JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal. The suit was for recovery of money. 2. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants second set were tenure-holders of plot No. 2013. A pucca well was situated in it. In the consolidation scheme, this well was allotted to the chak of the Defendants-Respondents first set. The compensation officer determined the compensation payable for the well at Rs. 800/-. On 30th September, 1956, possession of the plot as well as of the well was transferred to the Defendants first set. They, however, did not pay the compensation to the Plaintiffs. Consequently, the Plaintiffs brought the present suit for recovery of Rs. 800/- on 4th October, 1962. 3. The suit was contested on a variety of grounds including limitation. This plea was upheld by the trial court, which dismissed the suit as barred by time. The decree has been affirmed by the learned Civil Judge on appeal. 4. At the hearing of the second appeal, a learned Single Judge of this Court felt that the question of limitation was one of general importance. He accordingly referred the whole appeal to a Division Bench. That is how the case has some before this Bench. 5. The courts below have, in our opinion, rightly applied Article 120, Limitation Act, to the present suit Article 120 is as follow: A suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule. six years When the right to sue accrues. In AIR 1930 270 (Privy Council) , it was observed that there can be no 'right to sue' until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the Defendant against whom the suit is instituted. This view was reaffirmed by the Privy Council in AIR 1931 9 (Privy Council) and AIR 1931 89 (Privy Council) . In the latter case, it was emphasised that the expression 'right to sue' in Article 120 meant the right to bring the particular suit with reference to which the plea of limitation is raised. 6. This view was reaffirmed by the Privy Council in AIR 1931 9 (Privy Council) and AIR 1931 89 (Privy Council) . In the latter case, it was emphasised that the expression 'right to sue' in Article 120 meant the right to bring the particular suit with reference to which the plea of limitation is raised. 6. Section 24(2) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that on and from the date of obtaining possession, every tenure-holder getting trees, wells and other improvements existing on the plots allotted to him, shall be liable for the payment of and pay to the former tenure-holder thereof compensation for the trees, wells and other improvements allotted to him, as determined under the Act. Under this provision, the receiving tenure-holder becomes liable to and the erstwhile tenure-holder becomes entitled to the payment of the determined compensation from the date of the transfer of possession. 7. Section 29-A prescribes the mode of recovery of compensation. It provides: 29-A. Recovery of compensation- (1) Where a tenure-holder from whom compensation is recoverable under this Act fails to pay the same within the period prescribed therefor the person entitled to receive it, may, in addition to any other mode of recovery open to him, apply to the Collector within such time as may be prescribed to recover the amount due on his behalf as if it were an arrear of land revenue payable to the Government. (2) Where any compensation payable under this Act is not paid whether in whole or .in part within three months of the date of obtaining possession u/s 24 or Section 28 as the case may be, interest at the rate of three per cent per annum shall be charged on the amount not so paid. Rule 55(1) of the Rules framed under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act provided: (10). The compensation payable under Sub-rule (9) shall be, recovered as arrears of land revenue, if unpaid on the expiry of nine months from the date of transfer of possession. 8. These provisions clearly provided that the transferor-tenure-holder becomes entitled to payment of compensation on the date of transfer of possession, but the tenure-holder, who is liable to pay, has been given a period of nine months, within which he can make the payment at his choice without beings, troubled by recovery proceedings as arrears of land revenue. 8. These provisions clearly provided that the transferor-tenure-holder becomes entitled to payment of compensation on the date of transfer of possession, but the tenure-holder, who is liable to pay, has been given a period of nine months, within which he can make the payment at his choice without beings, troubled by recovery proceedings as arrears of land revenue. Thus, the prescribed period is nine months and in view of the categorical language of Section 29-A, both the modes of recovery namely to apply to the Collector as well as any other mode of recovery open to the tenure-holder, can be brought into play only after the expiry of the prescribed period of nine months. Clearly, the tenure-holder entitled to recover compensation cannot enforce his right by launching proceedings within nine months. In this situation, in our opinion, the right to sue within the meaning of Article 120, Limitation Act, cannot accrue till the expiry of nine month from the date of transfer of possession During this period of nine months, the right asserted in the suit, namely, the right to recover the determined amount of compensation through a court of law did not accrue and could not be said to have been infringed. The infringement would occur when default is committed by the tenure-holder in not paying the amount (in) 9 months. In this view, the right to sue could be deemed to have accrued on the expiry of nine months from the date of the transfer of possession. 9. In the present case, the possession was transferred on 30th September, 1956. No suit to recover the amount of compensation could, in law, be instituted for nine months thereafter. The right to sue would accrue on 30th June, 1957. This being the date of accrual of the cause of action, the suit which was instituted on 4th October, 1962, was within the prescribed period of limitation namely six years. The courts below were in error in dismissing it as barred by time. 10. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree is set aside. Since other issues arising in the case have not been determined, the case is remanded to the trial court for decision in accordance with law. The Appellants would be entitled to costs here and below. 10. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree is set aside. Since other issues arising in the case have not been determined, the case is remanded to the trial court for decision in accordance with law. The Appellants would be entitled to costs here and below. The Appellants shall be granted a certificate for the refund of the court-fees paid on the memorandum of appeal u/s 13 of the Court Fees Act.