Judgment :- 1. A land-owner who succeeded before the Land Tribunal and lost before the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Alleppey, in relation to an application filed by the respondent in this petition under S.80B of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, is the revision petitioner. The respondent claimed benefits under the Act alleging that he is a "kudikidappukaran" as defined in the Act. The action was resisted by the revision petitioner land owner on the ground that the respondent is not a "kudikidappukaran" as defined in S.2 (25) of the Act in so far as he is owner of a plot of 15 cents of land pursuant to Ext. P1 purchase. 2. The short question that falls for decision in this revision petition is whether the respondent petitioner has ceased to be a "kudikidappukaran" in view of the property owned by him under Ext. P1. Ext, P1 purchase is admittedly in the name of the respondent-petitioner, his wife and two children. In so far as the purchase is not for any tarwad as such the share of each vendee is definite even though the enjoyment may continue to be common. On partition, therefore, the respondent can claim, only an one-fourth share in the 15 cents. That being the position it has to be considered whether he ceases to be a kudikidappukaran as defined in S.2 (25) of the Act. 3. On partition, therefore, the respondent can claim, only an one-fourth share in the 15 cents. That being the position it has to be considered whether he ceases to be a kudikidappukaran as defined in S.2 (25) of the Act. 3. S.2(25) of the Act may be read as follows: "'kudikidappukaran' means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and (a) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or (b) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a but belonging to such person and situate in the said land; and 'kudikidappu' means the land and the homestead or the but so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easement attached thereto: Provided that a person who, on the 16th August, 1968, was in occupation of any land and the homestead thereon, or in occupation of a but belonging to any other person, and who continued to be in such occupation at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. shall be deemed to be in occupation of such land and homestead, or hut, as the case may be, with permission as required under this clause. The expression ‘person' is defined in S.2(43) of the Act in the following terms: "'person' shall include a company, family, joint family, association or other body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; and any institution capable of holding property;" The term 'family' in its turn has been defined in S.2(14). It cannot be seriously disputed that the vendees under Ext. P1 constituted a family as defined in S.2(14). It was, therefore, contended that in view of the definition of the expression ‘person' in S.2(25) defining kudikidappukaran, the family as a unit cannot claim the benefit if such family is in possession of any land in excess of ten cents. It cannot be seriously disputed that the vendees under Ext. P1 constituted a family as defined in S.2(14). It was, therefore, contended that in view of the definition of the expression ‘person' in S.2(25) defining kudikidappukaran, the family as a unit cannot claim the benefit if such family is in possession of any land in excess of ten cents. An analogous contention was turned down in the decisions reported in Achuthan v. Sulochanan (1971 KLT. 549) and Achuthan v. Sulochana (1971 KLT. 845.) The learned counsel strenuously contended that those cases are clearly distinguishable, and alternatively that the ratio laid down therein may require reconsideration. I think, it is not necessary to go into those aspects in this case, because the conclusions drawn in there can be supported by a slightly different reasoning emerging out of the facts of this case. The definition of the expression'person' in S.2(43) is an inclusive definition. Consequently the definition cannot be construed as taking in only the units or categories specifically mentioned therein. An individual is very much a person within the meaning of S 2(25); and it will be defeating the very purpose of the statute if it is held otherwise. It is not possible to envisage that an individual cannot come within the ambit of the definition of 'kudikidappukaran' simply because he happened to be a member of a'family' as defined in S.2(14). Hence the respondent-petitioner is not precluded from claiming the status of a kudikidappukaran in his individual capacity simply because he happened to be a member of a 'family' as defined in the Act if in other respects he satisfies the conditions laid down in S.2(25). Again, to disentitle a person from claiming the benefits as a kudikidappukaran it has to be shown that such person is "in possession either as owner or as tenant" land in excess of ten cents. In the instant case it cannot be disputed that the respondent-petitioner can claim in pursuance of Ext. P1 ownership of only an one-fourth share is the 15 cents of land purchased under Ext. P1, and such share will be much below the ten cents stipulated in S.2(25) of the Act. It follows, therefore, that the respondent-petitioner is a kudikidappukaran as defined in S.2(25) of the Act; and the order passed by the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms) calls for no interference. P1, and such share will be much below the ten cents stipulated in S.2(25) of the Act. It follows, therefore, that the respondent-petitioner is a kudikidappukaran as defined in S.2(25) of the Act; and the order passed by the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms) calls for no interference. In the result, the revision petition fails, and it is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.