Order.-The only point that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution instituted by the complainant is barred by limitation. 2. The second respondent herein who is the President and Executive Authority of Melakkal Panchayat filed a complaint under section 182 (3) of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act (hereinafter called the Act), against Nagarathinam, the petitioner herein, who is the Ex-President for having failed to hand over charge to the complainant even after a demand was made by notice to him. 3. The petitioner is the ex-President of Melakkal Panchayat. There was an election in 1970. The second respondent was elected as President of the Panchayat Board. He took oath as President on 2nd August, 1970. The petitioner failed to hand over the documents and other properties vested in the Panchayat Board to the second respondent who was his successor or to any other prescribed authority. But, however, it appears that the petitioner filed a suit in Thirumangalam District Munsif’s Court for a declaration that the election of the second respondent was not valid. He also filed an interlocutory application in the said suit praying for an injunction restraining the second respondent from taking charge as Panchayat President. That petition was dismissed. In the meanwhile the second respondent sent two letters, dated 2nd August, 1970 and 17th September, 1970 to the Commissioner of the Panchayat requesting him to direct the appellant to hand over charge of the documents and the properties belonging to the Panchayat to him. On 28th September, 1970, P.W.2, Venkatasamy, the Extension Officer, Panchayat Union, Vadiapatty, sent a notice to the petitioner requesting him to hand over charge of the Panchayat to the second respondent. The petitioner sent a reply on 30th September, 1970 stating that the suit filed by him before the District Munsif questioning the validity of the election of the second respondent as President of the Panchayat was pending and that, therefore, the second respondent was not entitled to ask the petitioner to hand over charge. Another notice was sent by the second respondent to the petitioner on 3rd October, 1970 asking him to hand over charge. As the petitioner failed to hand over charge, the complaint was filed by the second respondent on 2nd December, 1970. 4. Another notice was sent by the second respondent to the petitioner on 3rd October, 1970 asking him to hand over charge. As the petitioner failed to hand over charge, the complaint was filed by the second respondent on 2nd December, 1970. 4. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner in the lower Court that the prosecution was barred by limitation as the complaint was not filed within three months of the commission of the offence within the meaning of section 166 of the Act. It was contended that the date of the commission of the offence in this case was on 2nd August, 1970 when the second respondent assumed charge as the President of Melakkal Panchayat after taking oath. It was further contended that as the complaint was admittedly filed on 2nd December, 1970 about four months after the commission of the offence, it was not maintainable. It was also contended that no notice of demand is necessary, that the limitation cannot be reckoned from the date of the notice and that the offence under section 182 (3) of the Act is not a continuing offence. 5. The learned Sub-Magistrate held that the offence was committed when the notice of demand was made, which was on 28th September, 1970, and the limitation would run only from the date and therefore, the filing of the complaint on 2nd December, 1970 would be within three months from the date of the offence and the prosecution was not barred by limitation. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decision in Veeraswamy Reddy v. Soma Ramayya1, before the Sub-Magistrate in support of his contention that the commission of the offence under section 182 (3) of the Act has to be reckoned from the date when the successor to the office had taken charge. This decision was of course not considered by the learned Sub-Magistrate though he merely cited it. But, however, the learned Sub-Magistrate followed the principle laid down in Ramachandra Reddy, In re2, which was a decision rendered under section 347 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. 7. This decision was of course not considered by the learned Sub-Magistrate though he merely cited it. But, however, the learned Sub-Magistrate followed the principle laid down in Ramachandra Reddy, In re2, which was a decision rendered under section 347 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. 7. Sri T.S. Arunachalam, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner while reiterating the contentions raised by the petitioner in the lower Court specifically stressed that no notice of demand is provided under section 182 (3) of the Act, and the offence under section 182 (3) is committed if the outgoing officer fails to hand over charge to the successor immediately after the period of the outgoing Officer expires. 8. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 182 (3) of the Act is as follows: "(3) Any person who having been the President, temporary President or Vice-President of a Panchayat or the Chairman, temporary Chairman or Vice-Chairman of a Panchayat Union Council fails to hand over any documents of or any money or other properties vested in or belonging to, the Panchayat or Panchayat Union Council, which are in or have come into his possession or control, to his successor-in-office or other prescribed authority- (a) in every case as soon as his term of office as such President, temporary President or Vice-President or as such Chairman, temporary Chairman or Vice-Chairman expires: (b) in the case of a person who was the Vice-President also on demand by the President; and (c) in the case of a person who was the Vice-Chairman also on demand by the Chairman, shall be punishable with fine not exceeding one thousand rupees for every such offence". Section 166 of the Act reads thus: "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act; no person shall be tried for any offence against this Act or any rule or by-law made thereunder unless