P. N. BHAGWATI, D. P. DESAI, M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THE short question that arises for determination in this appeal relates to the construction of a will date 30th September 1934 made by one Zaverbhai a resident of Surat. The question is what is the nature and quality of the interest granted under the will to Laxmi widow of Zaverbhai. Zaverbhai died on 18th October 1954 leaving him surviving his widow Laxmi and two sons and a daughter of his sister namely Shantilal Govind and Chhani. Shantilal was living with Zaverbhai at the time of his death and was looking after him and attending to his Deeds. The properties left by Zaverbhai consisted of certain movables about which there is now no controversy between the parties and an immovable property situate in the City of Surat. The disposition of these properties after his death was made by Zaverbhai by his Will dated 30th September 1954. The original will is in Gujarati language and we shall have occasion to refer to some of the Gujarati expressions used by Zaverbhai which have been the subject matter of controversy between the parties but without attempting to give a translation of those expressions at this stage we may for the time being refer to them in Gujarati and reproduce below an agreed translation of the relevant clauses of the will with those expressions retained in Gujarati. The agreed translation is as follows:-I Zaverbhai Narottamdas Caste Gola about 52 years occupation grain business residing at Begampura Golwad Surat hereby make my last will. . . . . . . In order to see that after my death there is no dispute with respect to my properties and that Vyavastha is done in respect thereof according to my wishes I hereby make this the last will which will come into force after my death. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) There has been separation from my brothers since a long time and I am separate from my brothers and nephews since long. I carry on my trade separately and I have no concern whatsoever with my brothers sons All of them separately carry on their respective trades and they are separate in every respect. (2) I have a wife by name Lakhami who is daughter of Ramu Megha. I have no issue. I carry on my trade separately and I have no concern whatsoever with my brothers sons All of them separately carry on their respective trades and they are separate in every respect. (2) I have a wife by name Lakhami who is daughter of Ramu Megha. I have no issue. I have my sisters sons viz. Shantilal Balubhai and Govan Balubhai and sisters daughter viz. Chhani. My sisters son Shantilal Balubhai is at present staying with me and is serving me. There is nobody else except the aforesaid persons in my near relations. (3) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (4) make my wife Lakhami to be full and sole Waras of the immovable property stated in para 3 above and of the entire movables including furniture ornaments goods of the trade etc. whatever may be situated therein and of the properties which I may acquire hereafter. After my death my wife Lakhami will obtain possession of all the movable and immovable properties by virtue of Malki Hak. And she can by Malki Hak do such Vyavastha in respect thereof according to her sweet will and desire. Nobody else can raise any dispute therein and even if any dispute is raised the same is void and of no effect by this (Will ). (5) I have closed my business because of my indifferent health. I have no debt to be paid. I have some outstanding recoveries. After my death my wife as Malik should recover the balance of my outstandings. If there are any debts my wife should repay the same after verifying the same. (6) After my death my sisters son Shantilal Balubhai will stay with my wife. If he improves his conduct and staying with my wife serves her and gives her satis faction then after my wifes death Shantilal will become Malik of Baki Reheti immovable and movable properties. But he will not be entitled to do any Vyavastha in respect of immovable property. After Shantilal his sons will become Malik thereof in equal shares. But I do not keep any right or claim of Shantilal during the lifetime of my wife. If Shantilal does not carry on well with my wife then after the death of my wife the sons of Shantilal shall be Malik of all my movable and immovable properties in equal shares and I do not keep any claim of Shantilal. But I do not keep any right or claim of Shantilal during the lifetime of my wife. If Shantilal does not carry on well with my wife then after the death of my wife the sons of Shantilal shall be Malik of all my movable and immovable properties in equal shares and I do not keep any claim of Shantilal. (7) If my sisters son Govind Balubhai has got any difficulties and if he is in need of money then my wife should give him the amount of Rs. 100. 00 to Rs. 150. 00 from my properties. My wife should also incur expenses which are required to be incurred in connection with my sisters daughter Chhanis visits. Shantilal should incur such expenditure after the death of my wife. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxxpursuant to the will Laxmi took possession of the movable and immovable properties left by Zaverbhai at the time of his death and enjoyed the same. Now it appears that Shantilal did not behave properly with Laxmi and made her extremely unhappy to such an extent that she was driven to file a suit against him for evicting him from the immovable property in which he was residing with her. We are not concerned with that litigation in the present appeal and we need not therefore say anything more about it. Suffice it to state that Laxmi was so dissatisfied with Shantilal that she made a will dated 9th April 1955 giving away all the movable; and immovable properties received by her from her deceased husband to Chhani. Laxmi also executed a deed of gift dated 25th January 1958 giving in favour of Chhani the immovable property acquired by her from her deceased husband. On the death of Laxmi on 20th March 1960 a question arose as to who was entitled to the movable and immovable properties left by Zaverbhai. Chhani claimed these properties under the will dated 9 April 1955 made by Laxmi and also founded her claim to the immovable property on the gift deed dated 25th January 1958 executed by Laxmi. Shantilal and his sons on the other hand laid a claim to the properties under the will of Zaverbhai and contended that on a proper construction of the will Laxmi had merely a life interest in the properties left by Zaverbhai and. Shantilal and his sons on the other hand laid a claim to the properties