JUDGMENT : Madan Mohan Pd., J. There are in all 13 petitioners in both these cases who have come up against the ORDER :of their conviction and sentences passed against them under different sections as stated hereafter. 2. Petitioner Bindeshwari Mehta has been convicted under Sections 224 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced under the respective section to 1½ years' and 1 year rigorous imprisonment; the sentence to run concurrently. The other petitioners have been convicted under Sections 147 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment under each of them. They have also been convicted under Sections 225 and 332 of the Penal Code and under each section sentenced to one and half years' rigorous imprisonment. They had also been convicted by the Magistrate under Section 325/149 of the Penal Code and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment, but the appellate court has set aside the conviction and sentence thereunder. There was a charge against petitioner Arjun under Section 379 of the Penal Code for theft of the bicycle and torch bat he was acquitted of that charge. 3. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that there was a report of dacoity in the Sour Bazar Police station within the district of Saharsa and petitioner Bindeshwari was suspected in connection with that offence. Accordingly, the officer-in-charge of the aforesaid police station had sent a requisition to A.S.I. Rampujan Singh who was incharge of Pama shivir within the jurisdiction of the aforesaid Police station, for the arrest of Bindeshwari and two other accused who do not figure in these case. The A.S.I. arrested one of the three such persons but there was delay in the arrest of Bindeshwari. Accordingly, a reminder was Bent to him for arresting Bindeshwari. The A.S.I., therefore, tock the Dafadar and a few choukidars along with him on the 15th of October, 1965 at about 3 O’clock in the morning and went to arrest petitioner Bindeshwari. The A.S.I. took his bicycle also but gave it to one of the chonkidars for carrying it. Accordingly, a reminder was Bent to him for arresting Bindeshwari. The A.S.I., therefore, tock the Dafadar and a few choukidars along with him on the 15th of October, 1965 at about 3 O’clock in the morning and went to arrest petitioner Bindeshwari. The A.S.I. took his bicycle also but gave it to one of the chonkidars for carrying it. At about 4 O'clock the party reached near the house of the accused and one of the choukidars was sent to call petitioner Bindeshwari who brought him near the A.S.I. The A.S.I. told him that there was a requisition for his arrest and he was, therefore, placing him under arrest and wanted him to accompany him to the thana Bindeshwari, hearing this tried to escape but was caught by the Dafadar. He then shouted for help, upon which eleven of these petitioners came armed with lathi and dantas and began to assault the A.S.I. and his men. As a result, Bindeshwari escaped from the custody and snatched the bicycle of the A.S.I. The Police party then tried to flee away but were chased and some more men joined the chasers. Ultimately, the A.S.I. was caught but others ran away. He was brought to the door of Bindeshwari, his hands were tied with a rope, fastened to a pillar and in this position was made to sit on a bench. Some more persons arrived and they all started assaulting the A.S.I. with slaps and fists. Bindeshwari is said to have snatched the wrist watch of the A.S.I. and his torch light was taken possession of by petitioner Arjun. Three other persons then incited the mob to assault the A.S.I. and he was further assaulted. At about 8 O'clock two persons Awadh Mehta and Sukhdeo Singh came there and untied the A.S.I. and took him to the house of Sukhdeo. The Officer Incharge of the police station having learnt about the occurrence reached the village at about 1 O'clock in the afternoon and recorded the statement of the A.S.I. at the Baithka of Sukhdeo and started investigation and submitted charge sheet against 37 persons including the petitioners who were put on trial. 4. The Officer Incharge of the police station having learnt about the occurrence reached the village at about 1 O'clock in the afternoon and recorded the statement of the A.S.I. at the Baithka of Sukhdeo and started investigation and submitted charge sheet against 37 persons including the petitioners who were put on trial. 4. The defence of these petitioners is that the A.S.I. had come at night in plain dress to the house of one Kaushlya Devi, a widow aged about 25 years belonging to the Rajput community, who runs a small shop of Bidi etc. The A.S.I. knocked at her door while she was asleep and said that he wanted to purchase some Bidis, The door was then opened and the A.S.I. went in and started molesting her and ultimately raped her. On alarm being raised by her, one Muneshwar Sharma and Anandi Sharma arrived. The A.S.I. was then caught and brought outside and a mob collected and he was taken to the door of Bindeshwari where he was detained. It is said that he was assaulted by some villagers when he was trying to run away after having molested Kaushalya. It said that Kaushalya went to the Sarpanch to lodge a case but he was not available then and, therefore, she along with others went to Saharsa and filed a complaint before the Sub-divisional Magistrate. 