Judgment :- 1. The first defendant in the suit (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) is the appellant in the Second Appeal (defendants 2 and 3 have no interest in the litigation). The plaintiff is Sri Thirunethiranathar Temple, Thiruppalli Muddudal (hereinafter referred to as the temple) represented by the Executive Officer of Sri Thyagarajaswami Devasthanam, Thiruvartar. One Venkatachalam Pillai executed a will (Ex. A-1) dated 18th July, 1917 dedicating lands, about 5 acres 32 cents, to the plaintiff temple wit h specific directions that the “ Kalasandhi and Ardhajama ” services should be performed for the temple; there is no dispute that under the will there has been a complete and outright dedication of the properties to the temple. The will provides that the managers of the temple for the time being should manage the trust properties and perform the “ kattalais ” and that the properties dedicated cannot be alienated. At that time, his second wife Ammakutti Ammal was living with her sister away from the testator and even so, he had made certain provisions fur her. But as regards the properties dedicated to the temple, the specific provision is that the manager of toe temple for the time being should manage the properties and perform the trust. But later on, the testator executed another will, Ex. A-2, dated 3rd February, 1920 in Which he had stated that he had no confidence that the managers of the temple would perform the trust properly and efficiently, and that therefore, his second wife Ammakutti Ammal alone should manage the trust properties, during he life-time as provided in Ex A-1. Ex. A-2 did not contain any provision as to what should happen after the death of the testators wife, with regard to the management of trust properties. After the death of her husband, Ammakutti Ammal acted as the manager of the trust up to the moment of her death. She had executed a document, Ex. A-27 dated 15th February, 1939, by which she constituted her sisters son to succeed her in management. But, he pre-deceased Ammakutti. She, therefore, executed another document, Ex. A-26 dated 16th May, 1941, vesting the management of the trust properties, after her death, in her sisters daughter, the defendant, and there is no dispute that, after the death of Ammakutti some time in 1941, the defendant alone had been in possession and management of the trust properties. But, he pre-deceased Ammakutti. She, therefore, executed another document, Ex. A-26 dated 16th May, 1941, vesting the management of the trust properties, after her death, in her sisters daughter, the defendant, and there is no dispute that, after the death of Ammakutti some time in 1941, the defendant alone had been in possession and management of the trust properties. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff temple on 21st March, 1964 for recovery of possession of the trust properties, mesne profits and other reliefs. 2. Both the courts have held that there has been a complete dedication of the properties to the temple, that Ammakutti was only entitled to be in management of the properties as trustee upto the moment of her death, that thereafter the provision in the will, Ex. A-1 took effect in the sense that the trustees of the temple alone would have a right to manage the properties, that Ammakutti had no right to nominate any successor and that Ex. A-26 did not confer any right of management upon the defendant. Both the courts held that the suit for recovery of possession of the properties as, against the defendant was in timer by reason of S. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act. The courts below had rejected the further alternative contention that the testator had not made any provision as to What should happen after the death of Ammakutti, that there has been a hiatus with the result that the right to nominate the succeeding trustee, after the death of Ammakutti, reverted to the testator and his heirs and that Ammakutti, as the sole heir of the testator, had the right to nominate her successor and the right of the defendant to function as a trustee cannot there fore be questioned. 3. The same points were debated before me by learned counsel for both the sides. 4. Even at the threshold, it may be mentioned that the present suit is clearly barred by limitation and S. 10 of the Limitation Act has no application whatever to the instant case. That apart, I am also of the view that the appointment of the defendant as the trustee by Ammakutti under Ex. A-26 is a valid appointment. The lower appellate Court has indulged in a speculative reasoning as to why the testator executed the second will, Ex. A-2 confering the right of management upon Ammakutti. That apart, I am also of the view that the appointment of the defendant as the trustee by Ammakutti under Ex. A-26 is a valid appointment. The lower appellate Court has indulged in a speculative reasoning as to why the testator executed the second will, Ex. A-2 confering the right of management upon Ammakutti. There is a time interval of about three years between the first and the second Will and during this period, the testator must have gained intimate and personal knowledge about the management by the temple trustees. It is the testator who founded the trust and if he wanted to change the provision as to the management, he