JUDGEMENT :- Plaintiff is the appellant. The suit is for declaration of his title and possession over item 1 and for partition of items 2 to 4. Defendants 1 and 2, husband and wife, had a daughter by name Thankammal who was the wife of Plaintiff. She died on 2-12-1963. Plaintiff had married her in the year 1952. At that time item No. 1 was settled on plaintiff and deceased Thankammal by defendant 1 as per Ext. P-1 Streedhanom deed. A building was put up on this item later and this Thankammal was residing there and the plaintiff who was in military service used to come occasionally here to live and then go back to his place of service. Items 2 to 4 are acquisitions in the name of Thankammal. When Thankammal died the plaintiff was away. On hearing the news of her death he came on 12-12-1963. He staved in the house and after 12 or 13 days returned to his place of service. Subsequently dispute seems to have arisen between the parties as regards the rights over item No. 1. So, the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his title and possession over item No. 1' and for partition of items 2 to 4 and allotment of a one-half share to him. He claimed that the building in item No. 1 was put up with his funds and it exclusively, belonged to him, and so far as item 1 was concerned his case was that as per Ext. P-1 the property belonged to him and his wife and on her death her share also devolved on him. Defendants 1 and 2 contended that item No. 1 and the building and other items scheduled to the plaint exclusively belonged to Thankammal, item No. 1 was given to Thankammal as Streedhanom by the 1st defendant, the plaintiff's name was included in the Streedhanom deed only to facilitate the management of the property and by that no right is obtained by him. The deceased Thankammal was a teacher and the building in item No. 1 was constructed by her with her own funds and the plaintiff did not get any right over the building in item No. 1. They admitted the plaintiff's right over items 2 to 4. 2. The deceased Thankammal was a teacher and the building in item No. 1 was constructed by her with her own funds and the plaintiff did not get any right over the building in item No. 1. They admitted the plaintiff's right over items 2 to 4. 2. The trial Court found that item No. 1 was given by way of Streedhanom on the occasion of the marriage of the plaintiff with Thankammal and even though in the Streedhanom deed plaintiff's name was also mentioned as one of the executees being a Streedhanom gift deceased Thankammal alone was entitled to it as per law. The building was found to be one Put up by the plaintiff with his funds, and therefore the trial Court decreed partition of items 1 to 4 and allotment of one-half share to the plaintiff, and in effecting the division the building was directed to be included in the share to be allotted to the plaintiff. Defendants 1 and 2 appealed to the District Court, and the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal. The plaintiff's cross-appeal related to the refusal of the trial court to recognise plaintiff's one-half right as a grantee under Ext. P1. According to the plaintiff, by the terms of Ext. P1 he is entitled to one-half and the other half belonged to his wife and on her death one-half of that one-half viz. one-fourth is inherited by him and therefore he is entitled to three-fourth over item No. 1. The appeal by Defendants 1 and 2 was only against the decree of the trial court to the affect that the building over item No. 1 belonged to the plaintiff. According to them, the building belonged to the deceased Thankammal and on her death plaintiff is entitled to only one-half and the other half is inherited by Defendants 1 and 2. The lower appellate court considered these two claims, disagreed with the trial court on the Question of ownership of the building but confirmed the finding of the trial Court as regards the ownership of item No. 1. The lower appellate court came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence to come to the conclusion that the building was put up with the plaintiff's funds. The plaintiff might have sent some amounts to his deceased wife. But there is absolutely no evidence to connect those amounts with the construction of the building. The lower appellate court came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence to come to the conclusion that the building was put up with the plaintiff's funds. The plaintiff might have sent some amounts to his deceased wife. But there is absolutely no evidence to connect those amounts with the construction of the building. On the other hand, it has come out in evidence that these amounts were sent for maintenance of his wife and also to give some amounts to his parents. So in the absence of sufficient evidence to come to the conclusion that the building was Put up with the funds of the plaintiff, the lower appellate court took the view that the building must be held to belong to the person to whom the property belonged, The property having been found to belong to the deceased Thankammal the building must also be deemed to belong to her and on her death the plaintiff will be entitled to get only one-half. The other half must go to Defendants 1 and 2. On this finding the appeal was allowed and the cross-appeal was dismissed. It is against these that the plaintiff has filed the present appeal. 