D. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THIS application raises a question of construction of sub-sec. (2a) of sec. 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the Code ) in respect of the powers of the High Court if any to order a person to whom a certificate under Article 134 has not been granted by the High Court to be released on bail in order to enable him to move the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. The applicants who were original accused Nos. 1 and 3 were convicted by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class at Broach of offences punishable under sec. 135 (b) of the customs Act 1962 and sec. 8 read with sec. 85 of the Gold (Control) Act 1968 and were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment a d fine. Their appeal to the Sessions Court against this order of conviction and sentence failed; and therefore they came to this Court in revision. That was Criminal Revision Application No. 493 3f 1971. That application came for hearing before me on July 12 1972 and the same was dismissed so far as the present applicants were concerned. On July 17 1972 the applicants sought stay of the execution of the warrant of arrest in order to enable them to move this Court for a certificate under Article 134 of the Constitution. On that application I passed an order staying execution of the warrant of arrest till August 7 1972 Meanwhile petition of both the petitioners for certificate under Article 134 came up for appropriate orders before myself and Mr. Justice M. P. Thakkar on August 2 1972 We refused the certificate on that day. Therefore this application is now filed praying that time granted to the petitioners for surrendering to the authorities by my order dated 17-7-1972 may be extended by two weeks. On this petition question arose whether in a case like this where a certificate has been refused by a Division Bench of this High Court the High Court has power to release the petitioners on bail under sub-sec. (2a) of sec. 426 of the Code till the petitioners lodge an application for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Mr. (2a) of sec. 426 of the Code till the petitioners lodge an application for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Mr. R. D. Vyas the learned advocate for the petitioners made it clear at the time of arguments that he is confining his claim to the relief prayed for in the present petition to sub-sec. (2a) of sec. 426 only; and that obviously sub-sec. (2b) of sec. 426 will not apply to the present case because the certificate has been refused by the High Court. ( 2 ) BEFORE proceeding to judgment I had enquired of Mr. Vyas whether he would like to take a decision from this Court on the scope of subsec. (2a) of sec. 426 of the Code which would be a precedent requiring consideration in future. He it appears was inclined to take a decision of this Court. ( 3 ) FOR the purpose of determining this question it has been assumed by me that an application of this nature purporting to be under subsec. (2a) of sec. 426 of the Code can be dealt with by a Single Judge notwithstanding the fact that a certificate under Article 134 has been refused by the Division Bench. It is on that assumption that I proceed to decide the question raised before me. ( 4 ) SUB-SEC. (2a) of sec. 426 reads:-WHEN any person other than a person convicted of a non-bailable offence is sentenced to imprisonment by a court and an appeal lies from that sentence the court may if the convicted person satisfies the court that he intends to present an appeal order that he be released on bail for a period sufficient in the opinion of the court to enable him to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub-sec. (1) and the sentence of imprisonment shall so long as he is so released on bail be deemed to be suspended. ( 5 ) TWO questions arise on a bare reading of the provisions of subsec. (2a) reproduced above; and they are interconnected viz. (1) whether the appellate Court mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 426 of the Code is the appellate court contemplated by the provisions of appeal occurring in Chapter XXXI of the Code ? ( 5 ) TWO questions arise on a bare reading of the provisions of subsec. (2a) reproduced above; and they are interconnected viz. (1) whether the appellate Court mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 426 of the Code is the appellate court contemplated by the provisions of appeal occurring in Chapter XXXI of the Code ? and (2) whether the expression and an appeal lies is confined to a right of appeal as conferred by the provisions of Chapter XXXI or is also referable to a right of appeal arising under any other law ? ( 6 ) ONE thing is clear. The object of ordering a person to be released on bail under sub-sec. (2a) is to enable him to obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub-sec. (1 ). Therefore the first question as posed above has arisen. Evidently Chapter XXXI provides for different forums in case of appeals and these forums are the High Court or the court of Sessions or a District Magistrate and only in one case contemplated by sec. 411a the Supreme Court. That section reads:-411a. (1) Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction may notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 418 or sec. 423 sub-sec. (2) or in the Letters Patent or law by which the High Court is constituted or continued appeal to the High Court:- (A) against the conviction on any ground of appeal which involves a matter of law only; (B) with the leave of the appellate Court or upon the certificate of the judge who tried the case that it is a fit case for appeal against the conviction on any ground of appeal and (C) with the leave of the appellate Court against the sentence passed unless the sentence is one fixed by law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 417 the State Government day direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from any order of acquittal passed by the High Court in the exercise original criminal jurisdiction and such