need not give any reason. It is his own choice. But, he has given a very significant and crucial reason and that cannot be brushed aside as something inconsequential. At this distance of time, the court has to necessarily proceed upon the footing that the testator had no confidence and he apprehended that the trust created would not be properly and efficiently managed and administered by the temple authorities and that was the only reason why he changed over the management to his wife. Is simply idle to speculate that the testators fears or apprehensions were only upto the moment of the death of his wife and that the testator hoped that thereafter the trust would be properly and efficiently administered and managed, as though the existence of his wife was the real obstacle for the temple trustees to manage the trust properties efficiently. In other words, the fears and apprehensions entertained by the testator were real and well-grounded apprehensions and, in the nature of things, these apprehensions cannot be for a limited period, but they were something permanent and for ever. There is neither meaning nor logic in interpreting the will. Ex. A-2, to the effect that the fears and apprehensions of the testator about the proper and efficient management of the trust should be delimited to the life-time of his wife. If the lack of confidence and the apprehensions pertained to the proper and efficient management of the trust as such and not for any particular period, Ex. A-1 and A-2 should be read in a harmonious manner and if so done, it has to be held that as a result of Ex. If the lack of confidence and the apprehensions pertained to the proper and efficient management of the trust as such and not for any particular period, Ex. A-1 and A-2 should be read in a harmonious manner and if so done, it has to be held that as a result of Ex. A-2 and by necessary implication, appointment of the temple trustees to manage the trust had been cancelled or revoked by Ex. A-2 the subsequent document. Ex. A-2 necessarily implies and involves the cancellation of the provision with regard to the management set out in Ex. A-1. It is true that no express provision has been made in Ex. A-2, as to what should happen after the life-time of the widow, but the absence of such a provision alone cannot be taken in isolation, but it should be considered in the light of the important statement in the will, Ex. A-2, that the testator had no confidence that the temple trustees would manage the trust efficiently and properly. One is inseparably connected with the other, leading to the clear inference that the provision regarding the management contained in the earlier will has been cancelled and revoked by necessary implication. It has therefore to be held that the founder hat not made any provision beyond the life-time of his second wife and the right to nominate the successor bad reverted back to the founder and his heirs. It is in this context that Mr. T.R. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the appellant, relied upon the Bench decision of this Court (consisting of myself and Somasundaram, J.) in M. Thiagarajan and another v. M. Ganesan Appeal No. 437 of 1966. Judgment dated 28th August 1972 dealing with a similar problem In that case, one Jambuga Ramalingam founded certain charities and executed a will that, on his death, his ton Subbu Pillai should manage the trust properties. Of the several points which arose for decision in that case, the two points that are relevant to the instant case are: (1) whether a hereditary absolute trusteeship was confered upon Subbu Pillai and (2) what would be the legal position if the testator had conferred a limited trusteeship upon Subbu Pillai for the duration of his life-time. Of the several points which arose for decision in that case, the two points that are relevant to the instant case are: (1) whether a hereditary absolute trusteeship was confered upon Subbu Pillai and (2) what would be the legal position if the testator had conferred a limited trusteeship upon Subbu Pillai for the duration of his life-time. On the second aspect it was held that, on Subbu Pillas death, the right devolved upon his widow Thayyamuthu as the heir of Subbu Pillai in the view that the right to nominate a trustee after Subbu Pillais time reverted back to the founder Jambuga Ramalingam, that, on his death, that right also devolved upon Subbu Pillai himself and, on Subbu Pillais death, his widow Thayyamuthu would be entitled to function as trustee with absolute rights. In that case, the right of reverter to Subbu Pillai was contested by the lineal descendants of the founders brother. We may now refer to the relevant discussion in the Bench decision referred to above: “Let us now consider the various alternative constructions or interpretations of the will. Ramalinga, while appointing Subbu Pillai as trustee, conferred an absolute and heritable right of trusteeship upon Subbu Pillai, there was a total divestiture of all rights of Ramalinga as founder and there was no question of any reverter of any right from the trustee on his death so far as Ramalinga was concerned and the appointment of trustees in future or laying down the rule of devolution was the exclusive right of Subbu Pillai. When once the will took effect, Subbu Pillai became the trustee and it is his