JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is against a judgment of our learned brother chittatosh Mukherjee, J. by which his lordship has dismissed an appeal in this court against the judgment and decree passed by a judge of City Civil Court dismissing a suit instituted by the present appellant, 2. THAT suit was for a declaration that the decree passed in favour of the present respondent No. 1 Sm. Maina bibi against respondent No. 2. Messrs. Surajmal Nagarmal for eviction is not binding on the plaintiff. Relevant facts are that under the Respondent M s. Surajmal Nagarmal was a tenant in respect of a portion of the second floor of premises No. 192, jamunalal Bajaj Street under M/s. Tejpal jamuna Das the predecessor-in-interest of Respondent No. 1 who subsequently became the owner of the premises. Present plaintiffs were in ducted as sub-tenants in respect of part of the premises. The tenancy of Surajmal nagarmal, was terminated by a notice u/s. 106 T. P. Act and in Suit No. 937 of 1966 a decree for eviction was passed against them. Present plaintiffs were not made parties in that suit and no notice u/s. 106 T. P. Act was given to them. In execution of that decree the respondent prayed for vacant possession of the premises by evicting the plaintiffs also. 3. THAT decree was put in execution in Ex. Case No. 375 of 1968. The plaintiffs resisted delivery of possession and then present suit was instituted on the allegation that after the passing of premises Tenancy Act of 1956 they had given notice u s. 16 (2) of that Act and therefore the decree obtained without giving them notice to quit and without making them parties in suit is not binding on them. The case made by the plaintiffs was that a notice was sent to the landlord on 2. 5. 56 by post under certificate of posting and a copy of it was sent to the tenant also. Ext. 6 (b)is the copy of that notice proved in the case and Ext. 10 is the certificate of posting. That was before the Rules under the Act was framed. 4. 5. 56 by post under certificate of posting and a copy of it was sent to the tenant also. Ext. 6 (b)is the copy of that notice proved in the case and Ext. 10 is the certificate of posting. That was before the Rules under the Act was framed. 4. AFTER the Rules framed under the act, another notice was sent to the tenants Surajmal Nagarmal by regd, post as required by Rule 4 and there in they were requested to inform the superior landlord about the sub-tenancy. On those assertions the plaintiff contended that as notice had been given u/s. 16 (2), the decree obtained against tenant without making the sub-tenant parties in the suit is not binding on the sub-tenant. 5. THE defendant landlord denied the assertion that notice u s. 16 (2) had been given. They contend that both the notices are fabrications and manufactured for the purpose of the suit. 6. BOTH the parties adduced evidence in the trial court. That part of the plaintiff's case in paragraph 1 of the plaint in which they claimed to have been sub-tenants under defendant No. 2 with the knowledge and consent of m/s. Tejpal Jamuna Das appears to have been abandoned at the trial. The plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to prove such consent of the landlord, though that was denied in the written statement. The trial court found upon evidence that the plaintiffs had been a sub-tenant under the tenants from before the commencement of W. B. P. T. Act, 1956. But the trial court held that no notice of the creation of sub-tenancy u/s. 16 (2) of the Act was served on the superior landlord and the plaintiffs were not entitled to protection under sub-sections (2) and (4) of Sec. 13 of the W. B. P. T. Act, 1956. As a consequence the decree passed in the previous suit was held to. be binding on the plaintiff and the declaration and consequential reliefs prayed for in the suit were refused, and the suit was dismissed. 7. AGAINST that decision of the trial court, an appeal was preferred and it was registered as F. A. No. 96 of 1970. Value of the appeal is only Rs. 100/- and under the rules of this court that First appeal has been heard and decided by our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee, sitting singly. 8. 7. AGAINST that decision of the trial court, an appeal was preferred and it was registered as F. A. No. 96 of 1970. Value of the appeal is only Rs. 100/- and under the rules of this court that First appeal has been heard and decided by our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee, sitting singly. 8. IN the first appeal in this court the controversy between the contesting parties were essentially on the question of fact whether or not a notice u s. 16 (2) of the W. B. P. T. Act, 1956 had been given to the landlord. On the decision on that point of fact, the result of the appeal depended because the plaintiffs would be bound by the ejectment decree passed against the tenant defendant No. 2 unless they had duly given notice of their sub-tenancy to the land lord defendant No. 1 in view of the provision in Sec. 13 (2) that only sub tenants who have given such notice u /s. 16 (2) shall be made parties in a suit for ejectment brought against the tenant of the first decree. The learned Judge affirmed the finding that plaintiffs were sub-tenants under defendant No. 2 from before the commencement of the W. B. P. T. Act of 1956 and before him it was conceded that the provision made in Rule 4 requiring that notice u/s. 16 (2) shall be given by registered post with ack, due did not strictly apply. 9. THE notice relied on by the plaintiff appellants is Ex. 6 (b) which is a letter dt. 2. 5. 56 addressed to the land lord M/s. Tejpal. Jamunadas in which description of the portion of premises comprising the sub-tenancy has been mentioned and then it has been said. "we are sub-tenants under your tenants M/s. Surajmal Nagarmal of No. 8, Dalhousie Sq. (East), Calcutta in respect of the above portion of the premises No. 192, Cross St. P. S. Burrabazar, Calcutta since April, 1955 at a monthly rent of Rs. 43/- payable according to the English calendar month. Please recognise us your direct tenants. Copy : M s. Surajmal Nagarmal, 8, Dalhousie Sq. East, Cal" this letter and the copy of it were said to have sent under certificate of posting which is Ex. 10, which bears on its back postal seal with the date 2. 5. 56. 10. 43/- payable according to the English calendar month. Please recognise us your direct tenants. Copy : M s. Surajmal Nagarmal, 8, Dalhousie Sq. East, Cal" this letter and the copy of it were said to have sent under certificate of posting which is Ex. 10, which bears on its back postal seal with the date 2. 5. 56. 10. PLAINTIFFS had also produced in evidence another letter dt. 27. 9. 56 written on their behalf by Mr. R. P. Das, Advocate addressed to M/s. Surajmal Nagarmal requesting them to inform the superior landlord about the plaintiff's sub-tenancy. That letter is Ext. 6 and its copy Ext. 6 (a) and was said to have been sent under regd. post, receipt for it being Ext. 11. Even according to the plaintiffs no such letter nor any copy was sent to the landlord and for that reason the letter Ext. 6 (a) was held to be ineffectual arid served no purpose of the plaintiff. On behalf of defdt. 1 a letter dt. 28. 10. 56 and a regd. cover were produced in evidence and were marked E Ext. BI. Those were Ext. B and Ext, BI. Those were sought to be proved by D. W. 1 Madan Mohan Agarwalla who deposed to the effect that Dwarka Prosad Bajaj another employee of defdt. No. 1 had received the letter and had made an endorsement of the date 31st October, 1956 on the top of the letter Ext. B. That letter purported to have been written by M/s. Surajmal Nagarmal informing the landlord that sub-tenants had vacated the premises on 29th Sept. 1956 and said. "please treat this as notice under West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1956. It may be noted that the termination of the sub-tenancy does not affect you as we continue to be your tenants and shall continue to pay rent as usual". 11. THE trial court took all these documents into consideration and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs did not give any notice u/s. 16 (2) of the Act and therefore were not protected by Sec. 13 (2) of the Act. The suit was dismissed. 12. IN the High Court our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee did not accept the contents of the letter Ex. The suit was dismissed. 12. IN the High Court our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee did not accept the contents of the letter Ex. B for the reason that Dwarka Prasad Bajaj was not examined as a witness to prove that the said letter was written by M/s. Surajmal Nagarmal. D. W. 1 did not also state in his evidence that M/s. Baldeo Das Ram Kumar had vacated the suit premises on 29. 9. 56". He also said "i am unable to accept the contents of the letter as the evidence of the facts contained therein. In any event the said letter Ext. B is not relevant for the purpose of deciding whether the present plaintiffs Baldeo Das Ram Narayan had given any notice on 2nd May, 1956 u]s. 16 (2) of the W. B. P. T. Act. There fore I do not agree with the inference drawn by the trial court from said letter Ext. B". The learned Judge however took into consideration Ext. 6 (b) and Ex. 10. In doing so he discussed several decisions on the question and nature of presumption arising from certificate of posting and arrived at the conclusion "that plaintiffs have not satisfactorily proved that on 2nd May, 1955 they had sent the original of the letter Ext. 6 (b) under certificate of posting Ext. 10". He also held : "the certificate of Ext. 10 raised a very real presumption and was sufficiently returned by the facts and cir cumstances of this case. I am also un able to accept the interested testimony of P. W. 6 regarding the writing and the posting of the said letter Ex. 6 (b. The learned Judge of the Court below in my view was therefore justified in holding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfactorily prove that they had given any notice under Sec. 16 (2) of the W. B. P. T. Act. " The learned Judge, ultimately decided the First Appeal thus "but I hold that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that in fact they had given notices to their superior landlords in accordance with Sec. 16 (2) of the W. E. P. T. Act. In the facts and circum stances of this case I am not prepared to accept that the plaintiffs had in fact posted the original of the letter (Ex 6b), on 2nd May, 1956 or that the certificate of posting Ext. In the facts and circum stances of this case I am not prepared to accept that the plaintiffs had in fact posted the original of the letter (Ex 6b), on 2nd May, 1956 or that the certificate of posting Ext. 10 was really issued on the date mentioned in the postal seal affixed to it "in the above view the plaintiffs who did not give notices under Sec. (2) of the West Bengali Premises Tenancy Act and accordingly were not necessary parties in the ejectment suit brought by the respondent No. 1 against the respondent No. 2. The ejectment decree was obtained upon the plaintiffs appellants. I accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. " on the prayer of Mr. Dutt, learned Advocate for the appellant in the special circumstances of this case I grant the appellant time at the first instance till 30th June, 1971 to vacate the suit premises. In case the appellant files with in the said date an undertaking to this Court that it would deliver up vacant and peaceful possession on the expiry of the further time that would be granted, it would allow time to vacate the suit premises till 31st December, 1972 subject to the further condition that it must go on depositing in the trial court a sum of Rs. 80/- per month within the 15th of each succeeding month and in case of default for any two months the respondent No. 1 would be entitled to execute the decree obtained by her Eject; Suit No. 937 of 1956 the first of such deposit shall be made within 15th April, 1971. The respondent will be entitled to withdraw the sums, if deposited, with out prejudice and without security". Against that judgment delivered on 11th March, 1971 present appeal under Cl. 15 of Letters Patent has been prefer red. It was filed on 17th April, 1972, Decree has not been, drawn up. 13. THE appellant had made an application for an injunction against further proceedings. A rule was issued on that application but interim order was not granted. Thereupon on 29th June, 1971 the appellants have filed the undertaking in terms of the judgment; appealed for. By an order made in the Rule the Appeal was expedited and it" was heard on 21st July, 1971. At the hearing of the appeal before us Mr. A rule was issued on that application but interim order was not granted. Thereupon on 29th June, 1971 the appellants have filed the undertaking in terms of the judgment; appealed for. By an order made in the Rule the Appeal was expedited and it" was heard on 21st July, 1971. At the hearing of the appeal before us Mr. Bankim Chandra Banerjee on behalf of appellants invited us to go into all. questions of fact, findings on which have been against the appellant in the judgment appealed from and he also raised. in that connection a point of law regarding the view of the learned Judge on the presumption arising from certificate of posting by contending that on the evidence in the case it should be held that notice u/s. 16 (2) had been given on 2. 5. 56 and appellants were protected under Sec. 1312 of the Act. 14. MR. P. K. Das appearing for the respondent at the outset raised a question regarding scope of this appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. He raised that point as a preliminary objection to the appellant's right to urge points of fact for assailing the findings of facts arrived at by the learned Judge of this Court who decided the first appeal concurring with the findings of the trial court on those questions of fact. Though the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted it to be a preliminary objection, his contention is not really any objection to the right of appeal given by Clause 15 of the Letter Patent, hut realty is an argument regarding the scope of this appeal and jurisdiction of this Bench to go into question of fact for deciding the appeal. I shall deal with that point first. I shall deal with that point first. It is contended that this appeal is realty a second appeal from the appellate judgment passed in the first appeal and should be governed by Sec. 100 and 101 of C. P. C. which provide that no second appeal shall lie except on the grounds that (a) the decision being contrary to (law or to some usage having force of law (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits, mentioned in Sec. 100 C. P. Code. Mr. Das retiled on the decisions firmly laying down that in second appeal High Court shall not go into question of fact or reverse the con current findings of two courts below. He also pointed out that several High Courts in India have taken different views on that question of scope of an appeal under Cl. 15 of Letters Patent. But there is no direct pronouncement by this High Court on that point. 15. MR. Banerjee for the appellants has contended that there is no words of restriction as (o scope of the appeal in clause 15 as there are in Sec. 100 and 101 C. P. C. 16. BEFORE we proceed to decide on the validity of the antagonistic contentions and before we examine the reasons that appear in the conflicting decisions of several High Courts cited before us, it is necessary to analyse the provision in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as it stood originally and as it now stands after amendments in 1928. Before the amendment of 1928, clause 15 envisaged three kinds of appeals : (1) appeal from the judgment of one Judge of High Court. (2) Appeal from the judgment of one judge of any Division Court pursuant to Sec. 13 of Govt. of India Act, 1915 and (3) appeal from the judgment of two or more Judges of the High Court of Division Court whenever such Judges are equally divided in opinion and do not amount in number to a majority of the whole of the Judges of the High Court. of India Act, 1915 and (3) appeal from the judgment of two or more Judges of the High Court of Division Court whenever such Judges are equally divided in opinion and do not amount in number to a majority of the whole of the Judges of the High Court. By amendment of 1928 the third category above-mentioned has been excluded from Clause 15 and has been. provided for by amendment of clause 36. 