V P GUPTA v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS NEW DELHI
1972-04-11
BISHAMBHAR DAYAL, SHIV DAYAL
body1972
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition by some of the employees of the Posts and Telegraphs Department. The posts of Wireless Licence Inspectors and Town Inspectors were tenure posts in the beginning, but the President passed an order de-tenuring these posts and directed that these posts be added to rule 60 which contains a list of posts in which rotational transfers are to take place. Consequently, these posts have become posts of rotational transfers. Under the rules, appointment of officials to these posts has been provided by passing a particular test of efficiency. The petitioners passed that test and were appointed to these posts, but when the period of their rotational continuance on that post expired, they were being returned back to their original posts. Thereupon, this writ petition has been filed contending that the rotational transfer under rule 60 and in the Presidential Order merely means transfer from place to place and they, having once been posted to these posts, cannot be sent back to their original posts. This contention has not been accepted by the Department and the Department has made clear rule under which an incumbent once appointed on that post will remain there only for 4 years and 3 years respectively. The correctness of these rules is being challenged as contrary to the Presidential Order. ( 2. ) THE contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the fact that these posts have been dc-tenured and the further fact that these posts have been added to rule 60 for rotational transfer indicates that the intention was that a person once appointed to these posts will remain on these posts and the words "rotational transfer" only mean that they could not be transferred from post to post in the same place and the rules made to the contrary which provides for an incumbent holding these posts only for a limited period and thereafter going back to the original post are, therefore, illegal. ( 3. ) WE have heard learned counsel for the petitioners. We see no force in this contention. Rule 60 into which these posts have been added has a heading as follows : "the following posts should not ordinarily be occupied by the same official continuously at a time for more than the period shown against each.
( 3. ) WE have heard learned counsel for the petitioners. We see no force in this contention. Rule 60 into which these posts have been added has a heading as follows : "the following posts should not ordinarily be occupied by the same official continuously at a time for more than the period shown against each. " This rule makes it quite clear that the incumbent who occupies these posts cannot remain occupying these posts for more than the fixed period mentioned against each. It, therefore, clearly indicates that the officials once appointed to these posts must go back to their posts and cannot remain on these posts for more than the fixed period. If the intention had been that they will continue occupying these posts and will only go from one place to another on the same post, then the language would have been very different. The language employed in rule 60 clearly indicates that the appointment of officials to these posts is only for a fixed period after which they must automatically go back to their own posts and other officials by rotation, who are found fit, will occupy these posts. The mere fact that these posts have been de-tenured cannot lead to an inference that the persons once appointed to these posts will always remain on these posts. When rule 60 is quite clear, such an inference cannot be drawn from the mere fact that the posts had been de-tenured. ( 4. ) LEARNED counsel contended thru the other posts mentioned in rule 60 are not proved to be posts where the incumbents are sent back to their own posts after the fixed period. He has cited a decision of the Kerala High Court which was decided by a learned Single Judge. Even in that judgment, there is no material to show that an incumbent of other posts mentioned in rule 60 remained in those posts for more than the fixed period as a matter of routine nor has any such instance been cited in the present writ petition and we are unable to accept that to be the prevailing practice.
Even in that judgment, there is no material to show that an incumbent of other posts mentioned in rule 60 remained in those posts for more than the fixed period as a matter of routine nor has any such instance been cited in the present writ petition and we are unable to accept that to be the prevailing practice. Even if instances were produced to indicate that certain incumbents to the posts mentioned in rule 60 had remained in those posts for more than the period prescribed against those posts, it will not mean that rule 60 must be read in a way which cannot be supported by its language. The language used in rule 60 is quite clear and we are, therefore, unable to accept that this language should be read in the way contended for by the petitioner. ( 5. ) THE petition is accordingly dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed summarily.