exclusive privilege or right to constitute a trustee to ‘succeed him or to lay down the rule of devolution. The result was, that, as soon as Subbu Pillai died, Thayyamuthu became entitled to be the trustee, functioned as such trustee and she bad also the right to nominate a trustee to succeed her and/or to lay down the rule of devolution of trusteeship. Subbu Pillai, during his life-time had two rights: (1) the right to be the trustee; (where there is no beneficial interest in any of the trust properties, it is really a trust solely burdened with duties and obligations) and (2) the sole right or the privilege to appoint his successor and/or to lay down the rule of devolution of the trusteeship. On Subbu Pillais death both the rights devolved upon Thyyamuthu and Thayyamuthu therefore, had full competence to appoint her successor and/or to lay down the rule of devolution of trusteeship to function in future. Under the compromise, Ex. B-1, She has nominated her successor or successors and also laid down the rule of devolution on the death of the trustee for the time being. At the time when Ramalinga executed the will, Subbu Pillai, his only son, was the sole owner and it will be an unnatural reading of the will to hold that Ramalinga reserved for himself, any right as founder to lay down the rule of devolution and merely appointed Subbu Pillai as trustee during his life-time. The provision which the founder has made for the management of the properties during the minority of Subbu Pillai, coupled with the provision that on his attainment of majority the guardian must hand over possession of the entire properties to Subbu Pillai to function as trustee thereafter, shows that Ramalingas intention was to confer an absolute heritable trusteeship upon Subbu Pillai. In the environment and set-up of the family, if Ramalinga intended to delimit the trusteeship upto the life-time of Subbu Pillai, Ramalinga would certainly have laid down the provision with regard to further devolution. There is the further important fact that the will itself does not delimit the duration of the trusteeship upto Subbu Pillais life-time, in which case some problem may arise as to the right of the founder or his heirs to nominate successors or to enter into arrangements altering the rule. Under the will Subbu Pillai, has been appointed trustee and there is no other or further provision. If the intention of the founder was that it is merely an appointment delimited to the life-time of Subbu Pillai the founder would have made some provision after that contingency. Under the will Subbu Pillai, has been appointed trustee and there is no other or further provision. If the intention of the founder was that it is merely an appointment delimited to the life-time of Subbu Pillai the founder would have made some provision after that contingency. Nothing of the kind was done, but, on the other hand, Subbu Pillai was appointed trustee, which, in law, amounts to conferring an absolute heritable trusteeship upon Subbu Pillai: As observed already, the circumstances of the family, the fact that Ramalinga was very old at the time of the will and Subbu Pillai was his only son and was deeply attached to him lends considerable support to this view that Ramalinga did not think of any other aspect concerning the devolution Of trusteeship and he was content to confer an absolute heritable trusteeship upon Subbu Pillai. In other words, we are clearly of the view that there is absolutely nothing in the surrounding circumstances of the case and in the language of the will to warrant an interpretation that Ramalinga merely appointed Subbu Pillai delimiting the trusteeship to his life-time and not making any provision, as to reserve the power for himself to lay down the further rule of devolution. At that time he was very old and it will be unnatural in the extreme if we introduce the notion that Ramalinga reserved and retained for himself any further power to lay down the rule of devolution. “We may refer to the decision of the privy Council reported in Tripurarl Pal v. Jagat Tarini Basi 40 Cal 274 P.C. In that case, the founder, the grandfather founded a trust and executed a will that his son will be shebait for the performance of certain ceremonies. The will also contained a provision that if the testator died during the minority of the son, the second wife of the testator was to be the shebait as guardian of the minor son, and that on the sons attaining majority, the son would personally conduct the work of the sheba . The will contained the further provision that if, during the life-time or after the death of the testator, the son died, then the testators widow would be the shebait and after her, her daughters. The will contained the further provision that if, during the life-time or after the death of the testator, the son died, then the testators widow would be the shebait and after her, her daughters. The Privy Council held that, on a true construction of the will, there was absolute gift of the shcbaitship to the son on his attaining majority and was not cut down by anything that followed in the will. The High Court took the view that under the will the son had only a right to the shebaitship for his life. But the Privy Council, on appeal, did not agree with this view. In other words, the clause in the will, “my present begotten