17. BY the same amendment of 1928 Clause 15 has been recast to limit the appeal under that clause only from the judgment of one Judge of the High Count and that has been divided into two categories co Judgment not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a subordinate Court and (2) Judgment in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a subordinate Court. First of these categories does not require leave or certificate of the Single Judge by the second requires leave or certificate declaring that the case is fit one for appeal. Except that differentiation as to leave or certificate, the right of appeal under Clause 15 is absolute terms without being limited to particular grounds as in Sec. 100 and 10 of C. P. C. It was so before amendment and tit has remained so after amendment of 1928. 18. MR. Banerjee for the appellants has relied on that characteristic of the provisions in Clause 15 and has contend ed that scope of the appeal is not limited to grounds of law only and he is entitled to argue the appeal on facts and evidence for assailing the landings arrived at. On examining the decisions placed before us by Mr. Das it appears to us that broad view of the scope of appeal has been taken in (1) Ram Singh Khanna v. State of A. P. A. I. R. 1963 A. P. 447 and (2) C. M. Sivaram v. V. S. Jayaram Mudaliar A. I. R. 1966 Mad. 297. Restricted view that the scope of the appeal is limited to grounds mentioned in Sec. 100 C. P. C. has been taken in (3) Ramsarup Singh v. Maneshwar Singh and on. A. I. R. 1964 Pat. 76 and (4) Nilkanta Mahton and ors. 297. Restricted view that the scope of the appeal is limited to grounds mentioned in Sec. 100 C. P. C. has been taken in (3) Ramsarup Singh v. Maneshwar Singh and on. A. I. R. 1964 Pat. 76 and (4) Nilkanta Mahton and ors. v. Munshi Singh and ors. A. I. R. 1965 Pat. 141. A middle course has been taken in (5) M/s. Bholabhai Bhogilal v. Rattan Chand and. ors. A. I. R. 1958 Punj. 260 and (6) Bawa Singh v. Jagdish Chand. ors. A. I. R. 1960 Punj. 573. 19. IN our view one aspect of the question regarding scope of an appeal under Clause 15 is clear and beyond controversy. That is the aspect that appears from the language of that clause both before and after amendment of 1928 that makes no differentiation between appeal under either of the parts of the clause. Whatever the scope, it is the same, irrespective of the appeal being under the first part or the second part. 20. BEFORE amendment of 1928 it was held in this High Court that the appeal given under this clause was not confined to the points on which the Judges of the Division Court differ; the whole appeal was open before the Court for decision see (7) Upendra Nath Bose v. Bindheshri Prosad 22 C. L. J. 452, and (8) Gopeswar Pyne v. Hem Chandra Bose 31 C. L. J. 447. The same view was taken by Bombay and Allahabad High Courts though it was held in the High Courts of Allahabad, Patna, Lahore, Bombay that an appellant was not entitled to an appeal under this clause to be heard on points which had not been raised before the judge from whose judgment the appeal was preferred. Madras High Court held, that a new point of law going to the root of the case could be raised (See Mulla's Commentary on C. P. Code 12th Ed. p. 1471. It is true that an appeal under first part of the clause is a second appeal in the third court, while appeal, under the second part is a third appeal in the fourth court. Should that make any difference in the scope of the appeals under 1st and 2nd part ? p. 1471. It is true that an appeal under first part of the clause is a second appeal in the third court, while appeal, under the second part is a third appeal in the fourth court. Should that make any difference in the scope of the appeals under 1st and 2nd part ? In a. way it does because appeal under 2nd part is from the judgment in Second Appeal u/s. 100 C. P. C. which is limited to the ground mentioned in that section, so much so that an appeal there from cannot be longer in scope than the scope was of second appeal. On the contrary, appeal under 1st part, though it is second appeal it is from a judgment is a first appeal which was not limited to grounds of law only. Apart from that we are unable to find anything in, the provision of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent to enable, far less compel to limit the scope of appeal to grounds of law only and shut out the appellant from urging grounds of fact and assessment of evidence. 21. FOR that reason we are unable to read in clause 15 of the Letters Patent the restrictive words that occur in section 100 of C. P. C. as appears to have been laid down in the two decisions of Patna High Court we have mentioned above viz. (3) Ramsarup Singh v. Muneswar Singh and ors. reported in A. I. R. 1964 Pat. 76 and (4) Nilkanta Mahton and ors. v. Munshi Singh and ors. reported in A. I. R. 1965 Pat. 141. It may be noticed that in an older decision of Patna High Court in the case of (9) Rajib Nath Mukherjee v. Chotanagpur Banking Asson. Ltd. and ors. report ed in A. I. R. 1. 948 Pat. 433 the Division Bench (Agarwalla, acting Chief Justice and Meridith, J.) did not allow a question of fact to be raised in that appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent not because of any restriction in the scope of the appeal but because that question of fact had not been agitated before the courts below and held that such a point cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in Letters Patent Appeal 22. AS we have pointed above though appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent not because of any restriction in the scope of the appeal but because that question of fact had not been agitated before the courts below and held that such a point cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in Letters Patent Appeal 22. AS we have pointed above though appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent is not restricted in its scope, yet it being an appeal from an appellate judgment in broad principle adhered to by this Court that concurrent findings of fact arrived at by two courts below should not be interfered unless there is compelling reason therefore, is a whole some principle that should be adhered to. In the Punjab High Court in the case of (5) M/s. Bhola Bhai Bhagilal v. Ratan Chand and ors, reported in A. I. R, 1958 Punjab p. 260 which was an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of that High Court corresponding to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of our High Court. There it was held : "although there is not such Rule either of procedure or practice by which a Bench hearing an appeal under Cl. 10 of the L. P. is debarred from examining and reversing a finding on question of fact given by the learned Single Judge, nevertheless, the Appeal Court would be reluctant to interfere with that finding unless there are very strong reasons for doing so. " The same view has been adhered to by a Division Bench of Punjab High Court in the case of (10) Deoa Singh v, Jagdish Ch. and ors. A. I. R. 1960 Punjab p. 573. In that judgment which was delivered by Dua, J. it has been held. "it is true that as a matter of practice the finding on a question of fact given by the learned single Judge of this Court is usually treated with respect and is not lightly interfered with but there is no legal impediment in the way of Letters Patent Bench reversing the finding on question of fact by the learned Single Judge, if the same is considered to be erroneous. It is not open to us to read into clause 10 of the Letters Patent any limitation on the right of appeal, which is not included in it by the Legislature. It is not open to us to read into clause 10 of the Letters Patent any limitation on the right of appeal, which is not included in it by the Legislature. " We respectfully agree with that view and hold that while there is no impediment to examine question of fact or to reverse finding thereon in an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent this appeal court will not ordinarily reverse concurrent findings of fact or a finding arrived at by the Single Judge unless there appears very strong reason for holding that such finding has been erroneous by reason either by admission of illegal evidence or omission to consider material evidence for arriving at such findings. 