 of the limitation Act, and similar provisions in thp Representation of People act, the Supreme Court has observed that the words Sufficient cause should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bonafides is imputable to the appellant. vide Binabandhu Shau v. Jadumoni Mongaraj and Ramalal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. Tn the said decision the Supreme court has approved the following passage in Krishna v. Chanthappan : s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which the judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood the words 'sufficinet cause receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substant justice when no neglience nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. The words sufficient cause in sub-sec. (4) of S. 20, in my opinion should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Where no want of bona fides is imputable to the tenant and when no hardship is caused to the landlord on account of the delay in making the payment, if the tenant pays or deposits in Court the entire rent in arrears together with interest thereon, and the costs of the application, the Court will be exercising its discretion properly, if it relieves the tenant asainst the consequences of his default. " ( 6 ) THE principle, therefore, that has been laid down by this Court is that the tenant has to show cause by submitting all facts and circumstances of the case, including the circumstances under which he made the default. The Court then, in exercise of its jurisdiction under the subsection, must judge the case and for that purpose, what must be seen is the extent of the delay, the conduct of the parties, and the difficulty to which the landlord has been put to. If the delay is not great and from the conduct of the tenant, no want of bonafides can be imputed to him, and if he makes the payment by paying or depositing into Court all the rent in arrears, then the Court would be justified in granting relief to the tenant. The Court has, in the course of the judgment, reiterated this principle in more places than one. It has been said that the words sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and where no want of bona fides is imputable to the tenant, and when no hardship is caused to the landlord on account of the delay in making the payment, then the Court would be exercising its discretion properly, if it relieves the tenant against the consequences of his default. Therefore in my view, what is to be seen is whether there is any want pf bona fides imputable to the tenant and also find out as to whether any hardship has been caused to the landlord on account of the delay in making payment of the rent. It is undisputed that the entire amount has been paid. I have perused the entire order of the Court below and from a perusal thereof, I find that the learned Judge has not said one word about the want of bcna fides on the part of the tenant or the difficulties to which the landlord has been put to on account of the delay in payment of the rent. Since the Court below has not stated any one of these matters, it is clear that the order stopping further proceedings is unsustainable. Since the Court below has not stated any one of these matters, it is clear that the order stopping further proceedings is unsustainable. ( 7 ) THE principles laid down by this Court in Thomas Veigas case (1) have been followed in several cases including in a very recent pronouncement in the case of Ranga Naika v. Saraswathi, (1971) 1 Mys. L. J. 447. . In that case also what has been emphasised is that the Court in considering an application under s. 29 (4) of the Act, must first see whether there is any default in payment of rent and then find out as to whether there is sufficient cause shown as to why the further proceedings should not be stopped. It has also been stated that the principles laid down in Thomas Veigas case (1) particularly at page 374, have to be borne in mind by the Court in determining the matter. ( 8 ) IT was however contended by the learned Advocate for the respondent that in the present case there has been admitted delayed payment. If there is a delayed payment, then what should be applied is the judgments of this Court in K. Janaradhana acharya v. L. Ravindra. Rao, (1965) 1 Mys. L. J. 221, and in Shivalingappa Niranjanappa Shetty v. Dattu Appannd Kumar, (1967) 1 Mys. L. J. 378. In my view, neither of these judgments are applicable to the facts of the present case. It is not disputed that there has been delayed payment. What is, however, required to be seen and which has not been seen is as to whether the delayed payment disclosed want of bona fides on behalf of the tenant and also as to whether the landlord had been put to hardship as a result of the delayed payment. The decision in Janardhana Acharua's case (3) cannot be applied or considered for finding out as to whether sufficient cause has been shown by the tenant in the present case and it is the principles referred to above that should be made applicable. In my view, neither of these two judgments are applicable to the facts of the present case As in the present case, the Court below has failed to consider the essential matter, it is clear that its decision is unsustainable. In my view, neither of these two judgments are applicable to the facts of the present case As in the present case, the Court below has failed to consider the essential matter, it is clear that its decision is unsustainable. ( 9 ) THE solitary ground on which the order is passed stopping further proceedings in that the amount was not paid in time. As already stated, even though that may be a matter to be taken into consideration, what is really required to be considered is as to whether there was sum cient cause as to why the further proceedings should not be stopped. In the present case, the conduct of the tenant appears to be bona fide conduct and no prejudice has been shown to have been caused to the landlord by the slight delay in payment of rent. The words sufficient cause has to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and in the present case, want of bona fides has not been imputed to the present petitioner and also not found bv the Court below. So it is clear that the Court could not have refused to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner. So the orders passed by the learned trial Judge in both these cases are not sustainable. In the result these revision applications are allowed, the orders passed by the Court below in both these cases are set aside. The learned trial Judge is directed to now dispose of the main petition after giving an opportunity to the parties to produce the evidence as they consider appropriate. --- *** --- .