Judgment J.Narain, J. 1. C. W. J. C. No. 1726 of 197T and Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 23 of 1971 have been heard together as they arise out of substantially the same question. The petitioners in both the cases are Dr. Dukhan Ram and Dr. R. P. Lall. The respondents in the former case are the State of Bihar, President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, Shri Rajendra Prasad and Shri Baidyanath Prasad. The Opposite Parties in the other case am Shri Rajendra Prasad and Shri Baidyanath Prasad. 2. By the writ petition, Dr. Dukhan Ram as President of the Dayanand Vidyalaya, Mithapur, Patna and Dr. R. P. Lall as the Secretary of tie institution, have prayed for quashing the order dated December 18, 1971, passed by the President Board of Secondary Education, Bihar (Annexure 2). This order cancels the previous order communicated by letter dated September 23, 1971, by which recogpition of an ad hoc managing committee constituted by the President of the Bihar Arya Pratinidhi Sabha (Dr. Dukhan Ram) for the Dayanand Vidyalaya, Mithapur, was given and recognises the managing committee formed by the Arya Samaj, Mithapur, with Shri Rajendra Prasad as the President and Shri Baidyanath Prasad as Secretary. 3. The writ petition has been filed on the following allegations. Dr. Dukhan Ram, petitioner No. 1, is the President of the Bihar Arya Pratinidhi Sabha which organisation controls all the Arya Samajas and the institutions including schools for boys and girls under their control. One of such schools is the Dayanand Vidyalaya, Mithapur, Patna, which is being managed by the Bihar Arya Pratinidhi Sabha with a managing committee of its choice. Dr. Dukhan Ram is the President and Dr. R. P. Lall is the Secretary of that committee. Due to anti Vidyalaya activities by some members of the old Managing Committee, the President of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha (Petitioner No. 1) according to the prescribed Rales, dissolved in old managing committee on September 18, 1971 and appointed an ad hoc committee for administering the school. 3y his letter dated September 23, 1971, Secretary of the Board of Secondary Education communicated Boards recognition to this ad hoc committee. 4. 3y his letter dated September 23, 1971, Secretary of the Board of Secondary Education communicated Boards recognition to this ad hoc committee. 4. Arya Samaj is a religious organisation with organisations at various levels and the samaras at the lower levels are subordinate to and under the control of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha in whom full right and control vests over all the properties of the Arya Samaj and that the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha is not merely an affiliating body. 5. For certain anti-Arya Samaj activities, Dr. Dukhan Ram as President or the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, dissolved also the local branch of the Arya Samaj Mithapur on September 13, 1971, in accordance with the prescribed Rules and constituted an ad hoc committee for the management of the local Arya Samaj. 6. Shri Rajendra Pd. Singh and Shri Baidya Nath Pd. (respondents Nos. 3 and 4) in collusion with one Shri Chandra Prakash, a teacher of the school, are alleged to have been creating troubles in the peaceful running of the school by the ad hoc committee. Consequently, a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started wherein on November 12, 1971 it was observed that the petitioners had no right to manage the school with the help of the ad hoc committee. Against the order passed in the proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code, the petitioners filed criminal revision No. 2656 of 1971 which was admitted by this court on December 9, 1971 and operation of the order dated November 19, 1971 passed in the proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was stayed. 7. Further case of the petitioners is that despite the stay order passed by this court, respondents 3 and 4 maliciously approached the President of the Board of Secondary Education, respondent 2, and on the basis of the observations made in the proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sought for recognising respondent No. 3 as the President and respondent No. 4 as the Secretary of the rival committee. On December 9, 1971 and on the next date also the petitioners met the President Board of Secondary Education, respondent No. 2 and informed him that operation of the order of the learned Magistrate under Sec.145 of the Code had been stayed by the court Respondent No. 2 gave an assurance that the rival committee with respondent No. 3 as the President and respondent No. 4 as the Secretary will not be recognised. Respondents Nos. 3 & 4 along with the disgruntled teacher approached Shri Nitishwar Pd. Singh, Minister of State in the Department of Education for according recognition to the rival ad hoc committee. Ultimately, the President of the Board of Secondary Education cancelled the recognition given earlier on September 23, 1971 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) and instead by order dated December 18, 1971 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) recognised another committee with respondent No. 3 as the President and respondent No. 4 as the Secretary of the rival committee. Grievance of the petitioners is that the de-recognition of the former ad hoc committee without giving any opportunity to the petitioners to show cause, is in flagrant violation of the rules of natural justice and, accordingly, a prayer has been made that by a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ the order contained in Annexure 2 be quashed. 