JUDGMENT B. D. Singh, J. This application by the sole petitioner under sections 435 and 439 of the code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') is directed against the order dated the 27th December, 1968 (signed on 28th December, 1968), passed by the acting Sub-divisional Magistrate, under which he took cognizance of the offences under sections 182 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. 2. In order to appreciate the point involved in this application it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. On the 10th May, 1968, the petitioner had filed a petition before the Superintendent of Police, Giridih, making allegation against S. K. Samanto and others for offences under sections 147 and 323 of the Indian Penal code. The Superintendent of Police sent it to the Deputy Superintendent of Police for enquiry, who, in his turn, ordered the Sub-inspector of Police to institute a case and investigate it. The officer-in-charge registered it as P. S. Case no. 4 (5) 68 and took up investigation. He found the allegation made by the petitioner as false. Therefore, he submitted a final report dated the 20th May, 1968, with a prayer for prosecution of the petitioner under sections 182 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code, a copy of the report is marked as Annexure 2' to the petition. The said report was, however, received by the Sub-divisional Magistrate on the 31st May, 1968. On the 21st May, 1968, the petitioner had filed a petition before the Sub-divisional Magistrate for recalling investigation from the said officer-in-charge. On the 27th May, 1968, the petitioner also filed a regular protest petition. The Sub-divisional Magistrate ordered the protest petition to be put up on the 31st May, 1968, on which date he called for the case diary and fixed 15th June, 1968, for orders. However, no order was passed on that date, and ultimately on the 24th June, 1968, protest petition of the petitioner was rejected. The petitioner thereafter filed a criminal revision before the Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh, who by order dated the 21st September 1968, set aside the said order, and directed further enquiry. On the 17th December, 1968, after further enquiry, the protest petition of the petitioner was rejected; the final report was accepted, and the accused persons were discharged. Thereafter the impugned order against the petitioner was passed. 3 Mr. On the 17th December, 1968, after further enquiry, the protest petition of the petitioner was rejected; the final report was accepted, and the accused persons were discharged. Thereafter the impugned order against the petitioner was passed. 3 Mr. Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has assailed the impugned order and raised the: following points for consideration by this Court: (i) Na cognizance could have been taken of the offence under section 182 of the Penal Code against the petitioner in the absence of a complaint in writing by a public servant concerned as required under the provisions contained in Section 195 (1 ) (a) of the Code; and (ii) The congnizance under section 211 of the Penal Code was also bad in absence of a complaint in writing of the court before whom the alleged offence was committed as contemplated under section 195 (1) (b) of the Code. 4. I will take up for consideration point no. (i) first. Learned counsel drew my attention to the provisions contained in section 195 (}) (a) of the Code which reads as : "(1) No Court shall take cognizance- (a) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. " On the basis of the above provision he submitted that no court shall take cognizance under section 182 of the Penal Code, except on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. Learned counsel pointed out that in the instant case the petitioner had addressed his application dated the 10th May, 1968, to the Superintendent of Police, Giridih, making allegation against S. K. Samanto and others, the relevant portion of which reads as : "I am therefore approaching you with this petition and pray that you may be kind enough to take immediate action to ensure safety of my life and property.” A. true copy of the said application is marked Annexure ‘1’ to the application before this Court. In that view of the matter learned counsel urged that in the present case the public servant concerned was the Superintendent of Police Giridih and it was he who could have filed a complaint against the petitioner under section 182 of the Penal Code in accordance with the aforesaid provision. The Superintendent of Police was not subordinate to the Sub-inspector of Police. The efore, the submission of the prosecution report against the petitioner by the Sub-inspector of Police under section 182 was obviously contrary to the provisions contained under section 195 (l)(a) of the Code. 5. In order to substantiate his contention, learned counsel relied on Daulat Ram V. State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 1206 where it was held that there is absolute bar against the court taking seisin of the case under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code, except in the manner provided by section 195 of the Code. Their Lordships further observed that the offence under S.182 is complete when a person moves the public servant for action. Where a person reports to a Tehsildar to take action on averment of certain facts, believing that the TehsiIdar would take some action upon it, and the facts alleged in the report are found to be false, it is incumbent, if the prosecution is to be launched, that the complaint in writing should be made by the Tehsildar as the public servant concerned under S.182, and not leave it to the police to put a charge sheet. The complaint must be in writing by the public servant concerned. The trial under S. 182 without the tehsildar's complaint in writing, is therefore without jurisdiction abinitio. 