5. The learned Magistrate acquitted 24 persons tried by him and convicted the 13 petitioners as stated above. 6. It said that Kaushalya went to the Sarpanch to lodge a case but he was not available then and, therefore, she along with others went to Saharsa and filed a complaint before the Sub-divisional Magistrate. 5. The learned Magistrate acquitted 24 persons tried by him and convicted the 13 petitioners as stated above. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged the following points: (i) that the conviction of these petitioners under Sections 224 and 225 of the Indian Penal Code is bad in law because it appears from the evidence that the A.S.I. had not notified the substance of the ORDER :under Section 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') on the basis of which he claimed to have arrested petitioner Bindeshwari and the arrest was, therefore, illegal and the petitioners committed no offence in escaping or rescuing from the unlawful custody; (ii) That the learned Sessions Judge has not specifically upheld the conviction under Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code and the non-consideration of the case on the point makes the ORDER :of the learned Sessions Judge bad in law; (iii) that the individual cases of the petitioners have not been considered by the Court below; and (iv) that petitioners Arjun and Bhim being aged 18 years should not have been sentenced to substantive imprisonment in view of the Probation of Offenders' Act. 7. Before I take up the points it urged it is necessary to dispose of a preliminary question relating to limitation in respect of one of the applications, namely, Criminal Revision No. 2722 of 1969, According to the stamp report, it is barred by limitation being two days beyond time. A petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed explaining the delay. It is said that a vakalatnama executed by the fool petitioners who figure in this case separately had been given to the person or persons who came to file a revision application on behalf of 9 petitioners in the other case, but it was somehow lost with the result that the other case was filed on the 15th of November, 1969 but these four petitioners in the absence of the vakalatnama could not be impleaded as such. The petitioners were informed on the 17th of November, 1969 that they could not be made parties to the application. The petitioners were informed on the 17th of November, 1969 that they could not be made parties to the application. They then executed another vakalatnama and gave it to the father of petitioner Mohan Mehta who came to Patna and filed the revision application on the 19th of November, 1969, without obtaining a stamp report in view of shortage of time. In the circumstances aforesaid prayer is made for condoning the delay. These statements have not been controverted and there is nothing on the record to show that they are not true. In the circumstances I am satisfied that there was sufficient cause and accordingly I condone the delay. The cases of these petitioners also will, therefore, be dealt with on merits. 8. With regard to the first point, it is said that the A.S.I. (P.W. 14) had merely said to petitioner Bindeshwari that there was a warrant (requisition) for his arrest and he arrested him. This, it is said does not amount to notifying the substance of the ORDER :under Section 56 of the Code. Section 56(i) is as follows :- "When any officer in charge of a police station or any police officer making an investigation under Chapter XIV requires any officer subordinate to him to arrest without a warrant (otherwise than in his presence) any person who may lawfully be arrested without a warrant, he shall deliver to the officer required to make the arrest an ORDER :in writing, specifying the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made. The officer so required shall, before making the arrest, notify to the person to be arrested the substance of the ORDER :and, if so required by such power, shall show him the ORDER :." It is true that according to this section the person making the arrest has to notify the substance of the ORDER :and, if so required, to show him the ORDER :. In the present case, however, it appears from the evidence that Bindeshwari did not stop to ask the A.S.I. to show him the ORDER :or to elicit from him the substance of the ORDER :. It appears from the evidence that as soon as the A.S.I. had said what he had done the petitioner Bindeshwari tried to run away and was then caught by the Dafadar (P.W. 13). It appears from the evidence that as soon as the A.S.I. had said what he had done the petitioner Bindeshwari tried to run away and was then caught by the Dafadar (P.W. 13). There was thus no opportunity for the A.S.I. to tell him more than what he did. It is obvious that the requirement of Section 56 of the Code can be complied with only where there is an opportunity for its compliance. It would be no good if the officer who has come to arrest the person goes on giving the substance of the ORDER :after the person who is to be arrested has run away. It follows, therefore, that the omission to state all that the ORDER :under Section 56 contains cannot in such circumstances be held to be an omission resulting in the arrest becoming illegal. I am supported in the view which I have taken by a decision of a learned single Judge of this court in (1) Bisa Singh and another V. The State reported in 1955 Bihar Law Journal Reports 383. In that case it was held that Section 56 and 80 of the Code presupposes the case of a person who is willing to submit himself, for hearing the substance of the warrant or ORDER :or to see it, and they do not relate to the case of a person who is a fugitive and who wants to evade arrest or wants to forcibly resist any endeavour to arrest him and that in such case the provisions of Section 46 of the Code are attracted. 