under the will of Zaverbhai and contended that on a proper construction of the will Laxmi had merely a life interest in the properties left by Zaverbhai and. she was not entitled to dispose them of either by gift or by will and on her death they came to Shantilal and his sons. Since Chhani tookover possession of the properties on the death of Laxmi Shantilal and his sons filed a suit against Chhani and the executors of the will of Laxmi for recovering possession of the properties and mesne profits. The trial Court held that Laxmi had an absolute interest in the properties left by Zaverbhai and the gift over of the residue of the properties on the death of Laxmi in favour of Shantilal and his sons was void as being repugnant to the absolute estate granted to her and being an absolute owner she was entitled to dispose of the properties inter vivos or by will and the will dated 9th April 1955 and the gift deed dated 25th January 1958 were therefore dispositions of property and by virtue of them Chhani was entitled to the properties left by Zaverbhai and Shantilal and his sons could not make any claim to those properties. The trial Court on this construction of the will dismissed the suit of Shantilal and his sons. This led to the filing of a First Appeal in this court. The Appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of J. M. Sheth and S. H. Sheth JJ. The learned Judges were divided in opinion on the construction of the will. J. M. Sheth J. was of the view that an absolute interest was granted to Laxmi in the movable and immovable properties left by Zaverbhai and the gift over of what remained at the death of Laxmi in favour of Shantilal and his sons was therefore void as being repugnant to the absolute estate granted to her and since she was entitled to an absolute estate she had full power of disposition inter vivos as well as by will and the gift deed dated 25th January 1958 were therefore valid and effective to pass title to the properties in favour of Chhani. The view taken by Mr. Justice S. H. Sheth was quite the opposite. The view taken by Mr. Justice S. H. Sheth was quite the opposite. He held that on a proper reading of Clauses (4) and (6) of the will the interest given to Laxmi was only a limited interest for the duration of her life and she had no right to dispose of any of the properties of Zaverbhai either inter vivos or by will and both the will dated 9th April 1955 and the gift deed dated 25th January 1958 were therefore invalid and ineffective and did not confer any title to the properties on Chhani. The conclusion reached by the learned Judge was that on the death of Laxmi her life interest came to an end and the properties left by Zaverbhai came to Shantilal as a life tenant in any event to the sons of Shantilal as owners in equal shares. There was thus a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges on the construction of the will and the point on which they differed was formulated by them in the following terms:there is difference of opinion between us on the question whether the Will Ex. 49 confers upon Bai Laxmi only a life estate in the property of her husband Zaverbhai and it vests absolute remainder in Shantilals sons plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 6 or whether the first bequest which was in favour of Bai Laxmi was a bequest of an absolute estate in favour of the wife with all powers of disposition and eventually any directions given to tie down the future devolution in favour of Shantilals sons plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 6 would be repugnant to it and cannot be given effect to it legally and eventually they have got to be ignored. THE case was then heard on this point by Mr. Justice Divan who was assigned this work by me as a Chief Justice under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent. Divan J. found himself unable to agree with the view taken by either of the two learned Judges. He preferred to take an intermidiate view namely that on a combined reading of Clauses (4) and (6) of the will Laxmi took a life interest in the movable and immovable properties left by Zaverbhai with power of disposition inter vivos but not by will. He preferred to take an intermidiate view namely that on a combined reading of Clauses (4) and (6) of the will Laxmi took a life interest in the movable and immovable properties left by Zaverbhai with power of disposition inter vivos but not by will. This intermediate view he thought would give full effect to all the clauses of the will and effectuate the manifest intention of Zaverbhai. But taking this intermediate view rendered the decision of the appeal under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent impossible since on this intermediate view there would be no majority opinion amongst the Judges in accordance with which the appeal could be decided. Divan J. therefore referred the matter to me as Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench and it is in these circumstances that the point on which J. M. Sheth and S. H. Sheth JJ. differed has now come up for decision before us sitting in Full Bench. ( 2 ) WHEN the present reference reached hearing before us Mr. Chhatrapati learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants raised a preliminary contention namely that the only point of difference between J. M. Sheth and S. H. Sheth JJ. was whether Laxmi had an absolute interest or a limited interest and the jurisdiction of Divan J. under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent was therefore confined only to deciding which of the two views on the point of difference was correct and he had no jurisdiction to entertain a new point as to whether Laxmi had power of disposition inter vivos. Now it is true that under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent a point which has not been urged before the Division Bench and on which the Judges composing the Division Bench have not differed cannot be urged before the Judge or Judges to whom the point in difference is referred but we do not see how such an objection can arise here in the present case. The point on which J. M. Sheth and S. H. Sheth JJ. differed was no doubt construction of the will but construction of the will became material for determination of the question whether Laxmi had power of disposition inter vivos and by will. The point on which J. M. Sheth and S. H. Sheth JJ. differed was no doubt construction of the will but construction of the will became material for determination of the question whether Laxmi had power of disposition inter vivos and by will. The power of disposition of Laxmi was very much