6. Mr. Sinha also pointed out that a similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Barhamdeo Singh V. Emperors AIR 1928 Pat 102 In that case the accused made a statement to the writer Head Constable at the Mokameh Railway Police Station; charging a person with having stolen some property at Barh town and the next day the person was forwarded to the Barh Police Station with the statement of the accused who never appeared before the Sub-Inspector of Barh, who investigated the case and found it to be false and then made a complaint to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate asking that the accused might be prosecuted under Ss. 211 and 182, Penal Code and he was tried by the Magistrate and convicted under S. 182. Allanson and Sen, J. held that "the Magistrate had no power under S. 195 (I) Criminal P. C., to take cognizance of the case on the complaint of the sub-inspector to whom the writer Head constable was not a subordinate. 7. On the other hand, on behalf of the State Mr. B. K. Banerjee, learned counsel, argued with the permission of Mr. Lala Kailash Behari Prasad, State panel lawyer, supporting the impugned order. Mr. Banerjee initially raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present application of the petitioner. He advocated that on the facts of the case the revision application was not maintainable as there is specific provision for appeal and withdrawal in the Code itself. He drew my attention to clause (5) of section 439 of the Code, which reads: "Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed," He referred to clause (5) of section 195 of the Code, which provides: "Where a complaint has been made under sub-section (1), clause (a), by a public servant, any authority to which such public servant is subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and if it does so, it shall forward a copy of such order to the Court and, upon, receipt thereof by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint." In this connection he also referred to. Section 476 B of the Code, which provides. "Any person on whose application any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court has refused to make a complaint under section 476 or section 476A, or against whom such a complaint has been made, may appeal to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195, sub-section (3), and the superior Court may there-upon, after notice to the parties concerned, direct the withdrawal of the complaint or, as the case may be, itself make the complaint which the subordinate Court might have made under section 476, and if it makes such complaint the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly." On the basis of the above provisions Mr. Banerjee contended that against the impugned order the remedy of the petitioner was to prefer an appeal under section 476B for cognizance of an offence under section 211 I.P.C. whereas there was remedy for withdrawal under clause (5) of section 195 of •the Code with respect to the offence under Section 182 of the Penal Code. Since there was specific alternative remedy available to the petitioner, his revision application was not maintainable. 8. In order to substantiate his contention Mr. Banerjee relied on Kantir Missir V. Emperor AIR 1930 Pat 98 where Macpherson, J. had occasion to deal with the provisions contained under section 195 (I) (a) and (b) of the Code vIs-a-vis the provisions contained under sections 182 and. 211 of the Indian Penal Code. In that case the petitioner, who was a clerk of an advocate of this Court, lodged an information before the Sub-Inspector D. Mukherji in charge of the Kotwali police-station, Patna, on 13th June against the chauffeur of his master who he alleged had taken an advance of Rs. 35 and then decamped without permission, taking away also motor accessories of the value of Rs. 55-8.0, a list of which he supplied. The case was made over to and investigated by the junior. Sub-Inspector Ram Singh and on 23rd June reported it to be maliciously false and prayed that orders be passed for the prosecution of the complainant for an offence under S. 211 LP.C. Having perused the report the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 3rd July on an order sheet recorded that the investigating officer reported the case to be maliciously false and directed notice to issue to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be prosecuted under S. 182 or S.211 I P.C. On 19th July a complaint by Sub-Inspector Ram Singh dated 13th July under S. 211 was put up to the Sub Divisional Magistrate who directed it to be placed with the record. On that date also the petitioner showed cause verbally through a pleader but filed no petition. On 25th July the Magistrate recorded that having carefully gone through the case diary of the investigating officer, he had come to the conclusion that the petitioner should be prosecuted under S. 182 of the Penal Code. On that date also the petitioner showed cause verbally through a pleader but filed no petition. On 25th July the Magistrate recorded that having carefully gone through the case diary of the investigating officer, he had come to the conclusion that the petitioner should be prosecuted under S. 182 of the Penal Code. On 14th August the case was transferred to Thakurai B.D. Singh for disposal, On 23rd August an application was made to the High Court but was returned with a suggestion to apply to the District Magistrate. His Lordship further observed at page 101 that the next question was whether the District Magistrate had jurisdiction u/s 195 (5) to order the with drawal of the complaint. His Lordship held that he had jurisdiction. The District Magistrate acting administratively had authority to withdraw a complaint. 