8. In original criminal miscellaneous case No. 23 of 1971, besides Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh and Sri Baidya Nath Prasad, Shri B. P. Gyani, Director of Public Instruction and President of the Board of Secondary Education, Bihar was also arrayed as one of the opposite parties but the rule was not issued so far as he was concerned. 9. The prayer in this case is that the opposite parties be asked to show cause as to why they should not be committed for contempt of Court. This is claimed on the following allegations. From the decision dated November 19, 1971, in the proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code, the petitioners filed criminal revision No, 2656 of 1971 which was admitted On December 9, 1971 and operation of the order dated November 19, 1971 passed by the learned Magistrate was stayed. This is claimed on the following allegations. From the decision dated November 19, 1971, in the proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code, the petitioners filed criminal revision No, 2656 of 1971 which was admitted On December 9, 1971 and operation of the order dated November 19, 1971 passed by the learned Magistrate was stayed. The petitioners informed the President of the Board of Secondary Education regarding the stay order passed by the Court and the latter gave out that no recognition will be given to Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh and Shri Baidya Nath Prasad Singh as the President and Secretary of the School. Those two opposite parties, however, approached Shri Nitishwar Prasad Singh, the State Minister of the Education Department and despite full knowledge of the stay order passed by the Court, the President, Board of Secondary Education by his letter dated December 18, 1971 de-recognised the ad hoc committee formed by the petitioners and recognised Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh and Shri Baidya Nath Prasad as the President and Secretary respectively of the Dayanand Vidyalaya. Since the two opposite parties have by their actions deliberately disobeyed the order of this court, their action amounts to aiding and abetting the offence of contempt of court. 10. In C.W.J.C. No. 1726 of 1971 two counter-affidavits have been filed one on behalf of the State of Bihar and the President, Board of Secondary Education (respondents 1 and 2) and the other on behalf of Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh and Shri Baidya Nath Prasad (respondents 3 and 4). Respondents 1 and 2 have denied that the Dayanand Vidyalaya is controlled by the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha. According to them it is governed by the local Arya Samaj. Since this Vidyalaya is a religious minority school the Board does not interfere in its management and accordingly, has simply recognised the committee constituted by the local Arya Samaj. On September 23, 1971 Dr. Dukhan Ram (petitioner No. 1) met respondent No. 2 and expressed his difficulty in making payments of salaries to the teachers and that before payment could be made by Central Bank or India, Patna, they wanted a certificate that the ad hoc committee constituted by petitioner No. 1 on September 13, 1971 was a valid committee. Accordingly, Dr. Dukhan Ram (petitioner No. 1) requested respondent No. 2 to accord approval to the committee constituted by him as a valid one. Accordingly, Dr. Dukhan Ram (petitioner No. 1) requested respondent No. 2 to accord approval to the committee constituted by him as a valid one. It was in this circumstance that respondent No. 2 on September 23, 1971 accorded approval to the ad hoc committee constituted by the petitioner No. 1 although, at that time the petition filed by the Secretary Arya Samaj, Mithapur, was pending for consideration. Being aggrieved by the order dated September 23, 1971 of respondent No. 2, respondent No. 4 made a representation and prayed to stay the operation of the above order. In support of his case that the Dayanand Vidyalaya was being controlled by the local Arya Samaj respondent No. 4 submitted a number of documents. On examination of the papers submitted by respondent No. 4 it was found that the facts furnished by petitioner No. 1 were not correct and that he was not competent to dissolve the Managing Committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya. After being satisfied with, the claim of respondent No. 4 the President, Board of Secondary Education, revised his previous order dated September 28, 1971 and approved the committee constituted by the focal Arya Samaj. It is further contended that since there was suppression of facts on the part of the petitioners the question of giving any opportunity to show cause did not arise. 11. In their counter-affidavit, respondents 8 and 4 have set out the different organisations in the hierarchy of the Arya Samajes and their functions. At tho apex is the Sarbadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and at the State level is the Bihar Rajya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha. Some 394 local. Arya Samajes are affiliated to this Rajya Pratinidhi Sabha. Properties belonging to the local Arya Samajes only notionally vest in the Rajya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and in fact the local Arya Samajes have got full right and control over its properly movable and immovable. Properties belonging to a local Arya Samaj can vest in the Bajya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha only when they are transferred through a registered deed. No such document has been executed by the Arya Samaj, Mithapur and as such it retains full authority and control over its properties. In this manner the local Arya Samaj, Mithapur claims full control over the Dayanand Vidyalay, Mithapur and claims