3. In this appeal the plaintiff has raised two points. The first point is that as per the terms of Ext. P1 himself and his wife are the grantees of item No. 1 and therefore he is entitled to one-half in his own right. Ext. P1 is the Streedhanom deed executed by the 1st defendant on the occasion of the marriage of the plaintiff with Thankammal. The decision of the Travancore High Court reported in George Lonan v. Arthur Peter Hoogwerf. ((1924) 14 Trav LJ 1) is to the effect that among Christians Streedhanom given at the time of the marriage belongs to the wife alone. It is very rarely given to the bride. It is entrusted either to the bridegroom or to the bridegroom's relations and though it is so entrusted to the bridegroom or bridegroom's relations, the beneficial interest of it is to the bride. This principle has been given statutory recognition in Section 5 of Travancore Christian Succession Act. It is very rarely given to the bride. It is entrusted either to the bridegroom or to the bridegroom's relations and though it is so entrusted to the bridegroom or bridegroom's relations, the beneficial interest of it is to the bride. This principle has been given statutory recognition in Section 5 of Travancore Christian Succession Act. 1092, where the word 'Streedhanom' has been defined as follows :- "'Streedhanom' means and includes any money or ornaments, or in lieu of money or ornaments, any property, movable or immovable, given or promised to be given to a female or on her behalf, to her husband or to his parent or guardian by her father or mother; or after the death of either or both of them, by any one who claims under such father or mother. In satisfaction of her claim against the estate of the father or mother;" The fact that this Streedhanom deed is executed in favour of the husband and the wife will not alter the nature of the right intended to be conveyed. The document itself mentions that some ornaments have been given to the bride at the time of the marriage and that this property is being conveyed as Streedhanom. The fact that the plaintiff is also an executee under the document will not in any way alter the character of the gift or incidents of the Rift. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the definition of the word 'Streedhanom' in the Travancore Christian Succession Act will not in terms apply to the terms of the grant under Ext. P1. According to him, in order that, the gift may enure to the benefit of the wife it should have been given to her or on her behalf to her husband or to her husband's relation. Ext. P1 does not come under that category. In Ext. P1. as I said earlier, both the plaintiff and Thankammal are mentioned as the executee and grantee. From this it is argued that this does not satisfy the requirements of the definition of the word 'Streedhanom' under the Act. and therefore the rights of the parties must be decided on the basis of the apparent tenor of the document, i.e. the plaintiff and the deceased Thankammal must be taken to have got one-half right each. This contention cannot be accepted. and therefore the rights of the parties must be decided on the basis of the apparent tenor of the document, i.e. the plaintiff and the deceased Thankammal must be taken to have got one-half right each. This contention cannot be accepted. Even assuming that the legal right ever one-half passed on to the plaintiff under Ext. PI., this being the streedhanom given on the occasion of his marriage to Thankammal and streedhanom being always taken as a gift to a female the beneficial Interest over this one-half must be deemed to have been given to Thankammal alone. He must hold his one-half right on her behalf are in that view he has no beneficial interest, over this one-half and the entire beneficial interest belonged only to his wife. This can be looked at from another point also. Being a streedhanom given on the occasion of the marriage of the plaintiff and deceased Thankammal, plaintiff's name is included in the document only to enable him to manage the property on her behalf, That this is generally being done will be clear from the decision reported in (1924) 14 Trav LJ 1 and the case referred to therein. So, in any view of the matter the full right over item No. 1 belonged to the deceased Thankammal alone and on her death and as per the Travancore Christian Succession Act the plaintiff will be entitled to get only one-half subject to such restrictions provided for in the Act. 4. The second point urged on behalf of the Plaintiff is that the building in item No. 1 was constructed by the plaintiff. The defence case is that it was constructed with the funds of Thankammal. The plaintiff produced money order coupons. Exts. P 16 to P 50, to show that in the period during which the building was put up he had sent large amounts to his wife. He also deposed as PW. 1 that while he was at Trivandrum on leave he used to supervise the construction of the building. The building was commenced in 1954 and was completed in 1959. These amounts were sent not for her maintenance, because she had a job and she was getting a monthly salary, PW. He also deposed as PW. 1 that while he was at Trivandrum on leave he used to supervise the construction of the building. The building was commenced in 1954 and was completed in 1959. These amounts were sent not for her maintenance, because she had a job and she was getting a monthly salary, PW. 2 a mason also deposed that it was he who constructed the