9. Mr. Banerjee in this connection also relied on Nityanath Jha V. State 1965 BLJR 70 where Kamla Sahai, J., while dealing with the provisions contained under section 195 (I) (a) at page 72 observed. "It seems manifest, on a perusal of the above provisions, that, in cases falling under See, 195 (I) (a), either the public servant concerned or a public servant to whom he is subordinate can file a complaint. If neither files a complaint, the question of an application to a higher authority does not arise. If however, either the public servant concerned or the public servant to whom he is subordinate files a complaint, the aggrieved person may file an application under sub-section (5) before an authority to which the public servant, who has filed the complaint, is subordinate. That authority is competent to order the withdrawal of the complaint. It cannot reasonably be held that, when once the public servant concerned has refused to file a complaint, the public servant to whom he is subordinate can not file a complaint." 10. In my opinion, on the facts and circumstances of the case the revision application filed by the petitioner is not barred and it is entertainable. Clause (5) of Sec. 195 contemplates such a contingency where a complaint has been made. In the instant case I will presently show that there was complete absence of a valid complaint by the public servant concerned or some other public servant to whom he was subordinate. Clause (5) of Sec. 195 contemplates such a contingency where a complaint has been made. In the instant case I will presently show that there was complete absence of a valid complaint by the public servant concerned or some other public servant to whom he was subordinate. That apart, the words "may order" occurring in clause (5 indicate that it is an enabling provision. It does not bar the remedy of criminal revision to an aggrieved party. Similar provision under section 476B refers to a valid complaint. Here, the petitioner's main ground of attack is that no valid complaint was made. The two cases, on which reliance was placed by Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Lala Kailash Behari Prasad, do not relate to the cases in which the validity of complaint was in dispute. Therefore, those two cases do not lend support to the contention of the learned counsel for the State on this point. Hence, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the State fails. In this connection my view finds support from Virindar Kumar Satydwadi V. The State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 153 . In that case it was observed at page 156 that section 476-B provides for an appeal from an order passed under Section 476 to the appropriate Court. The result therefore is that if the complaint relates to offences mentioned in Section 195 (I) (b) and 195 (I) (c), an appeal would be competent, but not if it relates to offences mentioned in S.195 (1) (a). Obviously, therefore, on that ground also in the instant case since the cognizance taken against the petitioner was under section 182 of the Penal Code, the revision application is entertainable. 11. Now Mr. Banerjee challenged the application of the petitioner even on the ground of merit. He submitted that by the application dated the 10th May, 1968, addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Giridih, the petitioner never meant that the investigation should be conducted by the Superintendent of police himself. It is the officer-in-charge of a police station who usually conducts the investigation. In the instant case also it was conducted by the officer-in-charge, who submitted the prosecution report to the Sub-divisional Officer after it was approved by the Divisional Inspector. It is the officer-in-charge of a police station who usually conducts the investigation. In the instant case also it was conducted by the officer-in-charge, who submitted the prosecution report to the Sub-divisional Officer after it was approved by the Divisional Inspector. In that view of the matter it should be considered that it was a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned as required under section 195 (1) (a) of the Code. In order to substantiate his contention he relied on a judgment of the Madras High Court in Public Prosecutor V. Dnga Balija Devamma AIR 1942 Mad 513 where Horwill, J. while dealing with the provision contained in section 195 of the Code and section 211 of the Penal Code, observed that when a complaint is given by a person to a village Magistrate it is given to him for the express purpose of informing the police; and so a complaint to the village Magistrate, is tantamount to the sending of information to the police through the village Magistrate. A charge-sheet, therefore by the Sub-Inspector of Police amounts to a valid complaint under S.195, if he has found the case to be false. If the complaint sets out all the facts which constitute the offence, it does not matter whether the complainant thinks that the offence committed is punishable under S. 211 or under S. 182, Penal Code. 12. In my opinion,' the observation of his Lordship is not applicable even on facts and circumstances of the instant case. In the application dated the 10th May, 1968, the petitioner has specifically mentioned. "I am therefore approaching you