JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is preferred by the Union of India, appellant No. 5, and some of its Officers, appellants nos. 1-4 serving in Calcutta Customs against a judgment and order of Mr. Justice P. K. Banerjee dated 27th April, 1971, quashing the enquiry report and order of dismissal of the appellant in a disciplinary proceeding. 2. THE respondent who was a preventive officer Grade II at the material time in Calcutta Customs was suspended on 29th June, 1968. Thereafter on 16th December, 1968, he was charge-sheeted as follows : "shri M. H. Haque, P. O. Gr. If (under suspension), committed an act of gross misconduct and. thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in contravention of Rule 3 (I) of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 in that or 28. 6. 68 on which date he had been posted as Assistant Sectional Officer K. G. D. (I), he aided and abetted in the attempt at smuggling certain articles, (as detailed in the annexure (II) belonging to Sri C. I. Rodrigues, Chief Steward of the M. V. Bamora which was lying berthed on that date of 4 K. G. D," The allegations in support of the charge in substance were that on 28th June, 1969 at about 4-30 p. m. the respondent M. H. Haque went to board 'm. V. Bamora' and met one Rodrigues, Chief Steward of the ship and at his request Haque with a steward's friend A. Andrade in a taxi attempted to pass out few cosmetics, ladies apparel etc. without payment of duty but at the gate the taxi was stopped by a Police Head Constable and on search a bag containing these goods was detected and the articles were found inside the bag and seized by the Police Officers. The brief-case of Haque was also opened and several Indian currency notes of various denominations with some coins and few Cadbury's Nut Milk Chocolates and one article prescribed as Flicent (Air Fuots) set (4 ozs.) of Australian make, one Dot Pen and a small diary found inside were also seized. Eventually, an enquiry proceeding was started and after the evidence was closed in the enquiry proceeding on the direction of the Enquiry Officer written brief containing the arguments was filed by the respondent with copy to the other side. Eventually, an enquiry proceeding was started and after the evidence was closed in the enquiry proceeding on the direction of the Enquiry Officer written brief containing the arguments was filed by the respondent with copy to the other side. The 'presenting 'officer' also filed a written brief containing the arguments of the prosecution but without any copy to the respondent. The Enquiry Officer, however, submitted a report with a finding that the respondent's "connivance of act of aiding and abetting the smuggling of various articles found in the canvas bag and Haque's own brief-case or listed in annexure II to the charge-sheet" was clearly established but not with regard to the currency notes. The Enquiry Officer also found that there was over whelming evidence against Haque to establish that he failed to maintain (I) absolute integrity, (II) the devotion to duty and (III) did certain act which was unbecoming of a Government servant in terms of Rule 3 (1) of the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules 1964. But at the same time the Enquiry Officer mentioned certain facts about the efficiency and integrity of the respondent from his past records which were considered to be a mitigating factor in judging the gravity of his offence. The disciplinary authority, however, on agreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer issued a show cause notice at the second stage with a proposed punishment of dismissal upon the respondent and on consideration of his explanation dismissed him from his service. On appeal by the respondent the Collector of Customs thought that the smuggling of goods in any separate proceeding under the Customs Act or whether an attempt to pass foreign goods without payment of duty or coverage by an I. T. C. Licence from a vessel is smuggling or not hardly any finding was necessary and in any event such a finding was implied in the report of the Enquiry Officer and accordingly, he dismissed the appeal on the view that the penalty of dismissal from the service was not excessive. 3. THE respondent then came up in writ proceeding before this Court and obtained a Rule Nisi. 3. THE respondent then came up in writ proceeding before this Court and obtained a Rule Nisi. Banerjee J. who heard the rule found that there war violation of rules and principles of natural justice, firstly, on the ground that it was clearly incumbent upon the concerned authorities to serve a copy of their written brief of argument filed before the Enquiry Officer upon the respondent and by such failure the respondent was denied reasonable opportunity of defending his cause as clearly the Enquiry Officer in his report in support of his conclusion relied on the written brief filed by the Presenting Officer; secondly, the inference drawn from the evidence given by different witnesses or from facts were not irresistable inference; thirdly, the respondent was punished with the charge of smuggling some foreign goods himself and not merely for aiding and abetting of smuggling of such goods; fourthly, the dismissal also could not be sustained on the ground that the second show cause notice was issued by the authorities concerned with a closed mind for the disciplinary authority as found by the learned judge, made up his mind that nothing short of dismissal would meet the ends of justice in this case. The learned judge, accordingly, quashed the enquiry report and the order of dismissal. The correctness of this decision is now challenged by the appellants before us in the present appeal. 4. THE first question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether non-service of copy of the written brief has contravened rules of natural justice. Mr. Chakraborty for the appellants has contended firstly that there was no provision in the relevant rules for service of copy on the respondent of the written brief that may be filed by the Presenting Officer by the Government servant or in a disciplinary proceeding. Mr. Chakraborty for the appellants has contended firstly that there was no provision in the relevant rules for service of copy on the respondent of the written brief that may be filed by the Presenting Officer by the Government servant or in a disciplinary proceeding. He has relied for this purpose on Rule 14 (19) of Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 which is as follows : "the inquiring authority may, after the completion of the production of evidence, hear the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed, and the Government servant, or permit them to file written briefs of their respective case, if they so desire," This rule, it appears, has left with the Enquiry Officer alternative course to be followed after the closing of evidence for hearing the parties, that is, he may either hear the oral arguments of the Presenting Officer and the Government servant or alternatively permit them to file written briefs of their respective eases if they would so desire. The argument of Mr. Chakraborty is that the Enquiry Officer permitted in this case under the alternative course to file written briefs of their respective cases and accordingly the Presenting Officer and the respondent did file their written briefs as provided in the rule. Since this was in compliance with the statutory rules there could not be any question of violation of rules of natural justice. It is argued that principle of natural justice has to be followed not on any pre-conceived notion but such principles if embodied must be observed in accordance with the provision of that particular statute or statutory rules. In support of this contention Mr. Chakraborty has referred to certain passage from "the New Jurisprudence" (a Tagore Law Lecture delivered by learned Chief Justice P. B. Mukharji) at page 258 where while discussing questions as to observance of rules of natural justice by an Industrial Tribunal it is stated that "these principles of natural justice include that a party should have (a) the opportunity of adducing evidence on which he relies, (b) that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, (c) that he should be given the right of cross-examining witnesses examined against him and (d) that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. As will be seen, all these are the norms for ensuring administration of justice. See (1) Union of India v. T. R. Varmer, (1958) 2 L. L. J. 259 (S. C.. It is essential however to remember in this connection that rules of natural justice have to be applied or modified or excluded according to the constitution of different statutory bodies and subject to the statutes and rules. " It appears that reference is made to T. R. Varma's case in support of these principles to which we shall advert later in this judgment. It would be sufficient to Bay at the present moment that these principles do not help the appellants on the present question. Reliance is placed also on a decision of the Supreme Court in (2) Nagendra Nath v. Commr., Hills Division A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 398. This was a case where dispute arose in connection with settlement of excise shop in certain Hill Districts of Assam under the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act (1 of 1910. In this case a question was raised whether in deciding this appeal under the Act rule of natural justice was violated. In that context it is observed by the Supreme Court that the rules of natural justice vary with varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function, and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened, should be decided not under any pre-conceived notion, but in the light of statutory rules and provisions and further in absence of any contravention of such rules by the Tribunal there cannot be any ground for interference by the Tribunal under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. We fail to see how this case is of any assistance to the appellants. In this case the Supreme Court was considering the question as to how or in what manner a statutory tribunal would be required to observe rules of natural justice and the proposition laid down is that rules of natural justice are not inflexible rules and they change with the changing constitution of the statutory bodies and whether or not rules of natural justice have been observed must also be decided in the light of statute or statutory rules under which such tribunals function. Even on the broad principles indicated in this case we do not think courts are precluded from going into the question whether or not supply of copy of the written briefs is obligatory to meet the requirement of rules and principles of natural justice consistent with the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in a disciplinary proceeding and thus interfere in a proper case under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 5. THE next case relied on is reported in (3)Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala, A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 198, where in connection with an enquiry into the misconduct of a student in an examination it was observed that the Enquiry Officer was an impartial person and charge was made known to the student concerned. The witness who gave evidence against him was cross-examined by the student and lastly he was given every opportunity to present his case before the Enquiry Officer. It was, therefore, held that it could not be contended that failure to serve a copy of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer could constitute violation of principles of natural