in issue before the learned Judges because on the existence of the power of disposition depended the validity of the will dated 9th April 1955 and the gift deed dated 25th January 1958. J. M. Sheth J. took the view that the interest conferred on Laxmi under the will was an absolute interest and she had therefore power to dispose of the proparties left by Zaverbhai inter vivos as well as by will:- S. H. Sheth J. on the other hand was inclined to hold that the interest given to Laxmi under the will was a life interest without any power of disposition inter vivos or by will. This was the point of difference between J. M. Sheth and S. H. Sheth JJ. and it was this point of difference which was referred under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent. The question whether Laxmi had power of disposition inter vivos or by will was therefore very much before Divan J. on the reference made by J. M. Sheth and S. . . Sheth JJ. and it was open to Divan J. to take the intermediate view that though Laxmi did not have an absolute interest in the properties left by Zaverbhai but had only a limited interest it was coupled with power of disposition inter vivos but not by will. But this intermediate view taken by Divan J. would not have helped to decide the appeal because in that event it would not be possible to say that there was any majority opinion amongst the three Judges and therefore Divan J. requested me as the Chief Justice to refer the point of difference to a Full Bench. That could be legitimately done because Clause 36 of the Letters Patent provides that the case shall then be heard upon that point by one or more of the other Judges and the point of difference can therefore be heard by a Full Bench of three Judges. The preliminary contention urged by Mr. Chhatrapati must therefore be rejected. That could be legitimately done because Clause 36 of the Letters Patent provides that the case shall then be heard upon that point by one or more of the other Judges and the point of difference can therefore be heard by a Full Bench of three Judges. The preliminary contention urged by Mr. Chhatrapati must therefore be rejected. ( 3 ) THAT takes us to the merits of the question in controversy between the parties. The question is :- what on a true interpretation of the relevant clauses of the will is the nature and quality of the interest granted to Laxmi under the will of Zaverbhai. Is it an absolute interest with full power of disposition as held by J. M. Sheth J. or is it a limited interest without any power of disposition inter vivos or by will as held by S. H Sheth J. or is it a limited interest with power of disposition inter vivos but not by will as held by Divan J. ? The determination of the question turns wholly on the true interpretation of the different clauses of the will. We shall presently turn to examine these clauses but before we do so we may advert to ode rather striking feature which always characterises arguments relating to construction of a will. The learned advocates on behalf of the parties in cases of this kind always refer to a large number of decisions to support the construction respectively urged by them. Sometimes we even find the rather unusual spectacle of the advocates of both parties relying upon the same decisions and seeking to derive support from them. But it is necessary in this connection to remember the warning uttered by as high an authority as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan Chowdhury 49 I. A. 25 where it has been said :-THEIR Lordships may observe that it is always dangerous to construe the words of one will by the construction of more or less similar words in a different will which was adopted by a Court in another case. LORD Macmillan repeated this warning in Kamakhya Dat Ram v. Kushal Chand 36 Bom. L. R. 399 where he said that in construing the language and arriving at the intention of a particular testator decisions on the construction of other wills are of little assistance. LORD Macmillan repeated this warning in Kamakhya Dat Ram v. Kushal Chand 36 Bom. L. R. 399 where he said that in construing the language and arriving at the intention of a particular testator decisions on the construction of other wills are of little assistance. The only guidance to be obtained from them is that what must be sought in every instance is the dominant intention of the testator. The same warning was again reiterated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Shalig Ram v. Charanjit Lal 57 I. A. 282 in the following words :-THE intention of the testator must be gathered from the terms of the will reading it as a whole and not much assistance is to be gathered from the numerous cases which were cited to the Board and in which the terms of the will under consideration differed from the terms of the will in the present appeal. THE proper approach in cases of this kind must therefore be to form an opinion about the construction of the will apart from the decided cases and then to see whether these decisions require any modification of that opinion:- not to begin by considering how far the will in question resembles other wills upon which decisions have been given. ( 4 ) BUT even so it would be instructive to refer to some of the decisions cited before us for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is any principle of construction on which they are based. Now the decisions which were referred before us can be broadly divided into three categories. The first category comprises decisions where the testator granted absolute interest to the first donee expressly and in so many terms and then attempted to give the residue of the property which may remain at the death of the first donee to a subsequent donee absolutely. The courts held in these cases that once absolute interest in property was granted by the testator to the first donee no subsequent disposition could be made of the residue of the property which would be repugnant to the absolute interest granted to the first donee and the subsequent disposition would be void as being repugnant to the absolute estate first granted. This view proceeded on the principle which was stated in the following terms in Stringers Estate:- Shaw v. Jones Ford (1877) 6 Ch. This view proceeded on the principle which was stated in the following terms in Stringers Estate:- Shaw v. Jones Ford (1877) 6 Ch. D. 1 :-IT is settled by authority that if you give a man some property real or personal to be his absolutely then you cannot by your will dispose of that property which becomes his. . . . . . . . . . You cannot do that if you once vest property absolutely in the