building and the plaintiff while he was here used to look after the construction work and also pay him amounts by way of wages and for purchase of materials. But, this evidence is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that all the amounts required for the building proceeded from the plaintiff. The amounts covered by these money order coupons Exts. P 16 to P 50 come to Rs. 1,205/- Of course, the plaintiff has sworn that over and above what he sent by money orders, whenever he came on leave he used to bring some amount which was spent on the building. Even then it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the building which was stated to be worth Rs. 3,500/- was completely constructed with his funds alone. Deceased Thankammal was a teacher and she was earning a substantial income monthly by way of salary and she could also invest amounts for the construction of the building. In such circumstances, the reasonable conclusion will be that the building has been put up with the funds of both the plaintiff and deceased Thankammal. The name 'P. T. Mandiram' (P stands for Paul (plaintiff) and 'T' for Thankammal) also justifies this conclusion. 5. It is contended that the financial contributions if any of the husband to put up the building in the property of the wife must be taken as a gift by him to her by way of advancement. In the case of acquisitions by the husband in the name of his wife the theory of advancement la not generally applied among Christians in India. In Kerala among marumakkathavees, it was being applied to a limited extent, but recently it has been further restricted by judicial decision. In the case of acquisitions by the husband in the name of his wife the theory of advancement la not generally applied among Christians in India. In Kerala among marumakkathavees, it was being applied to a limited extent, but recently it has been further restricted by judicial decision. Even in England where this theory was started originally this is not being followed as can be seen from the observation of Lord Denning MR in Falconer v. Falconer, (1970) 3 All ER 449 at p. 452 : "If this case had come up for decision 20 years ago, there would undoubtedly have been a presumption of advancement : because at that time whenever a husband made financial contributions towards a house in his wife's name, there was a presumption that he was making a gift to her. That presumption found its place in the law in Victorian days when a wife was utterly subordinate to her husband. It has no place, or, at any rate, very little place. in our law today, see Pettitt v. Pettitt. (1969) 2 All ER 383 per Lord Reid Lord Hodson and Lord Diplock. We have decided these cases now for some years without mush regard to a presumption of advancement, and I think we should continue so to do". 6. Again, there is no difficulty in considering the rights of the parties over the building apart from the land on which it stands. In India a building can be owned separately from the land on which it stands and the English Maxim Quicould inaedificatur solo solo cedit has no application (See Dr. K.A. Dhairyawan v. J.R. Thakur AIR 1958 SC 789 and Chellappan Nadar v. Krishnan Nair 1963 Ker LT 750 : (AIR 1963 Ker 297). 7. This building was put up on the streedhanom property and it was intended to be their matrimonial home. It is not possible to come to the conclusion that there was an agreement as regards the proprietary interest which the parties Intended to have on the building. As a matter of fact, there would not have been any agreement, because at the time of the construction they would have only an intention that they should have a common use and enjoyment for themselves and their children. While that use continues their respective proprietary Interests in it are of no practical importance to them. As a matter of fact, there would not have been any agreement, because at the time of the construction they would have only an intention that they should have a common use and enjoyment for themselves and their children. While that use continues their respective proprietary Interests in it are of no practical importance to them. As a matter of fact, they would have given no thought to the subject of proprietary rights at all. Where the acquisition or improvement is made as a result of contributions in money or moneys worth by both the spouses acting in concert the proprietary interests in the building resulting from their respective contributions depend on their common intention as to what those Interests should be. As stated earlier at the time when this building was being put up both parties could not have thought about this Question. In such a situation what is the method which the Court will have to resort to find out the common Intention ? 