son Mukunda Murari will be shebait for the performance of those ceremonies”, was held by the Privy Council as conferring an absolute gift of shebaitship on Mukunda Murari. The problem that if the shebait appointed by the founder died without exercising the power of appointing a successor the right would revert back to the founder, would arise only if the founder had reserved such a right of reverter. The normal rule, that if for any reason, the term of the office of the shebait appointed by the testator comes to an end, the role of Hindu law gives the choice of shebait to the heirs of the founder would apply only in the absence of a context to the contrary in the terms of the will and the surrounding circumstances of the particular case. “In the instant case, even assuming that the founder had appointed his son, Subbu Pillai, as trustee only for the duration of his life-time and there was a consequent reverter to the founder or his heirs or his nominees, the situation would not make any difference. This well settled right of reverter could accrue at the time when a vacancy occurred by the death, removal or otherwise of the trustee for the time being. Even if we construe the will as constituting an appointment of Subbu pillai as trustee only for his life-time, the power to appoint the successor throughout inhered and vested in Jambuga Ramalinga, the founder, on his death in 1880, that power to nominate the successor would devolve upon his heirs, and in the instant case, upon Subbu Pillai himself. Even if we construe the will as constituting an appointment of Subbu pillai as trustee only for his life-time, the power to appoint the successor throughout inhered and vested in Jambuga Ramalinga, the founder, on his death in 1880, that power to nominate the successor would devolve upon his heirs, and in the instant case, upon Subbu Pillai himself. The result is, Subbu Pillai is the trustee for his life-time in one capacity and he is also the inheriter of the right to appoint or nominate a successor or lay down the rule of devolution as the heir and the only son of the founder. When both the rights coalesce in the same person, the result will be that from the moment of the death of Jambuga Ramalinga, Subbu Pillai has become entitled to an absolute trusteeship, in the sense that he can appoint or nominate his successor and or also to lay down the rule of devolution. We may refer to the following statement of the law in N.R. Raghavachariars Hindu Law (sixth (1970) Edition at page 677:) “if, on the other hand, the founder has parted with his right only in a partial manner for the life-time of the grantee, the residue still remains in him and his heirs, and on the death of the grantee the heir of the founder living at the time is entitled to shebaitship. If the grantee in such cases happens to be the sole heir of the founder upon whom the residuary right devolves on the death of the founder and he becomes the shebait under law as well, then, his position is that of an absolute shebait w hose right devolves upon his heir at his death and not upon the then heirs of the founder. If there was no grant in his favour he would have been entitled to an estate of ineritance under law as regards the shebaiti and the fact that there is a grant in his favour of a limited right cannot make his position worse, and take away from him the higher rights which he had irrespective of the grant. If there was no grant in his favour he would have been entitled to an estate of ineritance under law as regards the shebaiti and the fact that there is a grant in his favour of a limited right cannot make his position worse, and take away from him the higher rights which he had irrespective of the grant. Hence where a Hindu who had established certain family idols and dedicated considerable properties directed by his deed of dedication that after him, his son should be the shebait in his stead and the further provisions in that deed regarding succession to the son in the shebait were of no effect in law, it was held that on the death of the son, who had survived the founder, the shebaitship should go to the sons heirs, and not to the heirs of the father” Vide: also the statement of the law to the same effect in Maynes Hindu Law (Eleventh Edition) at pages 946 and 947. The law is stated in these terms in Mukherjeas Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, Latest (Third) Edition, 1970) at page 162: “It must be taken to be settled by the decision of the Privy Council that when the founder makes only a limited grant of shebaitship, the residue still remains in him and his heirs as an estate of inheritance. When the limited shebaitship ends, the next shebait would be the person in whom this residuary estate of the founder was vested at the termination of the limited shebaitship.” At this stage, we may refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Bhabatarini Debi v. Ashalata Debi A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 89 on which the above statement of the law in the leading text books rests. In that case, the founder S. appointed his only son, P, as the trustee and made other; provisions on the death of S, but those provisions became illegal and ineffective and the Privy Council held that the interest given to P, the son, did not defeat his heritable right and did not