23. MR. Banerjee has contended, before us that for arriving at this finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that in fact they had given notice to their superior landlord in accordance with section 16 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee J. has neglected to give proper value of the presumption arising from the certificate of posting Ext. 10 and also has left out of consideration the material evidence provided by the letter Ext. D and for that reason Mr. Banerjee con tended that the finding of fact against the plaintiff has been erroneous. It appears that while dealing with the first part of Mr. Banerjee's argument regard-ting the presumption arising from certificate ext. 10, our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee, J. referred to and in fact quoted a passage from the Division Bench judgment reported in (11) Chaya Devi v. Lohari Ram Prashar 67 C. W. N. p. 819. He also referred to another Division Bench decision reported in (12) Ramashankar v. S. I. Foundri A. I. R. 1966 Cal. p. 512 and quoted a passage from that judgment also. Our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee, J. appears to have held by effect of those two division Bench judgments the presumption that attaches to certificate of posting is "a very weak presumption". That view does not appear to be correct. In the case reported in (11) 66 C. W. N. 819 a Division Bench of this Court held that presumption arising from a certificate of posting goes to the extent that the letter described in that certificate was posted and reach ed the hand of the addressee in due course. That view does not appear to be correct. In the case reported in (11) 66 C. W. N. 819 a Division Bench of this Court held that presumption arising from a certificate of posting goes to the extent that the letter described in that certificate was posted and reach ed the hand of the addressee in due course. The presumption does not how-over attach to what was contained in the cover posted. In that case evidence about the content of the cover was the oral testimony of a witness only and there was nothing else in support of that testimony. The testimony was held to be unreliable and the presumption was held to be rebutted by the denial that the cover contained any letter as was testified. 24. IT is true that in the later Division Bench decision reported in (12) A. I. R. 1966 Cal. 512 in the judgment delivered by the two members of the Bench there are broad principles of fact postulated in general terms. In that reported case G. K. Mitter, J. observed that certificate of posting can be got held of without actually putting letters in the post. "nothing, I imagine, is easier for an unscrupulous person than to use a. certificate of this sort as a bluff". This latter Division Bench had not even referred to the earlier Division Bench decision reported in 67 C. W. N. 719. If by the observations quoted above the latter Division Bench was intending to take a view different from title view laid down by the earlier Division Bench decision by the rules of this Court they could only refer the point to a larger Bench. As postulate of fact appearing from those observations it appears to us to be too spacious even for matters to be taken judicial notice of as notorious facts under Section 57 of the Evidence Act, we are unable to follow that dictum. But we hold that the view that prevailed in the decision reported in 67 C. W. N. 819 that certificate of posting raised a presumption that a letter was posted as described in the certificate, but the presumption does not go to the extent of the contents of the cover and the presumption is rebutable by denial of the receipt of the con tents when evidence about the contents is unreliable. That is not the same thing to say that the presumption is a weak presumption. In a proper case if the evidence regarding contents of the letter posted under certificate of posting is reliable, the presumption may be strong presumption indeed. 25. HOWEVER, in the present case, Chittatosh Mukherjee, J. upon consideration of the evidence in the case has not accepted the interested testimony of P. W. 6 regarding the writing and posting of the said letter 6 (b) and has accepted the finding of the trial Judge that the plaintiff failed to satisfactorily prove that they had given any notice under :-ec. 16 (2) of the W. B. P. T. Act That concurrent finding of fact cannot be assailed in this appeal under Letters Patent because there is no good reason appearing for holding that the said finding is erroneous. 26. REGARDING other piece of evidence viz. letter dated 28th October, 1956 and a registered cover which were marked as Exts. B and BI our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee J. pointed out that those were produced by respondent No. 1 and according to the testimony of D. W. 1 Madan Mohan Agarwal the said letter was received by Dwarka Prosad Bajaj who had made an endorsement of the date 31st October, 1956 on the top of the letter Ext. B. The said Dwarka Prosad Bajaj was not examined as a witness. For those reasons the learned Judge held that he was unable to accent the contents of the letter as the evidence of the fact contained there in and that the letter Ext. B is not relevant for the purpose of deciding whether the present plaintiff Baldeo Ram Narayan had given any notice on 2nd May 1956 under section 16 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee, J. therefore, did not agree with the inference drawn by the trial Court from the said letter Ext. B. Mr. Banerjee's submissions with regard to this part of the judgment on appeal is that the material evidence Ext B has been erroneously left out of consideration. It appears to us that there is some force in Mr. Banerjee's submission. The witness D. W. 1 only deposed to the fact that the registered saver containing the letter Ext. B dated 28th October, 1956 was received in the office of M/s. Surajmal Nagarmal. It appears to us that there is some force in Mr. Banerjee's submission. The witness D. W. 1 only deposed to the fact that the registered saver containing the letter Ext. B dated 28th October, 1956 was received in the office of M/s. Surajmal Nagarmal. He was a witness only to the transaction of the letter being sent and received. Our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee J. rightly held that by that manner of proof the truth of the facts stated in the letter were not proved at all. It is profitable to refer to the observation of Shri Asutosh Mukherjee, J. in the case of (13) Lakshan Chandra Mondal v. Takin Dhali reported in 39 C. L. J. p. 90 at p. 94 which are in these words "the distinction between the admissibility of a document as evidence of a transaction and the admissibility of a document in proof of a statement contained therein is of a refined but of a fundamental character and is yet frequently overlooked. " 27. IN the present case the transaction of writing the letter may be viewed as a piece of evidence which was admissible under Section 11 of the Evidence Act, because that transaction either by itself or in connection with other facts might make the existence or non-existence