Range Gowda, J.-This appeal by the State is directed against the order, dated 12th May, 1971 passed by the Munsiff-Magistrate, Chikmagalur, in C.C. No. 239 of 1971 acquitting the four respondents who were accused 1 to 4 before him and who will also be referred to as such in the course of this judgment, of the offence for contravening the provisions of clause (1) of rule 154 of Mysore Forest Rules, 1969, read with section 86 of the Mysore Forest Act. 2. The charge-sheet in the case was filed on 10th February, 1971, and on the same day the case was taken on file and summonses were issued to all the accused returnable on 27th February, 1971. On 27th February, 1971, only accused 4 appeared and so fresh summons were issued to accused 1 to 3 returnable on 19th March, 1971. On 19th March, 1971, in response to the summons, accused 1 to 3 appeared and the case was then adjourned to 22nd April, 1971, on which day the complainant and the accused were all present. But, as the Presiding Officer was on casual leave, the case was adjourned to 12th May, 1971. On that day, it appears, the complainant and his witnesses and also the accused were all absent, and the learned Magistrate purporting to act under section 247, Criminal Procedure Code acquitted the accused of the said offence, and it is the legality and the correctness of that order that are assailed in this appeal. The respondent accused though served with notice of this appeal, have remained absent. 3. It was contended by the learned State Public Prosecutor that the learned Magistrate did not exercise proper discretion but acted mechanically while passing the impugned order. Elaborating his contention he submitted that the accused were all absent on the day the impugned order was passed and the learned Magistrate could not have proceeded with the hearing of the case oven if the complainant and his witnesses were present and that in these circumstances he should not have proceeded to pass the impugned order without adjourning the case. He further submitted that the consequences that would flow from such an order would be grave and would seriously affect the interests of the complainant and that the learned Magistrate without realising the same and without any valid grounds for not adjourning the case was not justified in passing the impugned order in such haste. The learned State Public Prosecutor also drew our attention to the following observations of this Court in Rangasetty v. Kunna Setty1: "We would however like to add that the discretion whether to adjourn or not under section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has to be exercised with great care and caution. The Statute itself contains the reason why such care should be exercised. In the first instance, the order as passed in the absence of a person who is vitally affected by it; secondly, the consequences of the order are serious and once that order is made, it is no longer in the power of the Magistrate to correct the mischief even if he subsequently discovers that the complainant had very good reasons for his absence. The order being one of acquittal, the complainant is prevented from taking fresh proceedings in respect of the offence complained of by him. Ordinarily, a first party in legal proceedings may be expected to be careful and not negligent of his own interest. The section no doubt uses the words ‘shall acquit’. But, that compulsion arises after the Magistrate has exercised his discretion and come to the conclusion that there are no valid grounds for adjourning the case. This further emphasises the need for exercising great caution and examining the position very carefully before Magistrates proceed to acquit the accused in private complaints under the provisions of section 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 4. In our opinion the submission of the learned State Public Prosecutor are well founded. It is seen from the order-sheet of the case that accused 1 to 3 appeared in Court for the first time only on 19th March, 1971, and on 22rd.April, 1971, the Presiding Officer himself was on leave. On all the previous days the complainant was present and the order-sheet does not disclose that the case was set down for hearing on 12th May, 1971. The order sheet relating to that date also does lot show that the complainant was negligent in the prosecution of the case. On all the previous days the complainant was present and the order-sheet does not disclose that the case was set down for hearing on 12th May, 1971. The order sheet relating to that date also does lot show that the complainant was negligent in the prosecution of the case. The impugned order does not contain the reason or reasons which prompted the learned Magistrate to pass it without adjourning the case to some other date even though the complainant was absent on that day. No grounds, muchless any good grounds, are given for not adjourning the case. It is therefore clear that the learned Magistrate has not applied his mind at all to the question whether the case should or should not be adjourned, and he has acted mechanically while passing the impugned order. 5. In a proper case, for good reasons, the case can be adjourned even though the complainant is absent and if there are good reasons for his absence. Before proceeding to pass any order under section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is one of the legitimate duties of the Court to apply its mind and see whether there are good grounds or not to act one way or the other. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate does not appear to have applied his mind at all to this aspect of the matter. Evidently, the order which is the result of such arbitrary conduct cannot be said to be a proper or judicial order. The result is that the impugned order must be set aside as being not sustainable, and it is accordingly set aside and the case is remitted to the learned Magistrate for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. S.V.S. ----- Order accordingly.