Judgement PATHAK, J. :- This appeal is from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Dhubri. 2. The plaintiffs case is that the land described in the schedule to the plaint originally belonged to Bijendra Nath Brahma, who had been enjoying the said land. After his death the suit land was inherited by his widow Rauswari Brahmani, pro forma defendant No. 2, and his son Pagla Brahma. Pagla Brahma died leaving his mother defendant No. 2 as the sole heir of the suit land. After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act on 17th June, 1956, the defendant No. 2 became the absolute owner of the suit property. Defendant No. 2 continued to live with plaintiff Satish Chandra Brahma alias Satindra Brahma, who cultivated the suit land as an "Adhiar". On 5-2-1962 the defendant No. 2 made a gift of the suit land to the plaintiff and executed a registered deed of gift and since then the plaintiff had been possessing and cultivating the suit land by virtue of his own right. Thereafter at the instance of the defendant No. 1 a proceeding under Sec. 145. Criminal P. C. was started and the suit land was attached in that proceeding. The Criminal Court in the proceeding under Section 145, Criminal P. C. declared possession in favour of the defendant No. 1 Baigram Brahma. The plaintiff therefore filed the suit for declaration of his right, title and interest in the suit land and for recovery of khas possession. Defendant No. 2 filed a written statement admitting that she had made a gift of the suit land to the plaintiff. 3. Defendant No. 1 contested the suit and filed a written statement. The Defendant No. 1 averred that pro forma defendant No. 2 did not execute any deed of gift in favour of the plaintiff and even if any such deed of gift was executed it was invalid in law and the plaintiff could not acquire any title on the strength of such a deed of gift. The Defendant No. 1 averred that pro forma defendant No. 2 did not execute any deed of gift in favour of the plaintiff and even if any such deed of gift was executed it was invalid in law and the plaintiff could not acquire any title on the strength of such a deed of gift. The defendant No. 1 next averred that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which came into force with effect from 17th June, 1956 was not applicable to the instant case inasmuch as the plaintiff and the defendants belonged to the Scheduled Tribal Community of Assam and therefore the defendant No. 2 did not acquire absolute title to the suit property and the transfer by way of gift in favour of plaintiff, if any, did not confer any title on the plaintiff. The defendant No. 1 also denied that the plaintiff was ever allowed to hold the land in question as "Adhiar". The defendant No. 1 further averred that the suit land was not the self-acquired property of late Bijendra Nath Brahma who was the husband of pro forma defendant No. 2 and elder brother of the defendant No. 1. That Binna Ram Brahma the father of late Bijendra Nath Brahma and Baigram Brahma (Defendant No. 1) came to Bangshijhora village. P. S. Bilasipara from Lalmati village. P. S. Golokganj about 30/35 years ago and began to live there with Bania Brahma, the nephew of Binnaram Brahma. At that time Binnaram Brahma was very old and incapable of doing any work. Late Bijendra Brahma and the defendant No. 1 reclaimed the suit land and began to live there by cultivating the same. In the meantime Binnaram Brahma died and after his death late Bijendra Brahma and defendant No. 1 began to live in the same family and to possess the suit land jointly. Afterwards according to prevalent practice a petition was filed for settlement of the said land in favour of Bijendra Brahma, who was the Karta of the family. Accordingly settlement was obtained from the Zamindar of Parvat Jowar in 1346 B. S. (corresponding to 1939-40 A. D.) and both defendant No. 1 and late Bijendra Brahma continued to possess the land jointly. About 18/19 years back Bijendra died and after his death defendant no. Accordingly settlement was obtained from the Zamindar of Parvat Jowar in 1346 B. S. (corresponding to 1939-40 A. D.) and both defendant No. 1 and late Bijendra Brahma continued to possess the land jointly. About 18/19 years back Bijendra died and after his death defendant no. 1 kept his nephew late Aduram Brahma and defendant No. 2 Rauswari Brahma in his family and maintained them by cultivating the suit land. Aduram Brahma died 5/6 years after Bijendras death. Defendant No. 2 continued to live in the family of defendant No. 1 who used to maintain her. Thereafter about 10 years back Rupsingh Brahma took away defendant No. 2 from the house of defendant No. 1. After leaving the house of defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 got the suit land recorded in her name without the knowledge of him during the settlement operation. Having come to know of this later on defendant No. 1 filed a petition in Revenue Court and the first defendants name was recorded by the Revenue Officer. That the second defendant was not the owner of the suit land and she had no title to it. The first defendant further stated that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed by the learned Munsiff. 