of fact in issue viz. whether a notice under Section 16 (2) was given by the plaintiff, probable. Viewed, as such, the transaction evidenced by the letter Ext. B was relevant and admissible evidence. The manner of proof afforded by D. W. 1 was of that transaction, though not evidence of the truth of the contents of the letter. That subtle and fundamental distinction appears to have been missed. We, therefore, hold that the letter Ext. B was a piece of evidence relevant and admissible. B was relevant and admissible evidence. The manner of proof afforded by D. W. 1 was of that transaction, though not evidence of the truth of the contents of the letter. That subtle and fundamental distinction appears to have been missed. We, therefore, hold that the letter Ext. B was a piece of evidence relevant and admissible. But we are agreeing in the finding of the learned Judge, even upon consideration of that evidence, that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they had given notice under Sec. 16 (2) of the W. B. P. T. Art to the superior landlord we hold so because we consider improbable that instead of sending a proper notice under section 16 (2) the plaintiff would take a circuitous way of writing to the inter mediate tenant M/s. Surajmal Nagarmal and it is more so because it is directly in conflict with the other piece of evidence showing that earlier M s. Surajmal Nagarmal had written to the land lord that sub-tenant under them i. e. M/s. Surajmal Nagarmal had vacated their portion of the premises. 28. WE, therefore, hold that the decision arrived at by our learned brother Chittatosh Mukherjee, J. is correct decision upon the evidence in case. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without costs. Salil Kumar Dutta, J. I agree with my lord that the appeal should be dismissed as proposed. I would also like to give my reasons in support, in view of the interesting points of law argued in the appeal. This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is by the plaintiff against the decree passed by Chittatosh Mukherjee, J. affirming the decree of the Judge, Tenth Bench of the City Civil Court, dismissing the suit. 29. THE facts according to the plaint in short are as follows: the plaintiff which is a registered partnership firm became the sub-tenant of the suit premises under the defendant No. 2 with knowledge and consent of the superior landlord M/s. Tejpal Jamunadas with effect from April 1, 1955. The suit premises comprised of. Southern portion of the hall with two kotharies and one inside room on the second floor of premises No. 192, Jamunalal Bajaj St., Cal. The plaintiff's tenancy was according to English Calendar month, the monthly rent being Rs. 44/ -. The suit premises comprised of. Southern portion of the hall with two kotharies and one inside room on the second floor of premises No. 192, Jamunalal Bajaj St., Cal. The plaintiff's tenancy was according to English Calendar month, the monthly rent being Rs. 44/ -. The defendant No. 2 was a tenant in respect of the suit premises under the said Tejpal Jamunadas who transferred its right, title and interest to the plaintiff in respect of the premises No. 192, Jamunalal Bajaj St. Cal. On the commencement of the W. B. P. T. Act 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the plaintiff duly served a notice dt. May 2, 1956 under Sec. 16 (2) of the said Act to the then superior landlord Tejpal Jamunadas informing its afore said sub-tenancy and its requisite particulars. 30. ON August 30, 1968 a Baliff at the City Civil Court with Police went to the suit premises to execute a decree and on enquiry the plaintiff came to know of Ejectment Execution Case No. 875 of 1968 arising out of Ej. S. No. 937 of 1966 which was decreed on April 15, 1968. On further enquiry the plaintiff came to know that the defdt. No. 1 instituted the above suit for recovery of possession of the suit premises on eviction of the defdt. No. 2 there from only on ground of default in payment of rent and obtained an exparte decree which decree was put in execution as stated above. The plaintiff was not made party to the said proceeding as required under sec. 13 (2) of the said Act nor had knowledge thereof till, when in execution of the decree, possession of the suit premises was sought to be recovered by the decree-holder, the defendant No. 1 herein. The plaintiff averred that the decree was not executable and it had become a direct tenant under the defdt. No. 1 in respect of the suit premises. As the plff. was likely to be dispossessed from the suit; premises, the present suit was instituted by it against the defdt. No. 1 on Sept. 1, 1968 for declaration that the plaintiff had become a direct tenant under the delft. No. 1 in respect of the suit premises. As the plff. was likely to be dispossessed from the suit; premises, the present suit was instituted by it against the defdt. No. 1 on Sept. 1, 1968 for declaration that the plaintiff had become a direct tenant under the delft. No, 1 with same incidents of its tenancy in respect of the suit premises, for further declaration that the decree was not executable against it and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from executing the decree or disturbing the plaintiff's possession of the suit premises. 31. THE suit was contested by the defdt. No. 1 who filed a written statement denying all material allegations. It was denied that the plff. ever became a sub-tenant and with consent of M/s. Tejpal Jamunadas as alleged. The defdt. No. 2 was himself not a tenant of the entire suit premises. It was specifically denied that any notice under sec. 16 (2) of the said Act was served on the then superior landlord and it was alleged that the notice and postal certificate as produced in support of case by the plaintiff were fabricated for the purpose. The plff. was not a necessary party to the Ej. suit and not being a lawful sub tenant, it was not entitled to be a direct tenant and to the reliefs claimed in the suit. The defdt. No. 2 who entered appearance in the suit, did not however file any written statement. 32. THE suit was tried on evidence before the learned Judge, Tenth Bench, C. C. Court, when the plff. and contesting defdt. No. 1 adduced evidence, oral and documentary. The learned Judge on a consideration of the materials on record arrived at the following findings. (a) The predecessor of the plff. had its office located in the disputed premises for a very long time and on amicable partition in April, 1955, the plff. succeeded in the said office and had been in possession thereof paying rent to the: defdt. No. 2. (b) There was no evidence adduced on the part of the plff. to establish that the plff. became a sub-tenant with the knowledge and consent of the then superior landlord. (c) No notice under Sec. 16 (2) of the said Act was served on the superior landlord and accordingly the plff. was not entitled to any protection under sec. 13 Sub-sees. to establish that the plff. became a sub-tenant with the knowledge and consent of the then superior landlord. (c) No notice under Sec. 16 (2) of the said Act was served on the superior landlord and accordingly the plff. was not entitled to any protection under sec. 13 Sub-sees. (2) and (4. The suit on the above findings was dismissed. The essential question at issue therefore is whether any notice under Sec. 16 (2) was served on the then land lord. The alleged notice dated May 2, 1956 under Sec. 16 (2) Ex. 6 (b) was not served by reg. post as required under the rules. It was despatched by ordinary post and as evidence of posting the plff. produced the certificate of posting dt. May 2, 1956 Ex. 10. Mookherjee, J. held in agreement with the trial court that there was no satisfactory proof that the original of the letter (Ext. 6 (b) j was sent under certificate of posting Ext. 10. The conclusion was arrived at also by internal evidence: of the alleged notice which contained all the requisite particulars in the same order as in Rude 4 even though the rules were published in the Gazette