JUDGMENT : This is an application for setting aside an ORDER :passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Patna City accepting final form submitted in a case - and discharging the accused persons. 2. It appears that a complaint was filed on the 16th of June, 1969 by the petitioner alleging offence under Sections 392 and 451 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the opposite party and one Ghasita. The Sub• divisional Magistrate directed this complaint to be put up the next day as it had been filed late. On the 17th of June, 1969 he examined the complainant and passed the following ORDER :: "Examined the complainant on S.A. This discloses a cognizable offence. Let the officer• in-charge, Malsalami register a case and submit final form in due course. Pat up on 17-7-69." In pursuance of this ORDER :the Police drew up a formal first information report on the basis of the complaint petition on the 19th of June, 1969 and started investigation. On the next date fixed in the complaint case, i.e., the 17th of July, 1969, it appears the final form was not received and a reminder was directed to be sent and on that date later the following ORDER :was passed: "Amalgamate it with G. R. Case No.380 of 1969, Malsalami P. S. Case No.10(6)69". No separate ORDER :s were recorded in the file of the complaint case thereafter. To go back to the Police case, it appears from an ORDER :of the 21st June, 1969 that the first information report was put up before the Sub-divisional Magistrate and he passed an ORDER :to await final form. The ORDER :passed on the 17th July, 1969 is as follows: "Perused complaint case No. 82/69 filed by Ram Anuj Vs. Ghasita and others. The above record amalgamated with this record and put up on the date fixed." It appears that final form was not submitted for a long time and the case was, therefore, postponed from one date to the other. It was ultimately received as appears from the ORDER :dated 24th of July, 1971. The police submitted final form saying that there was insufficient evidence in the case. On that date a protest petition was filed by the complainant-petitioner. Its hearing was postponed until the next date, the 29th July, 1971. It was ultimately received as appears from the ORDER :dated 24th of July, 1971. The police submitted final form saying that there was insufficient evidence in the case. On that date a protest petition was filed by the complainant-petitioner. Its hearing was postponed until the next date, the 29th July, 1971. A second petition was filed by the petitioner on that date and its hearing was postponed until the 5th of August, 1971. On that date one accused Ghasita was present but the other three were absent. The case was again postponed to the 12th August, 1971 on which date ORDER :for warrants of arrest to be issued against the three absentee accused was passed and the case was postponed to the 17th of August, 1971. On that date, an ORDER :, which translated from Hindi to English is as follows, was passed : "The protest petition is not being pressed today. Therefore, final from is accepted. Put up on 1-9-71." On the latter date the accused who was in attendance was discharged and the case was again postponed to the 17th of September, 1971 awaiting the attendance of the remaining accused. On the last day mentioned above the three accused (opposite party) also appeared and the ORDER :passed by the Magistrate again shows that he accepted the final form in respect of them and discharged them. As against this ORDER :the petitioner has come up in revision. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that in a case where proceedings are initiated on the basis of a complaint, as in this case, the ORDER :passed by a Magistrate discharging the accused persons must be taken to be an ORDER :under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') and in the absence of any reasons given for such dismissal the ORDER :is bad in law. It is not possible to accept this proposition of law for the simple reason that where two cases are started, one on the basis of a complaint and the other on the basis of a Police report and both are amalgamated, the complaint case ceases co have a separate identity having merged with the other case. This view is supported by a Bench decision of this Court reported in (1) A.I.R.1962 Patna 27 (Harbans Singh V. Daroga Singh and others). This view is supported by a Bench decision of this Court reported in (1) A.I.R.1962 Patna 27 (Harbans Singh V. Daroga Singh and others). The ultimate ORDER :passed thus cannot be deemed to be me under Section 203 of the Code. Recording of reasons as required by Section 203 will, therefore, not be obligatory. 4. Learned counsel has next urged that even though the complaint case be taken to have been amalgamated with the Police case, the petitioner had filed a protest petition which was dismissed on the 17th of August, 1971 without assigning reasons. This argument is of no avail to the petitioner because it appears that the protest petition had not been pressed and, therefore, final form had been accepted. In such a situation the Magistrate was not bound to give reasons for rejecting the protest petition. 5. There is, however, a more substantial point in favour of the petitioner which arises on the facts of this case. It appears that the Sub-divisional Magistrate examined the complainant and thereafter referred the complaint to the Police for registering the case and submitting final form as usual. The question arises as to whether the Sub-divisional Magistrate had the jurisdiction to refer the case to the Police for the purpose mentioned at that stage. It appears from the ORDER :passed by him on the 16th of June, 1969 that when the complaint was presented to him he applied his mind to the contents of the petition and proceeded to examine the complainant on oath. It is well settled that a Magistrate takes cognizance when he applied his mind to the contents of the complaint petition for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in Chapter XVI of the Code [see (2) A.I.R. 1951 Supreme Court 207 (R. R. Chari V. The State of Uttar Pradesh)]. In the present case it is quite obvious from the facts that the Magistrate did really act under Section 200 of the Code inasmuch as he examined the complainant on oath and reduced his statement to writing. There cannot be the slightest doubt, therefore, that he had taken cognizance of an offence and proceeded to act under Chapter XVI of the Code. 