first donee. That is because that which is once vested in a man and vested de facto in him cannot be taken from him out of the due course of devolution at his death by any expression of wish on the part of the original testator. THE testator having granted an absolute estate to the first donee cannot prescribe a new line of succession for the estate on the death of the first donee. The line of devolution of the estate cannot be altered by the testator and any attempt by him to do so would be legally impermissible. Sir Binod Mitter delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Deputy Commissioner Partabgarh 32 Bom. L. R. 129 pointed out:-ATTEMPTS on the part of a testator in India to restrict devolution of properties which he bequeths to a legatee absolulely and to prevent alienations of such properties are quite common and wills containing such provisions have often come up for decision before the Board. The question for determination has always been whether there are dispositive words creating an estate of inheritance in the first instance; and if so whether the subsequent restrictive clauses are sufficient to displace the effect of such dispositive words or whether such subsequent clauses are merely repugnant to the absolute estate. WHERE there are clear dispositive words creating an absolute estate in the first donee any subsequent disposition of the property remaining at the death of the first donee would be repugnant to the absolute estate so created and would be void. The courts adopting this principle held the gift-over of the remaining property at the death of the first donee to be void in the following cases where the estate granted to the first donee was clearly and expressly an absolute estate. The courts adopting this principle held the gift-over of the remaining property at the death of the first donee to be void in the following cases where the estate granted to the first donee was clearly and expressly an absolute estate. See Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Deputy Commissioner Partabgarh (supra) Kamakhya Dat Ram v. Kushal Chand (supra) Govindbhai v. Dahyabhai 38 Bom. L. R. 175 Bia Kevli v. Dalsukhram 46 Bom. L. R. 908 Bai Savita v. Girjashankar Mohanlal 49 Bom. L. R. 847 Jagat Singh v. Sangat Singh A. I. R. 1940 P. C. 70 In re Jones (1898)1 Ch. 438 and Perry v. Merritt (1874) 18 Equity 152. The words used by the testator clearly evinced an intention to grant an absolute estate to the first donee and the mere provision of a gift over of the property remain ing at the death of the first donee was held insufficient to cut down the absolute estate of the first donee into a limited estate. The principle deducible from these cases would therefore seem to be that where absolute estate is granted to the first donee in terms clear and explicit and where the intention of the testator to grant absolute estate is plain and unequivocal gift over of what remains at the death of the first donee cannot be construed as cutting down the absolute estate to a life interest. The gift over being repugnant to the absolute estate granted to the first donee would in such a case fail. It is true that the effect of taking this view would be in a sense to frustrate the intention of the testator but it must be remembered that this result follows not because of any iconoclastic approach of the court but because the testator cannot after granting absolute estate to the first donee attempt to prescribe a new line of devolution different from that provided by law. The intention of the testator is frustrated in these cases because it is not legally permissible to give effect to it To quote the words of Lord Davey in Lalit Mohun Sing Ray v. Chukkun Lal Roy 24 1 A. 76 :-IT is possible that a testator may have. . . . . The intention of the testator is frustrated in these cases because it is not legally permissible to give effect to it To quote the words of Lord Davey in Lalit Mohun Sing Ray v. Chukkun Lal Roy 24 1 A. 76 :-IT is possible that a testator may have. . . . . misconcecved the effect of conferring a heritable estate:- but this would not justify the court in giving an interpretation to the language other than the ordinary legal meaning The absolute estate must in such cases be given effect and the gift-over must be held to be bad. ( 5 ) THEN there is the second category of decisions which comprises cases where it is not clear from the language used by the testator whether the interest granted to the first donee is absolute interest or a limited interest. There are no specific words referring an absolute estate nor are there any specific words restricting the grant to a limited estate. The words uses by the testator are ambiguous so that it becomes a matter of construction whether the interest intended to be given to the first donee is an absolute interest or a limited interest. The courts have in such cases taken the view what the addition of a gift over indicates that the proper construction to be placed on the words of the grant is that the first donee should have no more than a limited interest. The principle which has been followed by the courts in these cases has been that every clause in the will should as far as possible be given effect and a construction must be adopted which does not render any clause superfluous or meaningless. This was the approach adopted by the courts in:- In re Sanford (1901) 1 Ch. 939 :- Manumallaswami v. Chinur Narayanaswami A. I. R. 1932 Madres 489 and Ramchandra Shenoy v. Hilda Brite A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1323. The testator in In re Sanford gave all his properties to his wife so that she may have full possession of it and entire power and control over it or act with regard to it as she may think proper and in the event of her not surviving him or dying without having devised or appointed the whole or any part of his said property it should go to his two sons. The question arose whether the wife took an absolute estate or merely an estate for life with a general power of appointment. Mr. Justice Joyce held that the wife took an estate for life only with a general power of appointment and in reaching this conclusion the learned Judge pointed out:-NOW pausing here for a moment. it is to be observed that there are no words of limitation in this gift to the wife. It is wholly indefinite. There is no expression of any intention that she should take absolutely or for her own use and benefit; nor; On the other hand are there any words limiting the gift to a life interest or otherwise. THE decision in In re Jones (supra) was distinguished by the learned Judge by saying that in that case. . . . . . THE property was given to the donee expressly for her absolute use and benefit this gift being followed by an attempted disposition of what might be left not sold or disposed of. SO also it was emphasized by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Munumallaswami v. Chinna Narayanaswami (supra):-THE rule in such cases is that if the intention of the testator as represented by his words was to confer an absolute estate that estate cannot be cut down by anything that follows. If however the intention is doubtful the addition of a gift-over may be evidence that his intention was to confer no more than a limited interest. Here the worst that can be said is that his intention as conveyed by the language of the gift was not clear and the gift over showed that his intention was to confer no more than a limited estate. (underlining is ours ). THE same principle was followed by the Supreme Court in Ramchandra Shenoy v. Hilda Brite (supra ). There it was pointed out by Rajagopala Ayyangar J. speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court:-IN the present case if as has to be admitted the testatrix did intend to confer an absolute interest in the male children of Severina the question is whether effect can or cannot be given to it. If the interest of Severina were held to be absolute no doubt effect were held to be given to the said intention. If the interest of Severina were held to be absolute no doubt effect were held to be given to the said intention. But if there are words the will which on a reasonable construction would denote that the interest of severina was not intended to be absolute but was limited to her life only it would be proper for the court to adopt such a construction for that would give effect to every testamentary disposition contained in the Will. (underlining is ours ). IT is obvious that if the words used the testator were such as not being reasonably capable of being construed as conferring life interest as contradistinguished from absolute interest this principle could not have been applied and the gift over to the male children of Severina would have to be void. ( 6 ) THE third category of decisions consists of those where interest granted to the first donee is plainly and manifestly a life interest. That was the case in In re Thomsons Estate Herring v. Barrow 13 Chancery Division 144 confirmed in appeal and reported in 14 Chancery Division 263 There the gift was made by the testator to his widow for the term of her natural life to be disposed of as she may think proper for her own use and benefit according to the nature and quality thereof and in the event of her decease should there be anything remaining of the properly or any part thereof said part or parts thereof were given to certain persons. The interest given to the widow was clearly and indubitably a life interest with a gift over of the residue which may remain undisposed at the death of the widow and this provision was construed by Hall V. C. and his view was confirmed in appeal as giving to the widow a life interest with an absolute power of disposition exercisable by her during her life time but not by testamentary instrument. It will thus be seen that where interest is granted to the first donee in terms which clearly and explicitly connote a life interest the question of considering whether it is an absolute interest or a life interest does not arise. It will thus be seen that where interest is granted to the first donee in terms which clearly and explicitly connote a life interest the question of considering whether it is an absolute interest or a life interest does not arise. ( 7 ) WE must of course make it clear that these categories into which we have divided the decisions cited before us are merely broad categories and they must always and invariably yield to the dominant intention of the testator as gathered from the language used by him. They merely indicate rules of construction for ascertaining the intention of the testator and these rules of construction cannot be elevated to the position of rules of law. Having said so much in regard to the rules of constructions we may now proceed to examine the relevant clauses of the will and consider in which of these three categories the present case falls. ( 8 ) THE preamble of the will starts with a declaration on the part of Zaverbhai that he is making the will in order that there may be Vyavastha of his properties according to his wish. The word Vyavastha as used in the preamble clearly connotes disposition or destination of his properties. There are two primary meanings in which the word Vyavastha may be used in Gujarati language. One is management or administration and the other is disposition or destination of property. Any arrangement by which Sthiti that is destination of property may be settled would be Vyavastha. The will was obviously being made by Zaverbhai for the purpose of setting the disposition or destination of his properties after his death. ( 9 ) ZAVERBHAI then proceeded to state in clause (1) of the will that he had separated from his brothers and their sons since a long time and he had no connection whatsoever with them. This statement was obviously made by Zaverbhai with a view to emphasizing the separate character of his properties and asserting that his agnates had no right title or interest in the same. It will be clear from the succeeding clauses of the will that Zaverbhai did not want that any part of his properties should go to his brother and their children Clause (2) of the will enumerated the near relations of Zaverbhai. It will be clear from the succeeding clauses of the will that Zaverbhai did not want that any part of his properties should go to his brother and their children Clause (2) of the will enumerated the near relations of Zaverbhai. Zaverbhai pointed out in this clause that he had a wife named Bai Laxmi and two sons and a daughter of his sister namely Shantilal Govind and Chhani. The properties belonging to Zaverbhai were described in Clause (3) of the will. They included inter alia the immovable properties situate in the city of Surat. Nothing turns upon these clauses of the will so far as the question in controversy between the parties is concerned. ( 10 ) THEN we come to Clause (4) which is a material clause required to be construed by us. It bequeathes all the movable and immovable properties of Zaverbhai to Laxmi. The question is what is the nature and quality of the interest in the properties granted to Laxmi. Now before we proceed to consider the language employed by Zaverbhai in Clause (4) ewe may first clear the ground b referring