exclude his heirs. The following head-note brings out the principle underlying this decision, i.e., so far as the bare right to trusteeship is concerned, the law of succession that is applied is the ordinary law of inheritance: “The shebait is property. The following head-note brings out the principle underlying this decision, i.e., so far as the bare right to trusteeship is concerned, the law of succession that is applied is the ordinary law of inheritance: “The shebait is property. It is not a catena of successive life estates, but is heritable—heritable property which, in the first instance, is vested in the founder. The founder may direct that a designated person should hold the office during that persons life either immediately or on the death of a previous holder. Such direction—subject to the relevant conditions as to perpetuity, whatever these may be—will be good although it carries no right to the heirs of the grantee and does not amount to a complete disposal of the shebaiti. On the death of the grantee the shebaiti goes to the founder or his heirs, because the right of founder is heritable and he has not completely disposed of the interest which he has therein. It is impossible to represent this as a spes successions . It is a right in the founder and his heirs. It is the same estate of inheritance as the founder held at the date of the grant. The grant did not exhaust it or terminate the founders interest. On the death of the grantee the shebaiti reverts, because the heritable interest of the founder has ceased to be qualified by the grant. The fact that the shebait in office completely represents the idol and its property, does not prevent the recognition of any other person as having a vested interest in remainder; and thus preventing any interest in the shebaiti from being carried along the straight line of inheritance from the founder during the time that the office is held by any person to whom the founder has granted the shebaiti but not absolutely or so as to devolve upon his heirs. Applying the principle of this decision to this case, it is clear that the moment the founder Jambuga Ramalinga died, the right to appoint or nominate the successor or the right to lay down the rule of devolution devolved and became vested in Subbu Pillai as an absolute heritable right and thereafter, there is no question of the reverter of the right to Jambuga Ramalinga.” 5. From the preceding discussion, it follows that under Ex. From the preceding discussion, it follows that under Ex. A-26 the defendant has been validly constituted trustee to administer and manage the trust properties. 6. Let me now examine the legal position even assuming that the appointment of the defendant as trustee is invalid and on the death of Ammakutti, the trustees of the temple alone would be entitled to manage and administer the trust properties. It is here, the question of the limitation becomes relevant. There cannot be any dispute whatever that, after the death of Ammakutti, the defendant got into possession and managed the properties asserting rights under Ex. A-26, she wrongly claimed to be a trustee and asserted a right to manage and administer the trust properties as such, while, according to the correct legal position, the temple authorities would be the persons who would be entitled to administer and manage the trust properties. There is no doubt that from 1941 onwards, the defendant has been claiming and asserting these rights. It is obvious that, whoever may be entitled to be the trustee, his rights would be extinguished and the defendant would have acquired rights by adverse possession. It does not matter what label we give to the precise nature of the claim and right put forward and asserted by the defendant. In substance, the claim on the right put forward by the defendant is to be in possession and manage the properties and perform and administer the trust founded under the will: Ex. A-1. Both the courts readily assumed that by reason of S. 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, lapse of time is no bar. S. 10 runs as follows: “S. 10. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hand such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time. Explanation : For the purposes of this Section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific put pose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof”. Explanation : For the purposes of this Section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific put pose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof”. (Explanation, added by the Amendment I of 1929). From the very language of S. 10, it will, at once, be noticed that S. 10 would not apply where the subject in dispute is rival and competing claims to trusteeship. If a person, who is a trustee either by reason of a valid legal appointment or by reason of acquisition of title to such a right by adverse possession, is in possession of the trust properties and administering the trust, under substantive law, another third person cannot file a suit to recover possession of the property from the former. If there is no right to institute a suit under the substantive law, S. 10 of the Limitation Act will not confer any right of suit. S. 10 postulates the person who institutes a suit having a right to recover possession of the property. A