1. Is the suit maintainable in the present form ? 2. Has the plaintiff any right, title and interest in the suit land ? 3. Had Bijendra Brahma any co-sharer in respect of the suit land ? 4. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 5. On consideration of the materials on record the learned Munsiff held that the suit was maintainable, that the plaintiff acquired title to the suit land by virtue of the deed of gift, that the first defendant failed to establish that he was a co-sharer in respect of the suit land with Bijendra Brahma and consequently the learned Munsiff decreed the plaintiffs suit. 6. The learned Assistant District Judge, on appeal, has discussed the evidence on record and found that the learned Munsiff decided issue No. 3 on wrong interpretation of the evidence of the first defendant. The learned Assistant District Judge has held that the first defendant has never admitted in his deposition that the second defendant was the sole owner of the suit land. The learned Assistant District Judge has held that the first defendant has never admitted in his deposition that the second defendant was the sole owner of the suit land. The learned Assistant District Judge has further held that while deciding issue No. 3 the learned Munsiff completely ignored two Khatians filed by both the parties, one final Khatian (Ext. 12) and the other final Khatian (Ext. Ka) which appears to be subsequent final Khatian issued in 1964. The Khatian Ext. Ka discloses that by an order dated 20-6-1964 in Case No. 696 (B) under Section 103 of the Goalpara Tenancy Act, Baigrana Brahmas name was recorded along with the name of Rauswari Brahmani. The Khatian Ext. Ka has not been challenged by the plaintiff. Smt. Rauswari Brahmani also has not challenged that Khatian. The final Khatian Ext. Ka is still standing as valid. It is, however, found that the Ext. Ka was issued in the year 1964, whereas the alleged gift of the suit land was in 1962. On consideration of the judgment of the learned Assistant District Judge, it is found that he has substantially found the first defendant to be a co-sharer with Bijendra Brahma in respect of the suit land. We are, however, constrained to observe that the learned Assistant District Judge has lacked in precision in discussing and arriving at decision in specific issues in the case. On going through the evidence and also the discussion of the evidence as made by the learned first Appellate Court, we are satisfied that the first defendant was a co-sharer in respect of the suit land with late Bijendra Brahma and therefore second defendant had no title in respect of one-half of the suit land in any case. 7. The next question that requires consideration is whether the second defendant had any right and title to transfer the suit land or any portion thereof by way of gift. The first defendant-respondent contends that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable to the parties in the present case. The relevant provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read as follows : "2 (1) This Act applies - (a) to any person, who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj. The relevant provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read as follows : "2 (1) This Act applies - (a) to any person, who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj. (b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and (c) to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. Explanation * * * * * (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of Clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs." Article 366 (25) reads as follows :- "366 (25) "Scheduled Tribes" means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this Constitution." Article 342 (1) reads as follows :- "342 (1) The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a State after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be." 8. By the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 Boro-Borokachari, and Kachari including Sonwal in the State of Assam excluding the Tribal areas, have been specified among others as Scheduled Tribes. Both parties admit that the plaintiff and the defendants are Boro-Borokachari, a Scheduled Tribe in the State of Assam. That being the position in view of sub-section (2) of S. 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the said Act is not applicable to the parties to the present case, who are admittedly members of a Scheduled Tribe namely, Boro-Borokachari in Assam. 9. That being the position in view of sub-section (2) of S. 2 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the said Act is not applicable to the parties to the present case, who are admittedly members of a Scheduled Tribe namely, Boro-Borokachari in Assam. 9. Even though the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable to the parties in the present suit, the Hindu Law as it was prior to 1956 will be applicable to the present case regarding succession. In Nearam Kadhari v. Ardaram Kachari. AIR 1921 Cal 558 (2), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court under the jurisdiction of which Assam was at the relevant time, observed as follows :- "The question whether the Hindu Law should be applied to the aborigines of Assam came up to this Court in several cases, and it was held that the Bengal School of Hindu Law applied to the people of Assam." 