JUDGMENT : K.B. Panda, J. - This is an appeal under section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, filed by the State of Orissa against the judgment passed by Shri S.K. Mohanty, Sessions judge, Sambalpur-Sundargarh, dated 4-12-1958, acquitting the respondent Sarangadhar Bhoi of a charge of murder. 2. Deceased Basupalli Das, respondent Sarangadhar Bhoi, R.V.V. Satyanaravana Rao (P.w. 2) and Gokul Chandra Meher (P.w. 9) were all employees under the Central Institute of Fishery Technology, Sub-Station, Burla. They were camping at Rampaluga under a small tent 13' X 13' (Spot Map Ext. 11). The village Rampaluga is about a furlong away. P.W.2 was the Research Assistant; P.W.9 was the net maker ; respondent was the Lascar (boatman) ; and the deceased was the Tindal (Supervisor over the boatman). 3. On the night of occurrence, that is, 24-9-1967, the deceased, the respondent and P.Ws. 2 and 9 were at the camp in the tent. They finished their night meals by about 7.30 P.M. prepared by P.W.9. Then P.W.2, the respondent and the deceased retired to bad while P.W.9 went out of the tent for using Gurakhu near the lake. A lantern was burning in the tent. P.W.2 who was the highest in rank amongst them slept on a camp cot, while the respondent and the deceased slept quite close to each other spreading their bed-clothes on a tarpaulin. Before P.W.2 fell asleep, he heard an alarm of the deceased that he was stabbed. P.W.2 saw the assaulting mood of the respondent, challenged his action and tried to snatch away the knife (M.O.I) from him. P.W.9 who was also close-by got into the tent and found the injured Basupalli Bleeding profusely and the knife in the right hand of the respondent. However, P.Ws. 2 and 9 succeeded in snatching away the knife from the respondent who fled away towards hill-side. P.W.2 and 9 left with the injured who had fallen unconscious, shouted for help from the villagers of Rampaluga but as the story goes, the respondent uttered something in Oriya (Sambalpuri Oriya) and prevented persons from coming there. At last P.Ws. 2 and 9 put the injured on a boat and with the knife proceeded towards Burla. When they had gone a mile or two, they found their tent on fire. At last P.Ws. 2 and 9 put the injured on a boat and with the knife proceeded towards Burla. When they had gone a mile or two, they found their tent on fire. P.W.2 reaching the 'Ashoks Nivas' rang up to his office and informed the watchman there how the deceased was in a precarious condition and that their officer-in-charge Mr. V.C. George, Assistant Research Officer P.W.7 should come with jeep to carry the injured for treatment, P.W.7 came with jeep and carried the injured and others ( P.Ws. 2, 9 and 5) to Burla Medical College Casualty Department where the doctor P.W.1 declared the injured to be dead. Thereafter, under the advice of P.W.1 the party proceeded to Burla Police Station where P.W.7 lodged information about the incident which has been treated as F.I.R. (Ext. 3) in this case. There the knife was also produced. The respondent with two others appeared at Lakhanpur police Station the next day on 25-9-1987 at 5.15 P.M. where he was taken into custody. His plea was that it was P.W.2 who, because of rivalry in love affairs with the deceased, had killed him and had put the blame on him. 4. The learned Sessions Judge took the evidence of 12 prosecution witnesses and finally acquitted the respondent of the charge giving him benefit of doubt occasioning this appeal. 5. There is a catena of authoritative judicial pronouncements of the scope of the High Court's power in cases of appeal against acquittal. 4. The learned Sessions Judge took the evidence of 12 prosecution witnesses and finally acquitted the respondent of the charge giving him benefit of doubt occasioning this appeal. 5. There is a catena of authoritative judicial pronouncements of the scope of the High Court's power in cases of appeal against acquittal. Following what their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down, the Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Itteravi v. State of Travancore Cochin AIR 1953 S.C. 478 , has reiterated that it can review the entire, evidence in the case and arrive at its own conclusion as in an appeal from an order of conviction, subject to the following limitations: (a) that due weight and consideration must be given to the view of the trial Court as to the credibility of witnesses and its findings on questions of fact; (b) that the presumption of innocence of the accused with which a trial starts has been reinforced by the order of acquittal, and that he must not be denied the benefit of a reasonable doubt, if such doubt exists ; (c) that the Court of appeal must be slow in disturbing the finding of the trial Court on questions of fact, and its conclusion that the