Judgement A short albeit somewhat vexing question that arises for determination in this second appeal by the defendant Kakodonga Tea Estate is what exact Article of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to the suit (culminating in this appeal) filed by Shir J. N. Saikia, a Chartered Accountant of Torajan, Jorhat. The trial Court decreed the suit to the extent of Rs. 350/- out of the total claim of Rs. 3525/-on holding that the plaintiff was entitled to get decree respecting those items of his bills which had accrued due within three years next preceding the institution of the suit. On appeal by the plaintiff the Assistant District Judge decreed the suit in its entirety on the findings that it was governed by Article 113 and that the right to sue had accrued to the plaintiff when the bills submitted to the defendant were refused. It is these findings of the Assistant District Judge which are challenged by the defendant in the present second appeal. 2. The facts of the case are not much in dispute. It appears that the plaintiff did some professional work for the defendant and on 30th September, 1961, he submitted three bills to the latter, one for Rs. 2500/-, the second for Rs. 200/- and the third for Rs. 475/-. Thereafter, another bill for Rs. 350/- was sent to the defendant on 31-12-63. The bills having remained unpaid, the plaintiff filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 3525/- on 30th September, 1964. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the plea that no money was due to the plaintiff from it as also on the ground that the suit was barred by time. However, in paragraph 7 of the written statement it was mentioned that "the plaintiffs bills appear to be inflated and the plaintiff must prove his claims and justify the heavy sums of money charged for works alleged and detailed in the copies sent to the Managing Partner of the Defendant." 3. As stated earlier, the trial Court held that the suit was within time only in respect of Rs. 350/-. This amount was covered by the bill which was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant on 31-12-63. The suit was consequently decreed only to that extent and it was dismissed qua the balance amount as barred by time. As stated earlier, the trial Court held that the suit was within time only in respect of Rs. 350/-. This amount was covered by the bill which was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant on 31-12-63. The suit was consequently decreed only to that extent and it was dismissed qua the balance amount as barred by time. The trial Court did not specify in its judgment by what Article of the Limitation Act was the suit governed. However, the judgment indicates that the Court believed that the period of limitation for the suit was three years from the date the professional work covered by each bill was done. 4. The appellate Court held in specific terms that the suit fell under Article 113 of the Limitation Act and that the period of limitation began to run when the "bills for the works were refused". 5. The counsel for the defendant-appellant urged that the proper Article which applies to the suit is Article 18. That Article applies to suits "For the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request, where no time has been fixed for payment", and the period of three years prescribed in the Article begins to run "When the work is done". The counsel submitted that since the work for which the charges are claimed by the plaintiff had been done much beyond three years before the filing of the suit, the suit was clearly barred by time. Alternatively, the appellants counsel urged that Article 55 would cover the suit. This Article applies to suits "For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not specially provided for", and the period of three years prescribed by column 2 thereof begins to run "When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases". Shri Barua, who appeared for the plaintiff-respondent, submitted that neither Article 18 applies to the present suit nor Article 55 and that the suit is actually covered by Article 113, the column 1 of which reads : "Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule". The period prescribed for such a suit is three years and it begins to run "When the right to sue accrues". The period prescribed for such a suit is three years and it begins to run "When the right to sue accrues". Shri Barua placed reliance on the decisions in AIR 1970 SC 1433 , Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. Union of India, and AIR 1964 Pat 225 , State of Bihar v. Thawardas Pherumal, to bring out the exact scope of the expression "the right to sue accrues" used in column 3 of Article 113. Shri Choudhury, the appellants counsel, placed reliance on the decision in Sachindra Nath v. Bengal Nagpur Rly. Co., AIR 1942 Cal 444, to support the contention that a suit for recovery of fees of a professional worker like a Chartered Accountant falls under Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which corresponds with Article 18 of the Act of 1963, and not under Article 120 of the old Act which corresponds with Article 113 of the new Act. 6. It is correct that the Calcutta High Court held in the case of Sachindra Nath, AIR 1942 Cal 444 that a suit by a pleader for recovery of his fees against the client falls under Article 56 and not under Article 120 of the old Act. But the correctness of that decision appears to have been doubted in a later decision of the same