JUDGMENT Shambhu Prasad Singh, J This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is by two members of the Managing Committee and a guardian of a student of Sri Krishna Marwari Multipurpose School, Mokameh, for quashing the orders dated 26-12-1969 (Annexure 4) and 25-6-1971 (Annexure 5) passed by the President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, Patna, here in after to be referred to as the 'Board'. 2. The facts leading to the filing of the application may briefly be stated as follows: Respondent No.6, Gita Prasad Singh was working as a teacher in the said School. According to the case of the petitioners, his appointment was on temporary basis. According to respondent No.6, on 10th July, 1965, he was appointed against a permanent post of teacher on probation, the period of probation being for one year. He was not confirmed immediately after the expiry of the period of probation. It appears that respondent No.6 felt insulted by the behaviour towards him of Satya Narain Yadav, a clerk of the School and in protest he submitted a written resignation on the 6th March, 1967. His case is that on 15th March 1967, he withdrew the letter of resignation. According to the petitioners, there was no such withdrawal. By Annexure 3, the Managing Committee accepted the resignation of respondent No.6 and relieved him from service with effect from 21st May, 1967. Respondent No.6 then appealed to the President of the Board. That appeal was allowed by order contained in Annexure 4 and the Managing Committee of the School was directed to re-instate respondent No.6. As this direction was not followed in spite of several reminders, the order under Annexure 5 superseding the Managing Committee of the School and Constituting an adhoc Managing Committee was passed. 3. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the order of the Managing Committee terminating the service of respondent no. 6 with effect from 21st May, 1967, was not appealable and the President of the Board had no jurisdiction to direct his reinstatement. 3. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the order of the Managing Committee terminating the service of respondent no. 6 with effect from 21st May, 1967, was not appealable and the President of the Board had no jurisdiction to direct his reinstatement. In the circumstances, the order of the President of the Board, as contained in Annexure 4, could not be a direction within the meaning of section 5 (2) of the Bihar High School (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960, Bihar Act 13 of 1960 and the Board could not suspend or dissolve the Managing Committee under sub-section 3 of section 5, It appears that the Education Department of the State Government by Notification No. H/R 4-01/55-E-4172, dated the 7th September, 1955, published certain rules framed by the Government for regulating appointments and service conditions of the teachers of non-Government Secondary Schools. It is not in dispute that these rules do apply to the instant case and are valid under Section 8(2) of the Act. Rules 14, 15 and 16 of the said Rules are as follows: "14. The termination of service of a person (i) during the period of probation, (ii) during the period in which he holds a temporary appointment, (iii) on retrenchment of a post, will not amount to discharge or dismissal. In such cases, however, the teacher or Headmaster shall be apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to terminate his services and his reply considered by the Managing Committee before orders are passed,” “15 A teacher shall not be discharged or dismissed save and except on grounds of proved inefficiency, conduct involving moral turpitude or gross negligence of duty or behaviour likely to prove subversive of discipline, or' any other good or sufficient reasons which may make his retention on the School staff no longer desirable. In the last case, the prior approval of the Department is necessary". "16, The decision of the Managing Committee under clause 15 shall be immediately communicated to the person concerned in writing. The person concerned shall have the right to appeal through the proper channel in respect of orders in which the teacher has been discharged or dismissed. In the last case, the prior approval of the Department is necessary". "16, The decision of the Managing Committee under clause 15 shall be immediately communicated to the person concerned in writing. The person concerned shall have the right to appeal through the proper channel in respect of orders in which the teacher has been discharged or dismissed. Appeal must be preferred to the District Education Officer within thirty days of the receipt of the punishment order, When an appeal has been preferred, the order of discharge or dismissal shall not be given effect to till the disposal of the appeal by the President, Board of Secondary Education", According to learned counsel for the petitioners even if the case of respondent No.6 be correct that he was appointed against a permanent post on probation, admittedly he not having been confirmed and the period of two years, for which a person may be kept on probation according to rule 2, not having expired, his services were terminated during the period of probation and such the order of the Managing Committee was passed under rule 14. He, therefore, has contended that it could not be considered an order of discharge or dismissal as envisaged by rule 15 and is not appealable under rule 16. Mr. Basudeo Prasad appearing for respondent no. 6 has submitted that as the services of respondent no. 6 were terminated against the terms of the contract of his service, it was really an order of his dismissal and not one under rule 14. In the alternative, he has also contended that if rule 14 is to be given a wider interpretation so as to include cases of termination of service during the period of probation against the terms of the contract of service, the rule itself is ultra vires. In my opinion, there is no substance in the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Prasad. The termination of service of respondent no. 6 cannot be said to be against the terms of the contract of his service. An employment on probation under the ordinary law of Master and Servant, which must apply to the facts of the case, as respondent no. 6 cannot be said to be a Government employee, comes to an end if during and at the end of probation the servant who is appointed on trial is found unsuitable and his service is terminated by a notice. 