charge against the accused has not been established beyond doubt must not be reversed except for strong reasons. Keeping the above dicta in view, we gave Mr. B.B. Mohanty, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent, full latitude to place the case in extense. We were taken through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, particularly of P.Ws. 2, 5, 7 and 9 together with the elaborate judgment of the learned Court below. But we are constrained to observe that the learned lower Court's approach to the case has not been proper, its appreciation of evidence has been lop-sided and what is more, it has completely ignored the circumstantial evidence, that is, the conduct of P.W.2 vis-a-vis the respondent and the broad probabilities of the case. The bulk of the judgment of the learned lower Court centres round, the cryptic words that came out of the lips of the deceased while receiving the injury and with what exactitude P.Ws. 2 and 9 repeated the same before the police, the committing Court and the trial Court. The bulk of the judgment of the learned lower Court centres round, the cryptic words that came out of the lips of the deceased while receiving the injury and with what exactitude P.Ws. 2 and 9 repeated the same before the police, the committing Court and the trial Court. The learned lower Court's finding is that, the deceased blurted out merely "I Am Killed, I Am Killed" (Mar Dia, Mar Dia) which did not point to the respondent and so the prosecution exaggerated it, improved upon it to link the respondent with the crime as "Bhoi Killed Me" (Mar Dia Bhoi). We agree that much turns out on the fact whether the deceased uttered the surname of the respondent or not. We are also aware of the construction that could be given to the expression "Mar Dia Bhoi" meaning "Oh Bhoi : See I Am Killed". To make the matter short, we do not propose to dwell much on this for apparently there is some amount of inconsistency over the fact whether the deceased uttered the surname "Bhoi" or not. But even brushing aside that evidence, an independent finding is quite possible. At least, the' undisputed part of the agonizing cry, i.e. "Mar Dia, Mar Dia", can be safely accepted to draw the attention of the other inmates of the tent towards the injured and his assailant. 6. The doctor (P.W.8) who conducted the post mortem found one incised injury 1" x ?" situated on the left side of the sternum between 4th and 5th costal cartilages, on dissection he found one incised injury 1" x ?" penetrating into the cavity of heart through the wall of left ventricle. The pericardium had been corresponding by pierced containing 3 ozs. of clotted blood. In his opinion, the knife (M.O.I) could cause such an injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The admitted facts of the case are also consistent with this post-mortem report. There is no cavilling the fact about the time, date, manner and the weapon with which the injury was caused. The question had boiled down to the narrow compass of judging whether the author of the injury was P.W.2 or the respondent. 7. Mr. The admitted facts of the case are also consistent with this post-mortem report. There is no cavilling the fact about the time, date, manner and the weapon with which the injury was caused. The question had boiled down to the narrow compass of judging whether the author of the injury was P.W.2 or the respondent. 7. Mr. B.B. Mohanty contended that the respondent and the deceased being in best of terms all through there was no motive for the murder; that it is only when P.W.2 threatened to assault the respondent with the knife (M.O.I) that the latter fled away from the scene for fear of life; that P.W.2 to save his own skin, instead of seeking help from the villagers of Rampaluga or going to the police station at Lakhanpur which was only two miles away and where there was a hospital, took the injured in a boat and in a jeep several miles to hasten his end; and that when the respondent appeared at Lakhanpur P.S. to give a true version of the occurrence, it was not entertained and he was taken into custody. These points raised by Mr. Mohanty would not detain us much. It is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish the motive for a crime. If otherwise a crime is established, the motive becomes immaterial. As to the other circumstances cited in favour of the respondent, they are not credible or convincing and that apart, when placed side by side with the conduct of P.W.2, who, according to the defence, is the author of the crime, pale into insignificance. The faint suggestion of rivalry in love between P.W.2 and the deceased has not been pursued and no pointed questions put in that respect except a bald and vague suggestion denied by P.W.2. On the contrary, the record igdicates that the deceased was