justice. We do not think, again, this case has any bearing to the question involved in the present case. 6. THE last case cited on this point is reported in (4) Slate of U. P. v. O. P. Gupta A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 679. In this case, a disciplinary proceeding against a Government servant was started for certain misconduct. The Supreme Court has laid down that the principles of natural justice are not embodied principles and whether or not such principles have been complied with must depend on the facts and circumstances of that case and all that the courts have to see is whether the non-observance of any of those principles in a given case is likely to have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. This case again does not help the appellants at all. On the contrary this case, it seems clear, is an authority for the proposition that in spite of some statutory rules or procedure it is always open to the court in a disciplinary proceeding to see in each and every case whether rules of natural justice have been complied with. This case again does not help the appellants at all. On the contrary this case, it seems clear, is an authority for the proposition that in spite of some statutory rules or procedure it is always open to the court in a disciplinary proceeding to see in each and every case whether rules of natural justice have been complied with. This apart it is also well established that rules framed or adopted under Art. 309 of the Constitution regulating the service conditions of a Government servant are subject to and may be struck down in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Art. 310 and 311 of the Constitution. See (5) State of U. P. v. Baburam, A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 751. That being so, the consequence is that these rules are open to judicial scrutiny and it would be for the court to decide whether they are consistent with the provisions of reasonable opportunity envisaged in Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. Clearly, therefore, it has to be seen whether in the instant case non-service of the copy of the written brief, even though not expressly provided in the above rule has resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity being given to the delinquent servant in accordance with the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. Mr. Chakraborty has then contended that by non-service of copy there has been no contravention of rules of natural justice. In course of argument Mr. Chakraborty, however, concedes that the hearing of argument after the closing of evidence as contemplated in rule 14 clause (19) of the appeal rules if given without notice and in absence of either side by the Enquiry Officer would contravene the rules of natural justice. If that be so, it is difficult to see how in the alternative course the arguments made by the parties of their respective cases in written brief should be made a secret. The whole object of the rule would be frustrated if either party is kept in ignorance by the other about the case made out by such party in the written brief of arguments. The whole object of the rule would be frustrated if either party is kept in ignorance by the other about the case made out by such party in the written brief of arguments. Unless the delinquent servant has clear knowledge of the arguments made on behalf of prosecution it is not possible to build up an effective argument further in defending his cause and necessarily therefore, he would be denied reasonable opportunity of hearing before facing a dismissal from his service. It would be relevant in this connection at this stage to refer to the Supreme Court decision in (1) T. R. Verma's case A. I. R. 1957 S. C. where the rules of natural justice required to be observed in a disciplinary proceeding against the Government servant has been broadly stated thus: "stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence oh which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. " From the principles indicated above it also follows that the delinquent servant has to be given every facility to explain all such questions as may be raised by the other side in its argument. In this connection we may usefully refer to earlier Civil Service Classification (Control and Appeal) Rules of 1930 in which there was provision for personal hearing but no specific provisions for hearing of arguments in the form as embodied in the present Rule of 1965. Nature, scope and effect of personal hearing have been explained by the Supreme Court in (6) G. Nageswar Rao v. A. P. S. R. T. Corporation, A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 308 (at page 327, paragraph 31 of the report) Subbarao J. (as he then was) while considering this aspect of the matter has inter alia observed : "personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanor of the witnesses to clear up his doubts during the course of arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned arguments to accept his point of view. " It, therefore, follows that unless such arguments in personal hearing are made in the presence of the other party or as in the instant case unless the arguments made in the written brief are known to the other side it is not possible for that party to clear up the doubts of the authority giving personal hearing to the parties and persuade him by his reasoned argument to accept his point of view. 7. MR. Banerjee for the respondent in repelling the contention of mr. Chakraborty has relied on a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in (7) Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joshep and others, A. I. R. 1963 Mysore 206, in which Mr. Justice Hegde (as he then was) while considering this aspect of the matter though not under similar circumstances inter alia observed that where a labour court received written