8. This aspect of ascertaining the common intention has come up for judicial consideration in the case of contractual rights and obligations. In the case of contracts when some event has happened for which the parties have made no provision in the contract, because at the time it was made neither party foresaw the possibility of that event happening and so never in fact agreed what its legal consequences would be on their respective contractual rights a term is implied in the contract. In such a situation the court imputes to the parties a common intention which in fact they never formed and it does so by forming its own opinion as to what would have been the common intention of reasonable men as to the effect of that event on their contractual rights and obligations if the possibility of the event happening had been present to their minds at the time of entering into the contract. Similarly, when certain family asset is being acquired neither spouse would have thought to an event happening, viz. the cesser of their common use and enjoyment which alone would give practical importance of their respective proprietary interests in the asset. In such a situation the court sometimes impute to them a constructive common intention which is that which in the court's opinion would have been formed by reasonable spouses. the cesser of their common use and enjoyment which alone would give practical importance of their respective proprietary interests in the asset. In such a situation the court sometimes impute to them a constructive common intention which is that which in the court's opinion would have been formed by reasonable spouses. Differently put, in such a situation the court will presume that this was the intention of the Parties at the time when the asset was being acquired. Recently, in Pettitt v. Pettitt (1969 2 All. E. R. 385 the House of Lords had occasion to consider this Question-Lord Diplock 'referring to his Judgement in Ulrich v. Ulrich and Felton (1968-1 All ER 67. at P. 72) held that the following passage in it fairly summarised the broad concensus of judicial opinion disclosed by the post-war cases as to the common intentions which, in the absence of evidence of an actual intention to the contrary, are to be imputed to spouses when matrimonial homes are acquired or built as a result of their concerted acts of a kind which are typical of transactions between husband and wife today The passage in (1968) 1 All, ER 67 relied on reads thus :- "When these young people pool their savings to buy and equip a home or to acquire any other family asset, they do not think of this as an 'antenuptial' or 'post-nuptial' settlement, or give their minds to legalistic technicalities of 'advancement' and 'resulting trusts'. No do they normally agree explicitly what their equitable interests, in the family asset shall be if death, divorce or separation parts them Where there is no explicit agreement, the court's first task is to infer from their conduct in relation to the property what their common intention would have been had they out it into words before matrimonial differences arose between them. In the common case today, of which the present is a typical example, neither party to the marriage has inherited capital, both are earning their living before marriage the wife intends to continue to do so until they start having children. They pool their savings to buy a house on mortgage in the husband's name or in joint names and to furnish and equip it as the family home. They pool their savings to buy a house on mortgage in the husband's name or in joint names and to furnish and equip it as the family home. They meet the expenses of its upkeep and improvement and the payments of installments on the mortgage out of the family income, to which the wife contributes so lone as she is earning. In such a case, the prima facie inference from their conduct is that their common intention is that the house, furniture and equipment should be family assets......'' So holding it was observed that such a family asset shall belong to them equally. But this approach to the problem through the medium of implied contractual obligation had not the majority support in the House then. 9. In a still more recent case Gissing v. Gissing (1970) 2 All. E. R. 780 the House of Lords in England had occasion again to consider a similar Question and the legal principles applicable are stated in the speeches of Lord Reid, Lord Pearson and Lord Diplock. They have applied the law of Trust to such ft case. Lord Reid observed at page 782 thus : "If there has been no discussion and no agreement or understanding as to sharing in the ownership of the house and the husband has never evinced an intention that his wife should have a share, then the crucial question is whether the law will give a share to the wife who has made those contributions without which the house would not have been bought. I agree that this depends on the law of trust rather than on the law of contract, so the question is under what circumstances does the husband become a trustee for his wile in the absence of any declaration of trust or agreement on his part. It is not disputed that a man can become a trustee without making a declaration of trust or evincing any Intention to become a trustee. The facts may impose on him an implied, constructive or resulting trust. It is not disputed that a man can become a trustee without making a declaration of trust or evincing any Intention to become a trustee. The facts may impose on him an implied, constructive or resulting trust. Why does the fact that he has agreed to accept these contributions from his wife not impose such a trust on him ?" Lord Pearson observed thus at page 787 : "I think it must often be artificial to search for an agreement made between husband and wife as to their respective ownership rights in property used by both of them while they are lying together in most cases they are unlikely to enter into negotiations or conclude contracts or even make agreements. The arrangements which they make are likely to be lacking in