Judgement ORDER:- This civil revision is directed against an order of the learned District Judge setting aside an earlier order of the learned Assistant District Judge whereby he had set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code. 2. It is said that there was a usufructuary mortgage decree, in execution of which a plot of seven lessas of land was old in public auction. The sale was held on 5th August, 1969, and the judgment-debtor had applied to the court earlier on 1st August, 1969, to allow him to deposit the amount. The court naturally did not accept the prayer and held the sale on the appointed date. On 1st September, 1969, the judgment-debtor made an application to the court to allow him to deposit the decretal costs and to let him know what the exact amount was. It appears from the original petition that the court allowed the prayer after the amount was checked by the office. The amount given by the office was Rs.1070.31 which, on being informed by the court, was deposited by the judgment-debtor on 2nd September, 1969. This amount was paid by the judgment-debtor on the bona fide belief that that was the sole amount which was required for the purpose of deposit under Order 21, Rule 89, so that the sale would be set aside. Since the learned Assistant District Judge allowed his prayer to deposit this amount, he had made the deposit. Later, it was found that he had not deposited five per cent of the purchase money which was due to the auction-purchaser as interest. The deficiency represented a sum of Rs.37.50 which was deposited by him on 19th November, 1969. The Assistant District Judge accepting the plea of good faith, set aside the sale on 5th January, 1970 after rejecting the objection of the auction-purchaser on the score of late deposit of the interest. Hence the auction-purchaser took the matter in appeal to the learned District Judge, who passed the impugned order in his favour. 3. It is admitted by both the courts that the amount was paid by the judgment-debtor on being calculated by the courts office. Hence the auction-purchaser took the matter in appeal to the learned District Judge, who passed the impugned order in his favour. 3. It is admitted by both the courts that the amount was paid by the judgment-debtor on being calculated by the courts office. The learned District Judge held that as there was no authorised clerk to do such a nature of job of helping a judgment-debtor in knowing the exact amount for deposit, this information which was given by the court was not an authorised information and, therefore, the judgment-debtor could not take benefit of this. He further held that under Order 21, Rule 89, it is the entire obligation of the judgment-debtor to pay five per cent of the purchase money under Order 21, Rule 89(1)(a) and also whatever is required under (b) of that sub-rule. The matter would have been different if courts act had not intervened. Here is a case in which a litigant, rightly or wrongly, approached the court by making a stamped petition for assistance to ascertain the amount which are required to be paid by him in order that the sale could be set aside. When, on such an application, the court informs a particular amount which the Judgment-debtor pays, even though that amount may not be the actual amount the judgment-debtor should not or the wrong information furnished by the Court. No litigant should suffer for any act of the court and whatever the wrong the first Court, in this case, itself remedied it. If any authority is necessary for this proposition, I may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 1631 (Jang Singh v. Brij Lal). "It is, therefore, quite clear that if there was a error the court and its officers largely contributed to it. It is no doubt true that a litigant must be vigilant and take care but where a litigant goes to Court and asks for the assistance of the Court so that his obligations under a decree might be fulfilled by him strictly, it is incumbent on the Court, if it does not leave the litigant to his own devices, to ensure that the correct information is furnished. If the Court in supplying the information makes a mistake the responsibility of the litigant, though it does not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the Court in supplying the information makes a mistake the responsibility of the litigant, though it does not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the litigant acts on the faith of that information the Courts cannot hold him responsible for a mistake which it itself caused. There is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Courts should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly summed up in the maxim: "Actus curiae neminem gravabit." " There is a similar observation also In AIR 1961 SC 832 (Jagat Dhish v. Jawahar Lal), wherein the following appear: "In such a case there can be no doubt that the litigant deserves to be protected against the default committed or negligence shown by the Court or its officers in the discharge of their duties. As observed by Cairns, L.C. in Bodger v. Comptoir d Escompte de Paris, (1871) 3 PC 485 at p.475 as early as 1871 "one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors"; . . . . . . . . ". The learned District Judge has not made any reference to these decisions and the law propounded by the Supreme Court in a situation which is similar, as in the present case. There is, therefore, complete error of jurisdiction of the District Judge in not applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 4. The impugned order of the learned District Judge is set aside. The petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.