VISHNU ATMARAM TENDOLKAR v. BALASAHEB ANANT PATIL — 1972 DIGILAW 85 (KAR)

( 1 ) PETITIONER in this revision petition is the original plaintiff. He has instituted O. S. No. 44 of 1967 in the Court of the Civil Judge at Belgaum claiming several reliefs. In that suit, the learned trial Judge heard Issue no. 7 and has ordered that "the present valuation furnished by the plaintiff is not acceptable and the plaintiff must give a new valuation slip valuing each of the declaratory reliefs sought in the plaint separately and also by valuing the relief of injunction separately. The question of valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction will be considered after the new valuation slip is furnishd and deficit court fee is paid by 13-8-1971". It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in the present revision petition. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF and defendants 7 and 8 are stated to be the neighbour-users of the suit lands. The plaintiff has brought the suit for declaration declaring (1) that the kabulayat dated 9-7-1951 passed by Dr. A. J. Patil in favour of the husband of defendant No. 6 and the sale deed dated 11-10- 1951 be declared invalid, (2) that the sale deed dated 10-4-1964 passed by defendants Nos. 1 to 5 i,n favour of defendant No. 9 be declared invalid, and (3) that defendant No. 6 be permantly restrained by an injunction not to make any transactions (disposing of the suit land) in contravention of the provisions of the B. T. and A. L. Act. The suit valuation is based upon 124 times the assessment, half of which comes to Rs. 503-14-6. This is for the purpose of court fee and it is valued at Rs. 40,485 for purpose of jurisdiction An objection was raised by the defendants that the case does not come under S. 24 (b) of the Mysore Court-Fees and Suits Valuation act 1958. The view taken by the learned trial Judge is that there are three different documents which are executed by defendants at three different periods and between different parties, therefore, as provided under the provisions of S. 6 of the Mysore Court-Fees and Suits Valuation act, the plaintiff has to separately value each of the reliefs. The learned judge further came to the conclusion that the nature of injunction sought was not a consequential one and so the case of the plaintiff could not come under S. 24, (b) of the said Act. The learned judge further came to the conclusion that the nature of injunction sought was not a consequential one and so the case of the plaintiff could not come under S. 24, (b) of the said Act. ( 3 ) THE two relevant provisions which are required to be considered in this revision petition are the provisions of S. 6 and S. 24 of the Mysore court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act. An extract of the relevant provisions of these sections is below:" 6. Multifarious suits. (1) In any suit in which separate and distinct reliefs based on the same cause of action are sought, the plaint shall be chargeable "with a fee on the aggregate value of the reliefs: provided that, if a relief is sought only an ancillary to the main relief the plaint shall be chargeable only on the value of the main relief. ****** (3) Where a suit embraces two or more distinct and different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, alternatively or cumulatively, the plaint shall be chargeable with the aggregate would be chargeable under this Act if separate suits were instituted in respect of the several causes of action: provided that where the causes of action in respect of reliefs claimed alternatively against the same person arise out of the same transaction, the plaint shall be chargeable only with the highest of the fees chargeable on them. Nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to affect anv power conferred upon a Court under Rule 6 of Order II of the CPC. , 1908 (Central Act V of 1908 ). 24t Suits for declaration. Nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to affect anv power conferred upon a Court under Rule 6 of Order II of the CPC. , 1908 (Central Act V of 1908 ). 24t Suits for declaration. In a suit for a declaratory decree or order, whether with or without consequential reliefs, not falling under section 25, (a) Whether the prayer is for a declaration and for possession of the property to whch the declaration relates fee shall be computed on the the market value of the property or on rupees one hundred, whichever is higher : (b) Where the prayer is for a declaration and for consequential injunction and the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees one hundred whichever is higher; (c) Where the prayer relates to the plaintiff's exclusive right to use, sell, priint or exhibit any mark, name, book, picture, design or or other thing and is based on an infringement of such exclusive right fee, shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees five hundred, whichever is higher; (d) in other cases, whether the subject matter of the suit is capable of valuation or not, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees two hundred and fifty whichever is higher. "the learned Advocates appearing for the parties have cited certain decisions to enable the Court to construe the provisions of these sections 3a. The first is the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Sahu Madan Mohan v. Tejram George Coronation Hindu School association, AIR 1949 All. 207. In that case, the following principle of law has been laid down and head-note correctly summarises the same:"a consequential relief means a relief which necessarily flows from the principal relief sought. It is a relief which in the circumstances of the case cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused. . 