succeeding trustee can file a suit against a trustee who has been dismissed or removed or whose trusteeship has come to an end or even a beneficiary can file a suit, provided the necessary conditions under the substantive law for a right to maintain such a suit are satisfied. In other words, if the main dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant, on which the whole suit rests even though there may be other reliefs prayed for, relates to the right to the trusteeship, S. 10 cannot be invoked, merely because there is no bar, under S. 10, to recover possession of the properties vested in the trustee. It is settled law that if the plaintiff sues only for his own personal rights to manage, or in some way, to control the management of the trust. S. 10 does not apply (Vide: U.N. Mitras Limitation Act, latest (eighth) edition. Volume I page 181, Foot-note 16 and page 182. Foot-notes 22 and 23). It is again settled law that if the plaintiffs right to the office itself has been extinguished by lapse of time, his right to recover possession also would be extinguished. S. 10 does not apply (Vide: U.N. Mitras Limitation Act, latest (eighth) edition. Volume I page 181, Foot-note 16 and page 182. Foot-notes 22 and 23). It is again settled law that if the plaintiffs right to the office itself has been extinguished by lapse of time, his right to recover possession also would be extinguished. I may also refer to the statement of the law to the same effect in the same book (Volume II, at pages 1636 and 1637, foot-note, (1) and at page 1639), Foot-notes 23 and 24 and also Rustomji at page 117. It shall now refer to the leading decisions of the Privy Council which have been referred to by the learned author. Reference may first be made to the earliest leading decision of the Privy Council in Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal 6 All. Page 1. In that case, the plaintiffs ancestors had founded at Thakur Ganeshji in village named Mandesi and dedicated certain properties to maintain the worship of the temple. The ancestor of the defendant was first appointed manager to look after the temple and manage the properties, but from 1842 onwards, the ancestor of the defendant set up an independent and hostile attitude towards the family and claimed that he was never the agent of the plaintiffs family, but that he was managing the temple and its properties in his own independent right. The attempts of the plaintiffs family (before the Revenue authority, the Collector) to restore possession of the properties to the plaintiff asserting a right to remove the defendant proved futile and went against him on 1st September 1865. More than twelve years thereafter, the plaintiff filed the suit against the defendant asserting a right to the management of the temple and its properties and to remove the defendant from the management and control of the properties of the temple and also for recovery of possession of the temple properties. One of the points raised was the question of limitation and the trial court overruled the plea and decreed the suit, but in appeal, the High Court dismissed the suit holding that S. 10 of the Limitation Act bad no application to the case, and this decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Privy Council. One of the points raised was the question of limitation and the trial court overruled the plea and decreed the suit, but in appeal, the High Court dismissed the suit holding that S. 10 of the Limitation Act bad no application to the case, and this decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Privy Council. Sir A. Hob house, delivering the judgment of the Board, observed as follows at pages 9 and 10: “The next ground is that the case must be taken as falling within S. 10 of Act 9 of 1971, which deals with trust property. That section is as follows:— “No suit against a person, in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his representatives, for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, shall be barred by any length of time”. Their Lordships are of opinion that the expression used by the Legislature, ‘for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property’, means for the purpose of recovering the property for the trusts in question; that when property is used for some purpose other than the proper purpose of the trusts in question, it may be recovered, without any bar of time, from the hands, of the persons indicated in the Section. But, here, there is no question of recovering the property for the trusts of the endowment, because the defendant admits that he is a trustee, and says that he is applying the property to the trusts of the endowment. There is no evidence that he is not applying the property to the trusts of the endowment, and there is no reason to conclude that the property would be more applied to those trusts if the plaintiff were to succeed in his suit than it is at this moment. The plaintiff is suing only for his own personal right to manage, or in some way to control the management of the endowment. The consequence is that the case does not fall within S. 10 of the Limitation Act. If it does not, then it must be within one of the Articles of the schedule. The plaintiff is suing only for his own personal right to manage, or in some way to control the management of the endowment. The