right to run and manage it according to the Rules framed by the local Arya Samaj, Mithapur. No such document has been executed by the Arya Samaj, Mithapur and as such it retains full authority and control over its properties. In this manner the local Arya Samaj, Mithapur claims full control over the Dayanand Vidyalay, Mithapur and claims right to run and manage it according to the Rules framed by the local Arya Samaj, Mithapur. The local Arya Sumaj, Mithapur, has its own constitution for the management of educational institutions including Dayanand Vidyalaya, Mithapur and in accordance with this constitution, in a meeting held on July 28, 1970 Dr. Dukhan Ram (Petitioner No. 1) was appointed President and Dr. R. P. Lal, Secretary of the Managing Committee of the Vidyalaya. Except for certain matter, the local Arya Samaj is a body independent from the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and the rules of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha do not provide for the suspension of the local Arya Samaj. The dissolution of the managing committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya on September 13, 1971 is said to be without jurisdiction and as such the President of the Board of Secondary Edu cation (Respondent No. 2) had full competence to withdraw recognition granted to it. Dissolution of the local Arya Samaj and in its stead constitution of an ad hoc Committee is also said to be without jurisdiction. All that the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha could do was to withdraw its affiliation. The allegation that respondents 3 and 4 along with Shri Chandra, Prakash had moved tho Minister Shri Nitishwar Pd. Singh for obtaining recognition is denied. They have also contended that there has been no violation of the Rules of natural justice by not giving opportunity to the petitioners to show cause. The allegation that the President Board of Secondary Education de-recognised the ad hoc committee formed by the petitioners under directions from the higher authority is said to have no foundation at all. 12. In respect of the contempt matter the stand of the opposite parties is that after the constitution of the managing committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya on September 15, 1971, under the constitution of the Local Arya Samaj, Mithapur, it was the legitimate right of the opposite paries to bring this fact to the notice of the President Board of Secondary Education for de-recognition of the ad hoc managing committee and which they did. They denied knowledge of the stay order passed by this Court and contended that at no point of time they aided or abetted the President Beard of Secondary Education for disobeying the orders of this Court and as such they have prayed for discharge o£ the Rule issued against them. 13. There has been great controversy between the parties as to whether the managing committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya could be constituted and dissolved by the local Arya Samai or by the Bihar Rajya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha. On behalf of the petitioners the claim is that it is Bihar Rajya Arya Prathinidhi Sabha which can do so whereas the respondents maintain that such a power vests in the local Arya Sarnaj, Mithapur. In support of then rival contentions, reliance has been placed upon certain rules framed by the Arya Prathinidhi Sabha and the local Arya Samaj, the proceedings of the meetings held and certain circumstances. 14. On behalf of the petitioners reference has been made to Rule 41 of the Rules framed by the Sarbdeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha. This rule provides that on violation or persistent defiance on the part of local Arya Samaj of the orders or arrangement made by the State Arya Pratinidhi Sabha or on mismanagement in the affairs of the local Arya Samajes, which in the opinion of the State Arya Pratinidhi Sabha is prejudicial for the society, the latter with the approval of Antarang Sabha, is competent to dissolve the local Arya Samaj for a fixed period and make suitable ar rangement for functioning of the local Arya Samaj and the institutions affiliated to it. 15. It is the case of the petitioners that all the subordinate Arya Samajes and their delegates have to sign an agreement acknowledging their subservience to the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha in a prescribed form and to promise that all differences between the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and the Subordinate Arya Samajes will be settled by the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and its decision will be binding, conclusive and final. In pursuance thereof an agreement was signed on September 13, 1968 by the Mithapur Arya Samaj and respondent Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh. The agreement affirmed by the Secretary of the local Arya Samaj, Mithapur, and the President, Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh, has been filed and marked as Annexure 2 to the affidavit in reply on behalf of the petitioners. 16. In pursuance thereof an agreement was signed on September 13, 1968 by the Mithapur Arya Samaj and respondent Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh. The agreement affirmed by the Secretary of the local Arya Samaj, Mithapur, and the President, Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh, has been filed and marked as Annexure 2 to the affidavit in reply on behalf of the petitioners. 