complaint is made within three months of the commission of the offence by the police, the executive authority, the Panchayat Union Council, the Commissioner or a person expressly authorized in this behalf by the Panchayat, Panchayat Union Council, executive authority or commissioner but nothing herein shall affect the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act V of 1898), in regard to the power of certain Magistrates to take cognizance of the offences, upon information received or upon their own knowledge or suspicion: Provided that failure to take out a licence or obtain permission under this Act shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a continuing offence until the expiration of the period, if any for which the licence or permission is required and if no period is specified, complaint may be made at any time within twelve months from the commencement of the offence". It is clearly stated in section 166 of the Act that the prosecution should be instituted within three months of the commission of the offence and that the failure to take out a licence or to obtain permission, shall be deemed to be a continuing offence. Failure to hand over charge under section 182 (3) cannot be deemed to be continuing offence as the proviso to section 165 does not include failure to hand over charge as a continuing offence. 9. It is clear from sub-clauses (h) and (c) of clause (3) of section 182 that the Vice-President or Vice-Chairman as the case may be shall hand over charge on demand by the President or the Chairman. In sub-clause (a) of clause (3), no provision is made for the demand. While the Legislature has made the provision for demand so far as Vice-President of the Panchayat and Vice-Chairman of the Panchayat Union are concerned, it has deliberately omitted to make a provision for demand by successor-in-office or prescribed authority in subclause (a). It is, therefore, clear that so far as sub-clause (a) is concerned, no demand is necessary and, therefore, the failure to hand over charge by the outgoing President to the successor in office does not depend upon the demand by the successor-in-office. It is, therefore, clear that so far as sub-clause (a) is concerned, no demand is necessary and, therefore, the failure to hand over charge by the outgoing President to the successor in office does not depend upon the demand by the successor-in-office. On this point, the learned Sub-Magistrate was wrong in holding that the offence was committed when a notice of demand was made and that the limitation has to be reckoned from the date of the notice of demand. 10. But the real question is as to when the offence is deemed to be committed and as to how the limitation has to be reckoned. The words used in subclause (a) are "in every case as soon as his term of office........expires". The implication and the purport of the words "as soon as" have a bearing in considering the point raised by the learned Counsel. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that on the expiry of the term of office the charge should be handed over by the outgoing officer. It cannot be so, If that was the intention of the Legislature, it would have used words "on the expiry of the term of office“. If such words were there, one can understand that irrespective of anything happening, the outgoing officer must hand over charge on the expiry of his term of office. I am of the view that the Legislature has not used such words, namely,”on the expiry of the term of office“, realising the several difficulties in directing the outgoing officer to hand over charge on the expiry of his term of office. Even though the term of office of the outgoing officer may expire, there may not be a successor in office, on the expiry of the term of office of the outgoing officer, to whom the charge has to be handed over or in a particular case, the prescribed authority may not be available for handing over charge, say for instance, such prescribed officer is on leave or that office is temporarily vacant. 11. 11. In the foregoing circumstances, can it be said in the absence of a successor in office or a prescribed authority, that if the outgoing officer does not hand over charge on the expiry of his term of office, he is committing an offence and that the limitation has to be reckoned from the date of the expiry of the term of office of the out-going officer? It cannot be. There may be several circumstances which may prevent the outgoing officer to hand over charge on the expiry of his term of office. Therefore, in this context, we have to consider the implication and the purport of the words”as soon as“used in sub-clause (a) of clause (3) of section 182. The words”as soon as“are more or less synonymous or equivalent to the words such as”as soon as“possible; as soon as practicable”. The words “as soon as” generally mean “immediately after the event happens’ in contradistinction to”at the time the event happens“or”on the happening of the event“. The words”as such as possible“or”as soon as practicable“had come for consideration in judicial decisions. 12. In the decision in Hydraulic Engineering Company v. McHaffie1 it was held that the words”as soon as possible“would mean, to do it within a reasonable time, with an undertaking to do it in the shortest practicable time. The following observation made by Bramwell, L.J., in the said decision is worth noting: ”I quite agree that a manufacturer or tradesman is not bound to discard all other work for the occasion, in order to take in hand a thing which he promises to do “as soon as possible”; for instances, a tailor, who accepts an order to make a coat “as soon as possible” need not put down a half-made vest in order to begin that coat; every customer knows at the time of giving the order that the manufacturer or tradesman may have other orders on hand......” 13. In the decision in Anglo-American Oil Company Limited v. Port of London Authority2 it was held that the expression ‘‘shipped again as soon as practicable” means shipped again in the ordinary course of navigation and having regard to the facilities of the port, and does not mean “shipped again as soon as practicable having regard to the convenience of the merchant’s business.” 