with this petition and pray that you may be kind enough to take immediate action to ensure safety of my life and property." In that view of the matter in the present case it cannot be considered that the application was given to the Superintendent of Police only for the express purpose of informing the police as it was done in the Madras case. That apart, the contention of Mr. Banerjee cannot be accepted in view of the observations made in A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 1206 and A.I.R. 1928 Patna 102 (supra). That apart, the contention of Mr. Banerjee cannot be accepted in view of the observations made in A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 1206 and A.I.R. 1928 Patna 102 (supra). In my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complaint in the instant case cannot be considered as valid as it was not filed by the public servant concerned, finds support from a series of decisions of this Court and other High Courts. In State V. Bala Prasad Wanchoo, C. J. (as he then was), observed that a complaint under section 182 of the Penal Code has to be made either by the public servant to whom information has been given, or by some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The public servant concerned under Sec. 195 (1) (a) of the Code is the public servant to whom the information is given. Hence where the false information was given to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, he would be the public servant concerned' within the meaning of Section 195 (I) (a) and should file the complaint under section 182. Penal Code. The fact that he sent the application to the Station Officer of a particular police station for investigation would not make the Station Officer the public servant concerned to whom information was given: The above observation of his Lordship is apt to the present case. His Lordship while making the observation has also referred to A.I.R. 1941 Madras 764, A.1.R. 1937 Lahore 624; A.I.R. 1936 Patna 56 and A.1.R. 1947 Patna 64. Hence, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Banerjee that it was a valid complaint under section 182 of the Penal Code against the petitioner. 13. Now I turn to consider point no, (ii). Learned counsel for the petitioner under this head referred to section 195 (1) (b) of the Act which reads as : "(1) No court shall take cognizance :- (b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely, sections 193,194, 195,196, 199,200,205, 206, 207, 208, 209,210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. " Learned counsel contended that the above provisions specifically contemplate that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence under section 211 of the Penal Code except on a complaint in writing of the court in whose proceeding an offence under section 211 was committed. In the present case admittedly the petitioner had filed a protest petition against the police officer before the Sub-divisional Magistrate. It is well established that a protest petition is treated 12. ILR 4 Pat 323 as a complaint if the allegation made in that petition is found to be false, it would be considered as an offence committed by the petitioner in the proceeding before the Sub-divisional Magistrate and it is that Sub-divisional Magistrate alone who is entitled to file a complaint in writing for initiation of a proceeding against the petitioner under section 211. In the present case there is no such complaint. Only there is a prosecution report by the Sub-Inspector, a copy of which is marked as annexure 2' to the application, about which discussion has already been made while dealing with the contention of the petitioner under point no (i). 14. In order to substantiate his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on various decisions of this Court. Reference may be made to the case of Shaikh Muhammad yassin V King-Emperor ILR 4 Pat 323 where Bucknill and Ross, JJ., while dealing with the provisions contained in section 195 (i) (b) of the Code and section 211 of the Penal Code, observed that where an information is lodged with the police and the police on enquiry, report it to be false, but the informant by an application to the Magistrate, insists on a judicial investigation, he is deemed to have preferred a complaint to the Magistrate and a sanction or complaint by the Court itself under section 195 (I) (b) of the Code is requisite before cognizance of an offence punishable under section 211 of the Penal Code can be taken in respect of the false charge made to the police, irrespective of whether the Magistrate has investigated the complaint or not. Similar view was taken in Daroga Cope V King-Emperor ILR 5 Pat 33 where Mullick and Jwala Prasad. JJ. Similar view was taken in Daroga Cope V King-Emperor ILR 5 Pat 33 where Mullick and Jwala Prasad. JJ. while dealing with section 195 (b) of the Code and sections 211 and 182 of the Penal Code, observed that where the petitioner laid a false charge before the police which caused the police to submit a report against the petitioner, which in its turn caused the petitioner to institute a judicial proceeding before the Magistrate by lodging a formal complaint and repeating the allegations made in his information to the police, and the Magistrate, on the written complaint of the sub-inspector of police, summoned the petitioner under sections 211/182, Penal Code, laying of the false information before the police was an offence committed in relation to a judicial proceeding and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to summon the petitioner under section 211, Penal Code, without a complaint being made in writing by the Court under clause (b) of Section 195 of the Code. 15. Learned counsel for the State under this head also had contended that the application of the petitioner under revisional jurisdiction of this Court was not maintainable. This aspect of the question I have already dealt with while dealing with point no. (i). Hence, it would not be necessary to reiterate the same. Suffice it to mention that the judgment in I.L.R. V Patna 33 (supra) is also an answer to the contention of the learned counsel for the State regarding non-maintainability of the revisional application. It may be noticed that in that case also revision application was filed and it was entertained. 