long after, that is on June 26, 1956. No evidence was adduced as to the person who drafted the notice, as he must have been one versed in law. Further the notice was not followed by any proceeding under Sec. 16 (3. A subsequent letter dated September 27, 1956 was written by Sri R. P. Das, Advocate to the defdt. No. 2 and sent by regd. post Ext. 6 (a) in which the notice of May 2, 1956 had been referred to. But curiously enough a copy of this letter admittedly was sent to the then superior landlord, while it was unbelievable it was held that such an important letter like notice: under. sec. 16 (2) could be sent by the plff. whose partners are all businessmen., by ordinary post. It was held on authorities that the dispatch of the notice by the certificate of posting raised (a very weak presumption) which was sufficiently rebutted by the facts and circumstances of case and further the certificate of posting was not genuine. Accordingly, in agreement with the findings of the trial court, Mookherjee, J. held that the plff. failed to prove that it had given any notice to the delft. Accordingly, in agreement with the findings of the trial court, Mookherjee, J. held that the plff. failed to prove that it had given any notice to the delft. No. 1 under sec. 16 (2) of the Act. 33. MR. Bankim Banerjee, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the findings both of law and fact arrived at by the trial court as also by this Court in appeal. His contention is that the courts erred in arriving at the finding upon materials on record that the original of the notice Ext. 6 (b) was not sent under certificate of posting Ext. 10. He further disputed the finding that the certificate of posting raised a weak presumption of service or that the presumption was sufficiently rebutted, 34. BEFORE we examine the contentions in detail, it is necessary to deal with an objection by Mr. P. K. Das, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 about the scope of the appeal before us. According to Mr. Das, the findings of fact arrived at by a single Judge of this Court in hearing a first appeal arc binding on the Division Bench sitting on appeal against this decision. In sup port of his contention he referred to a decision in (3) Ramsarup Singh v. Muneshaw Singh A. I. R, 1964 Patna 76 in which it was observed by Mahapatra, J. that the scope of Letters Patent appeal does not yield to a challenge to clear findings of fact. It was observed in dealing with clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Patna which is in similar terms with clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court; (a) No doubt clause 10 of the Letters Patent of High Court provided for an appeal a judgment in a first appeal passed by a single Judge, but its ambit cannot be more extensive than that of an appeal against the appellate judgment and decree of a court subordinate to High Court. Long before the Letters Patent was created (February 9, 1916) the Code of Civil Procedure was in the field and the scope of second appeals to the High Court was well defined under Sec. 110 of the Code. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent will be taken to have been provided in that context. Long before the Letters Patent was created (February 9, 1916) the Code of Civil Procedure was in the field and the scope of second appeals to the High Court was well defined under Sec. 110 of the Code. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent will be taken to have been provided in that context. Other wise an absurd situation will arise, such as, the limits of interference by a High Court In a second appeal, from a decree of a subordinate court will be much less while that scope against the decree of a single Judge of the High Court will be wide and circumspective like that in an appeal from an original decree. Viewed in this light, the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Judge of this Court cannot be assailed in the Letters Patent appeal unless it is shown to be based on no evidence or inconsistent with any particular position in law the statutory canons about the scope of interference in different appellate jurisdictions of the High Court as provided in the C. P. C. or otherwise accepted cannot be ignored while dealing with an appeal under the Letters Patent. Tarakeswar Nath, J. concurred with the above observations with regard to the scope of a Letters Patent Appeal and further observed ; "finding of fact arrived at by a learned Judge while deciding a First Appeal should not be interfered with unless there is gross error in the judgment". In (4) Nilkanth Manton v. Munshi Singh A. I. R. 1965 Patna 141 Mahapatra, J. again following the above decision and speaking for the Court observed : "the scope of a Letters Patent appeal against the judgment and decree passed by a learned Judge of the High Court in Court in a First Appeal (appeal from an Original Decree) does not permit any challenge to be raised against any clear and specific finding's on fact". 35. ON these authorities Mr. Das has contended that the finding of Mookherjee, J. that the notice under Section 16 (2) of the said Act was never issued or served on the superior landlord cannot be assailed in this appeal. 36. MR. 35. ON these authorities Mr. Das has contended that the finding of Mookherjee, J. that the notice under Section 16 (2) of the said Act was never issued or served on the superior landlord cannot be assailed in this appeal. 36. MR. Banerjee on the other hand contended that an appeal under C. 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment in a first appeal is one both on fact and law and there is no fetter on the appellate court to examine the findings of fact under appeal to arrive at its own conclusion. He referred to the decision in (14) Mulpura Venkataramaylla v. Dayabhaktuni Kesvanarayana A. I. R. 1963 Andhra Pradesh 447 in which it was observed : "there is also no force in the contention that a finding of fact arrived at by a single judge of the High Court is not open to attack. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent differently worded from Sec. 100 C. P. C. enacts that the High Court ought not to interfere in Second appeal on question of fact, there is no rule of law that any finding of fart arrived at by a single Judge of the High Court in a first appeal is not open to be challenged under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent appeal under Cl. 15 of the L. P. is in the nature of a rehearing of the appeal". Punjab 260, it was observed by Grover, J. for the Court as follows : "although there is not such rule either of procedure or of practice by which a Bench hearing an appeal under 01. 10 of the L. P. is debarred from examining and reversing a finding on a question of fact given by the learned Single Judge, nevertheless, the appeal court would be reluctant to interfere with that finding unless there are very strong reasons for doing so". 