DHANUBEN WD/o. KALIDAS NATHUBHAI v. ZAVERBHAI KALIDAS
1972-08-10
S.H.SHETH
body1972
DigiLaw.ai
S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been filed by the original defendants under the following circumstances. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff the defendant No. 2 and the defendant No. 3 are the sons of one Kalidas. The defendant No. 4 is the widow of Nanabhai the deceased son of Kalidas. The defendant No. 1 is the widow of Kalidas. The defendants Nos. 5 6 and 7are the daughters of Kalidas. The plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 599 of 1964 in the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division at Surat for partition of joint family properties and for separate possession of his share. ( 3 ) THE defendants raised no dispute as to the plaintiffs share in the joint family properties. There is also no dispute that the properties in which the plaintiff has been claiming a share are joint family properties. The defendants raised only two small contentions against the plaintiffs claim. They claimed a sum of Rs. 1000/from the joint family estate on the ground that they had spent the amount for obsequial ceremonies of Kalidas to whom the estate belonged. They also claimed a sum of Rs. 7000/from the joint family estate on the ground that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had discharged the debt of the joint family to that extent. ( 4 ) THE learned 5th Joint Civil Judge Junior Division at Surat who tried the suit passed in favour of the plaintiff preliminary decree for partition awarding to the plaintiff 3/16th share therein. He rejected both the claims made by the defendants. ( 5 ) THE defendants appealed to the District Court. The learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal confirmed the decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. ( 6 ) IT is that appellate decree which is challenged by the defendants in this Second Appeal. ( 7 ) KALIDAS to whom the estate belonged died on 23rd April 1962. There is no dispute before me in regard to the share which has been awarded by the Courts below to the plaintiff. ( 8 ) MR. Shelat appearing for the defendants has raised two contentions before me. One of them relates to the aforesaid sum of Rs 1000/and another relates to the aforesaid sum of Rs. 7000. 00. So far as the defendants claim of Rs.
( 8 ) MR. Shelat appearing for the defendants has raised two contentions before me. One of them relates to the aforesaid sum of Rs 1000/and another relates to the aforesaid sum of Rs. 7000. 00. So far as the defendants claim of Rs. 1000/is concerned the learned Appellate Judge has recorded the finding that the defendants had spent that amount after the obsequial ceremonies of Kalidas. It is a finding of fact and therefore it has not been assailed before me. So far as the sum of Rs. 7000/is concerned the learned Appellate Judge has found that the defendants have not proved that they paid joint family debts to the extent of Rs. 7000. 00. He has on facts held that the defendants paid only a part of the amount and no more. The question which has been raised for my consideration is whether the defendants are entitled to be reimbursed from the joint family estate to the extent of the amount they have proved to have spent on those two counts. In my opinion if a member of a joint Hindu family has volunteered to pay funeral expenses for the performance of the obsequial ceremonies of his deceased father or mother he cannot claim any contribution from the other members of the joint family because voluntary payment made by a member of a joint family for such a purpose does not give rise to any cause of action against other members of the joint family. In order to saddle the joint family estate or other members of the joint family with the liability of such a payment it must be proved that there was an agreement amongst the members of the joint family to share such expenses or that the member who made such expenses did so under the circumstances which would bind the joint family estate or other members of the joint family. So far as the claim of the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in regard to the discharge of joint family debts by their payment is concerned the learned Appellate Judge has found that there was no joint family debt existing at the date of partition. He has however found that some joint family debt existed prior to partition and that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had discharged it by paying it off. He has recorded a further finding that defendants Nos.
He has however found that some joint family debt existed prior to partition and that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had discharged it by paying it off. He has recorded a further finding that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 have not proved that the payment which they made for discharging the joint family debt was a loan advanced to the joint family. In my view if a member of a joint family has purely voluntarily discharged a joint family debt by making payment out of his own funds he is not entitled to any contribution from other members of the joint family because the unilateral exercise of a bare or mere volition by a person to do a certain thing does not create an obligation for another nor does it create any right in favour of the person who thus exercises his volition. In other words there must be a link between the exercise of volition by a member of a joint family and the liability which it is supposed to produce for the joint family estate or other members of the joint family. It is this link which is missing in the instant case. Voluntary payment is one which flows from the free exercise of ones volition. The free exercise of ones volition cannot lead to the creation of liability for anyone else. In order to render other members of the joint family liable to contribute towards the payment made by one of them it must be shown that the debt was either discharged out of joint family funds or it must be shown that one who discharged the joint family debt out of his own funds did so under the circumstances which would bind the joint family estate or other members of the joint family and create a right in his favour to be reimbursed from it. The Courts below have not approached the question from this angle. It has therefore become necessary for me to set aside the findings recorded by the Courts below on that point and to remand the suit to the Trial Court for taking further evidence on these two points in order to arrive at a correct decision. .