16. The petitioners also relied upon the case of Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Patna V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 359 . There the petitioners were Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Vice-President of the Sabha and the President of the Mithapur branch of the Sabha. Their case was that the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha had established several schools at Patna including a school for boys and another for girls at Mithapur and that the property of the school vested in the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and that the administration and the management of the school vested in the managing committee constituted by the President of the Sabha. Although that decision related to the Dayanand Kanya Vidyalaya but it is claimed that Dayanand Vidyalaya, which is meant for boys, and Dayanand Kanya Vidyalaya stand on the same footing. The contention of the petitioners is that in the aforesaid case the definite case of the local Arya Samaj was that the two schools and their administration and management vested in the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and that their present plea to claim the power in themselves cannot be sustained. 17. The respondents do not admit the claim of the petitioners except to the extent that the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha has the power to affiliate the local Arya Samajes. Besides denying the right to dissolve the managing committee of the school as also of Local Arya Samaj, they have referred to certain facts to show that the claim is unfounded and is an afterthought. The Local Arya Samaj, Mithapur has its own constitution for management of its educational Institutions including Dayanand Vidyalaya. Rule 1 of this constitution says that the life of the Managing Committee would be for two years. Rule 2 provides for there being 11 members in the Managing Committee (Vide Annexure "A" of the counter-affidavit of Respondents 3 and 4). In accordance with this constitution, a meeting was to be held in the month of December, 1969, for constituting the managing committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya. Rule 2 provides for there being 11 members in the Managing Committee (Vide Annexure "A" of the counter-affidavit of Respondents 3 and 4). In accordance with this constitution, a meeting was to be held in the month of December, 1969, for constituting the managing committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya. Accordingly a letter dated November 22, 1969, was written to the Bihar Rajya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha to send names of two representatives (vide Annexure "B" to the counter-affidavit). A reminder was also sent on December 19, 1969, (vide Annexure C). The Arya Pratinidhi Sabha forwarded names of Dr. Dukhan Ham and Shri Murli Manohar Jaiswal by means of their letter dated December 25, 1969 (Vide Annexure D). At a meeting held on July 16, 1970, managing committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya was constituted wherein Shri Vishnudeo Narain and Shri Rajendra Pd. Singh were elected as guardians representative and Dr. E. P. Lall as an educationist (Vide Annexure E). In another meeting held on July 28, 1970. Dr. Dukhan Ram was appointed President and Dr. R. P. Lall Secretary of the managing committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya, Mithapur. 18. In order to show that the claim of dissolution of the local Arya Samaj has also no basis, reliance is placed upon the following facts: (i) Lajpat Rai who is said to be convener of the so called ad hoc committee of the local Arya Samaj formed as a result of the dissolution of the local Arya Samaj, attended the meeting of the local Arya Samaj Mithapur on September 15, 1971, and participated in the meeting in which the managing committee of the Dayanand Vidyalaya was reconstituted and in that meeting Shri Rajendra Prasad was elected as the President and Shri Baidya Nath Prasad as the Secretary of the Managing Committee (Vide the proceedings of the meeting dated September 15, 1971, Annexure G to the counter-affidavit of Respondents 3 and 4). (ii) Despite the so called dissolution of the local Arya Samaj on September 13, 1971, the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha itself accepted the subscription from the Secretary of the local Arya Samaj on September 17, 1971 and granted receipts (vide Annexures H and H/l to the counter-affidavit). (ii) Despite the so called dissolution of the local Arya Samaj on September 13, 1971, the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha itself accepted the subscription from the Secretary of the local Arya Samaj on September 17, 1971 and granted receipts (vide Annexures H and H/l to the counter-affidavit). (iii) Shri Banarsi Singh Viyaji a member of the Antrang Sabha of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Bihar, under the direction of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, inspected the workings of the Arya Samaj, Mithapur on September 18, 1971 and found everything satisfactory in his inspection report (vide Annexure I to the counter-affidavit). 