to one contention urged by Mr. Chhatrapati on behalf of the appellants in regard to the construction of this clause. Mr. Chhatrapati contended that in determining the nature and quality of the interest granted to Laxmi under this clause we must not overlook that this was a will made by a Hindu in 1934 and it was a common accepted potion amongst Hindus at the time that the widow should not have an absolute estate which she can alienate to an outsider:- Clause (4) must be construed in the light of this ordinary notion prevalent amongst Hindus. Now it is true that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has said in Mahomed Shamsool v. Shewukram 2 1 A. 7:-IN construing the will of a Hindu it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property. It may be assumed that a Hindu known that as a general rule at all events women do not take absolute estate of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate. BUT that statement is no authority for the proposition that if the terms of the will give the woman an absolute estate of inheritance those terms should be ignored. It may be assumed that a Hindu known that as a general rule at all events women do not take absolute estate of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate. BUT that statement is no authority for the proposition that if the terms of the will give the woman an absolute estate of inheritance those terms should be ignored. It was at one time held by some of the Courts in India that under the Hindu Law in the case of immovable property given or devised by a husband to his wife the wife had no power to alienate unless the power of alienation was conferred upon her in express terms. But this view was overruled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and it was held that:- if words were used conferring absolute ownership upon the wife the wife enjoyed the rights of ownership without their being conferred by express and additional terms unless the circumstances or the context were sufficient to show that such absolute ownership was not intended. See Musammat Surajmani v. Rabi Nath 35 I. A. 70 and Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab 49 I. A. 1. If therefore the words of the grant convey an absolute estate to the wife it would not be right to cut down the absolute nature of the estate merely on the ground that the grant is made to a Hindu wife. We must therefore construe the words used by Zaverbhai in Clause (4) and ascertain what is the nature of the interest conveyed to Laxmi by those words regardless of the fact that Zaverbhai was a Hindu making his will in 1934. ( 11 ) NOW when we turn to the words used in Clause (4) it is abundantly clear that what is intended to be granted to Laxmi is an absolute interest in the properties left by Zaverbhai. Clause (4) starts by saying that Laxmi is constitutedfull and sole Waras of the properties of Zaverbhai. The word Waras has. been the subject matter of judicial interpretation in several decisions of the Bombay High Court. It has been held by the Bombay High Court in Chunilal v. Muli 2 Bom. Clause (4) starts by saying that Laxmi is constitutedfull and sole Waras of the properties of Zaverbhai. The word Waras has. been the subject matter of judicial interpretation in several decisions of the Bombay High Court. It has been held by the Bombay High Court in Chunilal v. Muli 2 Bom. L. R. 46 and Govindbhai v. Dahyabhai) (supra) that Waras or heir has the same connotation as Malik and Malik according to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lalit Mohan Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (supra) and Surajmani v. Rabi Nath 35 I. A. 73:- 10 Bom. L. R. 59 is a word ordinarily sufficient to connote an estate both heritable and alienable even in the case of a Hindu widow. The use of Waras or heir would therefore convey an absolute estate heritable and alienable. The same view has also been taken by the High Court of Bombay in Bai Savita v. Girjashanker Mohanlal (supra ). We find that in Shalig Ram v. Charanjit Lal (supra) also the word Waras was regarded as sufficient to confer full rights of ownership on the donee. The word Waras used in clause (4) would therefore be sufficient by itself to constitute Laxmi absolute owner of the properties left by Zaverbhai unless of course there is anything in the context which militates against such construction. But Zaverbhai has gone further and made his intention amply clear by adding two adjectives to the word Waras namely * that is full and again * that is only. The word ** that is full denotes the nature of the estate and the word * that is only provides for exclusion of other persons so far as the interest in the properties is concerned. Laxmi is constituted full heir that is heir to the whole of the properties and the only heir indicating clearly that she only and none else should have any interest in the properties of the deceased. These words emphasize the absolute nature of the estate granted to Laxmi. The use of the word * that is only shows beyond doubt that the dominant intention of Zaverbhai was to benefit Laxmi alone and no one else. These words emphasize the absolute nature of the estate granted to Laxmi. The use of the word * that is only shows beyond doubt that the dominant intention of Zaverbhai was to benefit Laxmi alone and no one else. Then again as if what he had said was not adequate Zaverbhai proceeded to add that after his death Laxmi shall take possession of his entire movable and immovable properties in the right of an owner. The Gujarati expression used in this connection is * Now the word * has also received judicial interpretation by the highest court in the land and it means absolute owner of heritable and alienable estate. There are several decisions construing the word Malik as used in wills but it is not necessary to refer to all of them. It would be sufficient if we refer to one decision of the Privy Council and two decisions of the Supreme Court on the point. The decision of the Privy Council is to be found in Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab (supra) where Lord Buckmaster pointed out that the word that was used in clause 3 as the original word of gift was the word malik which could be appropriately used to constitute the wife absolute owner. The Supreme Court had also occassion to consider the proper meaning of the word Malik in Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal (supra) and they pointed out in that case that the word Malik is of very common use in many parts of India and it cannot certainly be regarded as a technical term of conveyancing and the term Malik when