a married man who had his family in Burla. The investigation suggests that the respondent was aged 23, then in love with a girl and on the early hours of the night of occurrence had returned disappointed without seeing her in her place. Farther he saw the deceased and the girl coming out of a thicket in suspicious circumstances. Thereby the prosecution suggested that it was frustration combined with jealousy that was at the root of the murder. Farther he saw the deceased and the girl coming out of a thicket in suspicious circumstances. Thereby the prosecution suggested that it was frustration combined with jealousy that was at the root of the murder. Be that as it may, we are not going to place any reliance on this. 8. What impresses us most is the very innocent and natural reaction of P.W.2 when he saw the murder and at no time do we see him behaving in a sneakish far less in a guilty manner. This throws overboard the fling at him that he is the perpetrator of the crime. According to his (P.w. 2's) statement, be challenged the action of the respondent, attempted to snatch away the knife, condemned the action of the respondent, in all anxiety to save the injured with the help of P.W.9 took him in a boat more than two miles, informed the watchman to inform their officer to come in a jeep, told the officer the incident and then proceeded with officer and the injured to the hospital and to the Thana. In the F.I.R, it is dearly stated that the respondent was the murderer. The knife (M.O.I) was the knife belonging to the camp used for all odd jobs including dressing of vegetables for cooking. Does all this conduct of P.W.2 at different stages, accord with a guilty mind ? If he was the murder, could he weave out a story so promptly anticipating all the support and sympathy from P.W.9 who is another camp-mate and not a man of his native place but a man of Orissa? We think such conduct on the part of P.W.2 is only consistent and compatible with his innocence and not otherwise. 9. P.W.9, who is the fellow worker, supports P.W.2 in broad details and nothing has been suggested as to why he would support one against the other except that he is deposing falsely at the instance of P.Ws. 7 and 2 who are his bosses. It is hard to believe that to please these officers P.W.9 accuses the innocent respondent as the murderer in place of P.W.2, particularly when he had no such friendship with P.W.2 or ill-will against the respondent. He had cooked the food for all. Though not a witness to the actual stabbing, yet he is a post occurrence witness who appeared on the scene immediately. He had cooked the food for all. Though not a witness to the actual stabbing, yet he is a post occurrence witness who appeared on the scene immediately. He had heard the cry of anguish of the deceased, seen him bleeding profusely and sinking, seen the respondent in a murderous post with the knife red with gore in the right hand while P.W.2 trying to snatch it away. There is a ring of truth in his statement which can hardly be missed or whittled down. 10. Turning to the conduct of the respondent, he left the scene immediately, did not get the support of P.W.9, made himself scarce and made his appearance on 25-9-1967 at 5.15 p.m. at Lakhanpur P.S. Such conduct on the part of the respondent can hardly be consistent with his innocence. When he apprehended that a heinous charge of murder was going to be heaped on him mischievously and maliciously, human nature, as it is, normally he would react to frustrate it then and there. If P.W.2 was the murderer and he was the rescuer, as he claims, his subsequent conduct negatives the same. 11. Finally Mr. B.B. Mohanty could only place the following circumstances in favour of the respondent that P.Ws. 2 and 7, who are South Indians, have combined to implicate the lowly poor boatman to protect the officer P.W.2 ; that when all the persons who could'nt combined against the respondent, he felt helpless ; even his oral statement at Lakhanpur P.S. on 25-9-1967 was not taken down ; that there was no justification for not examining some people of Rampaluga-at least the controversial Chamaruni girl who was frequenting the camp, and that P.W.2 was not stating over phone to the chowkidar P.W.5 the name of the assailant was significant indeed. We have given our anxious consideration to these points, particularly because of the benefit of doubt given by the learned lower Court. In our view, divorced from the context they may masquerade as forceful but in fact not so. There is no earthly reason why all top people will combine against this innocent lowly respondent who is a small fry - a poor boatman only. Besides, there is no reason also why the boss P.W.7 would falsely support P.W.2 at the cost of the respondent. There is no earthly reason why all top people will combine against