19. I have narrated above the rival contentions of the parties and the rules, facts and circumstances which are relied upon by them. For determination of the question involved, it is however, not necessary to pronounce upon the rights and responsibilities of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha vis-a-vis the local Arya Samaj. The moot question for determination is whether the order dated September 2,3, 1971, passed by the President, Bihar Board of Secondary Education is vitiated because of violation of the principles of natural justice. At the hearing the only ground on which such a violation was alleged is the passing of the order without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 20. Before I proceed to consider the merit of the question I may dispose of the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents that the facts of the present case do not warrant issue of a writ of certiorari. In support of this contention Mr. K, D. Chatterjee on behalf of the respondents, invited my attention to the case of Radheshyam Khare V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 107 and Province of Bombay V/s. Khushaldas S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222 . In Radheshyams case, AIR 1959 SG 107 it was held: "It is equally well settled that certiorari will not lie to correct the errors of a statutory body which is entrusted with purely administrative functions. There are three requisites in order that the act of a body may be said to be quasi-judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of parties and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. There are three requisites in order that the act of a body may be said to be quasi-judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of parties and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. Since a writ of certiorari can be issued only to correct the errors of a Court or a quasi-judicial body it would follow that the real and determining test for ascertaining whether an act authorised by a statute is a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act, is whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially as required by the third condition ". In AIR 1950 SC 222 Kama, C. J., of the Supreme Court approved the conditions laid down by Sesser, L. J., which brought out the distinction between a judicial or quasi-judicial decision on the one hand and a ministerial decision on the other and laid down: "Wherever any body of persons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) in excess of their legal authority -- a writ of certiorari may issue." 21. The question whether facts of the present case strictly fall within the scope of the writ of certiorari or not is not quite relevant. No doubt, the petitioners in their writ petition, have made a specific mention of the writ of certiorari but they have also stated that for quashing the impugned order, an appropriate writ may be issued. Therefore, if merits of the case so demand, there will be no bar to the issue of an appropriate writ. 22. In this connection, it would be relevant to refer to some of the observations made in the recent case of A. K. Kraipak V/s. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 . It was stated there; "Till very recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functions to act judicially there was no room for the application, of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is new questioned, If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice there is no reason Why those rules should he made inapplicable to administrative inquiries. ...... The validity of that limitation is new questioned, If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice there is no reason Why those rules should he made inapplicable to administrative inquiries. ...... Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." It has been specifically stated in that case that concept of natural justice incorporate the rule audi alteram partem that is, no decision could be given against a party without affording him reasonable hearing and on the facts of the case I am of opinion, that it is a fit case which requires investigation whether principle of natural justice as been violated or not by not affording reasonable hearing to the petitioners before passing the impugned order. 23. The question of granting or withdrawing, recognition to schools is contained in Sec. 4 (b) of the Bihar High Schools (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960. It reads as follows:- - "Subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, the Board may grant recognition to schools imparting instructions in secondary education and suspend or withdraw such recognition." 24. It is common ground that it is for the purpose of recognition referred to is Section 4 (b) that the question of recognising the Managing Committee or de-recognising it came up for consideration before the President, Board of Secondary Education. The point for consideration is whether it was imperative on the part of the Board or for the matter of that, its President, to hear the petitioners before withdrawing the recognition given to the ad hoc committee constituted by them and granting recognition to Shri Rajendra Pd. Singh as President and Shri Baidyanath Pd. as Secretary of the institution. 25. The impugned order is contained in letter No. 48451-58 dated December 18, 1971, which is marked as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. It is from the President. Board of Secondary Education and is addressed to the Secretary, Arya Samaj Mithapur. Singh as President and Shri Baidyanath Pd. as Secretary of the institution. 