Order: The petitioner is a member of the Indian Police Service and the Union Government allotted his services to the State of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner was in-charge of Anantapur Rural Circle as Assistant Superintendent of Police from 1st August, 1971 to 14th October, 1971. On 15th October, 1971 the second respondent herein filed a complaint, P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Anantapur, against the petitioner and three others under sections 166, 202, 330, 365, 367, 368 and 324 read with sections 109, 114 and 34, Indian Penal Code. In the complaint it was stated that on 10th October, 1971 some time after midnight, accused 1 to 4 along with some police constables came to the house of the complainant in Dorigallu village. The petitioner herein told him that he wanted to search his house saying that he received some information that some of the accused concerned in a case of murder of one Tirupala Reddy (known as Kothapalli Murder case) were suspected to be in his house. The complainant denied any connection with them or that such persons were in his house. The petitioner and others thereupon, searched the entire house, though no search warrants were shown to the complainant or served on him. Thereafter, the petitioner asked the complainant to get into the jeep and go with him to the police station. According to the complainant the jeep was taken towards the village called Thimmarayanipalyam and stopped at some distance from that village. The house of one Chinna Bali was searched in the village. Thereafter the jeep proceeded to Anantapur and reached the Taluk Police Station at about 6.30 or 7 a.m. In the Police Station the petitioner insulted the complainant in filthy vulgar language. He also threatened the complainant to give a statement confessing that the absconding accused were harboured by him. As the complainant refused to do so, he beat the complainant with a stick on the face. The blow fell on the left cheek and the second blow fell on his left palm and wrist when he protested and raised his left hand to ward it off. As the complainant refused to do so, he beat the complainant with a stick on the face. The blow fell on the left cheek and the second blow fell on his left palm and wrist when he protested and raised his left hand to ward it off. A little later the petitioner compelled him to issue a false statement to the effect that three of the accused concerned in Kothapalli murder case were in his custody and threatened him that he would beat him again if he did not sign the statement. As the complainant had already received injuries, he signed the statement though he knew the contents were false. Thus the petitioner extorted a false confession by causing hurt to him. The petitioner left the police station and the complainant was wrongly confined therein. In the complaint it was also mentioned that the petitioner had caused a false case to be fabricated by the Sub-Inspector of Singanamala Police Station against the complainant alleging that the complainant assaulted the Sub-Inspector when he was interrogating him in Singanamala Police Station and that he sustained an injury while running away. The comlainant stated that he was never taken to Singanamala Police Station. 2. The Magistrate raised a query as to the maintainability of the complaint without the sanction of the Government tinder section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. In answer to the query the learned Counsel for the complainant cited decisions. The learned Magistrate after recording the sworn statement of the complainant and of his witnesses, pronounced the order dated 15th October, 1971 taking on file the complaint under sections 365, 367, 324, 330 Indian Penal Code against accused 1, the petitioner herein, and under certain other sections against accused-2 to accused-4. He observed in his order that the protection of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code was not attracted. As observed in the decision in Ramnath v. Saligram1, cited before him, the necessity for the sanction has to be determined only in the course of the progress of the case. Hence, he found there were grounds to take the case on file and issued process against the petitioner and others requiring their attendance in Court on 30th October, 1971. 3. Hence, he found there were grounds to take the case on file and issued process against the petitioner and others requiring their attendance in Court on 30th October, 1971. 3. The petitioner, thereupon, filed W.P. No. 4241 of 1971 in this Court praying inter alia that this Court may quash the proceedings in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 and the complaint dated 15th October, 1971 and also to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the Magistrate from proceeding further in the matter. Krishna Rao, J. who heard the petitioner and the respondents dismissed the writ petition by his order dated 16th November, 1971. He held that the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the complaint emanates from the allegations made in the complaint and not from what is alleged by the accused. He was of the view that on a reading of the complaint it did not disclose any allegation to warrant the sanction of the Government. It did not appear from the allegations in the complaint that the injuries were caused in the discharge of the duty of the Police Officers. It is not a case where the Police Officers had to use force to prevent person From escaping. He also observed that as observed in Nagaraj v. State of Mysore2, that the occasion for the Court to consider whether the complaint could be filed without the sanction of the Government would be when at any later stage of the proceedings it appears to the Court that the action of the Police Officer complained of appears to come within the provisions of sections 127 and 128 Criminal Procedure Code and that this can be either when the accused appears before the Court and makes such a suggestion or when evidence or circumstances prima facie show it. He, therefore, held that the view taken by the’ Magistrate was correct; in any event he was not inclined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The petitioner herein preferred W.A. No. 440 of 1971. By an order dated 23rd November, 1971 a Bench of this Court consisting of the Chief Justice and myself dismissed the appeal. 