consequence is that the case does not fall within S. 10 of the Limitation Act. If it does not, then it must be within one of the Articles of the schedule. Their Lordships do not see any reason to differ from the High Court in thinking that it may fall within Art. 123 or Art. 145, but they desire to express no opinion upon that point, and there is some difficulty in ascertaining the exact nature of the suit, owing to the obscurity with which the plaintiffs title is stated in the plaint. But, if it does not fall within either of those Sections, then the case is caught by the general Art. 118, which provides for every case that is not previously provided for in the Act. Therefore, either the suit is barred in six years or in twelve years,—it matters not which, for the cause of action arose, at all events, before the year 1865”. This decision of the Privy Council was followed by a Bench of this court in Karimshah v. Nattan Bivi 7 Mad. 417 consisting of Sir C.A. Turner, C.J., and Muthusami Ayyar, J. In that case, the plaintiffs family had founded a trust and dedicated certain properties and the plaintiff instituted a suit in 1880 to remove the defendant from the management of the properties of which he claimed to be a trustee and also for recovery of possession of the properties. The Bench held that the suit was barred by limitation on the ground that the second defendant obtained possession of the trust properties and asserted the right to be the trustee thereof for more than twelve years prior to the suit and that the suit was merely a claim to vindicate the personal right of a trustee to the possession of immovable property against another person claiming that right in the same character and that S. 10 would not apply to a suit of that character. The next decision to be referred to is the decision of Muthusami Ayyar and Hadley, JJ., reported in Sankaran v. Krishna 16 Mad. 456. The next decision to be referred to is the decision of Muthusami Ayyar and Hadley, JJ., reported in Sankaran v. Krishna 16 Mad. 456. In that case, a suit was brought by the plaintiff claiming title as the uralan of a Devswom and for recovery of possession of the properties from the defendant, treating the defendant as the agent of the plaintiff. The defendants plea was accepted that he was never the agent of the plaintiff. In this view, it was held that the suit filed more than twelve years from the time when the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff and set up hostile title in himself would be barred by limitation. The decision of the Privy Council in Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal 6 All. 1 (referred to above) was followed, the Bench observing as follows: It is then argued that Article 124 of the Second Schedule of the Act of Limitation could not apply unless respondent stated who the real uralan was. But we do not think that that article is applicable, the suit being one based on the alleged relation of uralan and pattamali between appellant and respondent. The suit is clearly barred either by Article 120 or 144, and as more than twelve years had elapsed before suit, it is unnecessary to decide which Article applies. The present case is similar to the one in Balwant Rao Bishwant Chandra Choa Puran Mal Chaube L.R. 10 I.A. 90-6. All. 1. It is sufficient to refer to two decisions of the Privy Council resported in Arunachallam chetty v. Venkatachalpathi Guruswamigal 43 Mad. 253 (P.C.) and Ambalavana Pandara Sannidhi v. Sundareswarar Devastanam of Madras 45 Mad. 665 (P.C.) in which the Privy Council followed the earlier decisions in Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal 6 All. 1 in circumstances somewhat similar to the instant case. In Arunachallam Chetty v. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 43 Mad. 253 (P.C.) the plaintiff, at the head of a Muti, instituted a suit to declare that the defendants had. no right to manage the trust properties in the village of Patharakudiand also for recovery of possession of the properties. 1 in circumstances somewhat similar to the instant case. In Arunachallam Chetty v. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 43 Mad. 253 (P.C.) the plaintiff, at the head of a Muti, instituted a suit to declare that the defendants had. no right to manage the trust properties in the village of Patharakudiand also for recovery of possession of the properties. The defendants resisted the claim on the ground that for over eighty years they and their predecessors in title were in possession of the trust properties, not for their own advantage, but, for the benefit of the Mutt and they continued in possession and management of it on behalf of the Mutt and the suit was barred by limitation. On the facts it was found that there was no proof that the defendants managed the trust on behalf of the plaintiff. Indeed, the evidence was that the defendants and their predecessor-in-title managed the properties claiming in their own independent right for over half a century to the knowledge of the plaintiff and the suit was therefore barred by limitation. Summing up the factual and legal position, the Privy Council observed as follows at pages 269 and 270: “With regard to the second point mentioned, namely that the possession by the Chetties has not been adverse to the Gurukkal , their Lordships fail to understand