High Court. That decision is reported in AIR 1971 Cal 150 , the Great Eastern Shipping Co. v. Union of India. It is mentioned in para 5 of the report that no reason was given by the learned Judges who decided the case of Sachindra Nath why Article 120 of the Act was not applicable and that the attention of those Judges was not invited to the fundamental principle that payment of "price" for work done can only arise under a contract and it can never arise when the claim is based on quantum meruit, remedy for which is the payment of compensation and not the price. It has further been observed that a previous decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1921 Cal 93, Upendra Krishna Mondol v. Naba Krishna Mondol, had also not been brought to the notice of the Judges. It has further been observed that a previous decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1921 Cal 93, Upendra Krishna Mondol v. Naba Krishna Mondol, had also not been brought to the notice of the Judges. It was held in the case of Upendra Krishna Mondol that Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is the only appropriate Article which will apply to a claim for compensation made under Section 70 of the Contract Act. 7. Apart from this criticism of decision in Sachindra Naths case, AIR 1942 Cal 444 Shri Barua cited Barada Kant v. Court of Wards, AIR 1931 All 752 (2), to bring out the untenability of that decision. The Allahabad High Court held that Article 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies to a claim by a Medical practitioner for recovery of his fees for attendance on a patient. Shri Barua, however, did not agree that Article 115 of the old Act provides for a suit of the present nature. I will presently examine the merit of this submission of Shri Barua, but suffice at present to state that the decision given in Sachindra Naths case is shaken not only by other judgments of the Calcutta High Court, but also by the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Barada Kants case. Therefore, I do not feel safe in accepting the decision given by the Calcutta High Court in that case. 8. It is easy to assume that very deep thought must have been devoted by the Legislature in giving shape to the various Articles of the old as well as the new Limitation Act. It is equally legitimate to assume that the words of each Article must have been used in their commonly accepted connotation unless contrary intention is expressed in the body of the Act just as is apparent from Section 2 where certain expressions have been defined to mean something less or more than what their commonly known attributes are. The expression "price" used in Article 18 must, therefore, be taken to convey the commonly accepted sense implicit in it. The expression "price" used in Article 18 must, therefore, be taken to convey the commonly accepted sense implicit in it. According to the Chamberss Twentieth Century Dictionary the word "price" means : the amount, usually in money, for which a thing is sold or offered; that which one forgoes or suffers for the sake of or in gaining something : money offered for capture or killing of anybody; that for which one can be bribed; betting odds; value. In common parlance what a client pays to a professional person like an Advocate and a Chartered Accountant is described as "fee" and not "price". Likewise, what a patient pays to a medical-man for the services rendered to him by the latter is called "fee" and not "price". Therefore, it would be unduly straining the expression "price" used in Article 18 if it were held synonymous in connotation with the fee paid to an Advocate, a medical-man or a Chartered Accountant. For this reason alone, I believe, Article 18 does not provide for a suit for the professional fee of the nature just stated. I may add that there are a number of Articles in the Act of 1963 which use the word "price", such as Articles 8, 9 and 14 to 17. A plain reading of the 1st column of those Articles would bring out that the word "price" used therein is quite appropriate in the context of the nature of the suits to which they relate. Moreover, Article 18 appears to refer to a concluded contract of which the only term not specifically settled is relating to time for payment of the price fixed. But the case we are to deal with does not fall in the category of "concluded contract". It is actually in the nature "of certain relations resembling those created by contract" dealt with in Chapter V, Sections 68 to 72, of the Contract Act. Therefore, I have no doubt that Article 18 does not apply to our case. 9. The alternative argument of the appellants counsel was that the case would fall under Article 55 of the new Act corresponding to Article 115 of the old Act. Article 55 provides for suits for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not specially provided for in the Second Schedule. 