arguments on the preliminary issue from one party but without notice to the other party and no opportunity was afforded to the other party to meet the contention advanced in the notes of argument in spite of an application the order of the labour court was clearly vitiated for non-observance of the principles of natural justice. We think the principle indicated in this decision equally applies to the instant case. For even if, in the present case, the respondent filed his written brief of argument he was still entitled to know the arguments of the other side and failure to furnish a copy for that purpose would no doubt end in denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself. 8. SECONDLY, Mr. Chakraborty has argued that the Enquiry Officer came to its own conclusion on evidence adduced in the proceeding and not on the argument made in the written brief but this does not appear to be the correct position. The learned judge found, we think rightly, that the Enquiry Officer relied on and took the clue from the written argument made by the Presenting Officer although it. may be he at the same time discussed the evidence while accepting the argument in support of his conclusion. The learned judge found, we think rightly, that the Enquiry Officer relied on and took the clue from the written argument made by the Presenting Officer although it. may be he at the same time discussed the evidence while accepting the argument in support of his conclusion. Even assuming that the Enquiry Officer did not rely on the written brief of the Presenting Officer in support of his finding on the charge against the respondent then also the true test is not whether he was influenced actually by the consideration of the written arguments as further observed in Venkannachar's case (supra) but whether there was possibility of being influenced. Surely, in such cases it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the Enquiry Officer was influenced by the written arguments presented on behalf of the concerned authority. On the facts of the present case, however, we find no reason to differ from the view taken by the learned trial judge that he was so influenced by consideration of the arguments in the written brief of the Presenting Officer. Thirdly, it is argued by Mr. Chakraborty that such consideration of the written brief could not, however, in the facts and circumstances of this case create any prejudice to the respondent and unless the respondent was so prejudiced rules of natural justice cannot be said to have been violated. In support of this argument he relies on a decision of this Court in (8) State of West Bengal v. S. N. Bose, A. I. R. 1964 Cal. 184. In this case a number of objections were taken against an order of dismissal passed in a disciplinary proceeding but we do not find that any question regarding non-supply of copy of the written brief was raised. One or the objections was that by the non-supply of documents asked for the delinquent servant was seriously prejudiced in cross-examining the witness and that was upheld by the trial judge and the appellate court also took the view that the respondent had to get ready to cross-examine all the witnesses who were going to be examined against him and that he could only hope to do so effectively if he had materials for cross-examining them, So this case is of no assistance to the appellants. We do not think, the question whether the petitioner was actually prejudiced is relevant. We do not think, the question whether the petitioner was actually prejudiced is relevant. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, however, it cannot be said that in absence of copy of the written brief, as already indicated by us, the respondent could not be prejudiced at all. 9. LASTLY, it is submitted that in the departmental appeal preferred by the respondent before the Collector of Customs no such ground of non-supply of the copy of the written brief was taken. We think, failure, if there be any to take such a ground before the Collector in the appeal will not by itself disentitle the respondent to raise the point in the writ proceeding, but then, we are satisfied that such a ground was substantially taken (ground No. 3) as it was stated by the respondent that the Enquiry Officer purported to rely on the statement contained in the written brief submitted by the Presenting Officer and the respondent was quite ignorant about such statements and allegations contained in the written briefs. In our opinion, the requirements of rules and principles of natural justice demand that the respondent should have been served with a copy of the written brief filed by the Presenting Officer even though service of such a copy is not expressly provided in the above Rule. Failure to supply such a copy has resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity to the respondent to defend himself and thus rendered the entire disciplinary proceeding invalid. 10. MR. Banerjee in this connection has raised another point namely, that the written brief which is a part of the record under rule 14 (23) of the Appeal Rules was also made a part of the enquiry report and marked therein as annexure 'c', But it is said that copy of this annexure i. e. written brief was not supplied to the respondent with the copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in (9) State of Gujarat v. Teredesai, A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1294, It is argued that if the entire copy of the enquiry report is not supplied to the delinquent servant, the requirement of reasonable opportunity would not be satisfied. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in (9) State of Gujarat v. Teredesai, A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1294, It is argued that if the entire copy of the enquiry report is not supplied to the delinquent servant, the requirement of reasonable opportunity would not be satisfied. It is not disputed that copy of the written brief which was made a part of the enquiry report was not supplied to the respondent with even the second show cause notice. This being so, on the authority of the proposition indicated in the above decision of the Supreme Court it must be held that non-supply of the copy of the written brief has also rendered from this stage the entire disciplinary proceeding invalid. In the view we have taken in the matter it is sufficient to dispose of the appeal but as Mr. Chakraborty has disputed correctness of the other grounds considered by the learned judge in support of his conclusion that the impugned proceeding and the order of dismissal suffered from breach of rules of natural justice we would proceed to deal with the points raised. 11. AS regards the second ground it is contended by Mr. Chakraborty that the view taken by the learned trial judge that the inference drawn by the Enquiry Officer as to the proof of charge against the respondent was not irresistible inference, is entirely misconceived. It is not, as argued, open to this Court to interfere while exercising its power under writ jurisdiction, with a finding of fact if based on evidence. Reliance is placed on several decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (10) Union of India H, C. Goyel; A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 364, (11) Syad Yakub v. Radhakrishnan; A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 477, (12) Railway Board, New Delhi v. N. Singh, A. I. R. 1989 S. C. 9635, to show that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority on evidence should prevail. Mr. Banerjee, however, while not disputing this well established proposition has raised a point which is quite serious and important. It is said that there is no evidence in the strict sense of the term to support the conclusion reached either by the Enquiry Officer or by the disciplinary authority. Mr. Banerjee, however, while not disputing this well established proposition has raised a point which is quite serious and important. It is said that there is no evidence in the strict sense of the term to support the conclusion reached either by the Enquiry Officer or by the disciplinary authority. The argument is that the petitioner was charged with an offence of aiding and abetting attempt of smuggling of foreign goods and such a charge was found to have been established by the Enquiry Officer only on the evidence of two persons who, according to the Enquiry Officer himself, were the architects of the crime. These two witnesses who played the role of approve were not proceeded against either in the criminal court or by the customs authority under the Customs Act 1962 for offence of smuggling or even, attempt to smuggle foreign goods. It is therefore, argued that no reasonable person merely on the evidence of such witnesses could conclude that the charge against the respondent was established. It is submitted that the conclusion even though one of fact reached by the Enquiry Officer was highly improbable and unjust as on the well established principle of acceptance of evidence of accomplices no reasonable person could hold relying on such evidence that the charge against the respondent was proved. It is, therefore, according to Mr. Banerjee, open to this Court to interfere with such a finding even in writ jurisdiction. The concept of natural justice, it is submitted, has changed or is undergoing great changes with the change of time. In the ultimate analysis an administrative order affecting the rights of a party is also open to judicial review if it tends to or has the effect of deflecting justice. In aid of such contention reliance is placed on several decisions of the Supreme Court reported in (13) A. K. Kripak v. Union of India; A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 180, (14) Union of India, v. J. N. Sinha, A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 40. We think, it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to examine the correctness of the extreme contentions raised by Mr. Banerjee in the light of the above decisions of the Supreme Court. We think, it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to examine the correctness of the extreme contentions raised by Mr. Banerjee in the light of the above decisions of the Supreme Court. For, all else apart, it cannot be said that there are no evidence of independent witnesses adduced in this case, or upon such evidence no reasonable man could have come to the conclusion as drawn by the Enquiry Officer. 12. EVEN so, Mr. Banerjee has further contended that the finding of the Enquiry Officer that charge against the respondent stood established could not be sustained, in absence of any finding by the Enquiry Officer that the attempt of smuggling was also proved on evidence. As already noticed, the Collector while dismissing the departmental appeal preferred by the respondent thought that smuggling of the goods in any separate proceeding under the Customs Act was not strictly relevant or any finding as to whether an attempt to pass foreign goods without payment of duty or coverage by an I. T. C. Licence from a vessel is smuggling or not was not necessary but at the same time the Collector took the view that such a finding on smuggling was implied in the report of the Enquiry Officer. Such an approach to the question, in our view, is entirely erroneous. On the charge as it stands it is difficult to see how the respondent could be charged with aiding and abetting attempt of smuggling unless such attempt of smuggling first stands proved on evidence. Clearly, charge of aiding and abetting is only a part of the larger offence of attempt of smuggling. So, unless the Enquiry Officer comes to a positive finding on evidence that there was attempt of smuggling of the goods seized we fail to see how the