10 of the L. P. is debarred from examining and reversing a finding on a question of fact given by the learned Single Judge, nevertheless, the appeal court would be reluctant to interfere with that finding unless there are very strong reasons for doing so". In (15) Girdharilal v. Krishnan Dutt A. I. R. 1960 Punjab 575, Dua, J. also speaking for the Court observed : "it is true that as a matter of practice the finding on a question of fact given by a learned Single Judge of this Court is usually treated with respect and is not to be lightly interfered with but there is no impediment in the way of the Letters Patent Bench reversing the finding on the question of fact by the, teamed Single Judge if the same is considered erroneous. It is not open to us to read into clause 10 of the Letters Patent any limitation on the right of appeal, which is not included in it by the legislature". The relevant provisions of Cl. 15 of the L. P. for the High Court of Calcutta dated December 28, 1965 (as amended in 1928) are as follows : ". . . . . . an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the: exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court. . . . . .) of one Judge of the said High Court and that not with standing anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court made on or after the first day of Feb. 1929 in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to superintendence of the said High Court, where the judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal. . . . . . " 37. THERE is an unqualified right of appeal from the judgment of single Judge on the original side under this clause. Apart from such provision, two classes of decrees or orders are contemplated under this Clause. . . . . . " 37. THERE is an unqualified right of appeal from the judgment of single Judge on the original side under this clause. Apart from such provision, two classes of decrees or orders are contemplated under this Clause. One class of such decree or orders are the ones passed by one Judge of this Court, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction against an original decree or order passed by any subordinate Court under its superintendence. The other class of decrees or orders are those passed by one Judge of this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction against an appellate decree or order passed by any subordinate Court under its superintendence. The latter class of decrees or orders passed are thus appeals from appellate decrees or orders and in common parlance known as a second appeal in respect of decrees and second miscellaneous appeals in respect of orders. The scope of such appeals 13 circumscribed by Sec. 100 of C. P. C, which provides for grounds on which a second appeal will lie. The grounds preclude interference by this Court in such appeals on findings of fact arrived at by the subordinate appellate court on materials before it and sec. 101 provides that a second appeal will not lie or: any other ground except as provided in Sec. 100. 38. THE scope of such appeals from appellate decree or orders before a single judge is thus circumscribed to the question of law by Sec. 100 and 101 of the C. P. C. and an appellate court sitting on appeal against the decision of the single Judge in such appeal will not have any larger powers of interference that those of the single Judge whose decision is under appeal before it. This proposition also finds support" in the said Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent providing that any appeal from the decision of a single Judge against appellate decrees or orders will lie only if a certificate of fitness for appeal is granted by the single Judge passing the judgment and it is the uniform and consistent practice that such certificate is granted in cases in which any point of law is involved in such appeal. Under Sec. 8 (1) of the City Civil Court Act, 1953 it is provided that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed by such court as also against some orders passed by the said Court. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribing such appeal to questions of law only. These appeals are regular appeals on both questions of fact as also of law and the single Judge under the extent rules of the appellate side of this Court has been given jurisdiction to hear appeals valued not exceeding Rs. 5,000/- from every decree of the City Civil Court of Calcutta under the City Civil Court Act of 1953. There is also no provision in the Letters Patent restricting the powers of the single Judge In respect of appeals before him from such original decrees. It is, there fore obvious that the single Judge can examine the decision of the original decrees under appeals before him from the City Civil Court as in the present case on both questions of facts and law. As to appeals from the decrees of the single Judge in such appeals, again there is no provision for any certificate of fitness for appeal to the Division Bench. The appellate court in such appeals from the decrees of the single Judge of this Court will therefore have all the powers as the single Judge had in deciding the appeal from him and there is no provision in the code or in the Letters Patent circumscribing the appeal before the Division Bench to question of law only. There can, there fore, be no doubt that the appellate-court being a Division Bench itself under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent will be competent to enter into and decide both questions of fact and law as may be involved in the appeal. I am accordingly, unable to agree with the view taken by the Patna High Court that the findings of fact arrived at by a single judge of this Court in hearing a first appeal are binding on the Division Bench sitting on appeals against his decision. I am accordingly, unable to agree with the view taken by the Patna High Court that the findings of fact arrived at by a single judge of this Court in hearing a first appeal are binding on the Division Bench sitting on appeals against his decision. It is however the settled practice that the findings of fact arrived at by a single Judge is treated with high respect and is not to be lightly interfered but there is no legal impediment on the way either by any provision of the Letters Patent, or the Code of Civil Procedure as held by the Punjab and Andhra Pradesh High Courts under their respective L. P. which are in similar terms of the L. P. of this Court. 39. I shall now examine as to whether the findings on the fact of non-service of notice under sec. 16 (2) of the W. B. P. T. Act as found by Mookherjee, J. is warranted by the facts established and the resumption arising there from. It appears from Ex. 10 (certificate of posting) that two letters one addressed to the predecessor-in-interest of defdt. No. 1 and the other to defdt. No. 2 were posted on 2. 5. 56. The P. W. 6 is Ramnarayan Kandui, a partner of the plff. who looked after the case. From his evidence it appears that he caused the notice of the sub-tenancy to be issued and served on M/s. Tejpal Jamunadas under certificate of posting. This notice was typed according to his instruction and signed by him and he himself posted the letter and obtained the certificate of posting. The suggestion on behalf of the defdt. No. 1 that Ex. 10 was manufactured was denied. It was also stilted that the letter was drawn according to his direction and not according to lawyer's instruction. Mookherjee, J. has held that there was no satisfactory proof that the original of the letter exhibit 6 (b) was sent under the certificate of posting, as this witness did not specifically say that the original letter was enclosed within the cover for which the alleged certificate of posting was granted. Mookherjee, J. has held that there was no satisfactory proof that the original of the letter exhibit 6 (b) was sent under the certificate of posting, as this witness did not specifically say that the original letter was enclosed within the cover for which the alleged certificate of posting was granted. It also, appears that all the requisite particulars of the sub-tenancy was mentioned in the said notice even in the same order as in Rule 4 of the W. B. P. T. Rule, 1966, even though the same became known to public after the publication of the rules long after, that is, on June 26, 1956. There is no evidence as to the person who drafted the notice which, it is obvious could only be done by a parson versed in law. By the internal evidence-also in respect of the letter itself as stated above it is highly improbable that such notice was issued on the date mentioned in the letter that is 2nd May, 1956. There is also another improbability relating to the dispatch of letter itself by ordinary post. As a prudent person it could only be reasonably expected for the plff. to send the letter by regd. post as was done subsequently by his lawyer. Mr. Das who wrote a letter on September, 27, 1956 to the defdt. No. 2 even here again no copy of the letter was Sent by regd. post to the superior landlord as could be expected of the plff. as a prudent man of business affording the superior landlord an opportunity to have a say about the notice under sec. 16 (2. It may be noted also, no further proceeding was initiated by the plaintiff under Sec. 16 (3) for declaration of its sub-tenancy as direct tenancy which could be done by filing an application within two months of receipt of such notice. 