14. Again in Verelst’s Administratrix v. Moror Union Insurance Company3 the scope of the words “as soon as possible” came up for consideration. It may be relevant to note briefly the facts of the case to understand the circumstances under which the“meaning of these words are considered. 15. The policy of insurance covering the death of the insured by accident contained the following condition: ‘‘In case of any accident, injury, damage or loss......the insured or the insured’s representatives for the time being shall give notice ...... in writing to the head office of the company of such accident, injury, damage or loss as soon as possible after it has come to the knowledge of the insured or of the insured’s representative for the time being”. During the currency of the policy, the insured was killed in a motor accident in India on 14th January, 1923. Knowledge of her death reached her personal representative in England within a month. The personal representative did not know of the existence of the policy of insurance till January, 1924. Notice was given to the Insurance Company as soon as possible thereafter. The Insurance Company repudiated the liability on the ground that notice was not given “as soon as possible” within the meaning of the condition. It was held on the facts of the case that in considering whether the notice was given “as soon as possible”‘within the meaning of the condition, all existing circumstances must be taken into account, including the available means of knowledge of the insured’s personal representative of the existence of the policy and the identity of the insurance company. This decision follows the principle laid down in the decision in Hydraulic Engineering Company v. McHaffie1 and agrees with the observation made by Cotton, L.J., in the said decision, namely, “by the words ‘as soon as possible’ the defendants must be taken to have meant that they would make the ‘gun’ as quickly as it could be made in largest establishment with the best appliances”. The principle laid down in these decisions would show that the interpretation of the words ‘as soon as’ or ‘as soon as possible’ would depend upon the existing circumstances of each case and that these circumstances have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of considering the scope and meaning of those words in a given case. 16. The principle laid down in these decisions would show that the interpretation of the words ‘as soon as’ or ‘as soon as possible’ would depend upon the existing circumstances of each case and that these circumstances have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of considering the scope and meaning of those words in a given case. 16. On the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the revision petitioner had knowledge that though the second respondent had been elected as his successor, his successor assumed charge on 2nd August, 1970 itself. It is not known as to when the suit was filed by the revision petitioner to set aside the election of the second respondent as the President of the Panchayat. From the records, we find that the petitioner must have come to know about the second respondent having assumed charge when he received the letter from P.W.2. Venkataswamy, the Extension Officer on 28th September, 1970 asking him to hand over charge to the second respondent. It is the case of the prosecution that the revision petitioner had not handed over charge even after he came to know, about the second respondent having assumed charge, from the letter sent by P.W.2 to the revision petitioner. In these circumstances it would be reasonable to hold that the petitioner has committed the offence of failure to hand over charge to his successor some time after 28th September, 1970, but in any event, on 30th September, 1970 when the revision petitioner sent a reply stating that he had filed a suit before the District Munsif questioning the validity of the election and that, therefore the second respondent was not entitled to ask him to hand over charge. If the offence was committed either on 28th September, 1970 or 30th September, 1970, the complaint which was filed by the second respondent on 2nd December, 1970 will be well within time as by that time, the period of three months had not expired. I am, therefore, of the view that the prosecution was laid within time and it was not barred by limitation. 17. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision in Veeraswamy Reddi v. Soma Ramayya,2 rendered by Chandra Reddy, J., as he then was. I am, therefore, of the view that the prosecution was laid within time and it was not barred by limitation. 17. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision in Veeraswamy Reddi v. Soma Ramayya,2 rendered by Chandra Reddy, J., as he then was. While holding that the offence of failure to hand over the properties to the successor in office by the out-going Officer is not a continuing offence he held that section 103 of the Madras Village Panchayats Act which is in pari materia with section 166 of the Act being a mandatory one, failure to launch a prosecution within three months of the commission of the offence, vitiates the proceedings. In the case, unfortunately, the scope and implication of the words, “as soon as” used in section 116 (3) (a) of the Madras Village Panchayat Act, 1950, the provisions of which are in pari materia with provisions in section 182 (3) (a) of the Panchayat Act was not considered. This decision, therefore, is not of any help. 18. The other decision cited by the Magistrate namely, Ramachandra Reddy, In re.1 for the view that the limitation has to be reckoned from the time the notice of demand was made and the failure so comply with such demand, does not require consideration as that was a decision rendered under section 347 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. This decision has no bearing to the facts of this case. 19. In the result, the conviction is confirmed. But so far as the sentence is concerned, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, I reduce the sentence of fine to Rs. 50 in default to undergo R.I. for two weeks. The excess fine, if paid, will be refunded to the petitioner. 20. This petition in the result is dismissed with the modification mentioned above.