appeal may notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 418 or sec. 423 sub-sec. (2) or in the Letters Patent or law by which the High Court is constituted or continued but subject to the restrictions imposed by clause (b) and clause (c) of sub-sec. 418 or sec. 423 sub-sec. (2) or in the Letters Patent or law by which the High Court is constituted or continued but subject to the restrictions imposed by clause (b) and clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) of this section on an appeal against a conviction lie on a matter of fact as well as a matter of law. (3) Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any Act or Regulation an appeal under this section shall be heard by a Division Court of the High Court composed of not less than two Judges being Judges other than the judge or judges by whom the original trial was held; and if the constitution of such a Division Court is impracticable the High Court shall report the circumstances to the State Government which shall take action with a view to the transfer of the appeal under sec. 527 to another High Court. (4) Subject to such rules as may from time to time be made by the Supreme Court in this behalf and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any order made on appeal under sub-sec. (1) by a Division Court of the High Court in respect of which order the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for such appeal. SEC. 411a is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is applicable only where a trial is held by the High Court in exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction. A person convicted on such trial is given a right of appeal to Division Bench of the High Court composed of not less than two judges and a further right of appeal from the order made by the Division Bench to the Supreme Court is conferred in a case where the High Court certifies that the case is fit one for appeal. Having provided for the forum of appeal sec. 419 of that Chapter lays down inter alia that every appeal shall be made in the form of a petition in writing. The expression Appellate Court occurrs in secs. 420 to 424 428 and 430. This expression occurring in those sections means an appellate Court to which a petition of appeal has been made under Chapter XXXI. The meaning of the expression Appellate Court in secs. 420 to 424 is quite clear. The expression Appellate Court occurrs in secs. 420 to 424 428 and 430. This expression occurring in those sections means an appellate Court to which a petition of appeal has been made under Chapter XXXI. The meaning of the expression Appellate Court in secs. 420 to 424 is quite clear. The question which then arises is what is the reason for giving a different meaning to the same expression used in sec. 426 (1) of the Code? The normal presumption is that the Legislature uses the same word in the same sense when dealing with a particular topic and making provisions in connection therewith. In the present case the topic dealt with by the Legislature under Chapter XXXI is a topic of right of appeal the forum to which appeal can be made and the procedure to be followed by the appellate Court. There is no indication in sec. 426 or at any other place to rebut this normal presumption. ( 7 ) THE expression and an appeal lies from that sentence would also mean an appeal which would lie under the provisions of Chapter XXXI. ( 8 ) MR. Vyas for the petitioners drew my attention to sec. 404 of the Code which reads:-NO appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force. HE submitted that the appeal under any other law for the time being in force is also contemplated by the Code. This section only lays down that there should be no right of appeal from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court unless it is provided for by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force. This provision has therefore no relevance on the construction of the expression and an appeal lies from the sentence. ( 9 ) MR. Vyas then contended that liberal interpretation should be given to the words appellate Court occurring in sec. 426 (1) of the Code and that the Supreme Court would be an appellate Court contemplated by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 426. A logical consequence of acceptance of this contention is that power to release a convicted person on bail by the Supreme Court can be found in sec. 426 only. 426 (1) of the Code and that the Supreme Court would be an appellate Court contemplated by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 426. A logical consequence of acceptance of this contention is that power to release a convicted person on bail by the Supreme Court can be found in sec. 426 only. Now Article 145 of the Constitution provides that subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament the Supreme Court may make Rules with the approval of the President for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the court in respect of various items enumerated in clauses (a) to (j) of Article 145 (1 ). One of the topics on which the Supreme Court can make Rules is to be found in clause (g) which reads:- rule as to the granting of wail. Rule 27 of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 reads:-27 Pending the disposal of any appeal under these rules the court may order that the execution of the sentence or order a pealed against be stayed on such terms as the court may think fit. EVIDENTLY this would show that the appellate Court contemplated by sec. 426 (1) is an appellate Court as contemplated in Chapter XXXI of the Code and would not include the Supreme Court because a specific provision has been made with regard to the granting of bail by the Supreme Court under the aforesaid Article 145 and the Rules of the Supreme Court. Rule 6 of Order 21 Supreme Court Rules reads as under :-6 Where the petitioner has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment the petition shall state whether the petitioner has surrendered. Where the petitioner has not surrendered to the sentence the petition shall