58. As to the presumption of service of a notice sent under certificate of posting Mr. Banerjee has referred to the decision in (16) Harihar Banerjee v. Ramasasi Roy 23 C. W. N. 77 (P. C.) in which the Privy Council quoted the following observation in the decision in (17) Graham House Estate Company v. Rossa Grandi Gold and Mining Co. (1870) W. N. 119. It was observed in that case. ". . . . . . (1870) W. N. 119. It was observed in that case. ". . . . . . If a letter properly directed, containing of notice to quit, is proved to have been put into the post office, it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to regular course of business of post office and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. " 40. IT was held in Harihar Banerjee's case that presumption would apply with greater force, to letters which the sender had taken the precaution to register and was not rebutted but strengthened by the fact that a. receipt of the letter was produced signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself. In (11) Chayya Devi v. Lahori ram 67 C. W. N. 818 in which my learned brother was party, after a review of the relevant cases the Court made the following observations : "the normal presumption under Sec. 114 Illustration (f) of the Evidence Act will also be that the covers were delivered to the petitioner. The presumption is not, however, proof and may be rebutted. In the instant case, the petitioner denies the receipt of the two letters in her affidavit in reply. The question for our consideration is whether the denial is sufficient to rebut the presumption that the letters were delivered to the petitioner. The opposite party did not acknowledge like man of ordinary prudence when he chose to send the above-mentioned two letters of the importance that they appear to be by ordinary post under certificate of posting. He took the peril of such letters being mislaid or mis delivered a risk not unknown in postal communication by ordinary post. " 41. IN (12) Ramashankar v. S. I Foundry P. Ltd. A. I. R. 1966 Calcutta 5115, a decision by a Division Bench of this Court, it was observed by G. K. Mitter T. as follows : "it is only too well known that certificate of posting can be got hold of without actual putting the letters in the post and the respondent must have adopted that course so far as the Board Meeting of January 22, 1963 or the extra Ordinary General Meeting of February 21, 1963 0was concerned". In (18) Kank Lata v. Amal Kumar A. I. R. 1970 Calcutta 328 (32) a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, it was observed by A. C. Sen J. "the certificate of posting having been given by the postal authorities in the ordinary course of business must be presumed to be genuine unless the presumption is rebutted by cogent proof. The contents of the certificate must be presumed to be true unless they arc proved to be false. No evidence has been adduced by the husband the addressee) that the three letters were duly posted according to the tenor of the certificates. Under Sec. 114 illustration (f) of the Evidence Act it must further be presumed the three letters were received by the husband in due course". 42. IT may be noted that in the above case no importance was attached by the Court to the denial of receipt of letters by the husband. It will appear that while the above observations of G. K. Mitter, J. is in relation to the facts of the case, the other decisions of this Court indicate that there is a presumption of service of letters posted under certificate of posting but unless the certificates are found to be spurious. Such presumption again is a rebut able presumption. In the present case we do not have the evidence from the defdt. No. 2 as to the receipt of the other copy of notice by him even though he entered appearance in the suit but did not file any written statement, nor gave any evidence about the notice. D. W. 1 an employee of the defendant No, 1 and formerly of the superior landlord at the material time, denied receipt of any notice under 16 (2) by the former employers and there was no specific cross-examination on the question. On the face of such denial it was incumbent on the plaintiff in order to claim protection under section 13 (2) of the Act to establish by positive evidence in rebuttal that this notice -was duly served on the defendant No. 2 as also on the superior landlord at the time who is not party to the present proceeding or the ejectment suit against the tenant. It is also curious that the copy of the notice of 27. 9. It is also curious that the copy of the notice of 27. 9. 56 sent under registered post was not given to the superior landlord as already noticed even though at that point of time a notice under section 16 (2) could be validly served on the superior Landlord. 43. TAKING in consideration all attending facts, I am in agreement with Mookherjee, J. that there is no evidence that the original of the notice was put inside the cover for which the certificate of posting was alleged to have been issued, even if genuine. I also think it improbable that such an important notice should be sent by ordinary post or that such notice could be drafted by the P. W. 16 without legal assistance. In the background of the hazards of letters being mislaid or mis-delivered if sent by ordinary post there is evidence of D. W. 1 who denied receipt of such notice by the superior landlord, his erstwhile master who is not a party to the suit. There is also absence of evidence about service of such notice on the part of the plaintiff apart from the certificate of posting either on the superior landlord or on the tenant. In the circumstances E am of opinion that the presumption of service of the notice under section 16 (2) under certificate of posting even assuming that the notice was put inside the cover was amply rebutted by the defendant No. 1. 44. THERE is another aspect of the question which was overlooked by the Trial Court as also by the appellate Court. Notice of sub-tenancy under section 16 (2) was to be given, under the unamended West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, XII of 1956 within a period of three months from its commencement which is 31. 3. 56. By West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act XVIII of 1956) the period of three months in section 16 (2) was substituted by six months with effect from retrospective effect, with consequential changes, in the main Act. This amending Act came into force on 27. 7. 1956, and was necessitated for the reason that the Rules under the Act were published in Gazette on June 28, 1956. Under its Rule 3, the notice under Section 16 (2) was to be given by registered post with acknowledgment due. When mr. This amending Act came into force on 27. 7. 1956, and was necessitated for the reason that the Rules under the Act were published in Gazette on June 28, 1956. Under its Rule 3, the notice under Section 16 (2) was to be given by registered post with acknowledgment due. When mr. Das Advocate for the plaintiff sub tenant was issuing a registered letter on 27. 9. 56 to the impediment on him or his client to serve the notice under section 16 (2) by registered post with acknowledgment due, as under the provisions of the said sub-section the required notice is to be given in prescribed manner, as in the rules subsequently published. Viewed on this aspect, there was no notice under section 16 (2) of the Act legally served as required by law on the superior landlord, which could afford a protection to the sub tenant under section 13 (2) particularly in absence of any positive proof of such services. I agree that the appeal in the circumstances fails and is dismissed without costs as proposed.