6. There cannot be the slightest doubt, therefore, that he had taken cognizance of an offence and proceeded to act under Chapter XVI of the Code. 6. The next question, therefore, is as to whether having done that, it was open to him to pass an ORDER :referring the complaint to the Police for instituting a case and investigating it. Learned counsel for the opposite party has urged that he could do so under Section 156(3) of the Code. There is no ether provision in the Code which enables a Magistrate to pass an ORDER :which amounts to a refusal to act further under Chapter XVI of the Code and to enable him to take recourse to Chapter XIV and to make an ORDER :of the kind made in this case. In my view, it was not open to the Magistrate to act under Section 156(3) of the Code at the stage at which he appears to have referred the matter to the Police. After having examined the complainant under Section 200 of the Code the proper course for him was either to issue process under Section 204, if he thought that there was sufficient ground for proceeding, or if he had any doubts about the truth of the complaint, to pass an ORDER :under Section 202 or to pass an ORDER :under Section 203 and certainly not under Section 156(3) of the Code. 7. Learned counsel has placed reliance on a case reported in (3) A.I.R. 1956 Calcutta 76 (Akshoy Kumar Dutta and others V. Jogesh Chandra Nandy). In that case a complaint was filed and without examining the complainant the complaint was directed to police for investigation and report. It was held that when a complaint was filed before a Magistrate he had two alternative courses open to him (1) to examine the complainant on oath and proceed under Chapter XVI or, (2) to direct an investigation by the Police under Section 156(3) and proceed under Chapter XIV of the Code. The Magistrate not having proceeded under Chapter XVI of the Code in that case it was held that he could proceed under Chapter XIV. This case cannot be, therefore, taken to be any authority for the proposition that where a Magistrate has acted under Chapter XVI he could simultaneously act also under Chapter XIV of the Code. 8. The Magistrate not having proceeded under Chapter XVI of the Code in that case it was held that he could proceed under Chapter XIV. This case cannot be, therefore, taken to be any authority for the proposition that where a Magistrate has acted under Chapter XVI he could simultaneously act also under Chapter XIV of the Code. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite party fairly placed before me the contrary view taken in some other decisions of the Calcutta High Court itself. In the case of (4) Pulin Behari Ghosh V. The King reported in 53 Calcutta Weekly Notes 653, a petition of complaint was filed and after reading the complaint which was held to disclose cognizable offence, the Police was directed to take cognizance and investigate and report but the complainant was not examined under Section 200 of the Code. Ultimately no report was submitted by the Police and the complaint was eventually dismissed. Thereafter the Police submitted a charge sheet with the result that the accused was tried and convicted. It was held that the whole proceeding was illegal. The Magistrate having proceeded under Chapter XVI of the Code had no jurisdiction to direct the Police to investigate under Chapter XIV and the trial Magistrate acted wholly without jurisdiction in proceeding on the basis of the charge sheet submitted later. It was also held that the Magistrate should not make a hybrid composite ORDER :both under Section 156(3) and under Section 202 of the Code as he made in that case. 9. In another case (5) Superintendent and Remenbrancer of Legal Affairs V. Abani Kumar Banerjee (A.I.R. 1950 Calcutta 437) reliance was placed on the basis of Pulin Behari Ghosh (Supra) and the view expressed therein on the point was followed. In the case of (6) A. C. Samaddar and another V. Suresh Ch. Jana and others (A.I.R. 1949 Calcutta 197) a learned single Judge held that the Magistrate cannot upon taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint refer the matter to the Police for investigation and submission of a report under Section 156 (3). He further held that Section 156 (3) is not intended to provide an alternate procedure to that laid down in Section 200. Reliance was placed by the learned Judge on a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of In re: Arula Kotiah and In re: Kasetti Ademma, 12 Cr. He further held that Section 156 (3) is not intended to provide an alternate procedure to that laid down in Section 200. Reliance was placed by the learned Judge on a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of In re: Arula Kotiah and In re: Kasetti Ademma, 12 Cr. L. J. 463 : (11 I. C. 999 Madras). 10. Learned counsel for the parties have not been able to find out any decision of this Court on the point arising in this case. 11. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Magistrate acted illegally in asking the Police to register a case on the basis of the complaint and submit final form. He also acted wrongly, therefore, in accepting the final form submitted and in discharging the accused persons. The proceeding, therefore, was illegal from the very beginning after the stage of examination of the complaint was over. 12. Even if I were to take the view that the ORDER :of the Magistrate in referring the case to the Police may be treated as an investigation under Section 202 of the Code, still the Magistrate was bound to record his reasons while making the ORDER :of dismissal of the complaint on the basis of that enquiry report, because the ORDER :of dismissal would be treated as one under Section 203 of the Code. In the circumstances of the present case, however, there is no room for treating the ORDER :as one passed under Section 202 of the Code at all. 12. It is thus quite clear that the ORDER :passed by the learned Magistrate on the 16th of June, 1969 referring the complaint to the Police to register a case and submit final form was illegal and, therefore, the ORDER :passed by him on the 17th of September, 1971 accepting the final form submitted by the Police and discharging the accused persons was also illegal. The ORDER :passed by the learned Magistrate on the 17th of September, 1971 is, therefore, set aside and the case is remitted to him for proceeding in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. This application is accordingly allowed. Application allowed