9. Apart from that I have said above, the evidence of the A.S.I. and the Dafadar on the point of what the former had stated to Bindeshwari, has been accepted by the courts below; he was informed that there was a requisition for his arrest and he was accordingly being arrested. Section 56 of the Code gives the requisite contents of such an ORDER :which are specification relating to the person to be arrested and the offence or other case for which the arrest is to be made. Section 56 of the Code gives the requisite contents of such an ORDER :which are specification relating to the person to be arrested and the offence or other case for which the arrest is to be made. In the present case the person specified to be arrested had been brought to the A.S.I. and he was told that a requisition for his arrest had come if petitioner Bindeshwari had stayed on to hear more, all that he would have been told further was that he was suspected for the commission of a dacoity. There was no occasion for that and, therefore, it seems to me that in the circumstance of this case there was a substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 56(1) of the Code. 10. Even if it be assumed that the substance of the ORDER :had not been notified the arrest of the petitioner would still be legal in view of Section 54, Sub-section (1), Clause (9) of the Code, which is as follows:- "54. (1) Any police-officer may, without an ORDER :from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest. ninthly, any person for whose arrest a requisition has been received from another police-officer, provided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears therefrom that the person might lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition." A police officer has the right to arrest without warrant a person for whose arrest a requisition has been received from another police officer provided it appears from the requisition that the person might lawfully be arrested without warrant by the officer who issued the requisition. Requisition was produced in evidence in this case and there is no dispute that there is any defect in its contents. The A.S.I. thus had his powers to arrest him under this clause of Section 54 independently of his right on the basis of the ORDER :under Section 56 (1) of the Code. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that Section 56(1) must be deemed to restrict the operation of Section 54(1), Clause (9), otherwise Section 56(1) would become nugatory. He relied on a decision in (2) Raja Mea and others V. Emperor reported in A.I.R. 1940 Calcutta 321. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that Section 56(1) must be deemed to restrict the operation of Section 54(1), Clause (9), otherwise Section 56(1) would become nugatory. He relied on a decision in (2) Raja Mea and others V. Emperor reported in A.I.R. 1940 Calcutta 321. In this case an officer incharge of Police station had handed over an ORDER :under Section 56 to a constable to arrest certain person. The question of legality of the arrest had not been raised at the trial but was raised in the lower appellate court for the first time, based upon the omissions in the prosecution evidence. The Sessions Judge had held that there was no evidence to show that the requirements of Section 56 had been complied with. He had however, held that the arrest was legal under Section 54. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that there was no evidence to bring the case within Section 54 because the constable did not say that he had information of suspicion that the accused was concerned in any cognizable offence nor the officer Incharge had said that he had given any information of the matter to the constable. The constable had been given only a hukumnama. In this case, therefore, the learned judges had no occasion to consider as to whether Clause (9) of Section 54(1) of the Code would make the arrest legal thereunder provided the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. This case is thus of no avail to the petitioners. 11. Reliance was placed on another case (3) The State V. Ram Chardra (A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad 438). In this case no written ORDER :under Section 56(1) had been given. The plea of the prosecution to the contrary was disbelieved and, therefore for want of a written ORDER :as provided by Section 56, the arrest was held to be illegal. 