4. The petitioner herein preferred W.A. No. 440 of 1971. By an order dated 23rd November, 1971 a Bench of this Court consisting of the Chief Justice and myself dismissed the appeal. After referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari3, to the effect whether sanction is necessary or not has to be determined from stage to stage and the necessity may reveal itself in the course of the case, we observed that it is open to the appellant to raise this question before the Magistrate when he appears before the Magistrate and it is for the Magistrate to decide it when adequate material is placed before him. 4-a. The petitioner filed Crl.M.P. No. 480 of 1971 before the Magistrate, stating that the petition was filed in pursuance of the directions of the High Court. It was contended that the order taking cognizance was non est as it was done without notice to the petitioner and without sanction of the Government under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate by his order dated 13th January, 1972 dismissed the petition. He held that it has not been shown that no offence is made out on the allegations in the complaint and sworn statement. The Magistrate also observed that the remedy of the petitioner was to have the order of taking cognizance of offences alleged quashed by a higher Court, which remedy had been availed of by the petitioner by way of writ petition, which had been dismissed and which order had already been confirmed in writ appeal. He observed that the circumstances under which the respondent was brought to the Taluk Police Station and as to how the alleged injuries were caused to the respondent have to be brought out in evidence for considering whether the act attributed to the petitioner would fall within the ambit of the official duty alleged by the petitioner. The petition raising the contention relating to sanction filed immediately after the disposal of the writ appeal in High Court without any progress in this case would appear to be premature. The question of sanction as already stated will have to be considered only at a later stage. The petition raising the contention relating to sanction filed immediately after the disposal of the writ appeal in High Court without any progress in this case would appear to be premature. The question of sanction as already stated will have to be considered only at a later stage. Another contention was raised before the Magistrate that under the provisions of the District Police Act a special machinery is provided for enquiry into charges against Police Officers and the cognizance of the offences against Police Officers without recourse to the special machinery should not have been taken. This contention was negatived by the Magistrate who held that the provisions under the District Police Act do not prohibit taking cognizance of the offences by the Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code. 5. The petitioner preferred Crl. R.C. No. 58 of 1972 to this Court against the said order on 29th January, 1972. On 6th April, 1972 the petitioner filed this W.A.M.P. No. 190 of 1972 under Order 47, rule 1 read with section 151, Civil Procedure Code to review the order dated 23rd November, 1971 dismissing W.A. No. 440 of 1971. On 5th July, 1971, the petitioner filed Crl.M.P. No. 1416 of 1972 under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the order of the Magistrate dated 15th October, 1971 and also the complaint dated 15th October, 1971 in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971. 6. Crl.R.C. No. 58 of 1972 filed against the order dated 13th January, 1972 was however withdrawn on 25th July, 1972 and was dismissed. Thereafter, on 5th August, 1972 the petitioner filed Crl. M.P. No. 1627 of 1972 under section 561-A Criminal Procedure Code praying that the Court may be pleased to call for the records in Crl.M.P. No. 430 of 1971 in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 and to quash all the proceedings in the said P.R.C. When the petition for review and the Crl.M.P. No. 1627 of 1972 which are now before me were pending, Crl. M.P. No. 1416 of 1972 came up for hearing before Muktadar, J. By his order dated 29th August, 1972, Muktadar, J. dismissed the petition. M.P. No. 1416 of 1972 came up for hearing before Muktadar, J. By his order dated 29th August, 1972, Muktadar, J. dismissed the petition. He held that having regard to the decision of this Court in W.P. No. 4241 of 1971 and W.A. No. 440 of 1972 he was not inclined to pass any order as there is not enough material placed on record warranting the same and that it would be better if the accused raised this plea in future at an appropriate stage in the course of the proceedings when there is enough material Warranting sanction to prosecute the petitioner. He also held that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the allegations contained in the complaint that the acts alleged against the petitioner are such as could be regarded to have been committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. At this stage, he found that no such sanction was necessary. He however observed that it will be open to the petitioner to establish during the course of furerth proceedings when there is sufficient material on record that the requisite sanctio under section 197 Criminal Procedure Code must be obtained. He also held that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Criminal Procedure Code was not excluded because of the provisions of the District Police Act. 7. The petition to review the judgment, and order of this Court in W.A. No. 440 of 1971 may be considered first. Though it was rendered by a Bench, the petition is properly before me having regard to Order 47, rule 5, Civil Procedure Code as the other Judge who was a party to the order ceased to be a Judge of this Court on 1st April, 1972 on his retirement on attaining the age of 62 years. 