Judgment :- 1. The facts in this case are similar to the facts in P. S. N. Lorry Transports v. The Collector of Customs and Central Excise (ILR. (1967) 2 Ker. 660). 2. The respondent is the owner of a jeep; and the first appellant seized the vehicle taking power under S.110 of the Customs Act claiming that uncured coffee seeds liable to excise duty were taken in the jeep and the jeep and the offending goods were liable to confiscation. The respondent filed a writ petition disputing the power of the first appellant to seize the jeep. It was contended before a Single Judge that there was no power for such seizure of a vehicle apart from the offending goods, which contention found favour with the Single Judge, who quashed the seizure of the vehicle. The Superintendent of Central Excise and the Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise have appealed against that decision. 3. The main point for consideration is whether a vehicle which carried excisable goods could be seized by virtue of the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act. Under S.12 of the Act, the Central Government has power to declare that any of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act relating to the levy of and exemption from customs duties, etc. be applicable in regard to like matters in respect of the duties imposed by S.3 of the Act, which empowers the levy and collection of excise duty. Taking power under this section, the Central Government published a notification in the Official Gazette declaring that some of the sections of the Customs Act like sub-s. (1) of S.105, S.110, S.115 (excluding clauses (a) and (c) of sub-s.(1) thereof), etc. be applicable to the collection and levy of excise duty. The jeep was found carrying uncured coffee seeds liable to pay excise duty; and on that ground the vehicle was seized a few days after. And it is this seizure that is being disputed. We may at the very outset observe that the decision we have already referred to in P. S. N. Lorry Transports case does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Single Judge who decided the writ petition. And it is this seizure that is being disputed. We may at the very outset observe that the decision we have already referred to in P. S. N. Lorry Transports case does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Single Judge who decided the writ petition. S.110 of the Customs Act made applicable to the Excises and Salt Act provides that, if the proper officer has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under the Customs Act, he may seize such goods. The question thus boils down to this: whether a vehicle is liable to confiscation, and if so, whether it is liable to be seized under S.110. 4. Under S.2 (22) of the Customs Act, the term "goods" is defined to include, inter alia, vehicles. (Ss. 2 (9) 'conveyance' includes vehicle and 2 (42) 'vehicle' means conveyance may also be noted). Under S.110, as we have already pointed out,'goods' are liable to seizure. Consequently, since 'goods' include vehicles and since 'goods' are liable to confiscation under Ss.111 & 113, vehicles are also liable to confiscation: and if vehicles are liable to confiscation since they are 'goods', they are also liable to seizure under S.110. The argument of the respondent against this is that the definition section, i. e , S.2 of the Customs Act has not been made applicable to the Central Excises and Salt Act by the notification so that 'goods' in the relevant sections of the Customs Act made applicable to the Excises and Salt Act will not include vehicles. This was the specific plea that was raised before Govindan Nair J. in the P. S. N. Lorry Transports case. Now, since S.110 and some other sections, where the term 'goods' occurs, have been made applicable to the Excises and Salt Act, it can be presumed that the term 'goods' that has been made applicable has the same meaning as it has in the Customs Act. In other words, the failure to make the definition section also applicable has no consequence. This is one way of looking at the matter. Again, even if the definition is not applicable, still as pointed out by Govindan Nair J., the position is not better for the respondent. In other words, the failure to make the definition section also applicable has no consequence. This is one way of looking at the matter. Again, even if the definition is not applicable, still as pointed out by Govindan Nair J., the position is not better for the respondent. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the term 'goods' means movable property and therefore must include vehicles too, with the result that vehicles can also be seized as 'goods' under S.110. 5. Then comes the other argument, which is the basis of the reasoning of the Single Judge (Eradi J.) whose judgment is under appeal. The reasoning of the Single Judge is that, under S.111 and 113 of the Customs Act, confiscation of improperly imported goods and of goods attempted to be improperly exported is provided for, and that in S.115, confiscation of conveyances is separately provided for. From this the learned judge proceeds to reason: "The Act has made a separate provision in S.115 for confiscation of conveyances which are used for the improper importation, attempted exportation or illegal carriage of goods thereby making it clear that the expression 'goods' used in the other sections relating to confiscation will not take in the vessel or vehicle used for the purposes of conveyance. Since S.110 empowers only seizure of goods which are liable to confiscation and more particularly because even under S.115 there is a proviso to the effect that when the conveyance