the precision and finality which an agreement would be expected to have. On the other hand, an intention can be imputed; it can be inferred from the evidence on their conduct and the surrounding circumstances. The starting Point, in a case where substantial contributions are proved to have been made, is the presumption of a resulting trust, although it may be displaced by rebutting evidence. It may be said that the imputed intent does not differ very much from an implied agreement. Accepting that, I still think it is better to approach the question through the doctrine of resulting trusts rather than through contract law." and Lord Diplock observed as follows at page 760 : "An express agreement between spouses as to their respective beneficial interests in land conveyed into the name of one of them obviates the need for showing that the conduct of the spouse into whose name the land was conveyed was intended to induce the other spouse to. act to his or her detriment on the faith of the promise of a specified beneficial interest in the land and that the other spouse so acted with the intention of acquiring that beneficial interest. The agreement itself discloses the common intention required to create a resulting, implied or constructive trust. act to his or her detriment on the faith of the promise of a specified beneficial interest in the land and that the other spouse so acted with the intention of acquiring that beneficial interest. The agreement itself discloses the common intention required to create a resulting, implied or constructive trust. But parties to a transaction in connection with the acquisition of land may well have formed a common intention that the beneficial interest in the land shall be vested in them jointly without having used express words to communicate this intention to one another; or their rejections of the words used may be imperfect or conflicting by the time any dispute arises. In such a case - a common one where the parties are spouses whose marriage has broken down - it may be possible to infer their common intention from their conduct. As in so many branches of English law in which legal rights and obligations depend on the intentions of the parties to a transaction, the relevant intention of each party is the intention which was reasonably understood by the other party to be manifested by that party's words or conduct notwithstanding that he did not consciously formulate that intention in his own mind or even acted with some different intention which he did not communicate to the other party. On the other hand, he is not bound by any inference which the other party draws as to his intention unless that Inference is one which can reasonably be drawn from his words or conduct. It is in this sense that in the branch of English law relating to constructive, implied or resulting trusts effect is given to the inference as to the intentions of parties to a transaction which a reasonable man would draw from their words or conduct and not to any subjective intention or absence of intention which was not made manifest at the time of the transaction itself, it is for the court to determine what these inferences are." 10. After coming to the conclusion that the common intention regarding the beneficial interest of either spouse is Presumed from the conduct of each contributing to the acquisition or improvements, Lord Diplock has described various factual situations and conducts of the spouses from which a common intention as to how the beneficial interest in it should be held can be inferred. After coming to the conclusion that the common intention regarding the beneficial interest of either spouse is Presumed from the conduct of each contributing to the acquisition or improvements, Lord Diplock has described various factual situations and conducts of the spouses from which a common intention as to how the beneficial interest in it should be held can be inferred. Initial contribution to acquire or improve the matrimonial home, subsequent contributions to discharge mortgage loans taken for purchase, indirect contribution to the household expenses which enables the other spouse to divert his earning to discharge the loan taken, to acquire the matrimonial home have been taken as conducts evidencing a common intention that the contributing spouse should be entitled to some beneficial interest in the matrimonial home. 11. This majority decision of the House of Lords in the case (1970) 2 All ER 780 settled the law which was in an unsettled state even after the decision of the House of Lords in (1969) 2 All ER 385. This principle applied to acquisition of matrimonial homes is equally applicable to subsequent improvements effected on them, Lord Denning MR has in Davis v. Vale (1971) 2 All. E. R. 1021 referred to the equitable school of thought on this point in these lines : ''According to this school, if the house belonged at the outset to the wife alone, and afterwards the husband made substantial improvements to It at his own expense then he ought in equity to have a share in the improved house unless he had agreed to forego it. The court, imputed to the parties a common intention to that effect coming into play when the improvements were effected, This school of thought found expression in the majority judgment in Jansen v. Jansen (1965) 3 All ER 363. and in the speeches of Lord Reid and Lord Diplock in (1969) 2 All ER 385." Then after referring to the recent legislation in England in this point stated thus : ''It is a declaration of the law a declaration of what the law is now of what it is to be in the future, and also of what the law was before the Act. It affirms, therefore, the decision of this court in (1965) 3 All ER 383 and the principles adopted by the equitable school to this I would add the elucidation given In (1970) 2 All ER 780, the speeches in which show that the beneficial interest is given, not by means of contract law but imputing a trust by the one for the other. It is resulting, implied or constructive trust which does not need to be in writing." 