8. The question for consideration is whether the judgment is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record as to entitle the petitioner to ask for a review under Order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. 9. As has already been noticed in the Writ Appeal this Court held that it cannot be said that the view taken by Krishna Rao, J. was erroneous. 9. As has already been noticed in the Writ Appeal this Court held that it cannot be said that the view taken by Krishna Rao, J. was erroneous. Krishna Rao, J. held that it did not appear from the allegations in the complaint that the injuries were caused in the discharge of the duty of the Police Officers and hence section 197 Criminal Procedure Code was not attracted. In any event, he was not inclined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It cannot be said that the Judges who heard the appeal committed any error of law apparent on the face of the record in expressing the view that they did not consider the decision of Krishna Rao, J., erroneous. It is a matter for the Court to decide having regard to the allegations in the complaint, whether the sanction of the Government was required before the Magistrate could take cognizance of the case. The Court has to decide whether the person who is accused of an offence committed it while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. Krishnarao, J. came to the conclusion that from the allegations made in the complaint it did not appear that the petitioner was accused of any such offence and this Court was not inclined to disagree with that view. Even assuming that it is possible to take a different view and even assuming that the question whether in the circumstances of the case, section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is attracted is a question of law, it cannot be said that the order of this Court on appeal is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. A mere error of law is not sufficient to justify a party to claim that the decision should be reviewed. 10. Sri Lingaiah Choudary, however argued that several questions which were raised by the petitioner were not considered by this Court either in the order of the writ petition or in the writ appeal. A mere error of law is not sufficient to justify a party to claim that the decision should be reviewed. 10. Sri Lingaiah Choudary, however argued that several questions which were raised by the petitioner were not considered by this Court either in the order of the writ petition or in the writ appeal. He submitted that the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the complaint and the subsequent proceedings are illegal, for the following reasons: (a) The offences said to have been committed were even on the face of the complaint alleged to have been committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and therefore, there cannot be any doubt that section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is attracted and the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence, except with the previous sanction of the Government. (b) In any event the order which was made behind the back of the petitioner without notice to him is vitiated as being opposed to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code as well as to the principles of natural justice. (c) On a proper construction of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance of a cognizable offence on a private complaint. (d) The order of the Magistrate is vitiated by reason of bias on his part. (e) Having regard to the provisions of the District Police Act, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. 11. It may be noticed that in the writ petition the order of the Magistrate was attacked on the ground that the complaint did not disclose any offence at all and in any event the offence alleged to have been committed was committed in the discharge of the official duty of the petitioner, and hence the sanction of the overnment is necessary. The other points mentioned above were not raised in the petition. However, in the reply affidavit the petitioner contended that the order was vitiated by reason of absence of notice to the petitioner and the bias on the part of the Magistrate. The remaining questions were not raised either in the writ petition or in the reply-affidavit. The other points mentioned above were not raised in the petition. However, in the reply affidavit the petitioner contended that the order was vitiated by reason of absence of notice to the petitioner and the bias on the part of the Magistrate. The remaining questions were not raised either in the writ petition or in the reply-affidavit. It appears from the order of Krishna Rao, J., that the only question that was argued before him was whether the sanction of the Government is required under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. Even in the writ appeal, arguments were addressed only on that point. I have already observed the conclusion of this Court on that point, even assuming that it was erroneous, cannot be said to be an erroneous conclusion on a question of law apparent on the face of the record, so as to justify a review of the order. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to some decisions in this connection. In Hari Sanker v. Anantha Nath1, it was found that there was a clear omission on the part of the Court to consider the clear provision of Order 41, rule 33 Civil Procedure Code when the original judgment was passed. Such omission which is analogous to one apparent on the face of the record is sufficient to bring the case within the purview of Order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code and hence the Court was not incompetent to reconsider the matter. That was a case where a clear provision of law was not at all considered by the Court. In such a case there cannot be any doubt that Order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, will be applicable. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh2, it was observed that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say there is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out. In that case the order sought to be reviewed was the order of the High Court refusing to grant a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution on the ground that no substantial question of law was involved. In that case the order sought to be reviewed was the order of the High Court refusing to grant a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution on the ground that no substantial question of law was involved. It was however apparent that the entire controversy had turned on the interpretation of rule 18 (1) of the Madras Turnover and Assessment Rules and other pieces of legislation and hence there could not be any doubt in that case that substantial question of law was involved. In Income-tax Officer v. K. Srinivasa Rao3, an order was passed following the Supreme Court’s decision, but that decision had already been reversed by the Supreme Court by a later decision by the time the order was passed and the later decision was not brought to the notice of the Court. It was held, therefore, that there was an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the review of the order. 13. All these cases have no application to the facts of the case. In the cases cited, either a provision of law was not considered or the binding decision of the Supreme Court was not noticed, or the question was of such a nature that there could not be two opinions about it. In this case, however, it cannot be said that this Court could not have found an opinion that on the face of the allegations contained in the complaint, the provisions of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, had not been attracted. 14. A perusal of the various decisions under section 197 Criminal Procedure Code including that of the Supreme Court will disclose that it is a difficult task for the Court in many cases to draw a line between offences which are committed in the course of the discharge of the official duties and offences which are not so committed. The interpretation of the expression “alleged to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of the official duty” has not been an easy task and several shades of opinions have been expressed from time to time. It is not therefore a case where it can be said that only one opinion is possible and if that opinion is erroneous the Court can review its previous decision. 15. It is then argued that the other questions referred to above had not been considered. It is not therefore a case where it can be said that only one opinion is possible and if that opinion is erroneous the Court can review its previous decision. 15. It is then argued that the other questions referred to above had not been considered. It is stated that even assuming that due to a mistake of Counsel, thes questions were not argued, it would not preclude the petitioner from asking for review, if he is able to satisfy that there was an error apparent on the face of the record. In this connection the petitioner referred to a decision in Chenchanna v. P.S. Transports Ltd.1, where it was held that the most important point arising out of the petition was not considered, the omission would constitute an error apparent on the face of the record, even though the omission to consider that point was due to the Counsel not putting forth that aspect of the case. He also drew my attention to Income-tax Officer v. K. Srinivasa Rao2, where the learned Judge observed that the binding decision of the Supreme Court was not brought to the notice of the Judge by the Counsel and even then the order was reviewed. I agree with the petitioner that if the Court is satisfied there is an error on the face of the record, the mere fact that such an error occurred by reason of inadvertance, mistake or omission of the Counsel will not stand in the way of this Court reviewing its order. But to my mind, even the other questions which are raised by the Counsel for the petitioner and now argued before me are also not of such a nature as to be answered only in a particular way and in which no two opinions are possible. On the other hand, I am of the view that there is not much substance even on the merits in some of the contentions which have been raised. 16. The first of these is that the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance without notice to the petitioner is opposed to the principles of natural justice. Under section 190 (1) (a) Criminal Procedure Code the Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. 16. The first of these is that the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance without notice to the petitioner is opposed to the principles of natural justice. Under section 190 (1) (a) Criminal Procedure Code the Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, provides that the Court shall not take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Government concerned, if the person referred to in that section is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the dis. charge of his official duty. Therefore, before taking cognizance of the offence, it is for the Magistrate to consider the question whether he has jurisdiction to take cognizance or not and in coming to such a conclusion, he will have to go into the question whether the accused is alleged to have committed the offence while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. It is true that this decision is arrived at before notice is given to the accused But it is always open to the accused to submit after notice that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction and the earlier decision arrived at in his absence is erroneous. The Magistrate is not precluded from revising his decision at the instance of the accused at any stage if he is satisfied that the provisions of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code are attracted. The decision of the Supreme Court in Nagaraj v. State of Mysore3, is itself an authority for the proposition that it is open to the Magistrate to consider the question of previous sanction at a later stage. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari4, also it was observed that the question whether the sanction is necessary or not may differ from stage to stage as it reveals itself in the progress of the case. Thus, the accused is not prejudicied by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the case by reason of the complaint without notice to him, as it is always open to him to plead before the Magistrate that he had acted erroneously in taking cognizance, as section 197 Criminal Procedure Code, would not apply to the facts of the case. Thus, the accused is not prejudicied by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the case by reason of the complaint without notice to him, as it is always open to him to plead before the Magistrate that he had acted erroneously in taking cognizance, as section 197 Criminal Procedure Code, would not apply to the facts of the case. I do not therefore, agree with the contention that the order passed is bad, as it was passed without giving notice to the petitioner. On the other hand, it would appear from the provisions that the Magistrate has to first consider prima facie whether he has jurisdiction to take cognizance on a perusal of the complaint. As a matter of fact under the Scheme of the Criminal Procedure an accused does not come into the picture a; all until process is issued. Vide Chandra Deo v. Prokash Chandra5. 18. The next question that is; argued is that the order is vitiated by bias. In this connection a few more facts maiced. When the petitioner was in the Anantapur Taluk Police Station, the nephew of the second respondent made an application under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, before the Magistrate praying that the Court may be pleased to have local inspection so as to observe the condition of the second respondent and record his statement and issue such orders as may be necessary to cause production of the 2nd respondent in the interests of justice. The Magistrate immediately went to the Police Station for satisfying himself as to the truth or otherwise of the allegation made in the petition. He found the 2nd respondent there and put him some questions and recorded his statement. Thereafter, he passed an order directing the 2nd respondent to be produced before the Medical Officer for treatment of the injuries. In these circumstances it is argued that the Magistrate may have to be a witness and he was precluded from taking cognizance of the offence. I do not think there is any substance in this contention. The Magistrate was doing his duty under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, and in the discharge of his judicial function under that section, he recorded the statement. The mere fact that the Magistrate recorded the statement in a petition under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, would not in my view preclude him from taking cognizance of the case. The Magistrate was doing his duty under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, and in the discharge of his judicial function under that section, he recorded the statement. The mere fact that the Magistrate recorded the statement in a petition under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, would not in my view preclude him from taking cognizance of the case. Vide, also section 556, Criminal Procedure Code, Explanation. If at any stage, the petitioner feels any apprehension that he will not get justice in the hands of the Magistrate concerned, he has a remedy by way of applying for transfer of the case to be tried by some other Magistrate and such an application will be considered on its merits. But it cannot be said that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction at all to take congizance of the case on this ground. 18-a. There is also no substance in the contention that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case in view of the provisions of the District Police Act. Section 51 of the District Police Act, which was relied upon is in the following terms: “Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to prevent any person from being prosecuted for any offence made punishable on conviction by this Act, or to prevent any person from being liable under any other law, regulation or Act, to any other or higher penalty or punishment than is provided for such offence by this Act: Provided always that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence.” 19. Far from excluding the jurisdiction of the Courts under the Criminal Procedure Code, the section preserves that jurisdiction and states that nothing contained in this Act shall prevent any person from being prosecuted for any offence under any other law, regulation or Act. The only limitation is that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence. The District Police Act contains, no doubt, certain machinery for punishing Police Officers in regard to certain matters, but there is no provision which ousts the jurisdiction of the Courts under the Criminal Procedure Code. Police Officers are also amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts as any other citizen under the Criminal Procedure Code. 20. Sri Lingaiah Chowdary, relied on section 5 of the Indian Penal Code, and sections 1 (2), 5 and 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 21. Police Officers are also amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts as any other citizen under the Criminal Procedure Code. 20. Sri Lingaiah Chowdary, relied on section 5 of the Indian Penal Code, and sections 1 (2), 5 and 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 21. Section 1 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, says that nothing herein contained shall affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. 