9. The alternative argument of the appellants counsel was that the case would fall under Article 55 of the new Act corresponding to Article 115 of the old Act. Article 55 provides for suits for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not specially provided for in the Second Schedule. Obviously, this is a residuary Article applying to all actions ex contractu not specially provided for otherwise in the Schedule. The fundamental objection raised by Sri Barua against the applicability of this Article was that it relates to suits for "compensation" and not to suits for professional fees. The term "compensation" having not been defined in the Act we have to ascribe to it the dictionary meaning. According to the Chamberss dictionary the word "compensation" means : act of compensating; amends for loss sustained. And according to the Oxford Dictionary the term "compensation" signifies that which is given in recompense, an equivalent rendered. Speaking etymologically, the term "compensation" conveys the concept of balancing one thing against another or something given or obtained as an equivalent. I am inclined to agree with Shri Barua that the term "compensation" used in Article 55 does not encompass a professional fee. What has weighed with me in reaching that conclusion is that essentially the plaintiffs suit is not for recovery of any amount as compensation for breach of contract but one for the recovery of unpaid professional fee due to him from the defendant. Hence Article 115 of the old Act corresponding to Article 55 of the new Act has no applicability to the suit. 10. Shri Barua placed reliance on the decisions in AIR 1970 SC 1433 and AIR 1964 Pat 225 , to shore up his submission that the suit is not covered by Article 55 of the new Act. The bead-note of the Supreme Court report is sufficiently vocal to bring out the ratio of the decision given therein and so I need reproduce the same without any further comment. The head-note reads as under :- "The appellant Company had undertaken under the terms of the contract to do specific construction work for the Union of India at "basic rates". The head-note reads as under :- "The appellant Company had undertaken under the terms of the contract to do specific construction work for the Union of India at "basic rates". The Engineer-in-charge was by the terms of the agreement competent to give instructions for work not covered by the terms of the contract, and remuneration was to be paid at the rate fixed by the Engineer-in-charge for such additional work. The appellant Company made a claim in a suit filed by it for payment at an additional rate over the stipulated rate in view of change in circumstances in respect of the additional work done at the request of the Engineer-in-charge. The suit was filed beyond 3 years of the date on which the work was done and in any event of the date on which the claim was rejected by the Union. Held that the suit was not governed by Article 56 or 115 but by Article 120 and under Art. 120 the suit was not barred by limitation. The suit was not governed by Article 56. The claim was for payment at an additional rate over the stipulated rate in view of change in circumstances, and not for price of additional work done by the appellant Company, at the request of the Engineer-in-charge. The additional work directed by the Engineer-in-charge when carried out might be deemed to be done under the terms of the contract; but the claim for enhanced rates did not arise out of the contract; it was in any case not a claim for compensation for breach of contract within Article 115." 11. The facts of the Patna case bear close analogy to the facts of the case dealt with by the Supreme Court and the decision reached was identical with the one arrived at by the Supreme Court. The head-note of the Patna case reads as under :- "For settling tank and ancillary works for water supply to a fertilizer factory under Union Government, As tender was accepted by State Government. While the work was proceeding the Central Government increased wages of labourers by resolution published on 12-5-1947. A expressed inability to execute the work. The Superintending Engineer promised to pay A additional sums. A completed those works in 1950 and submitted claim for further and additional amount which had been spent in order to pay the increased wages. While the work was proceeding the Central Government increased wages of labourers by resolution published on 12-5-1947. A expressed inability to execute the work. The Superintending Engineer promised to pay A additional sums. A completed those works in 1950 and submitted claim for further and additional amount which had been spent in order to pay the increased wages. The Chief Engineer fixed it at Rs. 98,528/- and acknowledged As right to get that sum in his letter dated 30-7-1953 to Managing Director of the Company with a copy to A. As right to get additional sum was denied on 3-3-1954. A instituted the suit on 30-8-1956 for recovery of principal and interest with prayer for pendente lite and future interest as well. The State admitted the contract but contested the claim for additional sum. A plea was taken that the suit was barred by limitation as the work was completed prior to three years before the institution of the suit. With regard to the letter of the Chief Engineer, the position, according to the State, was that the recommendation of the Chief Engineer for payment of Rs. 98,528/- as ex gratia payment was not accepted by the Central Government. Held (1) that there was liability of the State to pay the additional amount to A; (2) that Articles 55 and 115 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to the case. Article 120 was attracted and the period of limitation began from 3-3-1954, when As right to the additional sum was denied. The suit was not barred by time; (3) that it was open to A to claim compensation from the defendant under Sec. 70 of the Contract Act; and (4) ...... ..... ...... ..... ..... ......" 