used in a will or other document as descriptive of the position which a devisee or donee is intended to hold has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of full proprietary rights including full right of alienation unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such full proprietary rights were not intended to be conferred. So also in Bajrang Bahadur v. Bakhtrai Kuer A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 7 the Supreme Court pointed out that the words Malik Kamil (absolute owner) are descriptive of a heritable and alienable estate in the donee and they connote full proprietary rights unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances which indicate that absolute rights were not intended to be conferred. The Supreme Court also observed in a later decision in Pearey Lal v. Rameshwar Das A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1703 that the word Malik has been consistently understood by courts as conveying the idea of absolute ownership. It is therefore clear from the use of the expression * that is in the right of an owner that full rights of ownership were intended to be conferred on Laxmi. ( 12 ) BUT the matter does not rest here. Clause (4) further proceeds to state that Laxmi shall be entitled to make Vyavastha of the properties in the right of an absolute owner according as she wishes. Now the word Vyavastha as used in this clause was again a subject matter of Controversy between the parties. Mr. Chhatrapati on behalf of the appellants contended that here in the context in which it occurs it can mean only management or administration and it does not connote disposition or destination of property. We cannot agree with this contention. It is now a well settled rule of interpretation embodied in sec. 86 of the Indian Succession Act 1925 that where the same words occur in different parts of the same will they shall be taken to have been used every where in the same sense unless a contrary intention appears. This is also a rule of interpretation recognised by the Supreme Court in Pearey Lal v. Rameshwar Das (supra ). Moreover while interpreting a will it is always permissible to the court to see what is the vocabulary adopted by the testator and how he expresses himself with regard to other matters. Let us therefore see what is the sense in which the word Vyavastha has been used in the other clauses of the will. We have already referred to the preamble of the will and pointed out that the word Vyavastha has been used there in the sense of disposition and destination of property. So also when we turn to Clause (6) of the will we find that the same word Vyavastha has been used in relation to Shantilal. It has been said there that if certain contingencies are fulfilled Shantilal will become the Malik of the remaining movable and immovable properties of Zaverbhai on the death of Laxmi but he will not be entitled to make Vyavastha of the same. It has been said there that if certain contingencies are fulfilled Shantilal will become the Malik of the remaining movable and immovable properties of Zaverbhai on the death of Laxmi but he will not be entitled to make Vyavastha of the same. It is clear and indeed it must be said in fairness to Mr. Chhatrapati that he rightly did not dispute it that the words Vyavastha in this clause means destination or disposition of property and not management or administration. The object of Zaverbhai in making this provision was that though Shantilal may in the contingencies specified in clause (6) become Malik of the properties of Zaverbhai which might remain indisposed of at the death of Laxmi he should not be entitled to make any disposition of those properties. Now if the word Vyavastha has been used in the sense of destination or disposition of property in the preamble as also in clause (6) it must be presumed to have been used in the same sense in Clause (4) of the will. Moreover the words ** that is in the right of an absolute owner also support the view that what was intended to be conveyed by the word Vyavastha was disposition of property. Zaverbhai provided that Laxmi shall be entitled to dispose of the properties received by her in the right of an absolute owner according to her unfettered discretion. The power of disposal was conferred on her in terms of widest amplitude. She could do what she wished with the properties obtained by her from her husband; and then Zaverbhai proceeded to add a crowning provision namely that if she disposes of any of the properties no one shall be entitled to object to it. He was so keen and anxious to emphasize the absolute nature of the estate granted to Laxmi that he provided of course ex abundanti cautela that her right shall be absolute and no one shall be entitled to raise any objection against disposal of property by her. It is clear beyond doubt on a reading of clause (4 ). that an absolute estate of inheritance was intended to be granted to Laxmi. That is the plain and undoubted effect of the words used by Zaverbhai. It is clear beyond doubt on a reading of clause (4 ). that an absolute estate of inheritance was intended to be granted to Laxmi. That is the plain and undoubted effect of the words used by Zaverbhai. Clause (5) also emphasizes the absolute character of the estate by repeating the word Malik in relation to the recovery of outstandings of Zaverbhai ( 13 ) THEN comes Clause (6) and the question is whether there is anything in clause (6) which compels us to cut down the absolute character of the estate granted to Laxmi under Clause (4) to a limited estate. We do not find there are any clear and cogent words which require us to do so. On the contrary Clause (6) emphasizes the fact that the dominant intention of Zaverbhai is to benefit Laxmi. Zaverbhai is anxious that Laxmi should be properly looked after during her lifetime and therefore he lays down certain conditions to be fulfilled by Shantilal before he can be given the residue of the properties remaining at the death of Laxmi. The conditions laid by Zaverbhai are that Shantilal should reside with Laxmi improve his conduct look after Laxmi and give her full satisfaction. It is only if these conditions are fulfilled right upto the death of Laxmi that the properties remaining at the death of Laxmi should go to Shantilal. The words * that is remaining postulate that Laxmi may during her life time dispose of the properties received by her from Zaverbhai Wholly or in part. It may be that no property may be left undisposed of by Laxmi at the time of her death in which event nothing would go to Shantilal even if he has behaved himself. If some property remains it would