6 cannot be said to be a Government employee, comes to an end if during and at the end of probation the servant who is appointed on trial is found unsuitable and his service is terminated by a notice. Absence of notice will not entitle the servant to reinstatement; at best he can claim one month's pay as damage if no notice is served upon him. The Managing Committee terminated the services of respondent no. 6 during the period of probation and that would not amount to discharge or dismissal either according to ordinary law of Master and Servant or according to rule 14 which regulates the condition. of service of respondent no. 6. The only safe guard provided for by rule 14 is that the teacher or the Headmaster, whose service is terminated, shall be apprised of the ground on which it is proposed to terminate his service and his reply considered by the Managing Committee before orders are passed. In other words, he must get an opportunity of being heard in the matter. It appears from Annexure 3 that respondent no.6 was heard in the matter. Further even if there was any illegality or irregularity in the order terminating his service, he could have persued any other remedy open to him, but certainly he could not have appealed to the President of the Board. It is well established that a person cannot have a right of appeal unless such a right is conferred upon him by a statute or rules made there under. Rule 16 confers a right of appeal only against orders passed under rule 15. No appeal, therefore, could lie to the President of the Board against the order contained in Annexure 3. Thus the order of reinstatement passed in Annexure 4 was without jurisdiction and had no binding effect. 4. Section 4 of the Act lays down the functions of the Board. Clause (e) of it authorises the Board to issue directions to the Managing Committee of any High School, but the. directions are made subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules and Regulations made thereunder. It is manifest, therefore, that the Board can issue only such directions which are permissible under the Act or the Rules. Clause (e) of it authorises the Board to issue directions to the Managing Committee of any High School, but the. directions are made subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules and Regulations made thereunder. It is manifest, therefore, that the Board can issue only such directions which are permissible under the Act or the Rules. As already observed, the rules of 1955 are valid rules under section 8 (2) of the Act, Therefore, the Board or the President of it has got no power to issue a direction contrary to the rules. "Directions" referred to in section 5 (2) of the Act must refer to a direction which can be issued under section 4 (e) of the Act, in other words, a valid and legal direction and a Managing Committee can be suspended or dissolved under Sub-Section (3) of Section 5 only for contravening such a valid and legal direction. A Managing Committee cannot be suspended or dissolved for not carrying out a direction which is without jurisdiction. The view that the order of reinstatement passed by the President of the Board was without jurisdiction is supported by a Bench decision of this court in the case of Kabutra Kuer V. Board of Secondary Education and other's 1963 B.L.J.R 858. 5" Before closing the Judgment I must consider three arguments advanced by learned counsel for respondent No. 6 Firstly, it has been submitted by him that there has been a delay by the petitioners in coming against the order contained in annexure 4. As observed earlier, the order contained in Annexure 4 was not binding on the Managing Committee and the petitioners were entitled to ignore it. There has been no delay on the part of the petitioners in coming to this court after the order under Annexure 5 was passed. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it is not a case where the writ be refused to the petitioners on the ground of delay. Their real grievance is that the order of supersession as contained in Annexure 5 ought not to have been passed. The other contention of learned counsel for respondent No. 6 is that the petitioners having appeared in the appeal and having contested it, cannot now be allowed to challenge that order. In other words according to him they are stopped from challenging that order. The other contention of learned counsel for respondent No. 6 is that the petitioners having appeared in the appeal and having contested it, cannot now be allowed to challenge that order. In other words according to him they are stopped from challenging that order. As it has been held that no appeal lay to the Board and, therefore, the order is without jurisdiction, there can be no estoppel against the petitioners. 6. Lastly, it has been contended by learned counsel for respondent No.6 that the order of the Board contained in Annexure 5 was appealable under Section 6 of the Act and as no appeal was filed, this court should refuse to issue writ. It is true that where an alternative remedy is open to a person and he docs not avail of that remedy, the court ordinarily does not issue a writ in his favour. But, in appropriate cases, especially where the impugned order is without jurisdiction, writ is issued by the Court even if alternative remedy is not availed of in the instant case I do not think that a writ can be refused on the ground that the petitioners did not file an appeal under section 6 of the Act. 7. I may also refer to an argument of the learned counsel for the State. He pointed out to us that earlier a writ application filed by one Govind Singh, which was numbered as C.W. J.C. No. 229 of 1970 against the order contained in Annexure 4 was dismissed in limine by this Court and, therefore, this writ was not maintainable. Govind Singh had no locus standi to move this Court against that order. Perhaps the writ was dismissed in limine on that account. This writ by the petitioners, when an order for superseding the Managing Committee has been passed by the Board, cannot be held to be not maintainable on the ground that some one who had no locus standi had earlier filed another writ application against the order contained in Annexure 6. 8. Our attention has also been drawn by learned counsel for respondent no. 6 to the fact that respondent no. 6 has been in fact reinstated by the ad-hoc Managing Committee. I do not propose to say anything on that question. It will be for the present Managing Committee to see whether on compassionate ground respondent no. 8. Our attention has also been drawn by learned counsel for respondent no. 6 to the fact that respondent no. 6 has been in fact reinstated by the ad-hoc Managing Committee. I do not propose to say anything on that question. It will be for the present Managing Committee to see whether on compassionate ground respondent no. 6 should continue as a teacher of the School or not. 9. The orders of the President, Board of Secondary Education, superseding the Managing Committee and constituting an ad-hoc Managing Committee, must, therefore, be quashed. This application is accordingly allowed and the order contained in Annexure 5 is quashed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. I agree. Application allowed.