this innocent lowly respondent who is a small fry - a poor boatman only. Besides, there is no reason also why the boss P.W.7 would falsely support P.W.2 at the cost of the respondent. To add to it, P.W.9 who is native, can hardly fall in line and accuse the respondent as the murderer when in fact P.W.2 is the culprit in the absence of any ill-will between the two. The very fact that the respondent appeared at Lakhanpur P.S. the next day at 5-15 p.m., though it is only 2 miles from the tent, rather appeals to us to be indicative of his guilt than innocence, for man-with his inherent instinct of self-preservation, would always try to sabotage any attempt to imperil him at the first instance, than allow time to pass. If the defence version would have been true, the respondent would have rushed to Lakhanpur P.S. making a true statement of fact implicating P.W.2 in the crime, or at least would have moved heaven and hell and rallied round people of Rampaluga to foist the false charge against him. But he has done nothing of the sort. On the contrary, he appeared at Lakhanpur Thana with two others long after, and soon after the occurrence dissuaded the people of Bampaluga to come to the scene of occurrence. When there was merely a vague and indefinite suggestion of a Chamaruni girl, we do not think any useful purpose would have been served in pursuing that line of investigation by-passing the main issue. Much was made of the omission on the part of P.W.2 in naming the assailant to P.W.5, the chowkidar, over phone. To us it appears utterly inconsequential. P.W.2 was then anxious about the life of the injured and not to punish the assailant ; in a hurry he was telling the chowkidar to inform the officer to come with a jeep to facilitate treatment to the injured ; P.W.2 is a South Indian and P.W.5 is a man of Boudh talking different languages with different intention ; how the telephone was receptive and in what mood or medium (i.e. in Oriya, Hindi or Telgu) the talk was held are also very material. Besides, P.W.9 was there with the story that the respondent was the assailant and P.W.7 was also apprised of that which got into the F.I.R. In this setting we see nothing material in the points raised by Mr. Mohanty. The learned Court below has rightly extracted the principles of benefit of doubt; but in their application to the facts of the present case, has obviously gone wrong. There appears to be some amount of confusion over the significance and scope of operation of the principle of benefit of doubt. In all criminal proceedings, there are two golden rules viz, (a) presumption of accused's innocence till the contrary is established; and (b) benefit being given to the accused if there is existence of a reasonable doubt. In a way the second one flows from the first. But then their field of operation is not identical. The first principle is all pervasive and of universal application in all Criminal trials but not the second one. 12. From the point of degree of proof, criminal cases can be conveniently categorised in four groups. Where the criminal charge is mathematically proved against the accused or, as said in legal jargon,'beyond shadow of doubt', in such type of cases there is no scope for 'benefit of doubt to operate'. The obvious reason being that when all doubts are eliminated, no room is left for doubt to confer, its advantage on any. The second category of cases is where the evidence falls short of absolute proof. In other words, the degree of proof necessary to establish the charge fully is lacking and consequently some scope remains for doubt. It is in this type of case that the principle of benefit of doubt is invoked for the advantage of the accused. The third category of cases is where the evidence falls for short of the requisite standard to establish a criminal charge. In such type of cases principle of benefit of doubt has no application and these are cases of clean acquittal. The third category of cases is where the evidence falls for short of the requisite standard to establish a criminal charge. In such type of cases principle of benefit of doubt has no application and these are cases of clean acquittal. The fourth category of cases is where the evidence for the prosecution and the defence appears evenly balanced ; the prosecution proving its case through independent evidence to the hilt or the accused admitting commission of the offence but wishing to escape through some exception or proving the defence theory through the prosecution witnesses or independently-in such type of cases, even if some might hold that the defence has not become so formidable as the prosecution, yet the principle of benefit of doubt will have full play and the benefit thereof will accrue to the accused. In other words, in all evenly balanced cases, benefit of doubt will tilt the issue in favour of the defence. 