11. Reliance was placed on another case (3) The State V. Ram Chardra (A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad 438). In this case no written ORDER :under Section 56(1) had been given. The plea of the prosecution to the contrary was disbelieved and, therefore for want of a written ORDER :as provided by Section 56, the arrest was held to be illegal. Choudhary, J. did not accept the argument regarding the arrest being legal under Section' 54 of the Code and said; "The essential difference between Sections 54 and 56, Criminal Procedure Code is that while the former lays down in what cases may a police officer arrest a person without warrant, the latter prescribes the procedure to be followed in those cases when instead of making the arrest himself, the police officer, provided he is an officer in charge of a police station or a police officer making an investigation under Chapter 14 of the Code, deputes an officer subordinate to him to do so. The reason for the prescribing of this procedure, though it is quite unnecessary to probe into it, appears to be to pin both the superior and the subordinate officer down to their respective responsibilities where the former does not choose to act for himself but through the latter." But later he has observed: "There may, however, be a class of cases where, besides being armed with an ORDER :contemplated by Section 56, a police officer may also be possessed of the requisite information or requisition under Section 54, in which case his act will be supportable if it could assume legality under either Section." This case, in my view, is therefore no authority for the proposition that a police officer armed with an ORDER :under Section 56 cannot Exercise his powers under Section 54(1)(9) which is, independent of his power under Section 56(1). Nor does this case lay down the proposition that Section 56 restricts that exercise of the powers under Section 54(1)(9). In (act, the learned Judge has repelled the argument that Section 56 would become nugatory if it were possible to fall back upon Section 54 to legalise the act of a police officer when it was otherwise illegal under Section 56. He has further held that Section 54(1)(9) is not interchangeable with the provisions of Section 56(1). In (act, the learned Judge has repelled the argument that Section 56 would become nugatory if it were possible to fall back upon Section 54 to legalise the act of a police officer when it was otherwise illegal under Section 56. He has further held that Section 54(1)(9) is not interchangeable with the provisions of Section 56(1). The learned Judge held that the arrest could not be said to be legal under Section 54(1) since there was nothing on the record to show that the person making the arrest was in possession of the requisite information enabling him to arrest the accused an his own responsibility. The other learned Judge (Desai, J.) took the same view in respect of application of Sections 54 and 56 to the facts of the case before them. The learned Judge has, however, observed that the Officer Incharge of a police station or an officer investigation a case under chapter XIV of the Code could not issue a requisition to a subordinate under Clause (9) of Section 54(1), because by doing so he would be not complying with the mandatory provision of Section 56 of the Code. In view of the evidence in that case that there was no requisition in writing and that the person making the arrest had no information, the question raised by the learned Judge, with very great respect, did not require decision and it is not necessary for me to take into account the views expressed on that question. The distinguishing feature of the instant case before me is that here there was a requisition in writing containing all the informations required by Section 56 which could enable the A.S.I. to act under Section 54(1)(9). This case also is, therefore, of no help to the petitioners. 12. There are two Bench decisions of own Court much nearer to the facts of the present case before me. The first one is in (4) Kisun Mandar V. King Emperor (A.I.R 1926 Patna 424). In that case there was a theft of bullock and a constable had been deputed to arrest the accused. The ground upon which the conviction was assailed was that the police constable had not complied with the provisions of Section 56 of the Code inasmuch as he had not notified to the person to be arrested the sub3tance of the ORDER :. The ground upon which the conviction was assailed was that the police constable had not complied with the provisions of Section 56 of the Code inasmuch as he had not notified to the person to be arrested the sub3tance of the ORDER :. It was argued that independently of Section 56 the constable was entitled to arrest the person without a warrant, under Section 54. The learned Judges held that the constable independently of the command certificate given to him under Section 56, was entitled to make the arrest in view of Section 54 and further that the fact that Section 56 applied to a constable did not deprive him of his statutory powers conferred independently of that Section. The next case is (5) Jioo Mian and others V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1938 Patna 229). In this case a constable had been given a command certificate to arrest a person. The constable saw a man moving away, enquired his name and when he learnt it, asked him to go to the Sub-Inspector, but the man tried to escape and the constable caught hold of him. The point raised was that the substance of the command certificate had not been notified and the arrest was, therefore, illegal. Their Lordships repelled the argument and held that the issued of a written ORDER :under Section 56 does not limit the power conferred by Section 54. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case reported in (4) A.I.R 1926 Patna 424 (Supra). Verma J. pointed attention to the provisions of Clause (9) of Section 54 (1) which had not been considered in an earlier case of this Court in (6) Kartik Chandra Maity V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1932 Patna 171) and distinguished that decision. It is quite clear from these decisions of this court that even though a police officer may be armed with an ORDER :under Section 56(1) of the Code his right to arrest a person without a warrant under Section 54(1)(9) is not affected. 13. There are several decisions of different High Courts which by and large express the same view. It is quite clear from these decisions of this court that even though a police officer may be armed with an ORDER :under Section 56(1) of the Code his right to arrest a person without a warrant under Section 54(1)(9) is not affected. 13. There are several decisions of different High Courts which by and large express the same view. The principle laid down in the case reported in (4) A.I.R. 1926 Patna 424 (Supra) has been accepted and followed in the cases of (7) The State V. India Pradhan (A.I.R. 1960 Orissa 23), (8) Achar Bilawal and another V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1937 Sind 308) (9) Kizhakkethil Sulaiman V. The State of Kerala (1964 Kerala 185) and (10) Keshavalal Harilal V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1937 Bombay 56). Neither this case nor the case reported in (5) A.I.R. 1938 Patna 229 (Supra) appears to have been considered in the case reported in (3) A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad 438 (Supra). In the case reported in (9) A.I.R. 1964 Kerala 185 (Supra) it was held that the special powers under Section 56 of the Code cannot override the general powers of arrest without warrant in the cases provided for in Section 54 of the Code. It was observed that the mere fact that the constable had been deputed under Section 56 to arrest the accused did not take away from him his power of arrest in his discretion under Section 54 of the Code and to take a contrary view was likely to make the object of Section 54 nugatory because there may be cases where besides being armed with an ORDER :contemplated under Section 56 a police officer may also be possessed of the requisite information under Section 54 in which case his act will be supportable under either of the Sections. In the case reported in (10) A.I.R. 1937 Bombay 56 (Supra) it was held that the provisions of Section 54 are very wide and are not controlled by the provisions of section 56 and a police constable is entitled to arrest under Section 54 the person required independently of Section 56 without a warrant in a cognizable case. The learned Judges also repelled the argument that Section 56 would be rendered nugatory otherwise. The learned Judges also repelled the argument that Section 56 would be rendered nugatory otherwise. In (11) Re Mohamed Meera Sahib and others (A.I.R. 1943 Madras 207) also the learned Judge held that Section 56(1) does not purport to confine or restrict the application of Section 54. In (7) A.I.R. 1960 Orissa 23 (Supra) also it was held that the issue of a written ORDER :under Section 56 does not limit the powers conferred by Section 54. The learned Judge referred to the decision of this Court in (5) A.I.R. 1938 Patna 229 (Supra) and accepted it as the correct position in law. In another case of the same Court in (12) Gandarba Roth V. Aparti Samal (A.I.R. 1960 Orissa 33) another learned Judge took the same view as expressed in the earlier decision reported in (7) A.I.R. 1960 Orissa 23 (Supra). In the case reported in (8) A.I.R. 1937 Sind 308 (Supra) also the principle laid down is the same as the one laid down in the case reported in (4) A.I.R. 1926 Patna 424 (Supra). It is unnecessary to multiply decisions on the point. 14. It is, therefore, quite clear that Section 54(1) is a general provision empowering any police officer to arrest without warrant a person mentioned in the nine clauses therein. The ninth clause entitles a police officer to arrest a person on receiving a requisition from another police officer. Section 56, however, relates to procedure when an officer incharge of a police station or any police officer making an investigation under Chapter XIV requires any officer subordinate to him to arrest without warrant any person who may lawfully be arrested without warrant. The provisions of Section 56 do not, therefore, control the powers of a police officer under Section 54. The argument that Section 56(1) must be deemed to control the provisions of the ninth clause of Section 54(1) is unacceptable for the simple reason that the special provision under Section 56 cannot be held to restrict the general powers under Section 54(1)(9) and because the provisions of Section 54(1)(9) are not interchangeable with those of Section 56(1). Section 54(1)(9) gives power to any police officer to arrest without warrant any person for whose arrest requisition has been received from another police officer provided the conditions mentioned in that clause are fulfilled. Section 54(1)(9) gives power to any police officer to arrest without warrant any person for whose arrest requisition has been received from another