10. In the Calcutta case the parties were Kacharis and the Bengal School of Hindu Law was held to be applicable to the Kacharis. At page 87 of Maynes Hindu Law and Usage 11th Edition, it has been observed that the aborigines of Assam have become Hinduised and are governed by the Bengal School of Hindu Law and the observation is based on the decision in Deepo Debea v. Govindo Deb. (1871) 16 Suth WR 42; Dino Nath Mahunto v. Chundi Koch. (1912) 16 Cri LJ 14 and AIR 1921 Cal 558 (2) (supra). Considering the case law on the point, we are clearly of opinion that the parties in the present case who admittedly belong to Boro or Borokachari Scheduled Tribe are governed by the Bengal School of Hindu Law. But as discussed above they are not governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. That being the position the interest of second defendant in her husbands property or the last male owner was only life interest as understood in Hindu Law prior to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. According to the Bengal School of Hindu Law, every female who succeeds as an heir, whether to a male or to a female takes a limited estate in the property inherited by her (Vide Section 174 of Mullas Hindu Law). According to the Bengal School of Hindu Law, every female who succeeds as an heir, whether to a male or to a female takes a limited estate in the property inherited by her (Vide Section 174 of Mullas Hindu Law). "To uphold an alienation, by a widow or other limited heir of the corpus of immovable property inherited by her, it should be shown - (i) that there was legal necessity, or, (ii) that the alienee, after reasonable inquiry as to the necessity acted honestly in the belief that necessity existed, or, (iii) that there was such consent of the next reversioners to the alienation as would raise a presumption that the transaction was a proper one, or (iv) that it was a surrender by her or her whole interest in the whole estate in favour of the nearest reversioner or reversioners at the time of alienation. Where any one of the first three positions is established, the alienation may be of the whole or any part of the estate; but where the fourth alone is proved then the alienation must be of the whole estate. (Vide Section 178 of Mullas Hindu Law). 11. As the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable to the instant case the alienation of the suit property or any portion thereof by the second defendant may be only for legal necessity or for the reasons stated hereinabove (Vide Section 178 of the Mullas Hindu Law). A widow or other limited heir has no power to alienate the estate inherited by her from the deceased-owner except for the following purposes, namely :- (i) Religious or charitable purposes, (ii) Other purposes amounting to legal necessity - (Vide Section 131 of the Mullas Hindu Law). 12. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the instant case and since we have found that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable to the instant case the second defendant had no right of alienation by way of gift with respect to the suit land which she inherited as a limited heir of her husband or her deceased son. There is no allegation of legal necessity and as a matter of fact there could not be any question of legal necessity as it is a case of transfer by way of gift. There is no allegation of legal necessity and as a matter of fact there could not be any question of legal necessity as it is a case of transfer by way of gift. Consequently no title in the suit land, by the deed of gift in question executed by the second defendant passed in favour of the plaintiff in the instant case. 13. The learned Assistant District Judge has referred to a booklet Dhubri Mahkuma Boro Samajik Bidhan and it has been marked X. The booklet has not been duly proved. But D. W. 2 Harimohan Brahma, who is the Vice-President of the Boro Samaj of the Goalpara District, stated in cross-examination that they had written customary rights, but at the time of deposition the booklet was not with him. That printed booklet containing the customary rights of the Boro Community was produced in Court later on which was marked as X. According to the customs of the Boro Community also as recorded in the booklet it is found that the widow gets only life interest in her deceased husbands property. 14. Considering the facts and the law applicable to the instant case we agree with the finding of the learned Assistant District Judge that under the Boro customary rights or under the Hindu Law, as applicable to the Boro-Borokacharis in Assam, second defendant had no right to alienate the suit property by way of gift and by executing Ext. 1 she could not pass any valid title to the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff based his title to the suit land on the deed of gift, the plaintiffs case must necessarily fail. 15. In the result we find that this appeal has no substance and is dismissed without costs. The judgment and decree of the learned Assistant District Judge are affirmed. 16. B. ISLAM, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.