207. In that case, the following principle of law has been laid down and head-note correctly summarises the same:"a consequential relief means a relief which necessarily flows from the principal relief sought. It is a relief which in the circumstances of the case cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused. . Where the principal reliefs sought for were two declarations that (a) the plaintiff was the President of the school institution, and (b) that certain resolution passed by the defendants were void and ultra vires, and the injunctions sought were merely further reliefs intended to prevent the other party from acting upon the said resolutions passed by them and to prevent defendant 2 from acting as the President, and also to prevent them from interfering with the plaintiff acting as president; held that the injunctions were not independent reliefs, but necessarily flowed from the declarations sought for in reliefs (a) and (b ). They could be granted only if the title of the plaintiff to the declarations in reliefs (a) and (b) was established. They were therefore consequent reliefs. It might be that the plaintiff chose to describe the declaration as one relief and the consequential relief as a separate relief. But the mere form in which the reliefs were claimed could not determine the amount of court-fee payable under the Court Fees act. Court fee will be payable on the real nature of the relief claimed. The substance of the plaint would have to be looked into for that purpose. "it also considered it necessary to refer to paragraph 8 of the said section which reads thus:" The principal relief sought for in this case are two declarations that the plaintiff is the President of the institution, and that certain resolutions passed by the defendants party were void and ultra vires. The injunctions sought are merely further reliefs intended to prevent the other party from acting upon the said resolutions passed by them and to prevent defendant 2 from acting as the President and also to prevent them from interfering with the plaintiff acting as President. These injunctions, therefore are not independent reliefs but necessarily flow from the declarations sought for in reliefs (a) and (b ). They can be granted only if the title of the plaintiff to the declarations in reliefs (a) and (b) is established. They are therefore consequential reliefs. These injunctions, therefore are not independent reliefs but necessarily flow from the declarations sought for in reliefs (a) and (b ). They can be granted only if the title of the plaintiff to the declarations in reliefs (a) and (b) is established. They are therefore consequential reliefs. It may be that the plaintiff may choose to describe the declaration as one relief and the consequential reliefs as a separate reliefs. But the more form in which the reliefs are claimed cannot determine the amount of court-fee payable under the Court-fees Act. Court-fee will be payable on the real nature of the reliefs claimed. The substance of the plaint will have to be looked into for that purpose. It is clear to us that the reliefs for injunction claimed in this case were consequenial reliefs. " ( 4 ) THE other decision of the Allahabad High Court which is referred to is the judgment in the case of Vibhuti Narain Singh v. Municipal board, Allahabad, AIR 1958 All. 41 . In that case this is what has been laid down:" Where a declaration is sought for the existence of a right and a permanent injunction is sought restraining some one from interfering with the exercise of that right the permanent injunction would clearly be a relief consequential to the declaration. The relief of permanent injunction not to interfere with the exercise of a right cannot be granted in the absence of or independently, of the declaration about the existence of that right. In such a case, the court-fee is payable under S. 7 (iv) (a) of the Court-fees Act as applicable in U. P. and the court-fee has to be determined in accordance with the proviso to that provision of law according to the market price of the non-agricultural immovcable property. "the Court observed that the relief is clearly a consequential relief to the third declaration sought in relief (a ). The third declaration in relief (a) was in respect of the existence of the right to realise the tahbazari dues and the permanent injunction soueht is to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's exercise of that very right. "the Court observed that the relief is clearly a consequential relief to the third declaration sought in relief (a ). The third declaration in relief (a) was in respect of the existence of the right to realise the tahbazari dues and the permanent injunction soueht is to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's exercise of that very right. It was therefore held that where a declaration is sought for the existence of a right and a permanent injunction sought restraining some one from interfering with the exercise of that right, the permanent injunction not to interfere with the exercise of a right cannot be granted in the absence of or independently of the declaration about the existence of that right. ( 5 ) THE next is the judgment in the case of Ranjit Singh v. Birinder Kumar, AIR 1952 Pepsu 168. In that case, this is what has been laid down:". . . The operation of S. 7 (4) (c) of the Court-fees Act is, limited to those cases where a consequential relief is claimed in addition to that