police officer provided the conditions mentioned in that clause are fulfilled. It, therefore, covers all police officers whereas under Section 56(1) the ORDER :has to be given either by a police officer incharge of a police station or a police officer making an investigation under Chapter XIV. The ORDER :has to be given to any subordinate officer which may include an officer who may not be a police officer, for instance, a choukidar. Under Section 54(1)(9) there has to be merely a requisition whereas under Section 56 there has to be an ORDER :in writing. When a subordinate officer is effecting an arrest under Section 56 he is not acting on his own and need not satisfy himself that the police officer who had issued the ORDER :bad the right to arrest without a warrant. Reading the ninth clause of Section 54(1) it is quite clear that before a police officer arrests a person on a requisition from another police officer, he must be satisfied from the requisition that the person could lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who had issued the requisition. Acting under the ninth clause of Section 54(1) the police officer acts independently even though he has received a requisition from another police officer, whereas under Section 56(1) the subordinate officer is merely carrying out an ORDER :and not acting independently of it. The differences between the provisions of the two Sections aforesaid clearly leave no room for argument that Section 56 controls Section 54 or that Section 56 would become nugatory if it is not held to restrict the provisions of Section 54(1)(9). I am, therefore, unable to accept the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners on this point. 15. There is no substance in the next point urged before me that there is no specific finding of the learned Sessions Judge, to the effect that he upholds the conviction under Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that he has considered the entire prosecution case including the story of wrongful confinement of the A.S.I. He has discussed the evidence on the point and accepted the prosecution case. It appears that he has considered the entire prosecution case including the story of wrongful confinement of the A.S.I. He has discussed the evidence on the point and accepted the prosecution case. It appears, however, that in the last paragraph of his JUDGMENT : he has held that the appellants have been rightly convicted under the different Sections but there is an omission to name Section 342. He has set aside the conviction of some of the appellants under Section 325 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and clearly says that the appeal is dismissed subject to the modification made above. It is quite clear therefrom that there is merely a clerical omission to mention Section 342 along with the other Sections. In any case, since the only modification made was in respect of the offence under Section 325/149 and the appeal has been dismissed subject to that alone, it is obvious that the conviction under Section 342 Indian Penal Code also has been maintained. 16. Another point raised by learned counsel regarding the non-consideration by the courts below of the individual cases of the petitioners, also has no substance Paragraphs 35 onwards of the JUDGMENT : of the learned Magistrate and paragraph 22 of the appellate court's JUDGMENT : show that the individual cases of these petitioners have been specifically considered. 17. The only remaining point urged is that the sentence of imprisonment against petitioners Arjun and Bhim passed in the absence of any consideration of the application of Section 4 or 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act is not proper. It appears that the point was neither taken before the lower appellate court nor was it raised before the magistrate with the result that the courts below have not applied their mind to the point nor is there any report of any Probation Officer on the record. Considering the circumstances of this case which show a clear defiance of law and authority and an organised move to deter a public servant from doing his duties, I do not think it is a fit case for the application of Section 4 or 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act in respect of these two petitioners. 18. There is thus no substance in any of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners. The conviction of these petitioners must, therefore, be maintained. 19. 18. There is thus no substance in any of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners. The conviction of these petitioners must, therefore, be maintained. 19. Lastly an appeal has been made on the question of sentence. In the circumstances of the case the sentences passed against these petitioners do not appear to me to be severe. There is, however, one consideration in favour of the two petitioners Bhim and Arjun that they are young boys of tender age and the sentence of 1½ years rigorous imprisonment in their case appears to be severe. I would, therefore, reduce their sentences under Sections 35 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code each to six months' rigorous imprisonment. 20. With this modification the ORDER :of conviction and sentence passed in this case is upheld. These two applications are accordingly dismissed. Applications dismissed