used for the carriage of goods is one for hire the owner thereof shall have an option to pay a fine not exceeding the market price of the goods which are attempted to be smuggled in lien of confiscation, it is not possible to sustain the action taken by the first respondent in seizing the petitioner's jeep in purported exercise of his powers under S.110 of the Customs Act." 6. The reasoning of the learned judge, as we have understood it, appears to be this. Since separate provision is made under S.115 for confiscation of conveyances wherein also the term 'goods' appears, the said term appearing in the other sections relating to confiscation, viz., S.111 and 113, cannot include vehicles. Vehicles are thus not liable to confiscation; and hence they cannot be seized either under S.110, since S.110 empowers only seizure of goods liable to confiscation. Vehicles are thus not liable to confiscation; and hence they cannot be seized either under S.110, since S.110 empowers only seizure of goods liable to confiscation. The proviso to S.115 (2) provides that, when the conveyance used for the carriage of the offending goods is one for heir, the owner of the conveyance has the option to pay a fine not exceeding the market price of the goods: this is also indicative of the position that vehicles are not liable to confiscation. If vehicles are not liable to confiscation, they are not liable to be Seized either. This is how we have understood the reasoning of the Single Judge. 7. We find it difficult to agree with this reasoning. It is true that confiscation of goods and confiscation of vehicles are separately provided for. In our opinion, there is a purpose in the legislature enacting a separate provision like S.115 for confiscation of conveyances. S.115(1) (a), for instance, makes any vehicle, which is or has been in a customs area, liable to confiscation, when it is constructed, adapted, altered or fitted in any manner for the purpose of concealing goods: actual concealing of goods is not necessary, much less the concealing of offending goods. Clause (b) of the same sub-section makes any conveyance, from which the whole or any part of the offending goods is thrown overboard, staved or destroyed to prevent seizure, confiscable: no offending goods need be in the conveyance at the time of seizure. Again, clause (c) makes any conveyance, which fails to stop if required to stop as contemplated by S.106, liable to confiscation: S.106 authorises the proper officer to stop a conveyance if he has reason to believe that the conveyance is being, or is about to be used in smuggling, etc. actual use in smuggling, etc. is not essential. (We do not consider the other similar clauses in this sub-section.) In such cases, the confiscation is as 'vehicles' or 'conveyances' and not as 'goods': in such cases, separate provision for confiscation of vehicles or conveyances appears obviously to be necessary. actual use in smuggling, etc. is not essential. (We do not consider the other similar clauses in this sub-section.) In such cases, the confiscation is as 'vehicles' or 'conveyances' and not as 'goods': in such cases, separate provision for confiscation of vehicles or conveyances appears obviously to be necessary. (We may, however, point out here that clauses (a) and (c) are not made applicable to the Central Excises and Salt Act by the notification: but these clauses too bring out the purpose of S.115 of the Customs Act.) Similarly, under sub-s. (2) of S.115, any conveyance which was used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any smuggled goods may also be liable to confiscation: here also confiscation is not as 'goods' but only as 'conveyance'. This again indicates the necessity for a provision for confiscating conveyances or vehicles as 'conveyances or 'vehicles': in other words, the separate provision for confiscation of conveyances under S.115 does not necessarily indicate that the term'goods' does not include vehicles as well. 8. We are not also able to read the proviso to S.115(2) as indicating the vehicles are not confiscable: it only provides that the owner of the vehicle in a case coming within the proviso has the option to pay the value of the goods in lieu of confiscation of the vehicle: the proviso does not at all mean that the vehicle is not confiscable: if it is confiscable, it can be seized also. We may again point out that the language in the definition section is "unless the context otherwise requires", so that it is quite possible to say that In S.115 the term 'goods' may not include vehicles: in other words, the language of S.115 does not mean that the term 'goods' used in the other sections does not include vehicles. 9. We reiterate that the decision of Govindan Nair J. in P. S. N. Lorry Transport's case was not brought to the notice of the Single Judge: and we are in agreement with the conclusion of Govindan Nair J. in that case, though not for the reason given therein alone. We are also of opinion that the reasoning of the Single judge in the judgment under appeal is not correct. 10. The appeal is allowed, the decision of the Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. 11. We are also of opinion that the reasoning of the Single judge in the judgment under appeal is not correct. 10. The appeal is allowed, the decision of the Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. 11. The jeep has already been given to the respondent on security. And under the Act, an enquiry is contemplated; and such enquiry will proceed and the respondent will have all the rights he has under the Act. We have only decided that the first respondent has power to seize the jeep and nothing more.