22. Section 5, Criminal Procedure Code, provides that all offences under the Indian Penal Code, shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner, or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. 23. Section 29 says that subject to the other provisions of this Code, any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in this behalf in such law, be tried by such Court. 24. A combined reading of these provisions together with the provisions of th strict Police Act, would lead to the following result. All offences under the Indian Penal Code, or any other law will have to be investigated, according to the qualification that in respect of offences under laws other than Indian Penal Code, if there be an enactment regulating the manner or place of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences, such an enactment will prevail over the Code of Criminal Procedure. As I have observed there is no provision in the District Police Act which takes away entirely the jurisdiction of the Courts under the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject only to the limits prescribed in that Act, namely, that any charge against a Police Officer above the rank of a police constable shall be enquired into and determined only by an officer exercising the powers of a Magistrate the jurisdiction of the Court under the Criminal Procedure Code, still remains. 25. The learned Counsel relied upon the decision in Amritlal N. Shah, In re.1, in which it was held that the charge levelled against the persons who are Police Officers but relating purely to their situation as private individuals may not fall within the provisions of the Act. 25. The learned Counsel relied upon the decision in Amritlal N. Shah, In re.1, in which it was held that the charge levelled against the persons who are Police Officers but relating purely to their situation as private individuals may not fall within the provisions of the Act. Here, we are concerned with a converse case, namely the charges levelled against the Officer are in respect of acts alleged to have been committed while purporting to act in his capacity as a Police Officer. This decision is not an authority for the proposition that such an offence cannot be tried under the Criminal Procedure Code. 26. The next contention is that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction under section 190 (1) (a) to take cognizance of a cognizable offence. It was argued that section 190 (1) (a) applies only to non-cognizable offences. The language of section 190 is wide, in as much as it speaks of cognizance of any offence. There is no warrant to restrict the scope of this section to non-cognizable offence only. 27. Dealing with section 190 (1) (b), the Supreme Court held in Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi v. Ram Kali2, that under section 190 (1) (b) the Magistrate is bound to take cognizance of any cognizable offence brought to his notice, and the word “may take cognizance” in the context means “must take cognizance”. In the face of this decision, I do not think it is open to the petitioner to contend that section 190 applies only to non-cognizable offence. 28. It was then argued that the Magistrate could not in any event take cognizance, without making a preliminary investigation, merely proceeding upon the allegations in the complaint. Reference was made to section 156 relating to investigation into cognizable cases. Under section 156 (3) any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned, that is, investigation into cognizable offences. It was also argued that by taking cognizance of the offence the Magistrate in effect, prevented the police from making investigation under section 156 (1). In this connection reference was made to Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed3, where it was observed that the prohibition contained in section 197 against a prosecution without the necessary sanction is against the action by Court. It was also argued that by taking cognizance of the offence the Magistrate in effect, prevented the police from making investigation under section 156 (1). In this connection reference was made to Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed3, where it was observed that the prohibition contained in section 197 against a prosecution without the necessary sanction is against the action by Court. Under sections 154 and 156 the Police have a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence without the sanction of any Court, and, therefore, no sanction under section 197 is necessary for an investigation by the Police into a cognizable offence. The question of sanction will arise only when a charge is preferred before a Court and the Court’s functions begin. I do not see how this decision helps the petitioner. That was a case where the stage at which the Court was required to take cognizance of the matter, had not been reached and in such a case it was held that the Court’s functions begin when a charge is preferred and until that stage is reached, the police can exercise the statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence even without the sanction of the Court. 29. Another decision that was relied on was Gopal Das v. State of Assam4. In that case it was held that the provisions of section 190 do not mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence and the word “may” in section 190 cannot be construed to mean “must”. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under section 156 (3) to the Police for investigation. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. 30. It was argued therefore, that this was a case where the Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance but to have directed investigation under section 156. While this decision says that the Magistrate is not bound to take cognizance, it is not an authority for saying that the Magistrate should not take cognizance and should always direct investigation of the offence before taking cognizance. While this decision says that the Magistrate is not bound to take cognizance, it is not an authority for saying that the Magistrate should not take cognizance and should always direct investigation of the offence before taking cognizance. On the other hand, as pointed out by the later decision of the Supreme Court in Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi v. Ramkali1, the Magistrate is bound under section 190 (1) (b) to take cognizance of any cognizable offence brought to his notice. He has no discretion in the matter, otherwise, this section violates Article 14 of the Constitution. 31. The learned Counsel relied on the following observations of the Supreme Court in Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh2. After referring to section 190 it was observed: “It is clear from the wording of the section that the intention of the proceedings against a person commences on the cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate under one of the three contingencies mentioned in the section. The first contingency evidently is in respect of non-cognizable offences as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, on the complaint of an aggrieved person. The second is on a police report, which evidently is the case of a cognizable offence when the police have completed their investigation and come to the Magistrate for the issue of a process. The third is when the Magistrate himself takes notice of an offence and issues the process.” From the remarks it is argued that section 190 (1) (a) refers only to non-cognizable offences brought to the notice of the Magistrate on the complaint of an aggrieved person. These observations were made in connection with a contention that the Magistrate can issue a warrant only after taking cognizance of offence under section 190, Criminal Procedure Code. It was held that the stage at which a warrant is asked for under the proviso to section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is not on cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate. Hence the absence of sanction at that stage would not render all the subsequent proceedings illegal, even though the requisite sanction was obtained before the case eventually taken cognizance of by the Magistrate. The observations quoted cannot be taken to mean that the Supreme Court was of the view that section 190 (1) (a) applies only to non-cognizable offences. 32. Hence the absence of sanction at that stage would not render all the subsequent proceedings illegal, even though the requisite sanction was obtained before the case eventually taken cognizance of by the Magistrate. The observations quoted cannot be taken to mean that the Supreme Court was of the view that section 190 (1) (a) applies only to non-cognizable offences. 32. As I have not been able to agree even on the merits with any of the new points urged now before me, which were not urged either in the writ petition or in the writ appeal, the question whether a failure to consider these contentions in the writ appeal would justify a review, is really academic. 33. In the result, the petition for review is dismissed. No Costs. 34. In Crl.M.P. No. 1627 of 1972 to quash the proceedings in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 the same contentions which have been set out above have been raised. As I have dealt with those contentions in detail in the review petition, it is not necessary to deal with them again. 35. It was however, argued on behalf of the petitioner that though, in the review petition, it may not be open to the petitioner to urge again the question whether sanction of the Government under section 197 was necessary, it is open to urge the same in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition filed for quashing the proceedings in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 and particularly the order, dated 13th January, 1972. 36. As far as the complaint before the Magistrate and the original order dated 15th October, 1971 are concerned, they were challenged in the writ petition and in the writ appeal. As that was dismissed and this Court observed that the question of sanction may be raised at a later stage of the proceedings again, I do not think it is permissible for the petitioner to question the same order once again in a petition for quashing under section 561-A. Further, the petitioner also filed Crl.M.P. No. 1416 of 1972, under section 561-A itself to quash the order dated 15th October, 1971 and the complaint and that was dismissed. Any further attempt on the part of the petitioner to challenge the same order once again in proceedings under section 561-A cannot be permitted. Any further attempt on the part of the petitioner to challenge the same order once again in proceedings under section 561-A cannot be permitted. Hence though the petition is for quashing the entire proceedings in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 it is to be limited only to the quashing of the order dated 13th January, 1972 which was not the subject-matter of either Writ Appeal or the Criminal M.P.No. 1416 of 1972. 