JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is an appeal u/s 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment of acquittal passed by Shri N. Sarangi, Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj Keonjhar acquitting the Respondent of the charge u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code in sessions Trial No-23-K of 1968. 2. The prosecution story ran thus One of the young daughters of the Respondent was suffering from fever and other ailments. As per custom prevailing among the Adibasis of the area, the Respondent worshipped their caste deity and made sacrifices of cocks praying for early recovery of the child. Illness continued in spite of sacrifice of several cocks and the Respondent came to suspect that deceased Palmani had practised witchcraft upon the child. In the evening prior to the date of occurrence the wife of the Respondent had been rebuking the people at large without naming any individual person that there were ladies in the hutment around who practiced witchcraft upon her daughter as a result of which she was not recovering. In the afternoon on 19-5-1968 p.w. 1, the husband of the deceased, had been to Baripada to fetch medicine for his eldest son. On his way he dropped into the house of the Respondent and enquired from his wife as to why she was rebuking the previous evening. P.w. 1 was told that her daughter was ill and was not recovering in spite of customary worship to the caste deity. She further disclosed that she was satisfied that there was some witch in the locality who had practiced witchcraft upon her daughter. At about 3 P.M. the deceased had been to the house of Radha Munda (husband of p.w. 2) to fetch some fire to light her oven. She was sitting in front of the house of p.w. 2 by the road side and p.w. 2 was also sitting on her varendah. All of a sudden the deceased cried out that she had been shot by an arrow. P.w. 2 ran to her and found that the arrow had pierced into the chest of the deceased. She noticed that the Respondent was attempting to shoot again. P.w. 2 protested and asked the Respondent to desist. The Respondent thereupon left the place with the bow and arrow in hand. The deceased attempted to walk back to her house but fell dead on the way in the village road. She noticed that the Respondent was attempting to shoot again. P.w. 2 protested and asked the Respondent to desist. The Respondent thereupon left the place with the bow and arrow in hand. The deceased attempted to walk back to her house but fell dead on the way in the village road. P.w. 3, a young son of the deceased was in the neighbourhood. Hearing the mother's cry he ran to the spot and found that his mother had (dropped down dead. He ran to inform his father about the Incident. He and p.w. 1 returned to the village and when p.w. 1 was satisfied about the information given to him to be true, he left p.w. 3 and another relation to look after the deed body and ran to the police station. The first information Report (Ext. 1) was lodged that very evening at about 6.35 P.M. After due investigation, the Respondent was charge-sheeted and ultimately committed to stand his trial in the Court of session for the offence u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The defence was a clean denial of the prosecution story. 4. In support of the prosecution case, II witnesses in all were examined. Of these, p.w. 1, the husband of the deceased was the informant. P.ws. 2 and 3 were the only eye witnesses. P.w. 2 happens to be the wife of one Radha Munda who is said to have seen, the Respondent armed with a bow and arrows and ready to shot the same. This obviously was after the first arrow had been shot. P.w. 3 who is aged about 15 to 16 at the time of occurrence happens to be the son of the deceased and p.w. 1. An extra judicial confession of the Respondent admitting the guilt was sought to be supported by p.ws. 4 and 5. P.w. 7 was the doctor while the other witnesses were either witnesses to seizure or police officers connected with the investigation. 5. The learned Sessions Judge who analysed the evidence of the two eye witnesses found some discrepancies and, therefore, discarded the same. He also did not accept the extra judicial confession which was spoken to by p.ws. 4 and 5 and accordingly came to hold that the prosecution had failed to bring home the charge of murder against the Respondent. Accordingly he acquitted the Respondent. 6. He also did not accept the extra judicial confession which was spoken to by p.ws. 4 and 5 and accordingly came to hold that the prosecution had failed to bring home the charge of murder against the Respondent. Accordingly he acquitted the Respondent. 6. The learned Additional Government Advocate contends that: (a) the reasoning advanced to discard p.ws. 2 and 3 is wrong and these two witnesses should have been accepted; (b) the learned trial Judge should not have drawn adverse inference against the prosecution case, because certain details were not in the First information Report. P.w. 1 was not an eye witness and, therefore, any deficiency in regard to material details in the First Information Report should not have been seriously viewed; (c) the extra judicial confession which was supported by p.ws 4 and 5 should not have been discarded by the learned trial Judge. 7. There is no dispute that the deceased died after she was shot with an arrow. It appears that the incident took place near about a colliery where there were hutments and the Respondent and the deceased were living in the same area. The incident took place on a Sunday. Some of the inmates of the hutment had gone out to the Hat, but as the evidence shows, many others were present. P.w. 2 spoke about the arrow shot was on the right side chest of the deceased. The medical evidence is that the arrow shot is on the left side. She in her evidence in-chief stated: ...The accused all of a sudden shot an arrow at her (deceased) which hit her on the right side of her chest. When the accused was about to shoot a second arrow at her, I intervened and asked him not to do so.... In her cross-examination, however, she stated: ...I did not see the accused when he first shot an arrow at Palmani the deceased, but when he attempted to shoot a second arrow at her I saw him outside the fence and intervened.... Thus, p.w. 2 is not a witness to the actual shooting of the arrow which fatally injured the deceased though in her evidence in chief, she purported to have been the actual shooting of it. P.w. 2 also seems to be a close relation of p.w. 1 and the deceased. Thus, p.w. 2 is not a witness to the actual shooting of the arrow which fatally injured the deceased though in her evidence in chief, she purported to have been the actual shooting of it. P.w. 2 also seems to be a close relation of p.w. 1 and the deceased. The learned trial Judge discarded her evidence on account of the fact that she was a close relation and there was some evidence of strained relationship between the Respondent and the family of the deceased. He further found that there was discrepancy in the evidence as to which portion of the incident she actually saw. There is also discrepancy as to which side of the deceased hits been