25. The impugned order is contained in letter No. 48451-58 dated December 18, 1971, which is marked as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. It is from the President. Board of Secondary Education and is addressed to the Secretary, Arya Samaj Mithapur. It is in reference to letter No. 4 dated September 12, 1971 and says that recognition is being given to the managing committee constituted by the Arya Samaj Mithapur and that Shri Bajendra Prasad is the President and Shri Baidyanath Prasad Secretary of that committee. The letter further cancelled its previous letter No. 37485-89 dated September 23, 1971 (Annexure I) whereby the Board had recognised the ad hoc committee constituted by Dr. Bukhan Ram. 26. Respondents 1 and 2, that is, the State Government and the Board of Secondary Education, resist the claim of healing advanced by the petitioners on the ground that the school being a denominational school, the board has not to interfere with the management of such a school and it simply recognises the committee and what it did amounted only to recognising the committee constituted by the organisation and that when the Board accorded approval to the ad hoc committee constituted by the petitioners of September 18, 1971, the petition filed by Arya Samaj Mithapur was already pending. Regard being had to the papers marked Annexures E, C and D to the counter-affidavit of respondents 3 arid 4 and other papers, the Board found that the facts furnished by Dr. Dukhan Ram on September 23, 1971, were not correct and that he was not competent to dissolve the managing committee. This being a case of suppression of certain facts and the Board having been satisfied with the claim of Shri Rajendra Prasad, the contention is that in the circumstances it was not necessary to give any opportunity to the petitioners to show cause or to hear them. 27. The above facts which have been pleaded by respondents 1 and 2 in their counter-affidavit are, to my mind, the very ground on which an opportunity to show cause or of hearing should have been afforded to the petitioners. It seems that Dr. 27. The above facts which have been pleaded by respondents 1 and 2 in their counter-affidavit are, to my mind, the very ground on which an opportunity to show cause or of hearing should have been afforded to the petitioners. It seems that Dr. Dukhan Ram hud been connected with this institution since many years past and the Board had been dealing with him and the allegation against him was of suppression of certain facts- Besides this, certain competitive papers were produced before the Board which according to the Board, destroyed the contention of the petitioners. On the facts as placed by the petitioners, the Board had already granted recognition to the ad hoc committee constituted by them. In my opinion, in the circumstances, rules of natural justice required that the principles embodied in the salutary rule of audi alteram partem should have been followed. 28. It was contended for respondents 3 and 4 that no question of natural justice arises in the present case since recognition is not a right and that regard being had to the conflict between the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and the local Arya Samaj, the former has not even the semblance of right. The other part of the argument advanced on behalf of respondents 3 and 4 was directed to those farts which according to them did not bring this case within the scope of a writ of certiorari. I have already stated above that the question whether or not writ of certiorari is indicated is not decisive of the question involved, I do not think there is substance in the contention that in the present case no question of natural justice arises. As will appear from the case of A. K. Karaipak, AIR 1970 SC 150 (Supra), principle enshrined in audi alteram partem that no decision could be given against a party without affording him reasonable hearing, has been one of the two rules of natural justice since past. This concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years and other considerations also have been imported in this concept of natural justice. Therefore, the argument advanced by Mr. K. D. Chatterjee for respondents 8 and 4 in this regard cannot be upheld. 29. This concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years and other considerations also have been imported in this concept of natural justice. Therefore, the argument advanced by Mr. K. D. Chatterjee for respondents 8 and 4 in this regard cannot be upheld. 29. Observations made in the case of A. K. Kraipak, AIR 1970 SG 150 (Supra) are weighty and courts must be circumspect to see that administrative functionaries do not degenerate into despotism. It is essential that when a complaint is made before this Court that a principle of natural justice has been violated this Court must decide it. 30. It was next argued that if the above principle of natural justice is to be invoked in the present case, it should be equally invoked to the occasion when the Board withdrew its recognition to the former committee and gave recognition to the ad hoc committee constituted by the petitioners on September 23, 1971. The argument is not tenable. Firstly, because in the present proceeding there is no prayer to quash that order and secondly because one mistake cannot justify another. 31. On behalf of the State and the Board of Secondary Education, prayer of the petitioner was resisted on the ground that alternative remedy was available to the petitioners and of their failure to avail themselves of that remedy, they cannot be heard in the present proceeding. In this connection, reference was made to Sec. 6 of the Bihar High School (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960 This section says:- - "Any person aggrieved by an order made by the Board under clause (b) of Sec. 4 or under Sec. 5 may, within sixty days of such, order prefer an appeal to the authority appointed in this behalf by the State Government and appeal shall be disposed of in the prescribed manner". 