respondent could be held liable for adding and abetting attempt of such smuggling. It is true that such finding in a disciplinary proceeding is not binding on the persons responsible for larger offence nor the disciplinary authority is competent to proceed against them but at the same time having regard to the nature and extent of charge, it seems clear, such a finding is necessary prerequisite in the enquiry held in the impugned disciplinary proceeding against the respondent. In our opinion, the concerned authorities reached their conclusion without application of their mind to this aspect of the matter at all. So on this ground also the finding of the Enquiry Officer cannot be sustained as valid. On the third ground it is contended by Mr. Chakraborty, the view taken by the trial judge, that the respondent was punished on a charge different from the charge levelled against him, is clearly erroneous. Mr. Chakraborty draws our attention to the article of charge and submits that there is a clear finding of the Enquiry Officer that the act of aiding and abetting the smuggling of various articles found in the canvas bag and Haque's own briefcase or listed in annexure II to the charge-sheet stood established. It appears that the charge actually framed under the article of charge against the respondent and the charge made in the concluding portion of the statement of allegation are not identically worded. In the article of charge the respondent was charged with the aiding and abetting in the attempt of smuggling of certain Articles but in the concluding portion of the statement of allegation in support of the charge it was stated that by his connivance of the act of aiding and abetting the aforesaid smuggling operation the respondent rendered himself liable for departmental action against him. The Enquiry Officer made a finding that the respondent's "connivance of the act of aiding and abetting the smuggling of the various articles found in the canvas bag and Haque's own brief case or listed in the annexure II to the charge-sheet" was clearly established. This however was not the charge against the respondent as mentioned in the article of charge. For, clearly, there is no charge of connivance of the act of aiding and abetting the smuggling of various articles against tine respondent. It cannot be said that title charge of aiding and abetting the attempt of smuggling of goods are identical with that of connivance with the act of aiding and abetting the smuggling of goods. This apart, the disciplinary authority, again, made a finding that the respondent himself was guilty of smuggling of goods and thus proceeded to impose penalty of dismissal upon the respondent. We, therefore, find no substance in this argument. The learned judge considered the matter in further details and we entirely agree with the view taken by him. 13. This apart, the disciplinary authority, again, made a finding that the respondent himself was guilty of smuggling of goods and thus proceeded to impose penalty of dismissal upon the respondent. We, therefore, find no substance in this argument. The learned judge considered the matter in further details and we entirely agree with the view taken by him. 13. IT now remains to be seen whether the disciplinary authority issued the show cause notice at the second stage with a closed mind. The learned judge thought that since there was no difference between the orders passed provisionally on 15th April, 1969 and the concluding portion of the order passed on 12th September, 1969, after considering the representation of the respondent it was clear that the disciplinary authority already made up his mind to punish the respondent by imposing the penalty of dismissal at any costs. On a fair reading of these two orders it appears that the order passed on 15th April, 1969, is clearly stated by the disciplinary authority was provisional Order. After this provisional order by the second show cause notice the respondent was given opportunity to make representation against; the proposed order of dismissal and after consideration of this representation and all relevant materials on record the final order was passed by the disciplinary authority. Considering all these facts and circumstances we are not prepared to hold that the disciplinary authority issued notice to show cause at the second stage with a closed mind or the subsequent proceeding imposing penalty of dismissal ended only in empty formalities. Even so, we have already indicated that the disciplinary authority in imposing punishment of dismissal was influenced by a further consideration that the respondent himself was guilty of smuggling of foreign goods with which he was never charged and that is one of the grounds why the impugned order of dismissal including the appellate order cannot be sustained as valid. We, therefore, come to the same conclusion reached by the learned judge though with slight difference in our reasons. 14. IN the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but considering the facts and circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs. We, however, make it clear that nothing in our judgment will prevent the disciplinary authority to take fresh steps against the respondents according to law, if they are so advised. 14. IN the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but considering the facts and circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs. We, however, make it clear that nothing in our judgment will prevent the disciplinary authority to take fresh steps against the respondents according to law, if they are so advised. We grant stay of operation of this order until a fortnight after the Easter Holidays, as prayed for, but if no application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is made within the period the stay remains operative, this interim stay order as made to-day will stand vacated.