37. In the writ appeal this Court observed that it was open to the appellant to raise the question whether the sanction was necessary or not when adequate material was placed before the Magistrate. The question for consideration is whether any further adequate material has been placed before the Magistrate to enable him to come to a different conclusion from what he had reached earlier. It is admitted that except the affidavit filed in the writ petition and the grounds of appeal, and the orders in the writ petition and the writ appeal, no further material was placed before the Magistrate. In those circumstances, I am of the view the position is not in any way different from what it was before the accused appeared, except that his Counsel was in a position to place his contentions before the Magistrate regarding the complaint. The Magistrate again after arguments of the petitioner came to the same conclusion that on the allegations contained in the complaint, the sanction was necessary under section 197. He also observed that the petition raising the contention relating to sanction filed immediately after the disposal of the writ appeal without progress in the case would appear to be premature. For the reasons above stated I am m agreement with the Magistrate. 38. Since, however, elaborate arguments were addressed on both sides as to whether the sanction of the Government was necessary in the instant case, and a number of decisions were cited, I shall briefly deal with that connection. 39. Under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, the question for consideration is whether the officer concerned is alleged to have committed any offence while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. 39. Under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, the question for consideration is whether the officer concerned is alleged to have committed any offence while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. It is therefore, clear that in the first instance the Magistrate has to take only into account the allegations regarding the offence complained to have been committed, and then come to a conclusion whether they were committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The interpretation of the expression while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty has been the subject of innumerable decisions, including that of the Supreme Court. I do not think it is necessary at this stage to refer to all these decisions. It is sufficient to refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in B.P. Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra1. It was pointed out that this expression should neither be too narrowly construed, nor too widely. If it is construed narrowly as to mean only acts which strictly come within the discharge of official duty, then the section would be rendered meaningless, for it can never be a part of the official duty to commit an offence. On the other hand if too wide a construction is adopted, it would mean, even acts which do not ordinarily come within the discharge of official duty, are protected under this section merely because they are purported to be done while discharging the duties. The proper construction is therefore, that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty and the act must hear such relation to the duty that the accused can lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of performance of his duty. Vide Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari2, and rik Singh v. State of Pepsu1. As has been observed in many of these decisions, the principle is well understood, but the difficulty lies in its application to the facts of a given case. In B. P. Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra2, it was pointed out that the question whether a particular act is done by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty is substantially one of fact and has to be determined on the circumstances of each case. In B. P. Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra2, it was pointed out that the question whether a particular act is done by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty is substantially one of fact and has to be determined on the circumstances of each case. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that even a reading of the complaint alone makes it clear that the alleged acts were done by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, namely, the investigation into an offence, the search of the petitioner’s premises, taking him to a police station, the questioning of the petitioner in connection with an offence etc It was argued that even assuming that the petitioner had exceeded his powers while discharging or purporting to discharge his duty, it would still be an act done while discharging the duty or purporting to discharge the duty. It was stated in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu1, that sanction is necessary irrespective of whether it was in fact a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, would have to be investigated at the trial. It was again observed in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari3, that it does not matter even if the act exceeds what is necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage, when the trial proceeds on the merits. Though there is force in the contention of the petitioner, I am bound by the judgment in the writ appeal where, it was observed that it would be open to raise this question again before the Magistrate when he appeared before him and the Magistrate may decide it when adequate material is placed before him. As no further material was placed before the Magistrate, I do not propose to interfere with the order of the Magistrate at this stage. 40. The petitioner, after leading evidence with reference to the nature of his duties, and the circumstances under which the alleged acts were committed according to him, is entitled to request the Magistrate to consider whether the matter was one which requires the sanction of the Government. 41. The Petition is dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Petition dismissed.