16. It was also contended on behalf of the State that the defect if any, in the complaint was mere irregularity and was curable under section 537 (a) of the Code. Due to the said irregularity there has not been any failure of justice nor any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. In my opinion, this submission is also not acceptable. Reference may be made to Loknath Mishra Visheshwar Prasad Mishra V. The state of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1964 M.P. 237 where Naik, J. had occasion to deal with the provisions of sections 195 and 537 (a) of the Code in relation to an offence under section 188, Penal Code. In my opinion, this submission is also not acceptable. Reference may be made to Loknath Mishra Visheshwar Prasad Mishra V. The state of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1964 M.P. 237 where Naik, J. had occasion to deal with the provisions of sections 195 and 537 (a) of the Code in relation to an offence under section 188, Penal Code. In that case the accused was convicted for an offence under section 188 of the Penal Code in a trial initiated on a complaint, which was not signed by the public servant, concerned, but by his personal assistant, without jurisdiction, His Lordship held that a document purporting to be a complaint under the section but signed by the personal assistant to such public servant, is not a substitute for a complaint as envisaged in that section. He placed his reliance on Krishna Tukaram V. Secretary to the Chief Minister, Bombay AIR 1955 Bom. 315 and Ramswarup V. State AIR 1952 Ass. 68 His Lordship quoted with approval the observation of Shah, J. (as he then was), which may usefully be reproduced below: "When the Legislature makes the jurisdiction of a criminal Court dependent upon a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned, you cannot substitute the complaint by some other information or report-not of the 'public servant concerned' but of some other person who has moved the Magistrate at the instance of the public servant and say that the requirements of the statute are complied with. If the Legislature has provided a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Court, the condition precedent must be strictly complied with and a substitute cannot in my judgment avail the Magistrate to assume jurisdiction." His Lordship in respect of the provision contained in section 537 (a) of the Code observed in paragraph 8 at pages 238-239 that since it was not a complaint within the meaning of section 195 (i) (a), which alone could have given jurisdiction to the trying Magistrate to try the offence under section 188 of the Penal Code, there was no curable irregularity within the meaning of section 537 (a) of the Code. The expression 'error, omission or irregularity in the complaint', occurring in section 537 (a) of the Code presupposes the existence of such a legal complaint as could give jurisdiction to a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence. The expression 'error, omission or irregularity in the complaint', occurring in section 537 (a) of the Code presupposes the existence of such a legal complaint as could give jurisdiction to a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence. And once such a complaint was before the Court on• which cognizance of an offence could be taken, any error, omission or irregularity therein could be cured under section 537 (a) of the Code. But, if the so called complaint was invalid in law to give jurisdiction to the Court for taking cognizance, the criminal proceeding initiated on such a complaint is without jurisdiction and no question of curing any error, omission or irregularity therein at all arises. 17. I am in complete agreement with the above observation of his Lordship. Therefore, this submission of the learned counsel for the State also has no merit. 18. The object of section 195 is to prevent improper or reckless prosecutions by private persons for offences in connection with the administration of justice. It is aimed at giving protection to parties and witnesses, against vexatious or frivolous prosecution fur their resorting to courts and giving evidence there in and such protection is afforded by prescribing necessity of a complaint by the Court in or in relation to whose proceedings the offence is alleged to have been committed. Before filing a complaint as required by the said section, public servant or the court must satisfy itself that an offence mentioned in the clauses of sub-section (I) has been committed and should not like an ordinary litigant rush with a complaint to another court. The provisions of the said section are mandatory and the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is complaint in writing as required by the section. 19. In the result, judging from different aspects in the light of the above discussions the impugned order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, it is quashed and the application is allowed. Application allowed.