32. Manifestly, no appeal was preferred, instead recourse has been taken to the present proceedings; as such the contention of the respondents is that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. It is difficult for me to uphold this argument. As has been pointed out in Baburarn Prakash. Chandra Maheshwari V/s. Interim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 566 : "There are at least two well recognised exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. It is difficult for me to uphold this argument. As has been pointed out in Baburarn Prakash. Chandra Maheshwari V/s. Interim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 566 : "There are at least two well recognised exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. One of these exceptions is that the doctrine has no application in cases where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice." 33. I have held above that the present is a case of violation of one of the sound principles of natural Justice. Therefore, plea of exhaustion of statutory remedies cannot avail the respondents. 34. Regard being had to the view that I have taken of the matter, Boards order conveyed in letter No. 48451-58 dated December 18, 1971, (Annexure 2) must be quashed and the writ petition allowed. 35. Now as to the contempt matter. While making the Rule absolute against the petitioners, the Magistrate by his order dated November 19, 1971, in the proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, recorded as follow:- - "From what has been stated above it appears to me that Mithaporo Arya Samaj has been running Dayanand Vidyalaya, Mithapore since several years before the date of occurrence and several documents of unimpeachable character support this This Arya Samaj Mithapore had been doing so under the frame work of the constitution framed for running educational institutions under it. The reconstitution of the Managing Committee of the school on 15-9-71 by the Arya Samaj Mithaporo seems to be a legal one and the now managing comMIttee with 2nd party No. 1 and 2 as President and Secretary appears to have legally replaced the old managing committee with 1st Party Nos. 1 and 2 an President and Secretary." 36. It was the operation of the order passed in the proceesing under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that was stayed on December 9, 1971 by his Court. The contention of the petitioners is that armed with such an observation in the above proceeding, Shri Rajendra Pd. 1 and 2 an President and Secretary." 36. It was the operation of the order passed in the proceesing under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that was stayed on December 9, 1971 by his Court. The contention of the petitioners is that armed with such an observation in the above proceeding, Shri Rajendra Pd. Singh and Shri Baidya Nath Prasad approach the Board with an ulterior and mala fide purpose of getting the ad hoc committee formed by the petitioners de-recognised and despite knowledge of the stay order, got the impugned order passed by the President, Board of Secondary Education and as such aided and abetted the offence of contempt. It is the case of [he petitioners that these two persons had full knowledge of the stay order passed by this court. It has been vehemently argued by Mr. Basudeva Prasad on behalf of the petitioners that the manner in which facts have been traversed in their counter-affidavit, does not show denial of knowledge on their part. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on paragraph 12 of the show cause filed in Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 23 of 1971. The paragraph runs as follows:- - "That the statements made in paragraph 14 of the petition, filed on behalf of the petitioners that the Opposite Party Nos. 2 and 3 had knowledge of the stay order passed by this Hon ble Court is incorrect as no notice of the said order passed by this Hon ble Court was served either on Opposite Party No. 2 or Opposite Party No. 3." 37. Argument is that knowledge of the stay order is not denied but what is denied is that they were not served with any notice intimating the Courts stay order. 38. A distinction was also drawn between the prohibitory order and the mandatory order and it was contended that regard being had to the kind of denial made, the respondents must be imputed with the knowledge of the stay order. 38. A distinction was also drawn between the prohibitory order and the mandatory order and it was contended that regard being had to the kind of denial made, the respondents must be imputed with the knowledge of the stay order. In Hoshiar Singh V/s. Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1089 it was held: "In the matter of a prohibitory order it is well settled that it is not necessary that the order should have been served upon the party against whom it has been granted in order to justify committal for breach of such an order, provided it is proved that the person complained against had notice of the order aliunde. 39. It seems to me that the show cause rend as a whole does not support the contention of the petitioners. Besides paragraph 12, averments in this regard have been made in paragraphs 17 and 20 also of their show cause. These paragraphs unequivocally deny the knowledge of the stay order. There is also no case of the petitioners that these two opposite parties were present in court when the stay order was passed nor there is any evidence aliunde on record to indicato knowledge of the stay order on their part. Therefore, even if the opposite parties approached the President, Board of Secondary Education, it would not be legitimate to hold them guilty of contempt. 40. At the close of the argument, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of these opposite parties, expressed unqualified apology in case they be found guilty of contempt. Regard being had to the view that I have taken of the matter, I do not think the opposite parties can be committed for contempt. As such the rule against them is discharged. 41. In the result C. W. J. C No. 1726 of 1971 is allowed and the Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 23 of 1971 is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, no order regarding costs is being made.