13. Benefit of doubt is a salutary principle of criminal law to further justice. It is the royal road for those who seek to dispense with even-handed justice with boldness and courage; but a cloak to shirkers who seek the path of least resistance. "Benefit of doubt" has nowhere been defined ; nor is it capable of an accurate scientific definition. All sorts of doubts-fanciful, strange and base-less-are hardly reasonable doubts, on the basis of which any benefit might flow-or Courts will take into consideration. Doubts which are real, genuine, well founded which a normal man with normal intelligence in a given circumstance would naturally harbour, are doubts that come within the fold of "reasonable doubt" entitling one to the benefit thereof. Such doubts are normal in a normal man which should never be equated with the abnormal fear of an imbecile, indecisive or a timid fellow. Very aptly an eminent Judge has expressed it thus : "It is not a doubt of a vacillating mind that has no normal courage to decide but shelters itself in a vain and idle scepticism." Law so enunciated, we do not find anything which the learned Court below points out to be reasonably suspicious in the behaviour of P.W.2 to be persuaded to take the view that circumstances of guilt or innocence are equally balanced both in favour and against P.W.2 and the respondent. In other words, we are unable to place P.W.2 and the respondent at par, as the lower Court has finally done, giving benefit of doubt to the respondent. On the contrary, it appears perverse to us. In this context, another matter, though not so much material, yet is of great significance. Out of the four occupants of the tent, one was injured and removed by P.W.2 and P.W.9. The other occupant was the respondent who had decamped soon after the occurrence. When the injured had been taken in a boat about a mile or two, the tent was seen on lire. Evidence is that it had been reduced to ashes which is not challenged. It was at an isolated place away from village Rampaluga, that the tent had been pitched near the lake. There were no valuables in the tent. In the circumstances, it is to every body's surmisal as to who could have been the author of this mischievous incendiarism. True, there is no charge under section 436, Indian Penal Code against the respondent and so we do not take that at all into consideration. But, all the same, this is certainly another circumstance not against P.W.2. 14. In the result, therefore, rummaging the whole record, the evidence and the judgment of the learned lower Court, we are reluctant to concur with the learned lower Court that this is a fit case where the respondent is entitled to the benefit of doubt. There are no dearth of instances where on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness conviction can lie, for evidence has to be scanned, sifted and weighed and not counted. Again circumstances, which cannot be created and do lie, should not be ignored, putting undue emphasis on superficial oral evidence, as the learned lower Court has done, in discussing at fall length whether the deceased uttered the surname of the assailant or not. The unimpeachable evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 9, corroborated by the evidence of P.W.7, the immaculate conduct of P.Ws. 2 and 9 in the affair together with the circumstantial evidence and the broad probabilities of the case, are sufficient to clinch the issue against the respondent.. The unimpeachable evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 9, corroborated by the evidence of P.W.7, the immaculate conduct of P.Ws. 2 and 9 in the affair together with the circumstantial evidence and the broad probabilities of the case, are sufficient to clinch the issue against the respondent.. Accordingly we allow this appeal, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, convict the respondent under section 302, Indian Penal Code and sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for life which in the circumstances, I hope, will meet the ends of justice. The respondent is to surrender to the bail to undergo the sentence. Before parting with this judgment we cannot but observe that if this case has succeeded, it is due to its innate worth, redounding no credit to the mechanical investigation. R.N. Misra, J. - I agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brother that the acquittal has to be set aside and the respondent convicted for the offence of murder and sentenced to R.I. for life. 16. In Ramabhupala Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR 1971 S.C. 460 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have said:- "The scope of an appeal against an order of acquittal has been the subject of some controversy in Courts for a long time. 16. In