Judgement This second appeal by the defendant is directed against a decree for eviction and arrear of rent and compensation passed by the Assistant District Judge, Jorhat, in Title Appeal No. 25 of 1970. The plaintiffs suit was for ejectment of defendant from holding No. 149 comprising two rooms in the Sibsagar Municipality and also for arrear of rent of Rs. 114/- for September and October, 1968. 2. The defendant, has filed a written statement and contested the suit. He pleads that he is a monthly tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the said holding at a monthly rent of Rs. 57/-. His defence is that as the plaintiff does not require the house bona fide, he is protected from eviction under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. 3. The learned Munsiff framed as many as 7 issues and after trial decreed the suit for ejectment, arrear of rent with cost and also decreed future compensation. On appeal the judgment and decree of the Munsif were upheld by the Assistant District Judge. Hence this appeal. 4. Only two points have been urged before me by learned counsel for the appellant. His first contention is that the notice of eviction (Ext. 7) is not valid in law and he draws my attention to the last para of the notice which is as follows : "Accordingly, I serve this notice upon you determining the tenancy on 31-10-68 or on any day within that date, when according to you, the tenancy ends and ask you to give vacant possession of the rooms with its compound on the 1st day of November, 1968, failing which my client will file a suit for your eviction and that at your risk and responsibility." Learned Counsel finds fault with the portion "or on any date within that date, when according to you, the tenancy ends". His submission is that the plaintiff ought to have come with a definite case with regard to the month of tenancy and ought to have terminated the tenancy according to that month. 5. There is no doubt that according to the plaintiff the tenancy was according to the Gregorian calendar and that the house was for residential purpose and therefore he terminated the tenancy by a 15 days notice at the end of the English calendar month, namely, October, 1968. 5. There is no doubt that according to the plaintiff the tenancy was according to the Gregorian calendar and that the house was for residential purpose and therefore he terminated the tenancy by a 15 days notice at the end of the English calendar month, namely, October, 1968. He, however, gave an option to the defendant to vacate it earlier on a date on which, according to the latter, the tenancy ended. In the written statement the defendant has not stated that the tenancy was not according to the Gregorian Calendar or that it did not end with the end of a month according to the said Calendar month. The learned Munsif found that the tenancy was terminated by a valid notice of ejectment. The learned Assistant District Judge has considered Ext. 7 and has found that when the plaintiff gave evidence on oath in Court stating that the tenancy was according to English month and that it was terminated by notice Ext. 7, and the defendant chose not to examine himself and deny the plaintiffs evidence, the plaintiffs evidence remained unrebutted. The learned Judge ultimately came to the finding that it was clear that the defendant was given clear 15 days notice of eviction. 6. The purpose of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is to terminate a tenancy by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of tenancy if the purpose of the tenancy was agricultural or manufacturing, or by 15 days notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy, if the tenancy was from month to month and for any purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing. The notice should not be interpreted in a way to find fault with it, but only in a way to ascertain whether the defendant understood it. The notice should not be interpreted in a way to find fault with it, but only in a way to ascertain whether the defendant understood it. The Privy Council in the case of Harihar Banerjee v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102, has held : "The principles governing the construction of a notice to quit laid down by English cases are equally applicable to cases arising in India and they establish that notices to quit, though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in them, may still be good and effective in law; the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer, but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with all those facts and circumstances; and further, they are to be construed not with a desire to find fault in them which would render them defective but to be construed ut res magis valeat quam per eat." 7. When the defendant received the notice, Ext. 7 terminating the tenancy on 31-10-68 it was his duty either by a reply to it or by allegations mads in the written statement supported by evidence that the tenancy did not end with the end of an English month but on some other date. When he chose not to do so and not even to examine himself to deny the evidence of the plaintiff in this regard, he cannot now complain that the notice was not in accordance with law. 8. The second submission of learned counsel is that the decree for future compensation is illegal. The learned Munsif decreed future compensation at the rate of Rs. 57/- per month from November, 1968, till the date of delivery of possession of the house to the plaintiff. A decree of future rent for mesne profits may be passed under Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the material portion of which may be quoted : "(1) Where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree - ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until - (i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder, (ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Court, or (iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, whichever event first occurs. (2) Where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or clause (c), a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of such enquiry." Order 20, Rule 12 (c) does not contemplate immediate passing of a decree for future compensation from the institution of the suit till the delivery of possession to the decree-holder. It only contemplates an enquiry into the matter and the decree may be passed only at a subsequent stage. This provision was examined in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Surajmal Jain v. Kanaklata, ILR 16 Assam 1 : (AIR 1964 Assam 102). The Court has held : "The reading of these orders and rules (Order 20, Rule 12) shows that the plaintiff cannot be given a decree for compensation for wrongful possession after the period of the suit till the recovery of possession at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. If the Court desire that an enquiry should be made as to the rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit till the delivery of possession, a preliminary decree has to be passed to that effect and a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profit is to be passed in accordance with the result of such inquiry. The decree thus in so far as it orders the payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month from the date of the suit till the date of the possession, cannot stand." 9. This decision covers the present case. In the instant case the learned Munsiff did not order any enquiry but forthwith decreed future compensation at the rate of Rs. 57/- per month from the date of the suit till the date of recovery of possession. The decree for future compensation is unsustainable. The decree passed by the Munsiff was upheld by the learned Assistant District Judge. 10. In the result the decree for future compensation at the rate of Rs. 57/- per month from the date of the suit till the date of recovery of possession. The decree for future compensation is unsustainable. The decree passed by the Munsiff was upheld by the learned Assistant District Judge. 10. In the result the decree for future compensation at the rate of Rs. 57/- per month from November, 1968, till the date of delivery of possession of the house to the plaintiff, is set aside. With this modification in the decree, the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Order accordingly.