12. I feel satisfied that, the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court and the Patna High Court apply to the case in hand and as such I see no escape from the conclusion that our suit falls neither under Article 18 nor under Article 55 of the new Act or the corresponding Article 56 or Article 115 of the old Act. 13. The counsel for the appellant did not canvass that if Articles 18 and 55 are not held by that Court as covering the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent then any Article other than Article 113 of the new Act could apply. 13. The counsel for the appellant did not canvass that if Articles 18 and 55 are not held by that Court as covering the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent then any Article other than Article 113 of the new Act could apply. The latter Article corresponds to Article 120 of the old Act and it has been appositely described as an omnibus Article of the Limitation Act. It is for the reason that it is a residuary Article for suits not covered by other Articles mentioned in Schedule II. Since Shri Choudhury did not contend that any Article other than Articles 18 and 55 applies to the suit and since Shri Barua was vehement in asserting that the suit properly falls under Article 113, this Court finds almost irresistable compulsion in applying Article 113 after having returned the finding that the suit is not covered by Articles 18 and 55. I have had a look at all the Articles applicable to the suits and have reached the firm conclusion that our suit appropriately falls under Article 113 and is not covered by any other Article. 14. Having reached that stage, the next question that arises for determination is what is the meaning of the expression "right to sue" mentioned in column 3 of Article 113. Before proceeding to examine that point I would like to emphasise that since the period of limitation prescribed for Article 120 of the old Act was 6 years, and the corresponding Article 113 of the new Act has cut down the period to three years, the plaintiff is entitled to take the benefit of the provisions of clause (a) of Section 30 of the Act of 1963. That clause states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act of 1963, any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the old Act of 1908, may be instituted within a period of five years next after the commencement of the Act of 1963 or within the period prescribed by the Act of 1908, whichever period expires earlier. Therefore, the plaintiff had either the full period of 6 years within which to file the suit or a maximum of 5 years after the commencement of the Act of 1963, subject to the proviso that out of the two alternatives he could avail of that according to which the period expired earlier. 15. This takes me to the consideration of what the expression "right to sue" exactly implies. It will be noticed that the language used in column 3 of the present Article 113 is exactly identical with that used in column 3 of the old Article 120, it being : "When the right to sue accrues". The Privy Council had an occasion to interpret these words in the case of Mst. Bolo v. Mst. Koklan, AIR 1930 PC 270, wherein it held that there can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. These observations of the Privy Council were endorsed by the Supreme Court in Rukhmabai v. Laxmi Narain, AIR 1960 SC 335 . This matter again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Gannon Dunkerly and Co., AIR 1970 SC 1433 (supra). The Supreme Court observed in para, 11 of its judgment that under Article 120 there is no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. In this judgment as well, the Privy Council decision in the case of Mst. Bolo was cited with approval. Shri Chaudhury was unable to cite any authority conveying different meaning to the expression "right to sue" than what is assigned to it in the three decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court just mentioned. In the case of Gannon Dunkerly and Co., the Supreme Court overruled the contention raised on behalf of the Union of India that the right to sue accrues respecting a claim covered by Article 120 of the old Act on the date the work is done, or when the defendant obtains the benefit of the work done by the plaintiff. In the case of Gannon Dunkerly and Co., the Supreme Court overruled the contention raised on behalf of the Union of India that the right to sue accrues respecting a claim covered by Article 120 of the old Act on the date the work is done, or when the defendant obtains the benefit of the work done by the plaintiff. Therefore, Shri Chaudhury was not right in contending that the plaintiff could at best bring the suit within a period of six years (if it is held to fall under Article 120 of the old Act) counted from the dates the respective assignments were carried out by the plaintiff. The period would run, according to the decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, from the date the right to the recovery of the amount was unequivocally denied by the defendant, The evidence on the record brings out that the right was asserted by the plaintiff when he served the four notices on the defendant and that that right was infringed or threatened by the defendant when it refused to pay the money demanded. Consequently the suit for the entire amount in dispute was well within time, having been filed well within 6 years from the date of denial by trie defendant of the bills submitted by the plaintiff in 1961 and 1963. 16. No other point was urged in support of the appeal. 17. In conclusion, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.