on what the difficulty of the court below rests. Here was possession, not as in right of the gurukkal, but as in the Chetties own right, with all the incidents of possession, namely, the purchase of lands, the borrowing of lands, the erection of buildings, the letting of holdings, the making payments to the priest for his support and spiritual services, the keeping of the village accounts. The mahant was presumably aware of these transactions, extending now in his own time for over half a century, yet the first real challenge thereof appears to be the institution of this suit itself. This is a very ordinary case of possession nec vinec clam dec precarico . The person now claiming to be owner has stood by while others continued to possess, not by any derivative title, but in practical contravention of his alleged rights. The law does not require that the claimant to ownership must, in such circumstances, be shown to have protested, and that his rights were being violated, and that the possession went on adversely to his protests. The law does not require that the claimant to ownership must, in such circumstances, be shown to have protested, and that his rights were being violated, and that the possession went on adversely to his protests. In short, their Lordships cannot agree with the legal view upon this subject of possession adopted by the court below. “In these circumstances, there seems to the Board in reason why the law of limitation should not apply. In Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal 6 All. 1 P.C ‘it was held that limitation applied to cases where the defendant admitted he was a trustee, and the plaintiff, without proving misapplication, brought a suit more than twelve years after the cause of action arose, the object of the suit being to obtain control of the management. As Lord (then Sir Arthur) Hob house observed, in words which are applicable to the present case:— “Here there is no question of recovering the property for the trusts of the endowment, because the defendant admits that he is a trustee and says that he is applying the property to the trusts of the endowment. There is no evidence that he is not applying the property to the trusts of the endowment, and there is no reason to conclude that the property would be more applied to these trusts if the plaintiff were to succeed in his suit than it is at this moment. The plaintiff is suing only for his own personal right to manage, or in some way to control the management of the endowment”. “The present case is still stronger for the application of the rule of limitation, as the assertion is made, not only of the right to management, but of the right of beneficial ownership. But, while, in their Lordships opinion, the suit would be excluded by the twelve years limitation, they have, on the ground already stated, thought it right to deal with the whole breadth of the argument presents”. The next decision of the Privy Council is the one reported in Ambalavana Pandara Sannidhi v. Meenakshi Sundareswarar Devastanam of Madura Reported in 38 M.L.J. 217 affirming the judgment of the Madras High Court. The next decision of the Privy Council is the one reported in Ambalavana Pandara Sannidhi v. Meenakshi Sundareswarar Devastanam of Madura Reported in 38 M.L.J. 217 affirming the judgment of the Madras High Court. In the Privy Council case, the Pandar Sannidhi of Thiruyadur Mutt Reported in 38 M.L.J. 217 filed a suit against the Sri Meenakshi Sundareswarar Devasthanam, Madurai to recover possession of four villages situate in Madurai district of which an endowment had been made called Thanappa Mudali Kattalai by the Mutt for the performance of certain ceremonies in the temple at Madurai. On the facts, it was found that for over five decades prior to the institution of the suit, the temple authorities were in possession and management of the properties claiming to be the trustees or managers thereof, and it was held that S. 10 had no application, because, the main dispute in the suit related to the right to the management or trusteeship of the endowment. It is sufficient to extract the concluding portion of the judgment at page 674, which contains the ratio of the decision: “In the year 1849, the Government, which was undoubtedly then in possession of the villages in suit, handed them over to the manager of the temple of Madurai (the appointment of whom was in their hands), and there is no doubt that from that time they have been in the possession of such manager and the Temple Committee which is also appointed by Government. The Pandara Sannidhi made no opposition to their being so handed over. From that time onwards it is beyond question that the plaintiff has been out of possession of these villages. If ha has any right to claim possession in his suit he undoubtedly had the same right in 1849, and therefore, as at the date of the suit, he had been out of possession of those villages for nearly sixty years, his claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and this appeal fails”. (Note: This aspect is discussed in the judgment of the Madras High Court in the same case reported in 28 M.L.J. 217, at page 227 and page 249.) There is no need for further citation. For all these reasons, the second appeal is allowed and the plaintiffs suit, dismissed. No costs throughout. Leave refused.