injured by the arrow shot. The learned Additional Government Advocate contended that these are not good grounds for discarding the witness. Admittedly an arrow has been shot at the deceased and she became injured thereby. P.w. 2 is an Adibasi lady. There is enough scope for her having confused between the right and the left side of the chest. Even if p.w. 2 did not see the shooting of the arrow by which the deceased was wounded the fact that she saw the attempt of the Respondent to shoot again and when she prohibited, the Respondent walked away with the bow and arrow in his band, 18 sufficient to link up the Respondent with the incident of the shooting of the arrow. He also contended that the mere relationship is not enough for discarding such a material witness. The contentions of the learned Additional Government Advocate are not without force. But there is evidence to show that other independent witnesses were available. The incident took place within the buster and many residents were nearer about. The first information Report indicated that many others in the locality had peen the occurrence. In this background there was no justification for the prosecution to withhold material witness from the Court. P.w. 3 is a young boy of 15 to 16 years of age and happens to be the son of the deceased. He is said to have been busy playing and his attention was attracted towards her mother when she screamed after being wounded with the arrow shot. He half stated that he did not see the shooting at as but found that the Respondent was walking away with the bow and arrow. He is said to have been busy playing and his attention was attracted towards her mother when she screamed after being wounded with the arrow shot. He half stated that he did not see the shooting at as but found that the Respondent was walking away with the bow and arrow. The learned trial Judge found that his evidence in-chief and in cross-examination was not reconcilable. P.w. 2 had stated that there were no other persons present in the neighbourhood when she asked the Respondent to desist from shooting the second arrow. The learned trial Judge inferred from such evidence of p.w. 2 that p.w. 3 was near about and must have only come, if at all, to the spot after the incident was over. According to him p.w. 3 was, therefore, not an eye witness to the occurrence. The analysis made of the evidence of these two witnesses upon whom the prosecution relied as eye witnesses to the occurrence cannot be said to be wholly bad. In a recent decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Om Prakash, their Lordships indicated that the following ordinal rules should be kept in view in appeals against acquittal: Firstly, there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused which has to be kept in mind, especially when the accused has been acquitted by the Court below; Secondly, if two views of the matter are possible, the view favourable to the accused should be taken. Thirdly, in case of acquittal by the trial. Judge, the Appellate Court should take into account the fact that the trial Judge has the advantage of looking at the demeanour of the accused and Fourthly, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, the doubt should, however, be reasonable and should be such which rational thinking men will reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a timid mind which fights shy though unwittingly it may be or is afraid of the logical consequences if that benefit was not given. As we have just said, the conclusion about the evidence of p.ws. 2 and 3 cannot be said to be bad and we are not in a position to take a different view of it. 8. P.ws 4 and 5 are the two witnesses to support the extra judicial confession. As we have just said, the conclusion about the evidence of p.ws. 2 and 3 cannot be said to be bad and we are not in a position to take a different view of it. 8. P.ws 4 and 5 are the two witnesses to support the extra judicial confession. The learned trial Judge found that the evidence of p.w 4 was not corroborated by p.w. 5. He also found p.w. 5 to be an unreliable witness. There was some discrepancy in the evidence of p.w. 4 and the evidence of p.ws. 2 and 3 in the matter of the Respondent going away with the bow and arrow in hand P.w. 5 happens to be the father-in-law of the accused. The learned Additional Government Advocate contends that since p.w. 5 was such a close relation, his evidence should have been relied upon. It is also contended that these two witnesses were examined on the selfsame day by the police. There was no time for tutoring and, therefore, it must be taken to have been true. 9. P.w. 4 is a man from West Bengal. No particular friendship between the Respondent and' that witness has been indicated. It is difficult for us to concede that the Respondent must have gone to such a person to confess his guilt. P.w. 5 the father-in-law of the Respondent has denied in his cross-examination that the Respondent confessed before him. Thus we are not in a position to find really any support for the prosecution case from the evidence of p.ws. 4 and 5. The conclusion of the learned trial judge in regard to the accept ability of the extra judicial confession thus cannot be disputed. 10. The learned trial judge had further found that p.w. 1 bad improved upon his evidence at the trial by stating that the wife of the Respondent had told him that they suspected the deceased as the witch. If this was really a fact, it could not have been omitted from the first Information report. We have no doubt in our mind that the First Information Report is not accepted to be the encyclopedia of the prosecution case. But in the First Information Report (Ext. 1) such detail about other aspect of the witch craft have been indicated that if this was true, it should not have been omitted. We have no doubt in our mind that the First Information Report is not accepted to be the encyclopedia of the prosecution case. But in the First Information Report (Ext. 1) such detail about other aspect of the witch craft have been indicated that if this was true, it should not have been omitted. In that circumstances adverse inference may be drawn for omission of a material particular from the First Information Report would depend upon the facts of that case and the learned trial judge in the present case seems to have rightly drawn the adverse inference against the prosecution for such an omission. We are not prepared to take a different view of the matter. 11. The evidence on record does arise doubt in our mind against the Respondent. But on the basis of such doubt only, we cannot set aside the judgment of acquittal and convict the Respondent. Heavy burden lay on the prosecution to bring the charge home and on the evidence on record, we are not in a position to hold that such burden has been properly discharged and the Respondent can be found to be the author of the crime of murder. The doubt that hasarisen in our mind must resolve in favour of the accused and consequently the acquittal must be upheld. We dismiss the appeal. The Respondent who appears to be in custody subsequent to filing of the appeal be set at liberty forthwith. B.K. Ray, J. 12. I agree.