Ramabhupala Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR 1971 S.C. 460 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have said:- "The scope of an appeal against an order of acquittal has been the subject of some controversy in Courts for a long time. But that controversy is now settled by the decision of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 S.C. 715 , In that decision this Court summarised the legal position thus- (1) An appellate Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded ; (2) The principles laid down in Sheo Swarup's case AIR 1934 P.C. 227 , afforded a correct guide for the appellate Court's approach to a case disposing of such an appeal; (3) The different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court such as : (a) 'substantial and compelling reasons', (b) 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons', and (c) 'strong reasons' are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to came to its own conclusion, but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the Court below in support of its order of acquittal but should express the reasons in its judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. To these tests we may add, as laid down by this Court in several decisions that the appellate Court should bear in mind the fact that the trial Court had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the witness box and the presumption of innocence is not weakened by the order of acquittal. If two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record the appellate Court should not disturb the findings of the trial Court." In Jadunath Singh and others v. State of U.P. AIR 1972 S.C. 116 , it was again said:- "This Court has consistently taken the view that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has full power to review at large all the evidence and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed." 17. The learned Trial Judge supported his judgment of acquittal on the following findings:- (i) The evidence regarding what the deceased had said after being stabbed was discrepant and it cannot be held that he had said, "Mardia, Bhoi" (meaning the respondent); (ii) P.W.2's garments had been blood-stained as admitted by him. Those should have been seized and investigation should have been directed to ascertain whether he could have been the murderer in keeping with the defence version of the incident, (iii) If the respondent was indeed the author of the crime, by his shouts he could not have kept the villagers away from coming to the spot of occurrence to render help in pursuance of the shouts for help given by P.W.2 ; (iv) Non-examination of any of the Villagers to support this part of the prosecution case has led the Trial Judge to raise adverse inference against the prosecution case; (v) The deceased and the respondent were on good terms and as such there could be no earthly reason as to why the respondent would murder the deceased ; (vi) P.W.9 was not an eye witness and the evidence of P.W.2 does not bring home the charge against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt ; (vii) P.W.9 had admitted that a 20 years old chamar (scheduled caste) girl used to move about in and around the tent; though the prosecution has not admitted the defence story about this love episode to provide the motive for the murder, the defence case is to some extent probabilised. Added to these, Mr. Mohanty for the respondent contended that we should draw adverse inference against the prosecution for not having examined the girl or at least her father whom the police had examined during investigation. The learned Trial Judge has not relied upon the demeanour of any witness in the assessment of the evidence. As my learned brother has rightly pointed out, the dispute has become a very simple one the deceased has been murdered but who is his assailant - the respondent or P.W.2 ? 18. I shall first deal with the propriety or correctness of the reasons indicated by the learnrd Trial Judge for his finding. I proceed to deal in the same order as indicated above:- (i) The evidence regarding the deceased's uttering the respondent's surname is indeed weak and doubtful. 