go to Shantilal but that would be only as a life tenant so far as immovable property is concerned. Shantilal would not be entitled to dispose of the immovable property and on his death his sons would be entitled to receive the immovable property as also what is left of the movable properties as owners in equal shares. It is again important to note that Zaverbhai makes it clear in Clause (6) that during the life time of Laxmi Shantilal shall have no right title or interest in the properties. It is again important to note that Zaverbhai makes it clear in Clause (6) that during the life time of Laxmi Shantilal shall have no right title or interest in the properties. This also shows the anxiety and solicitude of Zaverbhai for Laxmi and makes it clear that the dominant object of his bounty was Laxmi and not Shantilal or his sons. Shantilal and his sons come into the picture only in so far as some property may remain undisposed of by Laxmi and in relation to such property Zaverbhai attempts to provide that it shall not go as on intestacy of Laxmi but it shall go to Shantilal and his sons. It seems that Zaverbhai was anxious that no part of his properties should go to his agnates and he therefore provided that the remainder of his properties remaining undisposed of at the death of Laxmi should go to Shantilal and his sons. This attempt to alter the line of devolution on the death of Laxmi cannot succeed since the law does not permit it. The gift over of the residue of the properties which may remain undisposed of at the death of Laxmi cannot be construed as cutting down the absolute estate granted to Laxmi to a limited estate. ( 14 ) IT is true that the effect of accepting this construction is that the gift over of the residue of the properties in favour of Shantilal and his sons under Clause (6) would be void as being repugnant to the absolute estate granted to Laxmi under Clause (4) and to that extent the intention of Zaverbhai would be frustrated but that cannot be helped because the intention of a testator cannot be allowed to prevail where it is contrary to law. It is also true that on this construction Shantilal and his sons would not get anything under the will while Govind would be entitled to receive Rs. 100 to Rs. 150 in case of need but that too is a consequence of law and cannot justify us in placing on the language of the will a construction which it cannot bear. Then again Clause (7) provides that after the death of Laxmi Shantilal must bear the expenses of Chhanis visits but that provision can apply only where Shantilal is in possession of any property of Zaverbhai under the will. Then again Clause (7) provides that after the death of Laxmi Shantilal must bear the expenses of Chhanis visits but that provision can apply only where Shantilal is in possession of any property of Zaverbhai under the will. There is therefore nothing in any of the clauses of the will which requires us to cut down the absolute estate granted to Laxmi to a limited estate. ( 15 ) WE are therefore of the view that the present case falls within the first category of decisions which we have referred. There is in fact one decision amongst those referred to by us as falling within the first category which comes very near the present case. That is the decision of the Privy Council in Jagat Singh v. Sangat Singh (supra ). The question which arose in that case related to the construction of a will made by one Ishar Singh. The will provided that after the death of the testator his widow would be exclusive owner of certain properties with all kinds of power to deal with those properties and after the death whatever property remained would be owned by the sons of Sundar Singh the testators nephew. Both the widow and the sons of Sunder Singh were prohibited from selling any immovable property. On the death of the widow competing claims were put forward by the heirs of the widow and the sons of Sundar Singh. The question arose as to what was the nature of the interest granted to the widow under the will of Isher Singh. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the true effect of the will was to make the widow an absolute owner of the property. Sir George Sankin delivering the opinion of the Privy Council said:-ON the question as to the true construction of the will of Ishar Singh the trial Court and the High Court were agreed in holding that its effect was to make Bishan Devi absolute owner of the Dyallpur property. Their Lordships are of the same opinion. The prohibition egainst selling the immovables is not addressed to the widow only but is extended to the sons of Sundar Singh under Cl. Their Lordships are of the same opinion. The prohibition egainst selling the immovables is not addressed to the widow only but is extended to the sons of Sundar Singh under Cl. 7 and is not in Their Lordships view to be regarded as showing an intention to give to the widow an interest life the estate of a Hindu woman but as a condition which the testator was proposing to attach to an absolute interest. Cl. 4 is in clear and emphatic language consistent only with the gift of an absolute interest and the phrase whatever property remains in the first part of Clause 7 of the will is in keeping with this intention. The prohibition against selling must be disregarded as repugnant to the absolute gift to Bishan Devi. IT was held that absolute estate was granted to the widow because she was made the exclusive owner of the properties and the words whatever property remains were construed as consistent only with the gift of an absolute interest. The same position obtains in the case before us and for the same reasons we would hold that the interest granted to Laxmi under Clause (4) was an absolute interest and the words * that is remaining property i Clauses (6) were consistent only with the gift of an absolute interest and the gift-over of the property remaining at the death of Laxmi in favour of Shantilal and his sons under Clause (6) was therefore void as being repugnant to the absolute interest granted to Laxmi ( 16 ) WE are therefore of the view that the construction of the will adopted by Mr. Justice J. M. Sheth was the right construction and the point of difference referred to us will be answered by saying that the interest granted to Laxmi under the will was an absolute interest with full power of disposition and the gift over of the residue of the properties if any in favour of Shanilal and his sons was void as being repugnant to the absolute estate granted to Laxmi and no effect could therefore be given to the directions as regards future devolution of properties on the death of Laxmi. .