not be posted for hearing unless the court on a written application for the purpose orders to the contrary. Where the petition is accompanied by such an application the application and the petition shall be posted together before the Court. THIS rule also gives an indication that the normal procedure for obtaining an order on the petition for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is that the petition should surrender to the sentence. Where the petition is accompanied by such an application the application and the petition shall be posted together before the Court. THIS rule also gives an indication that the normal procedure for obtaining an order on the petition for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is that the petition should surrender to the sentence. This would be consistent with the attempt on the part of the Legislature to see that a person whose sentence has been maintained by the High Court and who has been refused a certificate under Article 134 does not remain at large and surrenders to his sentence. The fact that sub-sec. (2b) of sec. 426 of the Code provides only for one category of cases where the person whose sentence has been maintained by the High Court can be released on bail is also consistent with the aforesaid intention of the Legislature. If a person whose prayer for certificate under Article 134 was refused can be granted bail under sub-sec. (2a) there was no need to make provision for only one category in sub-sec. (2b) because by the terms of subsec. (2a) that category also will be covered. This if sub-sec. (2a) is given the meaning contended for on behalf of the petitioners it would also enable the court to grant bail to a person who has been granted a certificate under Article 134 as well as to a person who has been refused that certificate. It appears however that by enacting sub-sec. (2b) the Legislature wanted to make provision for grant of bail in case of a particular category only because there was no other enabling provision under which the High Court can grant bail in the Code. ( 10 ) MR. Vyas referred to certain observations made in In re. Madanlal A. I. R. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 622 (page 625 para 13 ). These observations may be reproduced :-IT will be seen that a power intended to be normally exercised by the higher appellate Court was given to the High Court as a measure of necessity. The expres sion appellate Court has not been defined in the Cr. P. C. ; it obviously means a court taking cognizance of appeals. After the Constitution the Supreme Court takes cognizance of appeals in Criminal matters from High Courts. The expres sion appellate Court has not been defined in the Cr. P. C. ; it obviously means a court taking cognizance of appeals. After the Constitution the Supreme Court takes cognizance of appeals in Criminal matters from High Courts. Order XXI Rule 15 of the Supreme Court Rules specifically provides for the Supreme Court ordering stay of execution of the sentence or order appealed against in criminal matters. IT was urged that in view of these observations the Supreme Court is an appellate Court. The attempt is to show that these observations apply to the present case. The question that arose for decision by Andhra Pradesh High Court in that case was whether under sub-sec. (2b) of sec. 426 of the Code bail can be granted to a person who has been granted a certificate contemplated under Article 134 of the Constitution. The contention before the High Court was that sub-sec. (2b) only contemplates cases of special leave to be granted by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The learned single Judge who decided that case refused to accept this contention and gave meaning of the expression special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court also to include grant of certificate by the High Court under Article 134 of the Constitution. All the same the case was dealt with under sub-sec. (2b) because the certificate was granted in that case under Article 134. In the present case certificate has been refused by this court. Therefore the view of sec. (2b) taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid case does not arise for consideration in the instant case. ( 11 ) IT was laid down by the Privy Council in Jairam Das v. Emperor A. I. R. 1945 Privy Council 94 that Chapter 39 of the Code together with sec. 426 contains a complete and exhaustive statement of the powers of High Court in India to grant bail and excludes the existence of any additional inherent power in a High Court relating to the subject of bail. If therefore the provisions of sub-sec. (2a) of sec. 426 contains a complete and exhaustive statement of the powers of High Court in India to grant bail and excludes the existence of any additional inherent power in a High Court relating to the subject of bail. If therefore the provisions of sub-sec. (2a) of sec. 426 did not apply there is no other provision in the Code which in view of the law laid down by the Privy Council as to the power of the High Court would apply in the present case; nor is it submitted on behalf of the petitioners that any other provision would apply. As observed in the beginning the contentions are restricted to sub-sec. (2a) of sec. 426 only. ( 12 ) IT appears that in no decided cases cited at the bar sub-sec. (2a) of sec. 426 came up for interpetation and in all cases the question arose for determination under sub-sec. (2b ). Looking to the language of sec. 426 and the context and purpose for which that provision has been made it is not possible to agree with the contention of Mr. Vyas that in a case where certificate has been refused by the High Court under Article 134 of the Constitution powers can be exercised by the High Court under subsec. (2a) of sec. 426 of the Code because the appellate Court pending whose orders these interim orders are to be obtained is the appellate Court as contemplated by Chapter XXXI of the Code only. ( 13 ) IN this view of the matter the application fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged. .