18. I shall first deal with the propriety or correctness of the reasons indicated by the learnrd Trial Judge for his finding. I proceed to deal in the same order as indicated above:- (i) The evidence regarding the deceased's uttering the respondent's surname is indeed weak and doubtful. I agree with the conclusion of the trial Court but would reiterate as my learned brother has indicated that it is not fatal to the prosecution case. (ii) P.W: 2 had admittedly been at the spot. He had carried the deceased after he received the injuries. Sufficient explanation as to how his garments became blood stained is in the record. There was absolutely no basis laid for the love episode with the chamar girl. As such, the trial Court was not justified in viewing adversely against the prosecution on account of the fact that investigation was not directed against P.W.2 or into the love episode. (iii) P.W.2 is a man from Andhra Pradesh who does not know Oriya language while the respondent is local man. Admittedly the tent was by the side of the Dam about a furlong away from the village of Rampaluga. Between the shouts of P.W.2 and those of the Respondent the latter's sweets were expected to be effective. There are two apparent reasons-(a) P.W.2 was shouting from within the tent and away from the village while the respondent who had run into the jungle near the village was close to people; (b) P.W.2 had the language difficulty while the respondent must have been intelligible. If this aspect had been kept in view, the trial Court would not have found a point here against the prosecution. (iv) There is no clear evidence that Villagers had heard the shouts of P.W.2 and yet they avoided coming to the spot because the respondent prohibited them. There was no room for drawing any adverse inference. (v) P.W.2 in cross-examination has stated:- "Both the accused and Basupali (the deceased) were on friendly terms." His evidence further shows that the accused and the deceased had been to Burla a few days before the occurrence for obtaining provision for the camp. A few hours before the occurrence, the respondent and P.W.9 had gone to the village for eggs. There were four persons in all in the camp that day P.Ws. 2 and 9, the respondent and the deceased. A few hours before the occurrence, the respondent and P.W.9 had gone to the village for eggs. There were four persons in all in the camp that day P.Ws. 2 and 9, the respondent and the deceased. Some other had left for another spot in the morning of that day. There was apparently no enmity between the respondent and the deceased and they were living together. P.W.2's evidence shows that the, deceased was a married man and his wife was at Burla, the headquarters. The party was temporarily camping at different places by the side of the Dam for collection of spaceman for research. The defence plea of dispute over love-making with a local chamar girl has remained only a suggestion and nothing more. It is true the prosecution has not been able to advance a motive for the respondent to murder the deceased, but it is well-settled that a charge does not fail for lack of proof of motive if there be evidence to prove the charge. I shall deal with this aspect later again. (vi) After P.W.2 and the deceased spread their beds, P.W.9 went out of the tent to the Dam for washing his teeth with gudakhu (tobacco paste). As the evidence stands, the tent had been pitched by the side of the Dam. P.W.9 ran back into the tent on hearing the shout of the deceased that he has killed. P.W.9 clearly says that he saw the knife smeared with blood in the hand of the respondent. It is true he did not see the actual stabbing but he returned into tent immediately after the stab was given. His appearance at the spot was very proximate to the material point of time and he saw the knife in the respondent's hand. Thus he is indeed a very material witness. His evidence probabilities the respondent to have been the murder. Thus P.W.2 is materially corroborated by P.W.9. (vii) I have already indicated that there is no evidence regarding the chamar girl's activities. P.W.9 has said, "I do not know any chamar girl. Thus he is indeed a very material witness. His evidence probabilities the respondent to have been the murder. Thus P.W.2 is materially corroborated by P.W.9. (vii) I have already indicated that there is no evidence regarding the chamar girl's activities. P.W.9 has said, "I do not know any chamar girl. It is not a fact that I stated before the police that on the 23rd morning I found chamar girl aged about 20 was going towards the accused near about the tent." P.W.12, one of the investigating officers, has also not connected the chamar girl with the tent life there on the basis of the statement of P.W.9 under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, the learned Trial Judge has completely omitted to consider some very significant and material features. P.W.2 is a man of Andhra Pradesh while P.W.9 and the respondent are people of this state. Admittedly the respondent and P.W.2 were present inside the tent while P.W.9 rushed into the tent on hearing the shouts of the deceased that he was killed. P.W.9 in cross-examination has stated, "I saw Rao P.W.2 when he was getting up from his bed, Myself, P.W.2 and the accused were struggling for getting possession of the knife (M.O.I). As I remember, Rao snatched away the knife from the accused. Thereafter the accused left and ran away." There