of declaration and not to all kinds of cases which might come within the ambit of the proviso to S. 42, because though every consequential relief would be further relief within the meaning of the proviso, there may be other kinds of reliefs which can be regarded as further reliefs but they are not consequential. For the sake of example, let us consider the case of a creditor and debtor. The creditor comes to the Court with the allegation that his debtor owes money to him and sues him for the realisation of the money. Instead of bringing a suit for money in the ordinary form he splits up his relief into two parts, one consisting of declaration that he is entitled to recover from his debtor the amount claimed by him and the second that the debtor be ordered to pay the said amount to him. How can it be said that the second relief is consequential to that of declaration ? How can it be said that the second relief is consequential to that of declaration ? In my opinion the answer can only be in the negative for the simple reason that the creditor could bring a suit for the recovery of the amount alleged to be due to him without suing for a declaration and that the relief for declaration was a surplusage and consequently the second relief was not a consequential relief. Let us take another case in which the plaintiff alleges tp be the owner of immovable property but instead of suing merely for possession of the property brings a suit for declaration of his title to the property and claims the possession as a consequential relief. In this case, possession cannot be regarded as consequential relief. This view of mine is supported by a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court kalu Ram v. Babu Ram (54 All. 812 ). The Full Bench held that the suit did not come within the purview of s. 7 (4) (c) and defined the expression 'consequential relief' as meaning some relief which would follow directly from the declaration given, the valuation of which is not capablb of being definitely ascertained, which is not specifically provided for anywhere in the Act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantive relief. "in view of what I have said above, what is necessary to determine is whether in this case it was essential for the plaintiffs to claim declaration that the alienations were not binding upon them and whether the claim in respect of the possession of the alienated properties was incidental to that relief. " it will be clear from a perusal of these decisions that if the consequential reliefs follow as a result of the earlier declaration, then the case would come under the provisions of S. 24 (b) of the Act. In the present case, the case of the plaintiff is that the transactions entered into by several defendants are void as contravening the provisions of S. 64 of the BT. and AL. Act. In my view, it would be possible for the plaintff to get a decree declaring that the transaction entered into by the defendants offends S. 64 of the Act and it would be declared to be a void one. and AL. Act. In my view, it would be possible for the plaintff to get a decree declaring that the transaction entered into by the defendants offends S. 64 of the Act and it would be declared to be a void one. Further without even getting a declaration, as the claim of the plaintiff is that the transaction is a void one, he can get a decree for injunction. . If this is the position as stated in Ranjit Singh's case (3), the relief of injunction cannot be treated to be a consequential relief. As stated in all these three decisons the real question is whether the consequential relief is a relief following from the principal relief sought for. In my view, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the relief of injunction follows as a matter of course. As already pointed out, it is possible for the plaintiff to get a decree for injunction, even without a declaration that the transaction is a void one, as, if the transaction is a void one the declaration is not necessary to be asked for. In that view of the matter, i am in agreement with the view expressed by the trial Court that s. 24 (b) of the Act is not applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 6 ) THE three transactions have been entered into at different times and by different parties and are impeached and declaration is sought for regarding these transactions. If that is the true position of the relief asked for by the plaintiff, provisions of Section 6 (b) of the Act applies and the plaintiff has to make valuation as provided under S. 6 (b) of the Act. If the plaintiff does not want any declaration, the matter is totally different and he need not make valuation. But if the plaintiff wants declaration regarding 3 transactions referred to by him in the plaint, then it is necessary for the plaintiff to make separate valuation regarding all these 3 items and it is not possible to accept the submission that they are all ancillary reliefs to the main relief and hence separate court fee is not payable. But if the plaintiff wants declaration regarding 3 transactions referred to by him in the plaint, then it is necessary for the plaintiff to make separate valuation regarding all these 3 items and it is not possible to accept the submission that they are all ancillary reliefs to the main relief and hence separate court fee is not payable. ( 7 ) IN that view of the matter, there is no error of jurisdiction committed by the Court below entitling this Court to interfere in this revision petition. The revision petition therefore fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .