Judgment Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. 1. This second appeal by the plaintiff has been fifed against concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below dismissing his suit for specific performance of contract dated 2nd of February, 1958, by Mosst. Sanjha (defendant No. 1) for sale of 7 bighas of land. In order to appreciate the points raised in the appeal on behalf of the appellant and the respondents, facts of the case may briefly be stated. The case of the appellant was that Anand Lal Mahlo, husband of defendant No. 1, died in the year 1945, in the state of jointness with his father Babuji Mahto. Defendant No. 1 for sometime lived jointly with her father-in-law, but subsequently filed a partition suit against him which was numbered as Partition Suit No. 28 of 1954 of the Court of Munsif Madhubani, which was decreed. Defendant No. 1 was in need of money for payment to her creditors, for meeting the expenses of litigation in the partition suit and for marrying her two daughters. She, therefore, approached the appellant for money. There was an agreement between them on the aforesaid date, 2nd of February, 1958, whereby defendant No. 1 agreed to sell 7 bighas of land to the appellant for a consideration of Rs. 3,500/-, out of the lands she was likely to get in the partition suit by compromise. A Mohada-nama was executed stating that the appellant would get kebala for 7 bighas of land as mentioned therein executed from defendant No. 1, but in case she did not get the very 7 bighas of land, then the appellant would be at liberty to select any 7 bighas of land out of the lands she would be getting by the compromise. According to the Mohadanama, the sale deed was to be executed within one year of the final disposal of the partition suit. The entire consideration of Rs. 3,500.00 was paid by the appellant to defendant No. 1 on the very date the Mohadanama was executed. On 19th of July, 1958, compromise was effected in the partition suit and defendant No. 1 did get the land allotted to her in respect of which she had executed the Mohadanama. The entire consideration of Rs. 3,500.00 was paid by the appellant to defendant No. 1 on the very date the Mohadanama was executed. On 19th of July, 1958, compromise was effected in the partition suit and defendant No. 1 did get the land allotted to her in respect of which she had executed the Mohadanama. Subsequently, defendant No. 2, Jairam Chamar, a faithful servant of defendant No. 1, who had full knowledge of the Mohadanama got a sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 in his favour with respect to some of the lands in suit. Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 also, at the instance of defendant No. 2, purchased from defendant No. 1 some of the suit lands with full knowledge of the Mohadanama. 2. Three written statements were filed in the suit, one by defendant No. 1, another by defendant No. 4 and third, a joint one, by defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Defendant No. 1 in her written statement denied the execution of Mohadanama or payment of consideration to her. According to her, she had gone to execute a Bharna bond in favour of Nabi Mahto and the appellant and his uncle, Ganga Ram, on that occasion managed to obtain her thumb impressions on blank papers and perhaps one of those blank papers was frauduently converted into the Mohadanama. She was not in need of any money and there was no necessity for executing the Mohadanama. However, she did not contest the suit, nor she was examined as a witness in it. Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 in their written statement supported the case of defendant No. 1 that she never executed any Mohadanama in favour of the appellant, nor she received any consideration. Their further case was that they were bona fide purchasers for value without any notice of the Mohadanama. According to defendants Nos. 2 and 3, the appellant procured an ante-dated stamp and got the Mohadanarha fabricated after bringing the scribe and the attesting witnesses in collusion after the execution of the sale in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 4. Defendant No. 4 merely stated that the Mohadanama was forged and fabricated one. Defendant No. 3, Domi Mahto, also, however, ultimately did not contest the suit. 3. The trial Court held that the Mohadanama executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the appellant was a genuine and valid document and for consideration. 2 to 4. Defendant No. 4 merely stated that the Mohadanama was forged and fabricated one. Defendant No. 3, Domi Mahto, also, however, ultimately did not contest the suit. 3. The trial Court held that the Mohadanama executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the appellant was a genuine and valid document and for consideration. In that connection it further held that defendant No. 1 was in pressing necessity for money and she did execute the Mohadanama and was paid Rs. 3,500.00 by the appellant on the date of the execution of the Mohadanama itself, It has also held that deeds of sale and Bharna executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of other defendants after the execution of the Mohadanama were farzi transactions sfor which no consideration passed and defendant No. 1 continued to be in possession of the lands purported to have been conveyed by her to other defendants and that defendants Nos. 2 to 4 were not bona fide purchasers for value and had notice of the Mohadanama in question. It, however, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant on the ground that he had made undue delay in bringing the suit and that total inaction on his part for about six months amounted to an abandonment of the contract and waiver of his right to sue for specific performance. The lower appellate Court has confirmed the findings of the trial Court that the Mohadanama was genuine, valid and for consideration and that the defendants who purchased from defendant No. 1 had knowledge of the Mohadanama. It has not recorded any specific finding on the question whether the purchases in favour of these defendants were for value for, according to it, that point was not of much importance. It too has, however, held that delay in filing the suit by the appellant tantamount? to waiver and abandonment of right and affirmed the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit 4. Mr. S.K. Jha appearing for the appellant contended that Courts below were wrong in dismissing the suit on the ground of delay in filing of it and holding that the delay amounted to waiver and abandonment of the right of the appellant to sue for specific performance of contract. Mr. Shreenath, Singh on behalf of the respondents, however, submitted that the Courts below rightly dismissed the suit. Mr. Shreenath, Singh on behalf of the respondents, however, submitted that the Courts below rightly dismissed the suit. According to him, even if delay in filing the suit did not amount to abandonment and waiver of the claim of the appellant, that could be a valid ground for refusal by the Courts below to exercise their discretion of granting the relief for specific performance of contract and their decree could not be challenged in appeal, much less in a second appeal. 5. The Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years as limitation for specific performance of the contract Ordinarily, therefore, one may think that mere delay on the part of the persons suing for specific performance of the contract will not disentitle him to the relief if the suit is filed within the period of limitation. No doubt, a relief for specific performance is an equitable lelief and if there are laches on the part of the person suing for such a relief, it may be refused to him. The laches is not the same thing as mere delay. In Halsburys Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 36, in paragraph 470 at page 324, the law on the subject is stated as follows:- - "Where time is not originally of the esence of the contract, and has not been made so by due notice, delay by a party in performing his part of the contract, or in commencing or prosecuting the enforcement of his rights, may constitute such laches or acquiescence as will debar him from obtaining specific performance. The extent of delay which has this effect varies with circumstances, but as a rule must be capable of being construed as amounting to an abandonment of the contract." In Peer Mahomed Dewji V/s. Mahomed Ebrahim, ((1905) ILR 29 Bom 234), as it appears from the report, Chandavarkar, I. at first dismissed the suit which was filed on 30th of November, 1903 for enforcement of an agreement dated 29th of June, 1901, on the ground that conduct of the plaintiff is not filing the suit earlier amounted to laches. He, however, granted review of that decree and ultimately decreed the suit The learned Judge observed that while holding in his previous judgment that the plaintiff had been guilty of delay amounting to laches, he did not sufficiently appreciate the legal meaning of the term. He, however, granted review of that decree and ultimately decreed the suit The learned Judge observed that while holding in his previous judgment that the plaintiff had been guilty of delay amounting to laches, he did not sufficiently appreciate the legal meaning of the term. The learned Judge pointed out that as defined by Lord Ellenborough, C. J. in Sebag V/s. Abitbol, (1816) 4 M and S 462, and approved by Abbot, C. J., in Turner V/s. Hayden, (1825) 4 B and C 1 at p. 2, laches means negligence to do something which by law a person is obliged to do and that when the Limitation Act prescribed a period for instituting such suits, only obligation cast upon the plaintiff by law was to institute the suit within that period. He then proceeded to examine whether there was any other aspect of laches sufficient to deprive the plaintiff of that suit of his right to specific performance and quoted the following dicta of the Judicial Committee in Lindsay Petroleum Co. V/s. Kurd, (1874) 5 PC 221 at p. 239: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or, where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party, and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." The learned Judge then held that laches must amount to waiver, abandonment or acquiescence to bar the plaintiffs right. 6 Another great Judge Mr. Justice Woodroffe in Kissen Gopal Sadaney V/s. Kally Prosonno Sett, ((1906) ILR 33 Cal 633) held that delay which is short of the period prescribed by the Limitation Act and which is not of such a character as to give rise to an inference of abandonment of right is no bar to a suit for specific performance unless "it is shown to have prejudiced the defendant The suit was filed on 10th of July, 1903 for specific performance of an agreement dated 31st of August, 1900. The learned Judge observed that, in his opinion, delay was not material so long as matters remained in status quo and it did not mislead the defendant or amounted to acouiesccnce and that in order to defeat the plaintiff it must be shown that the delay had prejudiced the defendant. 7. In Mt. Batulan V/s. NIrmal Das, (AIR 1918 Pat 630). Imam, J. held that mere delay in the institution of a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell land is not sufficient to defeat the claim; the delay must be of such a character as to give rise to an inference of the abandonment of the right or should disclose some prejudice to the defendant. In Rustomji Ardesir Cooper V/s. Annasaheb Narandas, (AIR 1930 PC 165) their Lordships of the Judicial Committee rejected the argument that the suit for specific performance should fail on the ground of delay as in their opinion the position of the purchaser had not been so prejudiced as to disentitle the plaintiff in respect of his relief for specific performance and that the Limitation Act allowed the plaintiff three years time to sue. In Sampat Ram V/s. Baboo Lal, (AIR 1955 AH 24), Malik, C.J. laid down that a contract to sell could be specifically enforced within three years if time was not the essence of the contract. In Gomathinayagam Pillai V/s. Palaniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868 Bachawat, J; who was in minority, also held that mere delay, short of waiver and abandonment of the contract was no ground for refusing relief of specific performance of contract. There is nothing in the majority judgment to show that on this question the learned Judges took a different view from that of Bachawat. There is nothing in the majority judgment to show that on this question the learned Judges took a different view from that of Bachawat. J., Shah, J., who spoke for the majority, dismissed the suit for specific performance of contract on the ground that before the plaintiff could be awarded a decree for specific performance of contract he had to prove his readiness and willingness continuously from the date of the contact till the date of hearing of the suit and if he failed to do that his suit was liable to fail. In Smt. Gulabrani Choudharain V/s. Jagarnath Choudhary, (1969 BLJR 593), a Bench of this Court referred to the aforesaid observation of Bachawat, J. and relied on it. In R.C. Chandiok V/s. Chunilal Sabharwal, 1970 (3) SCC 140 = ( AIR 1971 SC 1238 ), learned Judges of the Supreme Court after having found that time not having ever been made the essence of the contract and the plaintiff having not failed to perform their part of the agreement within a reasonable time, they were entitled to the relief for specific performance. The decrees of the courts below were set aside by them and the suit decreed with the observation .................. "This relief is discretionary but not arbitrary and discretion must be exercised in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles. We are unable to hold that the conduct of the appellants, which is always an important element for consideration, was such that it precluded them from obtaining a decree for specific performance." The suit was instituted on December 4, 1956 for enforcement of the contract dated July 18, 1955. In my opinion, it is well established on the authorities discussed above that a claim for specific performance of contract if filed within the period of limitation cannol be defeated on the mere ground of delay unless the delay amounts to an abandonment of the plaintiffs claim for specific performance of contract or circumstances have so changed that granting the relief for specific performance would prejudice the defendant. 8 Great reliance was placed by Mr. Shreenath Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, on a Bench decision of this Court in Rameshwar Pd. Sahi V/s. Mt. Anandi Devi, (1959 BUR 809) = (AIR 1960 SC 109). 8 Great reliance was placed by Mr. Shreenath Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, on a Bench decision of this Court in Rameshwar Pd. Sahi V/s. Mt. Anandi Devi, (1959 BUR 809) = (AIR 1960 SC 109). On the facts of that case it was held that undue delay in bringing the suit amounted to abandonment and waiver and the plaintiff was not entitled to decree. The suit from which that appeal arose was instituted on 11th of September, 1946 for specific performance of a contract which was made some time in September, 1945. A delay of about 12 months in instituting the suit, as observed earlier, was held amounting to an abandonment and waiver so as to disentitle the plaintiff from getting a relief for specific performance of the contract. In the plaint it self it was stated that the document could not be registered as defendant No. 1 of that suit had fallen ill. That plea of illness of defendant No. 1 was rejected by the two Courts of facts. Reliance was placed on ob servations of Lord Penzance in Emile Erlanger V/s. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., ((1878) 3 AC 1218 at p. 1231). Lord Pen zance in that case pointed out with approval the dicta of the Privy council in Lindsay Petroleum Companys case, already quoted earlier. In my opinion, therefore, Rameshwar Prasad Sahis case did not lay down any new law on the subject. It merely reiterated the law as it was understood earlier and on the peculiar facts of that case held that delay amounted to an abandonment of the plain tiffs right to sue for specific performance. Waiver, abandonment or acquiescence cannot be inferred merely from the period of delay. In some cases the laches may be inferred even from a delay of two months, in others they may not be inferred even if the delay is of 2 years and 364 days. The decision in Rameshwar Prasad Sahis case was considered by Mahapatra, J. in Jiwanandan Singh v. Sia Ram Prasad Singh, ( AIR 1961 Pat 347 ). In some cases the laches may be inferred even from a delay of two months, in others they may not be inferred even if the delay is of 2 years and 364 days. The decision in Rameshwar Prasad Sahis case was considered by Mahapatra, J. in Jiwanandan Singh v. Sia Ram Prasad Singh, ( AIR 1961 Pat 347 ). The learned Judge after referring to various decisions, some of which have also been referred to by me earlier, held that the decision in Rameshwar Prasad Sahis case was given on the facts of that case and it was not laid down therein that delay of 12 months in all cases would prove fatal in a suit for a specific performance of an agreement. The learned Tudge observed, and if I may say so with respect, rightly, that the Court, as a proposition of law, cannot apply arbitrarily a time-limit to non-suit a litigant who under the statutory provision is entitled to seek the relief in a Court of law within a prescribed period, though if the circumstances of any particular case would indicate that the plain-iff had waived and abandoned his right to which he was entitled long before he came to the Court, he might be nonsuited, 9. Mr. Shreenath Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, placed reliance on the decisions in (i) Skinner R. H. V/s. Veronica Skinner, (AIR 1930 Lah 1004); (ii) ML Gaindo Devi V/s. Shanti Swamp, (AIR 1937 All 161) and (iii) Shankarrao Ramrao V/s. Surnatl Bhikaji, ( AIR 1971 Guj 178 ) in support of his contention that discretion exercised by the Courts below in the matter of granting the relief of specific performance should not be interfered with at the appellate state. He has also placed reliance on the decision in Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. V. Sunder Bros. Delhi, ( AIR 1967 SC 249 ) in support of the aforesaid submission. That was not a case of specific performance of contract. In that case the appeal was against an order under Sec.34 of the Indian Arbitration Act and it was observed that unless trial Courts exercise of discretion appeared to be capricious or unreasonable its order would not be interfered with. That was not a case of specific performance of contract. In that case the appeal was against an order under Sec.34 of the Indian Arbitration Act and it was observed that unless trial Courts exercise of discretion appeared to be capricious or unreasonable its order would not be interfered with. In my opinion, it cannot be laid down as a rule of law ;hat where a relief for specific performance of contract has been refused by the Courts below, this Court in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction cannot interfere, with the decree. The law appears to have been correctly laid down, if I may say so with respect, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in R.C. Chandioks case (1970) 3 SCC 140 = ( AIR 1971 SC 1238 ) that though the relief is discretionary, it is not arbitrary and if the discretion is not exercised in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles, it can be interfered with. 10. So far the case before us is concerned, on the findings recorded by the Courts below the Mohadanama in favour of the appellant was a genuine and valid document and for consideration and the defendants 2 to 4 had knowledge of that Mohadanama before they made their purchases. The trial Court further found, and the finding appears to have been based on good reasons and cogent evidence, that the conveyances in favour of defendants 2 to 4 by defendant No. 1 were farzi transactions and defendant No. 1 was still in possession of the lands conveyed by her to these defendants. It is obvious, therefore, that these defendants are in no way likely to be prejudiced by granting of the relief of specific performance to the appellant. Defendant No. 1 is also not likely to be prejudiced in any way by granting of the same relief to the appellant. If any one could challenge the claim of the appellant for specific performance of contract on the ground that delay on his part amounted to waiver and abandonment of his right to specific performance, it was defendant No. 1 but she did not contest the suit. According to the Mohadanama itself, defendant No. 1 was to execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant by 11th of August, 1960, i. e. one year from the date of the decree in her favour in the partition suit. According to the Mohadanama itself, defendant No. 1 was to execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant by 11th of August, 1960, i. e. one year from the date of the decree in her favour in the partition suit. Up to that date the appellant could not have made any grievance of non-execution of the deed by defendant No, 1. The suit was filed within 5 months from that date. The Court of --peal below, therefore, has arbitrarily thought that there was delay of 17 months on the part of the appellant. The delay really was of 5 months only. The trial Court has referred to the evidence of the appellant himself that he came to know of the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 after one and half year of the execution of the Mohadanama. This sale deed was executed on 8th of December, 1959. The sale deed having been found to be a farzi one and possession having remained with defendant No. 1, the trial Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference against the appellant from this statement. The courts below in holding that as in Rameshwar Prasad Sahis case delay of 12 months was held to be amounting to an abandonment and waiver, therefore, in the present case the delay which, according to them, was of 17 months, i.e. more than 12 months, must also be held to amount to abandonment and waiver, have not applied any rule of law, but a rule of thumb and acted arbitrarily. In my opinion, therefore, they have illegally refused the relief of specific performance to the appellant after having held that the Mohadanama was genuine and valid and for consideration and the defendants were purchasers with the knowledge of that Mohadanama and the suit having been instituted within three years from the date of the Mohadanama, the period prescribed for the purpose. In the circumstances of the case, the courts below ought to have decreed the suit. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of the two courts below are set aside and the suit of the appellant is decreed with costs throughout. Mukharji, J. 12 I agree