12. The situation and problems in India are the same. Now-a-days. in urban areas mostly, due to the various welfare measures taken by the Government in constituting Improvements Trusts, Housing Boards, advancing loans to Government servants and middle and lower income groups on the security of plots of land to acquire or build houses and advancing loans to Housing, Co-operative Societies who in turn advance loans to its member to acquire or build houses, so many houses have been built or are coming up. Many of these houses have also been built by spouses contributing in money or moneys worth for the acquisition of land or for construction of building on the lands already acquired in the name of one or other or both. Many are acquired or built on wholly or partially borrowed amounts on the security of the land and the house. These loans are repaid only over a period and on easy installments and so the acquisition is complete only when all the installments are paid. These houses are mainly used as the matrimonial homes of the spouses. In the same way other Household articles like furniture and other durable chattels are acquired for the common use and enjoyment of both the spouses and their children. Many of these acquisitions will be in the name of one or other of the spouses and rarely in the name of both. The funds for such acquisition or completion of acquisition may proceed from both. What are the legal con sequences of such acquisition ? Is the spouses in whose name the title stands the full beneficial owner ? Has the spouse who has contributed for its acquisition any beneficial interest in law, if so what the share ? An answer to this is found in the provision of Sections 81, 82 and 94 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. The language used in these provisions is very wide. Has the spouse who has contributed for its acquisition any beneficial interest in law, if so what the share ? An answer to this is found in the provision of Sections 81, 82 and 94 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. The language used in these provisions is very wide. Here an inference of trust can be drawn from all attendant circumstances and conduct is one such circumstance. So the principle stated in the above English decisions underlie the Indian law as well. 13. Following these principles I hold that in this case the Plaintiff has a beneficial interest in the building in his own right and his deceased wife had only a fractional right over it. 14. Then the question is what is the quantum of the share which the appellant is entitled. Largely it should be a question of fact depending upon the contribution made by the spouses to the acquisition or improvement. The law is stated thus in (1970 (2) All ER 780 at p. 792) by Lord Justice Diplock : "In such a case the court must first do its best to discover from the conduct of the spouses whether any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the probable common understanding about the amount of the share of the contributing spouse on which each must have acted in doing what each did, even though that understanding was never expressly stated by one spouse to the other or even consciously formulated in words by either of them independently. It is only if no such inference can be drawn that the court is driven to apply as a rule of law and not as an inference of fact, the maxim 'equality is equity' and to hold that the beneficial interest belongs to the spouses in equal shares". Here large amounts are seen sent by the plaintiff to late Thankammal. Over and above that he swears that he brought amounts whenever he came on leave and attended to the construction of the building which took nearly 5 years to complete. But even then it is not possible to find out the exact amount and fix the proportion of the contributions and so the rule of law that, 'equality is equity' will have to be followed. But even then it is not possible to find out the exact amount and fix the proportion of the contributions and so the rule of law that, 'equality is equity' will have to be followed. Hence I hold that the plaintiff and his wife had equal share in the house, and on his wife's death the plaintiff inherited one-half of her share, that is, he gets on the whole threefourth right over the building and one-fourth should belong to Defendants 1 and 2. No other question arises for determination in this appeal. 15. In the result, in modification of the decrees and judgments of the courts below I hold that the Plaintiff is entitled to three-fourth right, over the building and Defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to only one-fourth right in the building. Subject to this modification the trial court's decree is confirmed. The parties shall bear their costs. Order accordingly.