is no suggestion either to P.W.2 or 9 that the respondent was threatened with the knife by P.W.2 after he got control of it so as to justify his running away from the tent into the jungle. Even if, the respondent had reason to run away into the jungle, in normal course he would have disclosed to the villagers immediately of the ghastly event and called upon them to go to the tent for rendering assistance. If the deceased was his friend and p.w.2 was the murderer, the respondent's role would have been to ensure the detection of the murderer. The respondent's keeping away from the scene soon after the occurrence while ho was expected to be rendering assistance to the collapsing friend particularly when he was a local man and his not disclosing the fact to the villagers are important features which could not have been lost sight of. P.W.2's conduct, on the other hand, has been that of a normal man. P.W.2's conduct, on the other hand, has been that of a normal man. He has behaved throughout as a normal person not connected with the crime. Admittedly in the camp he was the superior of all. His conduct shows that he rose to the occasion and did all that was possible to meet the situation Mr. Mohanty's comment was that P.W.2 had no business to take the deceased to Bnrla when admittedly at a distance of 2 miles or so, there was a hospital. P.W.2 has not been asked that question but if an answer has to be looked for we might accept the learned Government Advocate's explanation that Burla was convenient to reach by boat; the headquarters where P.W.7, the boss of the establishment lived was preferred ; Burla had admittedly better medical facilities again, the deceased's wife lived there. If P.W.2 had committed the murder, he could not indeed have remained associated with all that followed. My learned brother has duly emphasised this aspect and I do not propose to repeat. P.W.9 is a local man. There is no particular justification for him to support P.W.2 against the respondent who is also a local man. Mr. Mohanty sought to offer a ground for it by saying that official influence may have brought about that result. P.W.7 George is the Assistant Research Officer. I do not see any justification to assume that P.W.7 sided to protect P.W.2 by putting the blame on the respondent. 19. My learned brother is right when he said that "the Trial Judge looked at the evidence in mechanical manner and overlooked the essential features in conduct evidence" which were more dependable than oral evidence. Law is well-settled that suspicion, however great, cannot take the place of proof and again, even if the entirety facts and circumstances do create a serious suspicion of commission of offence with which the respondent was charged and of which he has been acquitted, under our jurisprudence, conviction cannot be based upon suspicion and on the conscience of the Court being morally satisfied about the complicity of the respondent Gian Mahtani v. State of Maharashtra 1971 (2) S.C.R. 611 . I am also conscious of the position that the presumption of innocence has been rain-forced by the acquittal in the hands of the trial Court and though our power under section 423 Criminal Procedure Code is the same-be it an appeal against conviction or acquittal-a judgment of acquittal shall not be lightly interfered with merely because a different conclusion is open to be reached. But the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 9 read with the evidence of P.W.7, the conduct of the respondent and of P.W.2 after the occurrence and the non-sustainable grounds of the Trial Judge for recording the order of acquittal lead me to concur in the conclusion of my learned brother. 20. Both of us by independent analysis of the evidence on record have reached the conclusion that the jndgment of acquittal is unreasonable and if all the evidence-direct, circumstantial and conduct-had been taken into account, a judgment of acquittal, could not have been pronounced in this case. In Damodar Prasad v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1972 S.C. 622 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have said : "Once the appellate Court came to the conclusion that the view of the trial Court was unreasonable, that itself would provide a reason for interference." 21. The next question for consideration is as to what would be the proper sentence. The incident took place about 5 years back. At this stage we cannot think of inflicting the capital punishment. My learned brother is right in saying that the respondent upon his conviction under section 302, Indian Penal Code should suffer the sentence of R.I. for life. The respondent is on bail under orders of this Court. Steps be taken by the trial Court to apprehend the respondent and commit him to custody to suffer the sentence. Final Result : Allowed