ORDER K.N. Srivastava, J. - This is an appeal by the unsuccessful Defendant, arising out of following facts: The Plaintiff let out the Ahata in dispute to the Defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 23/- per month. According to the Plaintiff, the Ahata had no roofed structure when it was rented in the year 1957. The Defendant fell in arrears of rent. The Plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the Defendant by the notice dt. 15-6-1965. He thereafter filed the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. 2. The suit was contested by the Defendant and it was pleaded, inter alia, that the enclosed compound with a room inside was "accommodation" and therefore, the suit was barred by Section 3 of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 3. The learned trial court decreed the suit holding that the premises let out to the Defendant was an open Ahata without any roofed structure and therefore, the suit was not barred by Section 3 of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The Defendant filed an appeal. The lower appellate court concurred with the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal. 4. The only short question which arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether an Ahata, without any roofed structure, is an "accommodation", as provided u/s 2(a) of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). "Accommodation" has been defined in the Act as below: 'Accommodation' means residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building and includes- (i) gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; (iii) Any fitting affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include any accommodation used as a factory or for an industrial purpose where the business carried on in or upon the building is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. 5. Thus, accommodation can be residential or non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building. The word 'building' has not been defined in the Act. There are a number of decisions in which the expression 'accommodation' and 'building' has been considered. 5. Thus, accommodation can be residential or non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building. The word 'building' has not been defined in the Act. There are a number of decisions in which the expression 'accommodation' and 'building' has been considered. 6. The first case in the series of cases is Chanda Lal Vs. Ram Kishan, AIR 1952 All 607 . The following observation was made in this case in determining the question as to whether an open Ahata constituted a 'building' within the meaning of the Act. After taking into consideration the dictionary meaning of the word "accommodation" and "building", it was observed as below: This shows that in the general sense a space of land should be covered by building and that mere wall or fence is not to be termed a building. That the word 'building' connotes a roofed structure within the meaning of the Act appears to be clear from the use of the word 'includes' in Clause (a) of Section 2. Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) includes within the definition of accommodation, gardens, grounds and out houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building. If compounds had been intended to be considered as accommodation without reference to any building situate in them, the word 'includes' would not have been used to bring them within the definition of accommodation. 7. In Mohd. Sami v. Savitri Devi 1957 AWR 427 it was held that an open plot of land with no building on it was not an 'accommodation' for the purposes of Section 2(a) of the Act. Similar view was taken in Narayan Chand Dass v. Panna Lal 1969 AWR 52 . In this case, the tenancy commenced in respect of an open piece of land over which the tenant had raised some construction. In the instant case also, open land was let out to the Defendant and the Defendant made some constructions on it. Therefore, the tenancy was about the open land which was bounded by walls with no building or construction on it. 8. In Ami Chand v. Ram Sharan Das 1969 AWR 4 a number of rulings were considered and it was held that the accommodation must be inside a building having walls and a roof. Similar view was taken in Smt. Dhanwati Devi v. Khudaband Karim Jalley Jalalhu 1971 AWR 217 . 9. 8. In Ami Chand v. Ram Sharan Das 1969 AWR 4 a number of rulings were considered and it was held that the accommodation must be inside a building having walls and a roof. Similar view was taken in Smt. Dhanwati Devi v. Khudaband Karim Jalley Jalalhu 1971 AWR 217 . 9. These decisions, therefore, clearly go to show that the word "accommodation" connotes some form of structure which has a roof and walls fit to be used as a residence by a human being or for carrying on any trade, business, or industry in it. 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant relied on a decision of this Court in Sri Afzal Husain v. DM Kanpur 1957 AWR 390 . In this case the question was that it must be an 'accommodation' at the time of falling vacant and therefore, the question was as to whether an accommodation without any roofed structure if let out could be an 'accommodation' within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act. 11. Learned counsel for the Appellant also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Ghanshiam Das v. Devi Prasad 1966 AWR 412 SC. In this case the meaning of the word 'building' was considered in regard to the UP ZA and LR Act. The definition given u/s 9 of the UP ZA and LR Act is wider than the one given in the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and therefore, this ruling is of no help for determining the question in issue in this case. 12. In Abdul Sami and Another Vs. Mohammad Noor, AIR 1966 All 39 , a learned Single Judge of this Court observed that existence of a roof may not be necessary for a structure to be classed as a building, but it did not follow that every roofless structure was a building. This observation was not considered in the light of third proviso to Sub-section (2-A) of Section 1 of the Act. This provision lays down that nothing in the Act shall apply to any tenancy or other relationship in respect of a plot of land not covered by a roofed structure. 13. Thus, from a perusal of this provision it is abundantly clear that there should be a roofed structure in order to bring it within the definition of the word 'accommodation' as Laid down in Section 2(a) of the Act. 13. Thus, from a perusal of this provision it is abundantly clear that there should be a roofed structure in order to bring it within the definition of the word 'accommodation' as Laid down in Section 2(a) of the Act. This provision coupled with the decisions referred to above, leaves no room for doubt that an open Ahata without any roof on it or any construction with roof on it would not be included within the meaning of the word "accommodation". 14. Admittedly, the disputed Ahata was let out to the Appellant when there was no structure on it. The present structure had been raised by the Appellant after the creation of the tenancy and therefore, the presence of this structure would not be of any help to the Appellant in raising the question that it was an 'accommodation', u/s 2(a) of the Act. 15. As shown above, the accommodation must be in a building or part of a building'. The use of the word 'in' makes it quite clear that there should be some building and accommodation should be there in that building or part of it. A building is one which has, roof on it and therefore, this Ahata cannot be said to be an 'accommodation'. 16. In this view of the matter, the appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged.